SYRIA CRISIS
Humanitarian Crises Analysis 2016
Regional Overview

Each year, Sida conducts a humanitarian allocation exercise in which a large part of its humanitarian budget is allocated to emergencies worldwide. This allocation takes place in the beginning of the year as to ensure predictability for humanitarian organisations and to allow for best possible operational planning. In an effort to truly adhere to the humanitarian principles Sida bases its allocation decisions on a number of objective indicators of which the most important are related to the number of affected people, vulnerability of affected people and level of funding in previous years. One of the indicators is also related to forgotten crises in order to ensure sufficient funding also to low profile crises. Besides this initial allocation, another part of the humanitarian budget is set aside as an emergency reserve for sudden onset emergencies and deteriorating humanitarian situations. This reserve allows Sida to quickly allocate funding to any humanitarian situation throughout the year, including additional funding to the Syria crisis.

This Humanitarian Crisis Analysis for the Syria crisis applies a regional approach, covering Syria and the refugee hosting countries that are included in the regional appeal (3RP), i.e. Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. The HCA regional overview includes a summary of trends in context and response, and Sida’s priorities for 2016. In addition, the HCA includes country annexes for Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, the countries most affected by the crisis. On Iraq, Sida applies a country approach by including the refugee response into the Iraq HCA. Regionally unearmarked Syria crisis funding may however also be used for refugees in Iraq.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

As reflected by the inflow of Syrian asylum seekers into Europe, 2015 has been a turning point for the millions of conflict affected people in Syria and its neighboring countries. The conflict in Syria has entered into a new phase of further complexity and increasing violence. The accumulated hopelessness created by the lack of real hope for a political solution, increasing indiscriminate violence and abuses of basic rights, existential threats posed by the rise of extreme groups, worsening economic conditions and soaring prices, and the depletion of coping methods has put more people on the move. The unpredictability of humanitarian assistance has been another factor increasing vulnerability.

More than 11 million people have left their homes in Syria since the beginning of the conflict, making it the largest displacement crisis on a global scale. Almost half of the entire population, 6.5 million are internally displaced inside Syria. Almost 4.3 million have been registered as refugees in Syria’s neighbouring countries of Turkey (2.2 million), Lebanon (1.1 million), Jordan (630,000), Iraq (245,000), and Egypt (130,000), and to a lesser extent in other countries of the region. Inflows have slowed significantly, however, due to stricter border policies. During 2015 the number of net arrivals of new refugees was 380,000, almost all of them in Turkey. In Lebanon and Egypt the caseload has decreased due to onward movement.

The conflict in Syria has led to devastating humanitarian consequences within Syria itself, but has also resulted in a protracted humanitarian situation and increasing tensions in the neighbouring countries. Inside Syria 13.5 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, an increase of 1.3 million in a year. More than 8 million people in neighbouring countries are in need of assistance, including all 4.3 million refugees and an estimated 4 million vulnerable members of hosting communities. In refugee hosting countries, whose public service delivery struggled already before the crisis, the impact has been severe. While the economic effects of refugees on host countries is a mixed picture, there is no doubt that those most affected by the refugee influx are the poorest social strata, hit by an increased demand on services, rising prices and increased competition for jobs. The social strain has at times resulted in increased political instability and inter-communal tension, most notably in Lebanon and southern Turkey.

The situation is a protection crisis of extreme dimensions due to the persistent lack of respect for international humanitarian and human rights law. In Syria indiscriminate and deliberate attacks using barrel bombs and mortars on densely populated civilian areas and civilian objects continue unabated, and so does the use of siege as a military tactic. Health services are increasingly targeted. Syrians both inside and outside the country are extremely vulnerable also to an array of more indirect protection threats, both legal, economical and social. Children are the most vulnerable, across the board. As resilience levels among the population are rapidly being depleted and poverty levels are on the rise, people fall back on harmful coping strategies. In Lebanon,
for example, negative coping has increased by 30 percent in the past year. Vulnerabilities linked to harmful coping have strong gender dimensions. Girls and women are at a higher risk of early marriage, domestic and sexual violence, reduced freedom of movement and access to services, whereas boys and men risk forced recruitment, detention and dangerous child labour. The response to negative coping is increasingly forming of the humanitarian protection agenda.

Besides those affected by age and gender related vulnerabilities, certain groups of people are of particular concern for humanitarian action. People inside Syria, particularly the 6.4 million IDPs and the 4.5 million living in besieged and other hard-to-reach areas are of high priority. In neighbouring countries, while refugee hosting communities are increasingly vulnerable, the legal discrimination that Syrian refugees and Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) are subjected to, puts them in a particularly vulnerable position. In Lebanon and Jordan, issues around refugees’ legal status is a growing cause of concern and affects all aspects of rights and well-being. The lack of civil documentation like birth certificates is also a growing protection concern, both in opposition controlled areas of Syria and in among refugees, increasing the risk for statelessness for those affected. Other vulnerable groups include the disabled, the elderly, and in Syria, health workers.

Palestine refugees, a population with a long history of vulnerabiliy and aid dependency, has been unproportionally affected by the ongoing crisis. More than half of the 560,000 Palestine refugees registered in Syria have been displaced and more than 100,000 have left the country. In Syria Palestinian camps are heavily affected by fighting. Also social discrimination is on the rise. Palestinians’ access from Syria to Jordan and Lebanon was stopped already (January 2013 and May 2014 respectively) and the ones who have been able to register are subjected to heightened protection risks.

1.2 Risks and threats

Unless there are tangible successes on the political track, the conflict will continue and escalate, creating further humanitarian needs. The intensified fighting in Syria will create further waves of displacement, while refugee numbers in neighbouring countries are likely to stagnate due to a continued restriction of inflow. Onward movement of refugees will likely continue, much depending on signals from European governments, but most probably with insignificant effects on the humanitarian caseload in the region. The resilience of people and communities risk deteriorating further, not least as a result of a continued economic downturn, competition for jobs, as well as the pressures on existing basic service delivery institutions. Protection risks and vulnerabilities, as decribed above, are likely to increase in scope and scale.

In the refugee hosting countries, as the social tensions and the political climate hardens, the governments will most likely continue applying restrictive border policies and denying refugees access to livelihoods. As the number of refugees without legal residence grow, even larger numbers risk return and forced encampment. With increasing investments though development cooperation with host governments (see section 2 below), there may be new opportunities for the international community to influence host governments’ policies toward the refugees.

The unpredictability of humanitarian assistance will likely continue. In 2015 temporary cuts in WFP food voucher affected hundreds of thousands of vulnerable refugees, and was surveyed as a key explanation to an increase in voluntary returns from Jordan to Syria. While there are some indications that donor funding may rise at least temporarily in 2016, spurred perhaps by the refugee crisis in Europe, it will probably not reach the levels needed for a stable and predictable food and cash assistance, causing further insecurity for the most vulnerable. Some also see a risk of funds moving away from humanitarian assistance to long-term development programmes (see 2 below).

The risks faced by the humanitarian community are expected to increase. The increasing intensity and complexity of the conflict in Syria, and a continued lack of respect for IHL, will likely have further devastating consequences on the humanitarian response, not least in regards to humanitarian access and the security of humanitarian staff. Signs can already be seen in previously accessible areas of Northern Syria, where several organisations have been compelled to suspend operations due to the security situation. In neighbouring countries access is much less problematic. However increasingly wilful government policies may have implications on humanitarian space, particularly for INGOs.

Humanitarian operations will also continue to manage a high risk of corruption and aid diversion, particularly in Syria, where the conflict economy is growing and possibilities of first hand monitoring are extremely limited. There is an urgent need to strengthen due diligence and remote monitoring mechanisms.
1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan

The Strategic Objectives of the Syria Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2016 are:

1. Save lives, alleviate suffering and increase access to humanitarian response for vulnerable and those with specific needs
2. Enhance protection by promoting respect for IHL and HRL through quality principles assistance, services and advocacy
3. Support resilience of local communities and households within the humanitarian response by protection and restoring livelihoods and enabling access to essential services and rehabilitation of socio-economic infrastructure

The following are set as guiding objectives for the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) in 2016-2017:

- Refugee protection and humanitarian assistance will address the protection and assistance needs of refugees living in camps, in settlements and in local communities in all sectors, as well as the most vulnerable members of impacted communities.
- Resilience/Stabilisation-based development will address the resilience and stabilisation needs of impacted and vulnerable communities in all sectors; build the capacities of national and sub-national service delivery systems; strengthen the ability of governments to lead the crisis response; and provide the strategic, technical and policy support to advance national responses.

The overall strategic thinking in the planning for 2016 is heavily influenced by the widely recognized need to find more sustainable and longer-term solutions fit for a protracted crisis. The high-level Resilience Development Forum held in Jordan in October 2015 produced a set of recommendations, the so called Dead Sea Resilience Agenda, calling for increasing synergies between humanitarian and development approaches, creating self-sufficiency, and strengthening national and local capacities.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

Governments’ capacity and willingness to respond to the crises varies widely over the region. In Syria, where the government is a party to the conflict, wide-ranging restrictions have been imposed on the humanitarian community, however, line-ministries continue to deliver services in various degrees to parts of the country including to a limited extent in areas controlled by the opposition.

In Syria’s neighbouring countries host governments, particularly Jordan and Lebanon, have in 2015 taken a much-awaited leadership role in the planning and coordination of the response. The planning has been led by national authorities, albeit with heavy technical assistance from international organisations. Turkey has since the beginning led and funded the bulk of the refugee response and has, for example, only recently allowed INGOs to work with refugees outside the camps. In Iraq and Egypt the responses are still largely UNHCR-driven.

The move to stronger national leadership has coincided with a break-through of the resilience agenda, which promotes a shift from short-term humanitarian assistance to longer-term, nationally led responses to the refugee crisis. Using this momentum, the governments of Jordan and Lebanon are aiming to increase programmatic focus on national needs, pointing to the vulnerabilities of refugee hosting communities and the needs of overburdened public service systems. An encouraging example can be drawn from the successes of the Lebanese education sector, which has enrolled 150,000 refugee children into the public schools in 2015 alone. However, while a move towards a national response is critical, in most cases the shift can only be gradual due to limited capacities. Hence the need for targeted humanitarian assistance will remain, for which humanitarian space must be guaranteed. Moreover, the credibility of the resilience agenda is hampered by the reluctance of governments to create legal job opportunities for refugees.

Non-governmental actors are becoming increasingly central, particularly in Syria, where access for international actors is diminishing. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) continues to be the main implementor of humanitarian programming. National and local NGOs were almost non-existent prior to the crisis, and there is therefore an urgent need to build their capacity, and ensure constructive and fair partnerships. Moreover, a significant part of the overall response is carried by hundreds of local groups, like diaspora or activist groups, whose work is not captured by the formal structures.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints
The 2016 response to the Syria crisis is built, as in previous years, on two main appeals, the Humanitarian Response Plan for Syria, and the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP 2015-16) for the response in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt. The international response to the Syria crisis has long been characterised by diffused coordination structures, lack of overall strategic leadership, on the regional as well as on country level. Disagreement over coordination structures and mandates, have impacted negatively on the overall response. The main humanitarian donors, including Sweden, continue to advocate strongly for improvements in line with the Transformative Agenda, and some improvements have been noted in 2016.

The most significant step forward has been the implementation of the Whole of Syria approach. The WoS was mandated in late 2014 by the UNSC with aim to make the response more effective by putting in place a single coordination system encompassing all hubs, both Damascus based and cross-border operations. The response is lead by a semi-structured HC system lead by a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator in Amman, and a separate HC function in each main hub. The implementation of WoS has been promising in 2015 and deconfliction of responses inside Syria has been achieved. The new WoS level coordination structure has produced a first comprehensive needs assessment covering all of Syria, resulting in the HRP 2016 being more evidence based than its predecessor. Building trust between actors in a tough security environment is difficult, however, and challenges remain particularly with regard to information sharing and management.

The 3RP 2015-16 is presented as a “nationally-led, regionally coherent” plan to respond to the needs of refugees and the overall burden the crisis has caused to the neighbouring countries. The appeal is divided into two pillars, one for the refugee response, lead by UNHCR, and one for resilience, lead by UNDP. As mentioned, the national planning processes are increasingly central and the 3RP for 2016 incorporates the national Lebanon Crisis Response Plan and the Jordan Response Plan as the respective country chapters, along with country chapters for Turkey, Egypt, and Iraq.

The 3RP is increasingly becoming a vehicle for raising support for an integrated humanitarian and development assistance, reflecting a wide consensus on the need to shift focus into more sustainable, nationally led responses.

The Syria crisis response is by far the largest and most costly humanitarian response on a global scale. The combined HRP and 3RP financial appeal for 2016 is close to USD 9 billion, of which USD 5.8 billion is for the 3RP and USD 3.15 billion for the HRP. This is an increase of USD 1.5 billion from 2015. The larger part of the increase is from the 3RP host government programming, which reflects difficulties in controlling the budget in a multi-sector, nationally led process. The UN/INGO part of the 3RP is USD 4.8 billion, a 5% increase from 2015. In 2015 the SRP was financed to 62 percent and the 3RP to 77 percent (after large year-end top-ups). Against this background, there is a continued need for better needs-based targeting, prioritisation, and for development financing to relieve the burden of the humanitarian system.

2.3 International and regional assistance

The top five donors to the region include the US, the UK/DFID, EC/ECHO, Germany, and Kuwait. A fourth donor conference has been planned for February 2016 in London, hosted by the UK, Norway, and Kuwait, this time with a more integrated humanitarian and development agenda. It is likely that donors will continue a multi-sectoral approach for both Syria and the neighbouring countries, with more development oriented financing coming in from 2016 onwards. The EU has already announced a EUR 350 million package of development funding to refugee hosting countries in the region through the so called Madad Fund (EU Trust Fund), in addition to EUR 200 million through ECHO in 2016. Also DFID, for example, is planning for a joint humanitarian and development strategy for the crisis, and the World Bank has launched a new regional strategy.

Regional donors, institutions and individuals are involved in the response. Gulf countries are a growing factor in humanitarian financing, and efforts are ongoing to bring them closer to the UN lead coordination structures. A large share of regional funding is still outside of the appeals.

3. SIDAs HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN
3.1. Sida’s role

The Sida strategy has since the beginning of the crisis included strong emphasis on the need for improved coordination, needs-based targeting and needs assessments, provision multi-sectoral assistance with a strong emphasis on protection, as well as adherence of IHL and HRL, and gender mainstreaming. Sida has also emphasised the need for capacity building of local actors.

In 2015 Sida allocated a total amount of SEK 353 million to the Syrian crisis response through UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement and INGOs. Approximately 60% was allocated to Syria itself, while specific funding was also allocated to targeted interventions in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Sida provided unearmarked funding on the appeal level to UN agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA, and OCHA) and ICRC in order to ensure needed flexibility. Sida has built longer term partnerships with the Swedish Red Cross (SRC), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Norwegian Refugee Committee (NRC), and Save the Children (SC), all receiving funding in more than one country context. The RRM mechanism was used strategically for six MSB secondments of coordination and information management experts into UN agencies, as well as four response projects by strategic partners in Syria and Lebanon.

The Evaluation of Sida’s Humanitarian Assistance 2011-2014 (InDevelop, 2015) included a case study on the Syria crisis response. The study finds that Sida’s strategy, characterised by a neutral and principled approach with a high degree of flexibility, has provided clear added value to the overall humanitarian response. In the rapidly changing context, the flexibility of Sida funding has been the most valuable aspect for Sida partners. Lightly earmarked funding to UN agencies and the pooled funds, as well as the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement has given partners the ability to fill funding gaps and respond to unexpected needs, while other donor contributions are tightly earmarked. The fact that Sweden is perceived as a neutral actor in an otherwise highly politicised context has given Sida credibility in its dealings with UN agencies and provided Sida with a larger influence than its financial contribution would imply. A greater field presence would however have given Sida better possibilities to use its voice, the evaluation finds.

3.2. Response Priorities 2016

Sida’s response priorities will build on and refine further the strategy of previous years. The allocation for the Syria crisis is its largest globally in 2016, but it is still limited compared to magnitude of needs in Syria and the region. Sida is currently the 15th largest donor to the crisis (FTS). Sida will therefore build on its specific value added, as reflected by the evaluation of 2015, being a principled and a flexible donor. The humanitarian response is firmly based on IHL with protection as the overall logic.

Sidås humanitarian priorities in 2016 include:

1. Support for protection with a focus on the most vulnerable, both through targeted protection programming to reach the most vulnerable (responsive and remedial programmes), and by considering protectiveness of other forms of support (preventive programming, incl. protection mainstreaming). This will include a continued cooperation with long-term INGO partners on e.g. psychosocial services and ICLA. It will also include an overall strengthened support to cash assistance actors like UNHCR and UNRWA, as cash support is deemed to reduce risks for negative coping. Dialogue will focus on the IHL and IHRL and protection of refugees. Sida will advocate for strategic approaches to protection in all country contexts.

2. Flexible financing to enable a needs-based, multi-sector response and emergency responses. This means a continuation of lightly earmarked support to UN and RCRC partners. The CBPFs will be another key strategic tool, and an active participation in Advisory Boards will continue. In the Syria response, Sida will seek to increase WoS level funding (instead of funding for a specific hub).

3. Strengthen a principled local response, through capacity building of national and local NGOs. The CBPF will be Sidas main tool for supporting national NGO projects. Sida will also require sound partnership practices from its international partners.

4. Strengthened coordination, better targeting and prioritisation. Coordination will be supported both through a sustained support for OCHA and UNHCR and and through dialogue. Coordination between humanitarian and development actors is a rising priority.

Sida will be open to supporting all principled means of delivery to reach populations in need, including in all parts of Syria, from all operational hubs inside and outside Syria. While funding increases, the number of
partners will be contained to enable monitoring with a limited field presence. Sida will continue to require a high level of conflict sensitiveness along its entire programme.

Creating synergies with development programming is an increasing priority for 2016 and beyond. Sida will begin implementing a new five-year development strategy for the Syria crisis in 2016, focusing on building resilience in Syria and neighbouring countries, with a focus on basic services, livelihoods, GBV, and human rights. The strategy is based on the application of OECD:s resilience systems analysis tool. It introduces SEK 300 million per year in additional funding, doubling the total Sida contribution to the crisis. As the strategy is operationalized during 2016, concrete synergies between the two streams of funding will be actively sought. The strategy has an explicit aim to relieve the burden of humanitarian assistance.

In the new situation where the humanitarian assistance is complemented by a sizable resilience instrument, humanitarian assistance can stand even more firmly on its life-saving mandate, driven by the humanitarian imperative and needs. Sida will therefore increase the share of funding to emergency and front-line humanitarian responses, including through the CBPFs. At the same time, prompted by the protracted crisis setting, programmes within the humanitarian realm should also contribute positively to the resilience of the population. Sida will do this both through dialogue and programming, for example by (a) building local capacities, particularly those of civil society actors, to respond to crises, (b) advocating and supporting a transition to cash assistance and local procurement, also in Syria, where possible, and (c) encouraging the alignment of services (e.g. GBV, CP) with national systems, where possible, to help a gradual strengthening of a national response.

Dialogue will also be aligned with joint Sida policy, where sustainable models and a gradual shift away from short-term humanitarian solutions will be sought, particularly in refugee hosting countries. In this context the issue of refugees' access to livelihoods is a key question.

### 3.3. Partners

All of Sida’s humanitarian UN partners are involved in the Syria crisis response. The following strategic partner NGOs have included Syria crisis related concepts in their initial submission: SRC, NRC, IRC, Save the Children, Oxfam, SMC, ACF, and IR. The initial allocation plan for 2016 is as follows. (For sector focus, see tables in country annexes).

#### Suggested initial allocation for the Syria crisis, SEK 300 million

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Annex 1: SYRIA

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

Well into its fifth year, the war in Syria has evolved into a full-fledged international conflict. In the autumn of 2015, Russia has increased its military presence in Syria, supporting a regime offensive against opposition groups. A US-led coalition began an areal campaign against ISIL and Jabat al Nusra (JAN), with a stepped up response from France and the UK in November and December. The Syrian opposition continues to be fragmented. The continued presence of ISIL in particular, but also other radical groups, has weakened the influence and strength of moderate oppositional groups. The Kurdish PYD and its military wing YPG have increased its control of Kurdish areas along the Turkish border. At the same time, amidst scepticism, the diplomatic process has moved forward. In mid-November the international stakeholders agreed on a process, including establishing a transitional government within six months, elections within 18 months, and a start for negotiations between the Syrian government (GoS) and opposition groups (excluding ISIL and JAN) in early 2016. An implementation of the agreement is far from certain.

In this context, the protection environment has further deteriorated. Flagrant and systematic abuses of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights Law (HRL) characterize the conflict. Over 250,000 people have been killed since the beginning of the conflict, including tens of thousands of children, and 11 million have been forced to leave their homes. Indiscriminate and deliberate attacks using barrel bombs and mortars on densely populated civilian areas and civilian objects continue unabated, and so does the use of siege as a military tactic. Targeting of medical personnel and infrastructure has increased in 2015, as well as controlling public services like water and electricity supply as a military tactic.

Moreover, for Syrians to claim their right to asylum is becoming increasingly difficult. In 2015 an additional 380,000 Syrians (or PRS) were registered in neighbouring countries, mainly Turkey. Since late 2014 tighter border policy is making it more difficult for Syrians to flee the country. After the Jordanian and Lebanese governments closed their borders in late 2014, the Turkish border has long been the main way out. In 2015 also the Turkish border has gradually de facto closed, which has driven more people to use dangerous, informal crossings (Human Rights Watch).

The conflict has led to widespread and increasing in humanitarian needs. The Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO, Oct 2015) identifies 13.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, an increase of 1.3 million in a year. Of those, 8.7 million are estimated to be in need of assistance in more than one sector. Some 6.5 million are IDPs, and 1.3 million vulnerable residents of IDP host communities. An estimated 6 million are children. An estimated 4.6 million are located in so-called ‘hard to reach’ areas, of which at least 2 million in ISIL held areas and close to 500,000 in besieged locations. People trapped in besieged areas are living under extremely difficult circumstances with almost no assistance coming in. Close to all of the remaining 460 000 Palestine refugees are in need of assistance.

As assets and resilience of the population are being depleted, the scale of the needs increase. In 2015 the situation has further deteriorated by a deepening economic recession, caused mainly by the decrease in oil production, a disruption of markets, and the fluctuating national currency. The inflated cost of food and fuel, and climbing unemployment is making lives even in relatively stable government-held areas increasingly difficult. While the inflow of aid is considerable, it has not benefitted the local economy to its full potential. The most vulnerable become increasingly aid dependent as livelihoods opportunities diminish. Almost 7 million people are now highly food insecure. A major consequence is the increase in negative coping strategies such as drop out from school, child labour, early marriages, and reducing food consumption, raising serious protection concerns.

Also access to basic social services continues to deteriorate, contributing to humanitarian needs in all sectors. Services in the most conflict affected locations suffer from lack of staff, damage to infrastructure and security concerns, while in IDP hosting locations services are overstretched. The health system especially is at brink of collapse, with less than half of pre-conflict hospitals functional. Half of Syrian doctors are believed to have fled the country. Vaccination coverage has dropped from 90% to 60% (HNO). One out of four schools are no longer accessible, and at least 2 million children are out of school. Equally, in the WASH sector, access to safe drinking water has halved as a result of damage to infrastructure. The lack of access to civil
documentation, particularly in opposition held areas, is an increasing protection concern, subjecting children to statelessness.

While all conflict affected people require protection and assistance, certain groups require special attention. **Children** continue to be the most vulnerable, not least due to the proliferation of negative coping strategies, as discussed above. Child labour is perceived to be a problem in 55% of the country (HNO). The gender dimensions of vulnerability are significant. **Girls and women** are at a higher risk of early marriage, domestic and sexual violence, reduced freedom of movement and access to services. Women are particularly vulnerable in relation to their reproductive health, particularly when pregnant. There are also reports of conflict related sexual violence by all parties to the conflict. **Boys and men** risk forced recruitment, detention and dangerous child labour. People with **chronic illness or disabilities** have very limited access to care and services. **Health workers** suffer from a specific protection risks, due to the frequency of attacks on health facilities. **Palestine refugees** are disproportionately affected by the conflict, camps heavily affected by fighting, experiencing increasing discrimination, including lack of access to services and livelihoods and limited freedom of movement, both inside Syria and when attempting to cross borders. The are also approximately 40,000 Iraqi refugees in Syria still and thousands of migrant workers.

The humanitarian needs are widespread across Syria, however, the governorates of Dara’a, Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa and Rural Damascus are top five in the WoS severity ranking system (HNO 2015). The governorates of Deir-ez-Zor, Ar-Raqqa, Dara’a, Aleppo and Rural Damascus are most difficult to access. Urban areas are highlighted as a specifically vulnerable due to high concentrations of people, including a heavy IDP presence, limited freedom of movement, and dependence on public services like water and electricity.

### 1.2 Risks and threat

There is no military solution in sight, and even with international aerial support no side has currently the ability to secure control over the whole country. They do however have the continued capacity to cause considerable damage. **Unless the political track delivers unexpected positive results, a further escalation of violence, loss of life and displacement is to be expected in 2016.** Humanitarian needs, as described in the section above, will increase and deepen.

**Access constraints continues to be the largest hindrance for the humanitarian response inside Syria.** Despite the UN SC resolutions 2139, 2165 and 2191 calling for actors to facilitate humanitarian access, the overall access situation has deteriorated. Besides security risks, acces is also object to the systematic obstruction by authorities, but also opposition groups. Cross-line missions are hampered and delayed due to GoS administrative procedures, and the delivery of certain relief items (like surgical items) is systematically hindered. At the same time, humanitarian space in areas held by non-state armed groups has shrunk, particularly in ISIL held areas. Besieged areas continue to be almost completely closed off from humanitarian assistance. Cross-border assistance capacity is high but will continue to depend on shifting border policies of neighbouring countries. The threat to aid workers continues to be high.

The response is characterized by high risks of aid diversion, corruption and lack of adhering to humanitarian principles. **Monitoring is restricted.** The level of corruption has soared as a result of the breakdown of governance, and the emergence of a war economy. The humanitarian system depends heavily on local capacities and remote management mechanisms. The aid community has progressively invested in innovative approaches to response monitoring, like third party and peer-to-peer monitoring. Ther are increasing efforts on capacity building of local partners, but significant challenges remain. Comparison and assessment of needs has improved though the Whole of Syria (WoS) system, but the risk of badly targeted response remains due to the difficulty in obtaining reliable data. While further efforts on monitoring is needed, the fact remains that effective assistance in Syria requires a higher-than-average acceptance of risks.

**The risk of insufficient funding is expected to continue in 2016.** In November 2015 the USD 2.9 billion SRP was funded to about 40%. Overall humanitarian assistance is considerably higher, but large share is channelled outside of the UN lead appeals and sector coordination. There is a high risk that the 2016 appeal, which is USD 200 million higher than its predecessor, will face similar levels of under- and parallel funding. Besides fundraising, the humanitarian community needs to further develop targeting and cost-effectiveness. Moreover, as the crisis has become protracted in nature, there is a need to respond to the increasing calls for longer term, resilience focused financing also inside Syria, and move away from short term NFI and food support as much as possible in favour of methods that support self-sufficiency and local markets.
1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Humanitarian Response Plan

The Humanitarian Response Plan for 2016 is the second annual appeal within the Whole of Syria (WoS) framework, drawing on an improved coordination in 2015, including a first comprehensive needs assessment with comparable data across the whole country. The funding requirement is USD 3.19 billion, which is a 11% increase from the 2015 SRP, explained by a greater inclusion of key I/NGO projects compared to previous years. A total of 476 projects are included, utilizing all existing modalities, including regular Damascus based programming, cross-line and cross-border responses.

The Strategic Objectives are:

4. **Save lives**, alleviate suffering and increase **access** to humanitarian response for vulnerable and those with specific needs
5. **Enhance protection** by promoting respect for IHL and HRL through quality principles assistance, services and advocacy
6. **Support resilience** of local communities and households within the humanitarian response by protection and restoring livelihoods and enabling access to essential services and rehabilitation of socio-economic infrastructure

**Coordinated multi-sector programming** will focus particularly on groups and areas where needs converge across several sectors. The strategic use of the three country-based pooled funds will be strengthened and more investments will be made in building the capacity of national and local partners. The HRP also calls for improving programming flexibility, capitalizing on the network of operational hubs within and outside of Syria. Programming will be tailored to the different response contexts, so that more stable areas can benefit from longer-term resilience building efforts. There is an explicit intention to move into cash and market-based programming, where possible, to benefit local systems and support livelihoods, but also contributing to the protection of children from economic exploitation. Highly volatile and hard-to-reach areas will continue to be targeted on an access basis. The preparedness to deliver rapid response to sudden-onset displacement will be strengthened. Emergency allocations of the pooled funds will be used to rapidly disburse funding for such emergencies.

The Strategic Steering Group for the Whole of Syria response has also endorsed a Humanitarian Strategy for Protection (October 2015), a first of its kind in the Syria context. Priorities include (1) encouraging the respect for IHL and mitigating protection risks through advocacy, (2) increasing protection responses, particularly in the areas of child protection and GBV, and (3) strengthening capacities of local actors in protection mainstreaming. The strategy also includes a protection advocacy plan.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

The main burden of the humanitarian crisis in Syria is carried by Syrian host communities, and as a result their own resources and resilience levels are decreasing. The government continues to be involved in all aspects of the response within areas of its control through ministries and line-ministries, including in regards to providing ongoing basic services. It controls the response, as mentioned, through granting or limiting access and permits to humanitarian actors. In areas no longer controlled by the government, so-called local councils have been set up, to sustain the provision of some basic services, however, in many areas their influence has drastically decreased since the arrival of more radical groups. The Syrian interim government and the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) has lost its role in aid coordination, and ACU now works mostly as an implementer in opposition areas.

The Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) continues to be the main implementer of assistance, and as such, the largest and arguably the most important, humanitarian actor in-country. With 14 governorate branches and 80 sub-branches and a network of volunteers, it still has wide-reaching access, including many (but not all) opposition controlled areas. SARC has been fairly successful in the complicated balancing act of protecting its neutrality and access while managing its auxiliary role with the government.

There are currently 135 national NGOs (an increase by 24 in 2015) authorised by the government to work with the UN agencies. INGOs operating from Damascus are usually not allowed to partner with national NGOs. In addition, more that 185 Syrian NGOs operate from neighbouring countries through cross-border assistance. The capacity of national NGOs is often insufficient, although the now long term engagement and partnerships with international humanitarian organisations has improved capacities. It should be emphasised
that national staff and volunteers, including national staff of international organisations, remain the front-line responders, taking enormous risks in their work. A total of 81 aid workers have been killed during the conflict and kidnappings are commonplace. Fair partnership policies with national actors should include capacity building, but also focus on the obligation of duty of care.

In addition to the formal humanitarian system, there is an estimated 600-700 local groups – professional bodies, charities, activist networks, diaspora organisations, fighting groups also giving assistance – that have been created since the start of the conflict. Their work is usually not captured by the formal structures, and they do not necessarily adhere to the humanitarian principles, but they play a vital role in responding to needs, particularly where the ‘system’ cannot reach. There is also an array of regional and faith based organisations, also outside of the formal structures. How to cooperate with these types of actors to further strengthen the overall response remains an underexplored question for the humanitarian leadership.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

The humanitarian community continued to scale up its response during 2015 through both regular, cross line and cross border operations in all 14 governorates, reaching more people than previous years. The UN lead response alone reached 6 million people within monthly food assistance; 4.8 million with NFIs, 6.7 million with drinking water, and 2.9 million children with polio vaccinations, along other achievements.

Coordination improved in 2015 through the operationalization of the Whole of Syria approach (WoS). The WoS strategy was mandated by the Security Council in 2014 with the aim of to maximize efficiency through a single coordination system encompassing operations from Damascus and governorate level hubs inside the country, and the cross-border hubs of Turkey and Jordan, and to some extent Iraq and Lebanon. The response is lead by a semi-structured HC system consisting of a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator in Amman, his Deputy as the de facto HC for the cross-border response from Turkey, and a RC/HC for Syria responsible for the Damascus based operations. In addition the RC/HC in Lebanon and Jordan coordinate the cross-border work in their respective hubs (in addition to the in-country response). Three pooled funds serve the WoS response, the Turkey and ERF Syria exclusively and the Jordan HPF partially through a cross-border window.

The number of actors involved in the UN lead response has risen considerably, not least due to the firmer inclusion of cross-border work into the HRP. A total of 12 UN agencies and IOM are present in Syria, still mainly working through regular and cross-line operations from Damascus, still heavily dependent on SARC delivery. SCR 2165 and 2191 (2014) authorized UN agencies and partners also to deliver assistance cross border, and there has indeed been a moderate increase of UN cross-border operations in 2015. The larger share of cross-border assistance continues however to be provided by over 50 INGOs and 185 Syrian NGOs, most of them not burdened by the need to protect a humanitarian space of Damascus based operations. The 16 INGOs that have registered in Damascus are still in a secondary position compared to the UN, given lesser access by GoS and not allowed to partner with local NGOs nor establish sub-offices. In 2015, NRC has become an exception to the rule, working cross-border but still attaining registration to work from Damascus.

The WoS sector coordination structure across hubs is functioning, although to a varying degree between sectors. The basic deconfliction of operations inside Syria has largely been achieved. A first WoS needs analysis has been conducted, with comparable needs data across the whole country, feeding into an improved second WoS response plan (HRP). The share of anonymised projects in the HRP has been reduced by 83%, compared to the 2015 SRP, a significant achievement in itself. Challenges remain, however, not least in the field of information sharing and management. Presenting a comprehensive gaps analysis through the 4W (Who does What, Where, When) mechanism has been difficult despite the possibility of anonymizing information. Given the sensitivities, the remaining lack of trust between some actors in the cross-border hubs and Damascus is not unexpected.

3. SIDA´s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1. Sida´s role

Sida has continued its strong emphasis on protection throughout the crisis, however, the response has been multi-sectoral in character. Of the overall support to the Syria crisis some 60 percent has been allocated to Syria through sectorally unearmarked funding to UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA, OCHA and ICRC, the pooled funds, loosely earmarked funding through the Swedish Red Cross (to SARC programming), and through
project funding to Sida strategic partner INGOs. Emergency response has been central, particularly through ERF funding. Sida’s rapid response mechanism (RRM) has been utilized, however to a limited extent. Two RRM projects were funded in 2015. Sida’s has emphasised the need for well coordinated response, including regular, cross-border and cross-line operations throughout the crisis.

3.2. Response Priorities 2016

For the overall response priorities for the Syria crisis, see section 3 in the regional chapeau. For the Syria response specifically, the following can be highlighted. Priority will be given to life-saving emergency response and strategic protection interventions. Particularly, efforts to reach people in hard-to-reach areas will be supported and explored. The further strengthening of the WoS approach remains a key priority. While the Sida supported humanitarian response is life-saving in nature, it should also contribute to the resilience of the Syrian population and economy, where and as much as possible. Conflict sensitivity is another key requirement.

Sida will be open to supporting all principled means of delivery to reach populations in need, including in all parts of Syria, from all operational hubs inside and outside Syria. Sida will consider the high risk nature of programming and limitations in monitoring, by containing the number of partners in Syria.

**Suggested initial allocation for Syria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
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<th>Syria (WoS)</th>
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<td>Emergency response</td>
<td>Amman</td>
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<td>HPF Turkey bc</td>
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<td>Emergency response</td>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>52,50%</strong></td>
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Inkl. UNRWA: 64,17%
UNHCR has registered over 1.08 million refugees in Lebanon, although figures of the total refugee population vary, the Government of Lebanon (GoL) estimating there being over 2 million Syrians in the country. Syrian refugees now account for a fifth of Lebanon’s total population, making it the highest per capita concentration of refugees in the world. The refugee populations is slowly decreasing, however, from the peak of 1.2 recorded in May 2015. Onward movement to Europe is on the rise and almost 150 000 refugees have been inactivated from the UNHCR database during 2015. The largest concentrations of refugees are in Bekaa (370,000), Mount Lebanon (290,000), and the North (161,000). No formal refugee camps are established in Lebanon, and refugees live scattered in 1,750 different locations among Lebanese host communities, either in urban areas or in informal tented settlements. The country also has some 1.5 million vulnerable Lebanese directly affected by the crisis and it hosts 320 000 Palestine Refugees. In total, more than 3 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance.

The conflict in Syria, the inflow of refugees, its economic effects, and spillover of conflict has had a significant effect on the economy and stability of Lebanon, leading to an increase in vulnerability among Lebanese in host communities. Managing the refugee crisis is therefore sensitive balancing act for the already fragile Lebanese government, a system running without a functioning parliament, unable to elect a president since May 2014, and tackling a popular discontent sparked by a waste management crisis in Beirut. Fighting in Syria has spilled over into the Lebanese border city of Arsal, where Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fight jihadist groups (mainly Jabhat al Nusra) since the autumn of 2014. In a recent incident six people were killed in a suicide attack in Arsal. Tensions between groups in Palestinian camps have also grown, leading to casualties. Some conflicts have been contained in 2015, however, including the conflict between Sunnis and Alawites in Tripoli. This is largely explained by the shared priority of managing the threat of ISIL. Whether the complex attack that killed 50 people in Beirut in November 2015 is a start of a new wave of violence in Lebanon is yet to be seen.

The Lebanese policy toward refugees has tightened during 2015. In late 2014 there was a dramatic shift in border policy, effectively stopping the inflow of Syrians. Since January 2015 no new registrations of refugees has been allowed. UNHCR has at the request of the government stopped all registration of Syrians and in May 2015 a controversial de-registration exercise removed the registration of a number of Syrians, who had arrived since the January time limit. (Syrians approaching UNHCR now have their bio-data and vulnerabilities assessed, and referred to other agencies for services). Syrians continue also to be restricted from legal work in Lebanon, although a large share work informally, mainly in the agriculture or construction sectors.

Refugees are therefore increasingly dependent on humanitarian assistance, particularly the monthly cash and food voucher assistance from UNHCR, WFP, UNRWA and others. This support has become a de facto social safety net for the refugees, although the support is highly unreliable due to deficiencies and unpredictability of humanitarian donor financing. Dependency on food vouchers as the primary livelihood source increased in 2015 by 14% to 54% of households, according to Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees (VASyR) in Lebanon.

Lebanese legal restrictions on legal stay are creating significant protection challenges. To obtain and renew legal residency refugees have to pay 200 USD per person and either present a sponsorship letter from a Lebanese employer or sign a pledge not to work. These disincentives force an increasing number of Syrians not to renew their residency permits and to live illegally in the country. In 2015 just 28% of households report having legal stay for all family members, down from 58% in 2014 (VASyR). One of the implications is the tendency of unregistered parents to not register births, which risks making children stateless.

As a result of the deteriorating protection environment, lack of livelihoods opportunities, and dwindling assistance, vulnerability among refugees is growing. Some 70% of refugees now live below the national poverty line, a rise from about 50% in 2015. Increasing vulnerability has lead to an increase in harmful coping strategies and further weakening of refugees resilience in the face of new shocks. The most common coping strategies include reducing household expenditure on food (85%) or buying food on credit (81%) (VASyR). The depletion of savings and larger indebtedness is another trend. The share of families withdrawing their children from school is increasing and is linked with serious protection challenges like child labour and early marriage. Psychosocial support needs are high, not least among children, who are both traumatized from war and experience hardship and violence in refuge. Humanitarian actors also see an increase in gender based violence, although quantitative evidence is difficult to establish. In addition, partly
due to restrictions on the shelter sector, more than half of the refugee population in Lebanon live in informal
tented settlements, construction sites and unfinished houses, which is a major concern, not least during the
winter season.

**Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) suffer from double vulnerability** due to the disadvantaged position
Palestine refugees have in Lebanon. PRS have been unable to enter Lebanon since May 2014 and at the
moment some 42,500 PRS live in Lebanon. More than half reside in Lebanon illegally. Decreasing UNRWA
school enrolment rates suggest that large numbers of PRS have chosen onward movement to Europe in 2015.

### 1.2 Risks and threats

In a likely scenario the **refugee caseload will not increase in Lebanon, rather it may decrease at a slow rate.** It is expected that Lebanon will continue its strict border control and no large scale influx of new refugees is expected. Mainly a scenario of an ISIL take-over of the strategic route between Damascus and Latakia would create such a large scale displacement toward the border that an temporary reopening of the border may ensue. Depending on signals from European countries, the onward movement will either slow down or increase.

The **scope of humanitarian needs will likely increase,** however, as vulnerabilities grow. The government will likely continue to apply strict measures over the refugee population, including limit refugees’ right to legal work. While funding continues to be unpredictable, dependency on a cash- and food assistance will continue, and possibly deepen as the resilience of households erodes. Serious protection implications will ensue. The risk of further tension between refugees and host communities as well as sectarian conflict is a constant threat.

With the Government’s increased ownership of the planning and coordination processes, some humanitarian actors in Lebanon also see a risk that focus and ultimately funding may move towards stability related programmes and investments into the public systems, and away from immediate humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable. In the context where most basic service delivery is privatised public service provision currently lack the needed absorption capacity and ways to reach the most vulnerable, particularly refugees. Also discriminatory policies create barriers to refugees access to services. In this context the need for targeted humanitarian action remains.

Access in Lebanon is relatively unrestricted but sensitive to the conflict dynamics. Arsal has been cut off from international actors for most of 2015, and access to Wadi Khlaed in Akkar governorate is limited. The Lebanese Red Cross is the actor with the best access to hard-to-reach areas within the country.

### 1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan

The Leabon Crisis Response Plan 2016 is a joint UN-GoL plan, which aims at a continuation of humanitarian assistance to refugees, while expanding investment in Lebanese public services and institutions. The LCRP is in its entirety the 3RP country chapter for Lebanon. The total budget is USD 2.5 billion for 2016, up by USD 400 million from 2015. Strategic objectives include:

1. Ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for the most vulnerable among the displaced from Syria and the poorest Lebanese.
2. Strengthen the capacity of national and local delivery systems to expand access to and quality of basic public services.
3. Reinforce Lebanon’s economic, social, institutional and environmental stability. It aims to: (i) expand economic and livelihood opportunities benefitting local economies and the most vulnerable communities; (ii) promote confidence-building measures within and across institutions and communities to strengthen Lebanon’s capacities.

### 2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

#### 2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

The government has in 2015 further strengthened its leadership role of the planning and coordination of the response. As described above, there has been a move towards addressing needs within host communities, not only humanitarian needs of refugees. The LCRP also increasingly aims at strengthening public services at
national and local level. The central government is still relatively weak, not least politically but also in terms of its capacity and reach. Service provision is mostly privatized in Lebanon. The Ministry of Education has been a positive exception, though, upscaling significantly in the last years. In 2015 it has enrolled 150 000 refugee children into public schools.

The capacity of civil society organisations in Lebanon is relatively strong and there is a selection of well-capacitated and principled organisations who can participate in the response. As an example, the Lebanese Red Cross (LRC) is a strong actor benefitting from a high level of social acceptance and access.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

The international response is dominated by UNHCR, who is the largest operational actor as well as mandated to lead coordination on the refugee response. In addition, the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, supported by a small OCHA office (and an RC Office), provides leadership on the wider humanitarian and development response in the country. The division of labour between UNHCR and the HC function is not entirely clear, partly due to recent changes in leadership, and will evolve during 2016. Among UN agencies UNICEF has been leader on an more integrated humanitarian and long term response, increasingly focusing on national capacities and service provision. While the dual role of UNHCR as a donor and coordinator is still perceived as an impediment to completely functional sector coordination system, there are clear gains on the operational level. The development of joint framework for cash and voucher assistance based on common vulnerability criteria is a key achievement. The INGO community has scaled up considerably since 2013, both in terms of presence and operational capacity. INGOs are being increasingly restricted by the government, for example, through the imposition of quotas for non-Lebanese staff (including internationals and Palestinian and Syrian refugees). Through the LCRP 2016, there will be particular restrictions on INGOs work in the field of non-formal education, a development that worries the INGO community.

3. SIDAs HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

For the overall response priorities for the Syria crisis, see section 3 in the regional chapeau. Due to the heightened humanitarian needs, Lebanon will continue to receive the largest share of targeted support among the neighbouring countries. Sida will support protection and basic needs through four long-term partnerships, with Save the Children (child protection), IRC (GBV), and NRC (ICLA, shelter, WASH), and SRC (protection, WASH). Flexible, multi-sector support is channelled through the ICRC, the Lebanon ERF, and unearmarked regional allocation to UN agencies.

Conflict sensitivity is a priority requirement of Sida funded programmes in Lebanon. Interventions must be designed in a way that they at a minimum do not contribute negatively, but ideally even contribute positively to the increasingly tense social relationships between refugees and host communities and other intercommunal conflicts. Particular focus will be given the refugee community due to its increasing (legal, social, and economic) vulnerability, but needs of vulnerable host communities will not be disregarded. Dialogue will focus on key protection concerns, particularly around legal stay.

Initial suggested allocation for Lebanon

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</table>
Annex 3: JORDAN

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

Currently some 630,000 Syrian refugees are registered with UNHCR in Jordan. Also some 14,000 Palestinians from Syria (PRS) have managed to cross into Jordan and registered with UNRWA before Jordan closed its borders to PRS in January 2013. A large majority (83%) of refugees live outside of the camps, despite the GoL encampment policy. Geographically, Amman and northern parts (Irbid, Mafraq and Zarqa) host the highest numbers of Syrian refugees. Three main refugee camps, Za’atari, Azraq and the Emirati Jordanian Camp (EJC), host a total of 110,000 refugees.

Jordan has continued its strict control of the Syrian border, a policy since 2014. While inflow of Syrians has slightly increased during the second half of 2015 due to the intensified conflict, the average was around 70 people per day. There has long been a particular concern for refugees, who have set up camp at the border (the berm), unable to enter Jordan, living in extremely harsh conditions with very limited access to humanitarian services. Recently due to a new wave of displacement from North Syria, the number has more than tripled, reaching 10,000 people, mostly children and women. There are also cases of deportations into Syria. In 2015 the accumulated hardship among refugees in Jordan led to an increase in returns to Syria, with 4,000 people choosing to go back in the month of August alone. It should be noted that Jordan has not ratified the refugee convention and consider the Syrians temporary guests.

The government has also imposed new registration requirements for Syrian refugees. In March 2015 GoL launched an urban verification exercise to document all refugees and qualify them for public services. After heavy advocacy efforts, GoJ removed the requirement of costly documentation (lease agreement and medical certificate), which were considered major barriers for registration. GoJ has asked agencies not to provide services to refugees without this registration. Refugees without the required documentation become also more vulnerable to harassment from authorities. There is also continued trend towards enforcing the encampment policy, and refugees, even minors, who are caught without proper documentation often end of up being placed in the camps.

Refugees remain outside of the formal labour market. No concrete steps have been taken despite advocacy from the international community towards opening up segments of the labour market to refugees, which places refugees in a situation of high aid dependency. Funding constraints have made humanitarian assistance insufficient and unpredictable. WFP’s food voucher programme, which many rely on as a main source of income, was significantly cut in September-October, placing hundreds of thousands of refugees under survival minimum and creating another push factor for returns to Syria. WFP has since resumed its programme, but funding is secured only until January 2016.

In 2015 the situation of refugees deteriorated further and levels of vulnerability is growing. According to the national Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) 86% of refugees are below the national poverty line (68 JOD/capita/month), an significant increase from about 50% in 2014. About 85% are food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity compared to 48% in 2014 (WFP). This has lead to an increase in negative coping strategies, with particular protection implications, not least for children. Up to 80% of refugees report resorting to such behaviour, including child labour, begging, and early marriage. Also nearly 100 000 refugee children are still outside the formal education system. Increased poverty is also leading to increasing gender based violence, including domestic violence, early marriage among girls and women. Boys are increasingly subjected to child labour. Maternal health is of particular concern, with a drop in the rate of deliveries in government facilities and in access to antenatal care.

Besides basic needs and protection, the lack of adequate urban shelter is a major concern in Jordan, with 75% of refugees deemed shelter vulnerable (VAF), and 20% of refugees in the North living in housing that does not provide basic protection from the elements (NRC).

Jordan has so far been spared of significant spill over of the conflict in Syria, although concerns of extremist infiltration have increased since Jordan joined the military campaign against ISIL in late 2014. Effects of the refugee crisis have however been significant on vulnerable Jordanians, particularlt those living in refugee hosting communities. As more than half of Syrian men are active in the (informal) labour market, wage levels decrease (ILO). Rents have gone up by 17 %, according to GoL. The poor performance of the Jordanian
economy also plays in, with negative trends in trade, tourism and GDP growth. More investment in the public service infrastructure is needed and there are hopes that donors will ramp up their development financing.

1.2 Risks and threats

Considering Jordanian border policy the refugee caseload is expected to stay relatively stable in the coming years, with returns to Syria on one hand and high nativity on the other. Needs are expected to grow, however, if no further steps toward access to livelihoods are taken. After years of refuge the depletion of assets raises vulnerability and aid dependency, with an increase in negative coping strategies. Protection concerns related to government restrictions, can also be expected to continue. Increased levels of tension between Syrian refugees and host communities is highly expected.

Although there are hopes of more donor funding coming in 2016, there is a continued risk of further unpredictability of financing, particularly to cash and food voucher assistance. This forces agencies to constantly adjust service levels to funding, and beneficiaries to live in constant economic insecurity. There is a particular risk that WFP’s food voucher programme will experience another interruption in February, which in Jordan’s case increases the risk of another wave of returns to Syria.

Besides funding constraints, risks to humanitarian operations include government restrictions on humanitarian programmes, including possibly increasing the obligatory share of Jordanian beneficiaries in projects. Today all projects targeting refugees are required to include vulnerable Jordanians as 30% of their beneficiaries, and INGOs report of an increasing tendency of ministries requiring an even more equal division, compromising a needs-based approach. The shelter sector has been particularly affected by GoJ restrictions, including though suspension of projects, and there is a risk this will continue to some extent in 2016.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the humanitarian response plan

The government of Jordan has published a new three-year Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis (JRP 2016-2018), which also constitutes the country chapter of the 3RP 2016. The intention is to build on the approach of the JRP 2015, moving away from a strictly humanitarian refugee response to “a resilience-based comprehensive framework that bridges the divide between short term refugee, and longer term developmental responses”. The total cost of interventions within three years is USD 8.1 bn, including a programmatic component worth USD 4.9 bn and a budget support component worth USD 3.2 bn for three years. The budget for the programmatic response for 2016 is USD 1.7 bn, divided roughly in half between the refugee response and resilience programming.

In summary, the objectives of the JRP 2016-18 include (1) upscaling government capacity to plan and implement the development response; (2) foster the resilience of the service delivery system in health, education, water and sanitation, and municipal services and infrastructure in areas affected by demographic stress, including solid waste management, housing, and energy sectors; (3) meet the immediate humanitarian needs of Syrian refugees in and out of camps and vulnerable Jordanians affected by the Syria crisis; (4) expand employment and livelihood opportunities, and strengthen the coping mechanism of the most vulnerable affected by the crisis; (5) mitigate pressures including social imbalances on Jordanian host communities; (6) support the government budget to cope with the financial burdens resulting from the Syria crisis; and (7) mitigate pressures on the natural environment and ecosystem services. The JRP is a rolling plan, i.e. at the end of each year it is reviewed and another planning year is added.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

The government has since late 2014 strengthened its leadership of the response, as mentioned, shifting focus from a UNHCR-led refugee response to a more comprehensive developmental approach answering to longer-term structural gaps in public service delivery, which have been brought to the fore by the refugee crisis. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) leads the response planning and coordination process, with significant technical support from UNHCR and others. Since 2015 all projects are required to be approved in a MoPIC managed online approval portal (JORISS), through which the government also enforces the requirement of including 30% Jordanian beneficiaries in all refugee programming.

Civil society organisations play a major role in the overall response and has increased its capacity over past years.
2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

As per the format of the regional response to the Syria crisis and the 3RP, UNHCR provides the international counterpart for GoJ on the refugee response while UNDP does the same with regards to the resilience pillar. UNHCR and sector ministries lead most of the sector working groups. UNHCR also has a large multi-sectoral operational role, the heaviest components being its cash programme in the basic needs sector, and a mandate to lead the protection advocacy efforts toward duty-bearers.

The RC/HC supported by OCHA is formally the most senior representative of the UN towards and leads the Humanitarian Country Team, but is placed in a middle ground between a strong UNHCR and a willful Government. HC/OCHA also has a role in coordinating the Jordan hub of the Whole of Syria response, i.e. the cross-border support to Southern Syria. The OCHA managed pooled fund for Jordan has been fairly stagnant since the regional ERF was dissolved in 2014, but has gained momentum in late 2015 through new funding from European donors and, in addition to increasing its funding in Jordan, been able to activate a window for Southern Syria (with Sida support).

The INGO community has expanded its presence and capacity in Jordan since the beginning of the crisis, implementing a large share of the refugee response. Some 40 organisations form the Jordan INGO Forum. INGOs are represented also in the sector working groups. As mentioned, INGOs are experiencing increasing bureaucratic hurdles from some line ministries, decreasing humanitarian space.

3. SIDAs HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

In previous years, including 2015, Sidas support to Jordan has been based mainly on its unearmarked regional funding to the UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNRWA appeals. Jordan-specific funding was in 2015 given to the ERF and NRC for its urban shelter and ICLA programme. As mentioned above, the ERF for Jordan (and South Syria) has been underutilized until late 2015, which is why assessable results will only emerge in 2016. The NRC programme has shown positive results and a good approach to conflict sensitivity, although issues around sustainability/exit-strategy will need closer follow-up during 2016.

For the overall response priorities for the Syria crisis in 2016, see section 3 in the regional chapeau. Jordan specific priorities will be on protection and shelter through a continued cooperation with NRC, and a flexible multisector response covered by the support to the Jordan HRP and unearmarked regional funding to the UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNRWA. Dialogue will focus on key protection concerns. Synergies with development programming will be sought.

Suggested allocation for Jordan

<table>
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<th>Jordan</th>
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1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

In April 2011 the first refugees from Syria arrived in Turkey which the same year declared an “open door” policy and in a prime ministerial circular officially granted Syrian and state-less people from Syria unlimited access to the country. The total number of refugees from Syria in Turkey is today estimated at 2.2 million (UNHCR November 2015) of which only 11 per cent, approximately 250,000, live in government- and municipality administered camps (HRW Nov 2015). Turkish authorities unofficially estimate the total number of registered and unregistered refugees to 3 million. The urban refugees were initially concentrated to the southern and southeastern border areas but have increasingly spread across the country, most notably to Istanbul. Moreover, a large number of, mainly Kurdish, refugees from Iraq are staying in, mostly predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey. The number was estimated at 250,000 mid-2015 but is uncertain due to lack of registration and continuous outflows of refugees with the hope of reaching Europe.

Unlike Jordan and Lebanon, Turkey has ratified the Refugee Convention with a limitation to covering only persons escaping Council of Europe member states. All people from Syria have been declared to fall under a temporary protection regime, since 2014 regulated by a regulation on temporary protection.

No reliable multi-sector needs assessment has until now been conducted in Turkey but information suggests high needs among refugees. Syrians’ access to labour market has largely been limited to, often exploitative, informal employment. The regulation on temporary protection grants a right to employment but requires this to be explicitly regulated in secondary legislation, which was expected during 2015 but has not yet been passed. The lack of livelihoods often results in negative coping mechanisms. Around 75 per cent of school aged children are not enrolled in school, even though their right to education is legally provided out in a MoE circular.

The refugee influx has also increasingly burdened host communities, mostly situated in the already poverty-stricken south and southeast of the country, with overstretched public services, increased rents and living costs, increased competition over jobs and shrinking salaries within the informal sector. Tensions have followed as a consequence and led to outright clashes between refugees and local populations across Turkey during the summer of 2014. IS expansion in Kobane/Ayn al-Arab of September-October 2014 had spill-over effects with deadly clashes around the country. 2015 has drawn Turkey even closer into the Syrian conflict through its joining of the anti-ISIL coalition and bomb raids against the PKK in Iraq and ISIL in Syria. The related indiscriminate bomb attack targeting a demonstration organized by HDP and several labour unions in October 2015 is a strong example of how this engagement has further spill-over effects in Turkey.

Despite the fact that Turkey’s initially declared “open-border policy” towards Syria officially remains in place, the management of the borders was tightened considerably during 2015 and regular access to Turkey is available only to particularly vulnerable persons. In practice a complete closure of the long, porous and mountainous border would be difficult and refugees continue to cross the borders irregularly.

In late 2015 the EU and Turkey were negotiating a joint action plan on Syrians under temporary protection and migration management, intended to provide Turkey with a substantial financial aid package against commitments on protection of refugees already in the country and actions to hinder migrants from irregularly leaving Turkey to the EU.

Given the present military tensions in the border areas and generally political instability in the country and region, a public opinion increasingly unfavourable towards the presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey and high financial costs, it does not appear reasonable to expect an easing of the border in the near future. However refugees have hitherto proven able to continue crossing into Turkey.

1.2 Risks and threats

Soon entering the sixth year of conflict and the pending secondary law on access to labour markets for persons under temporary protection still stalled, the unmet livelihood needs among the Syrian refugees in Turkey can be expected to increase as accumulated resources gradually are depleted. A likely consequence of this is a continued increase in negative coping mechanisms.
As destitution among the refugees and the burden on host communities increase, Turkey is increasingly drawn into the Syrian conflict, and prospects for economic growth in Turkey appear bleaker than earlier years, the existing tensions could possibly further increase and again escalate into acts of violence similar to what was seen in 2014.

Recently having gone through a turbulent period of four elections emanating in another mandate period of majority government the near future remains unpredictable but could provide a renewed political willingness to deal with domestic issues such as the status of refugees in Turkey, their access to labour markets etc.

The Turkey chapter of the 3RP has hitherto been the most heavily underfunded and may continue so which remains a serious risk to the humanitarian response. The EC, however, has diverted considerable IPA funds to the “Madad Fund” supporting resilience focused programmes amongst host communities. Furthermore the ongoing discussions between Turkey and the EU may conclude in substantial EU funding for the refugee response in Turkey.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

The government in Turkey has taken full leadership for the humanitarian response in the country with UN agencies having only an additional role in providing authorities with technical expertise and assistance. By the arrival of the first refugees in 2011 Turkey's emergency response authority AFAD, with no previous experience of dealing with refugees in the country, was tasked to respond to the influx. In April 2014 the migration management body DGMM was established, formally acquiring the responsibility, including registration, for legal issues pertaining to all refugees including registration, while AFAD remains the responsible agency for assistance.

Turkey has showed itself remarkably generous having spent USD 7.5 billion (AFAD Sep 2015) on the response. Turkish authorities are responsible for the registration of refugees to which UNHCR has contributed with expertise and mobile registration centres. While the AFAD-administered camps exceed SPHERE standards in most respects, the vast majority of Syrian refugees reside in urban settings. The Turkish Red Crescent is a major actor both inside the camps and in urban settings.

Several Turkish NGOs operate, in many cases as implementing partners to the UN and INGOs. Many of these have previous experience from humanitarian operation abroad while others have redirected into the field with the coming of the Syria crisis and may lack certain capacities.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

UNHCR leads the international refugee response. The two year 3RP, includes the Turkey Response Plan with a resilience and refugee response element of USD 461 million and USD 163 million respectively. Turkey does not have a designated Humanitarian Coordinator and the GoT holds a central role for the humanitarian coordination. The cluster system has not been activated in Turkey and the coordination of assistance outside of the camps for long lacked any formal structure. However, working groups for most sectors, and inter-agency coordination fora have been established.

The situation for INGOs operating in Turkey remains complicated with a larger number of INGOs being registered in 2015 but facing administrative hurdles remain limiting operations. Around 20 INGOs are now registered and many report increased willingness by Turkish authorities to allow operational space.

3. SIDAs HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

Sida has mainly responded with un-earmarked regional contributions to UN agencies, of which funds have been allocated to Turkey are the following; UNICEF (WASH, child protection, health, education), UNHCR (protection, shelter/NFIs). However, agencies have largely deprioritised Turkey and the bulk of Sida contributions have been utilised elsewhere in the region. In 2016, Turkey will continue to be covered only by the unearmarked funding on the 3RP level. For the overall response priorities for the Syria crisis in 2016, see section 3 in the regional chapeau.
SOURCES
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GoJ: Jordan Response Plan 2016-18
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ECHO: Humanitarian Implementation Plan 2016
OCHA: Developments in Northern Governorates, sitrep 3
Sida: Underlag för Strategi för Syrenkrisen 2016-20