Each year, Sida conducts a humanitarian allocation exercise in which a large part of its humanitarian budget is allocated to emergencies worldwide. This allocation takes place in the beginning of the year as to ensure predictability for humanitarian organizations and to allow for best possible operational planning. In an effort to truly adhere to the humanitarian principles, Sida bases its allocation decisions on a number of objective indicators and parameters of which the most important are related to the number of affected people, vulnerability of affected people and level of funding in previous years. One of the indicators is also related to forgotten crises in order to ensure sufficient funding to low profile crises. Besides this initial allocation, another part of the humanitarian budget is set aside as an emergency reserve for sudden onset emergencies and deteriorating humanitarian situations. This reserve allows Sida to quickly allocate funding to any humanitarian situation throughout the year, including additional funding to the Sahel.

For 2017, the Sahel crisis is allocated an initial 140 MSK in January 2017. Close monitoring of the situation in the Sahel will continue throughout the year to determine whether additional funds should be allocated.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

The Sahel regional Humanitarian Crisis Analysis takes in consideration the common aspects of crisis affected countries in the Sahel-region and facilitates shifts in funding levels between countries depending on each country’s response needs each year. The regional approach is also a way for Sida to explore how support can be given in a comprehensive, cohesive and effective way to respond to underlying causes to humanitarian needs and bridge humanitarian funding to development in the form of alignment with national and regional conflict resolution/prevention programming and resilience/development programming. The humanitarian situation in the Sahel has persisted in 2016 but is gradually shifting from a drought related food security and nutrition crisis to a conflict driven crisis where the three main conflicts affecting population in the region are the Mali situation, the Lake Chad Basin situation and the CAR situation causing humanitarian needs predominantly within food security and protection.

Conflict and displacement, erratic weather and epidemics continue to generate substantial humanitarian needs across the region. In 2017 the humanitarian response in the Sahel will be guided by the OCHA led Humanitarian Responses Plans. For 2017 the general trend is a phase-out plan for Mauretania and Burkina Faso where humanitarian needs will progressively be included in the UNDAFs, a new three-year plan for Mali+ and a three-year plan for the Lake Chad Basin have been developed. National response plans are developed for Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. As the nature of the crisis has progressed in very different ways from the neighboring countries, the Lake Chad Basin crisis effects in Nigeria will be dealt with in a separate HCA. The CAR crisis affecting Cameroon and Chad is increasingly becoming a forgotten crisis and very little attention is given to solve the situation or catering for the needs for affected refugee and returnee populations. The CAR response is dealt with in a separate HCA, but where some funding is directed to respond to needs of refugees in neighboring countries (in this HCA the relevant country for allocation from CAR HCA is Cameroon).

Conflict

The Mali Crisis

The state of Mali lost control of the north of its territory in 2012, after Tare groups (from the region they call Azawad) began a campaign for greater autonomy. A separate coup d’état further destabilised the country. A fragile alliance in the north between Tuareg and Islamists was quickly broken, and Islamists took control of key cities. Civilian rule was re-established in mid-2013 with the support of French military. The government and the Azawad Movement Coalition (AMC), which comprises the main Tuareg armed groups operating in the north, signed a peace agreement in mid-2015. Communities affected by the violence still struggle to access food, water, health care, education, protection and livelihood opportunities. The conflict has further
exacerbated the vulnerabilities of communities whose capacity to withstand shocks has been eroded by repetitive droughts, floods, epidemics and chronic poverty.

The Nigeria Crisis
The armed Islamist group sometimes known as “Boko Haram” (meaning ‘Western education is forbidden’) is leading an insurgency with an ambition to create an Islamic state in the predominantly Muslim regions of north-east Nigeria. Since the end of 2014, the conflict has taken on a more regional dimension, with insurgent attacks in neighbouring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Boko Haram’s long-running violence and military counter-offensives have affected 21 million people across the Lake Chad Basin and left nearly half of the region’s population, or 9.2 million people, in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. The Lake Chad Basin crisis affects already before the crisis the poorest areas and most vulnerable populations of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The combined effect of the pervasive insecurity and the underlying severe vulnerability is translating into record numbers of people in need of emergency assistance.

CAR crisis
Over the past years, the Central African Republic has experienced a major political crisis which has resulted in a violent conflict that has affected nearly the entire population. The security situation continues to deteriorate, with community tensions and sectarian violence on the rise. More than a million people have fled their homes for safety from December 2013. The humanitarian consequences of the crisis are being felt across the region. Since December 2013 alone, 460,000 CAR refugees have been registered in neighboring countries - in Chad, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Congo. The situation remains unstable, tense and unpredictable. The humanitarian space is largely compromised due to violence, obstructions and barriers erected by armed groups.

Natural Disaster
Nature of disaster:
The climatic Sahel region, which covers a vast area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea and encompasses parts of Senegal, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Sudan, and Somalia, is more than 80% comprised of arid and semi-arid desert lands. The population density of the Sahel is in the vicinity of one inhabitant per square kilometre. Population growth is around 3% which is the highest in the world. Most inhabitants in the region are small scale subsistence farmers, and a drought, even if only affecting a small part of the geographic region, may have devastating consequences for affected households. Floods and locust invasions may have the same effects and a household’s entire food resources can be devastated in an instant. Another aspect of household vulnerability is high grain prices combined with widespread poverty (including high unemployment). These factors force a large number of families into negative coping strategies to deal with the stresses. For example, children are taken out of school, lesser quality food or seeds are consumed, animals that might have been intended for reproduction and survival migration, seasonal or permanent, are killed for sale, livelihood opportunities are sought in other places than home, predominantly in the cities, neighboring countries or as an attempt to get to Europe by crossing the Mediterranean by boat.

Prevalence:
Since the last major drought in 2011 rains have produced relatively good harvests and local losses to harvests have been due to floods, infestations or local droughts. The indications for 2017 is that it will be a relatively normal year in production and only Mali is indicating larger losses due to floods of the Niger river. The general trend is that humanitarian needs that are climate driven are on the decline, and when humanitarian needs prevail in non-conflict settings, the underlying causes are structural and political in their nature. The strategy is therefore to shift assistance from the traditional humanitarian relief including food distribution to self-reliance oriented activities to promote autonomy and resilience.

Resilience and coping mechanisms:
Coping mechanisms that traditionally have been elaborated by people to adapt to the climate, are not as effective or as feasible as they used to be due to a number of reasons; national borders established by colonial powers do not reflect traditional mobility patterns, population increase is not in pair with increase of production and growth, conflict and world market prices on grains and seeds grown in the region fluctuate. Households are not as resistant as they would need to be to cope with stress and shocks and lack resources
to invest to adapt, diversify and invest in order to become more resilient. The coping mechanisms that have evolved from long-term adaptation to the climate are still in practice such as the transhumance and cross-border trade, and also diversification of livelihoods, migrant work, and diversified crops and livestock.

1.1 Geographical areas and affected population

The food security and nutrition crisis is proliferated all through the region but is most severe in conflict affected regions and in rural areas of Mali, Chad, Cameroon and Niger. Rural areas and border areas to countries with internal conflicts are particularly exposed. The most vulnerable are persons without resources, safety nets and flexibility in regards to livelihoods including women and men, girls and boys. Women and men are affected differently in their vulnerabilities and the burden of supporting children and elderly may quickly drain the resources from a breadwinner. Women may be more prone to rely on dependencies and through this render them more exposed to forced marriage, domestic violence and forced migration. Men face vulnerability through forced migration, forced recruitment and also risk of radicalisation to outlaw rebel and terrorist groups. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are the most vulnerable of the mobile populations, since they receive the least assistance and recognition. Coping mechanisms include migrant work, and diversified crops and livestock. Conflicts, climate change and epidemics hamper the existing coping mechanisms and together with population growth, interact to render the crisis more severe.

1.2 Critical Assumptions, risks and threats

Climate change and desertification/land degradation in conjunction with population growth and conflict together with generally weak states and poor social safety nets are constant risks and threats and keeps the region in a cycle of chronically exposing vulnerable households to more and more stress. All Sahel countries in the region rank high on risk for corruption. Low degree of mechanisms of transparency and accountability hampers the possibilities to change this negative pattern. The population growth rate is 3% per year with high fertility rate per woman (6-7 live births per woman). The highest nativity rates are noted among rural populations. The economic growth rate is high (5 or 6% per year), but growth is not redistributed in an even and inclusive way, which is a great source of stress, particularly for children, who represent over 50% of the population. With many underlying vulnerabilities (food insecurity and conflict) and few safety nets (basic social services), the vulnerabilities are acute and high. The lack of basic social services increases peoples’ vulnerability - a population which otherwise could have remained in a chronically severe situation is more frequently tipped over the emergency threshold. This is manifested by the extraordinary large numbers that need humanitarian assistance in the Sahel. Lack of infrastructure such as harbours, roads and airports as well as lack of humanitarian access due to security deficits, leave some populations with humanitarian needs un-responded or insufficiently responded to. A significant gap is the phase-out of humanitarian assistance and hand-over to development partners and national governments in the Sahel region when recovery should be transformed into development and be locally owned. Healthcare systems in the Sahel countries are weak, and there is still a risk for Ebola or other outbreaks like meningitis or cholera.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Humanitarian Response Plan

As the Sahel crisis is being phased out as a regional three-year response plan and instead divided into three separate plans where only the Mali crisis and the Lake Chad Basin Crisis will remain as three-year response plans, these will be dealt with under each country profile.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

Government:
Governments of the Sahel’s capacity to respond to both humanitarian and development needs have so far been weak. The Sahel countries rank among the lowest in Human Development Index (HDI) in the world. Through strong engagement and advocacy with regional organizations and their development partners, humanitarian teams are promoting policies and investments that help Sahel’s most vulnerable households to better cope with shocks, and to protect their assets. Only an integrated humanitarian response, with coordinated and sustained action from governments, humanitarian and development actors, can curb the worrying trend of spiraling needs in the Sahel.
Civil Society:
The national civil society organizations in the Sahel countries, including national Red Cross Societies, have remained weak and often only acting as service delivery partners for the UN and international non-governmental organizations (INGO’s) humanitarian programmes. As civil society may be seen as a potential destabilizing factor to governments lacking in democracy and respect of human rights, it is often difficult for civil society organizations to become strong advocates for change of politics and resource mobilisation/resource management. Even in Burkina Faso, where there are many NGOs, when it comes to humanitarian response capacity they are often lacking in systems and institutional resources to be efficient actors in humanitarian response.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

Leadership and Coordination:
The Sahel humanitarian response has a UN Secretary General's Special Envoy placed in Dakar. Most UN agencies, donor agencies and INGOs keep a regional office in Dakar to cover both the Mali crisis and the Lake Chad Basin crisis. Sectoral coordination groups for the region are held in Dakar, but increasingly agencies are planning regional advisers, logistical and coordination bodies specialised in the Lake Chad Basin crisis.

Humanitarian Agencies:
Regional representations both for the Sahel and for West Africa are in place both among UN and INGOs. Many donors also have regional advisers and representations, mostly in Dakar. Humanitarian coordination structures are well developed and include INGOs. The latter have shown a high degree of cost efficient service delivery, but have been somewhat lacking in capacity development strategies for local NGOs to render hand-over and phasing out possible. Resources for humanitarian response also include the stand-by partner agreement with surge capacity to UN partners.

2.3 International and Regional assistance

Donors:
The largest donors in 2016 are USA, ECHO and the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF). Other important donors are Japan, UK, Sweden and Canada.

Regional Organizations:
The engagement of locally driven regional structures such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been active, but they have not shown strength in addressing the underlying causes of food insecurity, household vulnerability and security issues. The AGIR initiative (the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative) has given guidance to national governments in developing national and local capacities for resilience and CILSS to address desertification and reduce vulnerability due to drought. The Lake Chad Basin Commission is active, but could be further revitalised.

3. SIDA's HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1. The role of Sida

Earlier assistance and results:
Sida’s Sahel-allocation for the last years, increased focus has been put on organizations that can provide an integrated multisector response package supporting various humanitarian needs at the same time ranging from nutrition to health, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and education to name a few key sectors. There was also an increased flexibility in allowing part of the integrated programming to address underlying causes even though not qualifying as core life-saving interventions including durable solutions and livelihoods support to reduce or eliminate the need for food and non-food items distributions.

Lessons learnt:
Sida has had a roving position to the Sahel the last two years. This has increased Sida’s field presence and a greater understanding of Sida’s partners programming has been developed. Increased presence has led to improved donor coordination, especially with ECHO. The Sida humanitarian strategy opening up to funding
durable solutions and livelihoods initiatives is instrumental to reducing humanitarian needs and key to successfully phase out humanitarian response. Cash Based Support is increasingly being implemented and is showing signs of improving resilience and promotes autonomy on household level.

**Synergies with longer-term development assistance**

Sweden currently has two active bilateral cooperation strategies (Mali and Burkina Faso) that include resilience and a regional strategy for Africa south of Sahara. Thematic strategies on human security and health also fund initiatives in the region.

**3.2. Response Priorities 2017**

The priorities for Mali, Cameroon, Chad and Niger are on protection and durable solutions for affected populations and coordination and access for humanitarian actors to deliver response adapted to both immediate and longer term needs.

**3.3. Partners**

**Framework agreements:**

Most of the strategic partners of Sida-Hum are active in the region. The UN organizations are most of them represented both on regional level and national level, in some countries also on local level. The funding by country is shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended Sida support partner for Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming ), financing modality (e.g. in-kind or cash-based)</th>
<th>Proposed amount (MSEK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Multisector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Multisector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Multisector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Multisector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional support to IFRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation from CAR crisis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional support to OCHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>140 MSEK</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3.4 Strategic Funding in protracted crisis**

The humanitarian response in the Sahel countries affected by conflict need to seek durable solutions and a shift from food/cash support to livelihoods and durable solutions. Many actors already have shifted their programmes in this direction. An important partner for Sida in this regard is FAO. They have a unique competence and have the possibility to work with affected populations in both agricultural activities as well as development of value-chain and market competence. Hence a three-year programme directed to populations of refugees and IDPs is proposed to be implemented with FAO that will be conducted in close cooperation with WFP and UNHCR to shift response towards self-reliance.
### Sida’s humanitarian assistance to protracted crises in Sahel for 2017-2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended partner for Sida support</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming), financing modality (e.g. in-kind or cash-based)</th>
<th>Proposed amount by Sida</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAO Mali</td>
<td>Returnee durable solutions</td>
<td>6 MSEK X 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO Niger</td>
<td>Diffa durable solutions IDP/Refugee</td>
<td>4 MSEK X 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO Cameroon</td>
<td>Extreme-Nord and East durable solutions IDP/Refugean</td>
<td>4 MSEK X 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO Chad</td>
<td>Lac and South durable solutions to IDP and refugees</td>
<td>6 MSEK X 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL: 20 MSEK</td>
<td>20 MSEK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 MSEK X 3 = 18 MSEK
4 MSEK X 3 = 12 MSEK
4 MSEK X 3 = 12 MSEK
6 MSEK X 3 = 18 MSEK

TOTAL: 20 MSEK

20 MSEK

20 MSEK
For 2017 Chad is allocated an initial 32 MSEK. Close monitoring of the development of the humanitarian situation follows throughout the year for potential additional funds.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

Conflict

Background/Underlying cause:
Chad is politically a stable country, but with a low degree of decentralisation and democratic governance. Still ranking among the lowest in human development index, economic growth due to oil revenues have contributed to a significant degree of development and investments in infrastructure and services in the latter years. State investment in security (defence) is also significant. Chad is a secular state including large populations of both Christian and Muslim populations. Ethnically Chad is diverse and counts over 160 local languages and dialects. Most of the population live in rural areas. There is a mix of pastoral and agriculturalist farmers, and many groups of both pastoralists and agriculturalists are nomadic or semi-nomadic. Urbanisation is rapid and city growth is both according to development plans and in form of unofficial settlements, since colonial borders do not reflect ethnicity and language nor mobility-patterns such as seasonal transhumance movement in the region, cross-border issues are further complicated. Society is in its social organization to a large extent traditional with a clear division between male and female duties and expectations. Chad has a dual governance system with the traditional sultanate with a hereditary order of succession and a post-colonial administration that is heavily centralised to the capital. Nativity rates remain very high and combined with a reduced infant and maternal mortality, as well as general improvement in health, population growth is very rapid.

Main stakeholders in the conflict:
The conflicts in neighbouring countries each have their own dynamics and reasons but affecting Chad not only through refugees, but also politically. The president of Chad, Idriss Déby, has been active in peace negotiations in crisis in neighbouring countries, as well as keeping close relations to France and USA. Chadian troops have intervened in the 4 country joint military operation to resolve the insurgency situation in Northern Nigeria. The deficits in democratic governance and decentralisation are threats to inner stability and the current calm may change rapidly. Chad has seen an increase of terrorist attacks conducted by militant groups with affiliations to the Nigeria crisis, both in the capital city N’Djamena and in border areas to Nigeria and Cameroon.

Cross border implications:
Borders to Chad are in general open and the possibility to seek refuge in Chad is welcoming to those who are in need of protection. The border between Chad and Nigeria is has been closed for trade and the southern border to CAR has also been closed in periods. This has affected trade in a negative way and aggravated poverty for farmers and pastoralists. Other conflicts in neighbouring countries are not at the moment creating any significant cross-border implications other than refugees arriving in Chad.

Trends:
The general trend in Chad is despite internal challenges and conflicts in neighbouring countries that the economic growth will continue and that security will remain stable. Low prices on petrol affect the national economy adversely. The stable situation calls for a gradual handover from humanitarian to development actors including national NGOs and the state, centrally and down to county and district level are now starting to get to the point where they may pursue their own development goals.

Natural Disaster

Nature of disaster:
The Sahel region and Chad in particular has a climate and topography that is sensitive to seasonal drought and floods resulting in food insecurity. The natural variation from year to year is exuberated by climate change
and desertification. Population increase also drives the need for increase of food production. Indications for 2016 are that it will be a normal year when it comes to agricultural production in most of the country with exception of the south east of the country. Despite a rather good harvest predicted, there are many households that will struggle; especially in the period just before, and in the beginning of the rainy season (usually May to September), called the lean season, when many households run out of reserves and the number of malnourished children rises. Over 85% of rural populations live below the poverty line. Chad ranks among the least developed countries in the world on the human development index (HDI).

Prevalence:
For 2016 the needs in food aid is expected to rise. This is to some extent due to drought in south east region of the country and because of conflict and IDP situations. Needs in the Lac province in all sectors, including food aid, are very high mostly due to the IDP situation caused by eviction of fisher folk from the islands of Lake Chad to the mainland. Around 50 000 internally displaced persons are in acute need of assistance. In October 2015 the number of persons in need of food aid is estimated to 3.4 million of which 663 000 are responded to. There is an estimate of 567 000 persons displaced either as refugees, IDPs or returnees. A total of 398 800 children are malnourished.

Resilience and coping mechanisms:
Traditionally there are resilience and risk management systems and coping mechanisms among the Sahel people. Seasonal variations and yearly variations have been dealt with through transhumance migrations and access to multiple sites for agricultural crops in different areas to alternate between. The role of the extended family and ethnic groups is also a way to cope, where resources are distributed amongst members of the extended family that live in another area of the country or abroad. Population increase and degradation of the environment (desertification), low usage of irrigation and closure of borders, the traditional coping mechanisms are not enough to deal with the protracted crisis. Since the financial resources on household level are weak, there may be severely malnourished children and adults, despite that food is readily available on the market.

1.1 Geographical areas and affected population
The Lake Chad district in Western Chad emerges as an acute crisis within the greater Sahel crisis and is connected to a similar situation in the Diffa region of Niger, northern Cameroon and Borno-state in Nigeria. Food insecurity affects the whole country, but is most pronounced in the dryer parts of the country (northern and eastern part of the country) and parts of the country that are affected by conflict in the neighbouring country (Nigeria and CAR). The refugee crisis is mostly affecting border areas in the south, east and Lake Chad region. The most vulnerable groups including women and men, girls and boys who lack social safety nets such as assets, family/extended family and/or transferrable skills are the most sensitive both in regards to the refugee crisis and the food insecurity crisis. Among mobile populations the most vulnerable are IDPs who are the least catered to when it comes to both protection and basic humanitarian needs. Also host communities are strained of resources as IDPs sometimes settle in informal settlements close to existing communities. Communities and individuals are trying to, and have ambitions on how to, better cope in the situation they live. Diversification of transferrable skills, diversification of crops, improved seed, etc. but for most households these coping strategies need investments and often resources are not enough to realize ambitions.

1.2 Risks and threats
Chad is a fragile state and there is always a risk of spill-over from conflicts in neighbouring countries. The food insecurity is revised on a yearly basis as each year’s crop affects the next year’s lean period. As most farmers are subsistence farmers, a drought for a year may lead to low or no crop at all for consumption the next year. Chad is also one of the least democratic states in the world, so despite the last few years’ stability, civil unrest is possible. As for financial risks, Chad receives the score 22, on a scale where 100 equals freedom from corruption, from Transparency International. Hence the public sector in Chad, compared to other countries, can be said to be characterised by a high level of corruption. Humanitarian access has improved due to the fact that the security situation has improved in the entire country. Also better and developed infrastructure makes transport and access easier. Humanitarian flights are still the only effective way to reach refugee populations both in the east and in the Lake Chad district. The IDP situation in the Lake
Chad district has a risk in conflicts between IDPs and host communities. Surge of terrorist attacks is an increased risk both in cities and in refugee camps. Slow humanitarian response and unevenly distributed support adds to the risk of conflict and hostilities between communities.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan

OCHA’s Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for Chad in 2017 estimates 4.6 million people to be in need of humanitarian assistance and 2.7 million people are planned to be targeted with assistance. The appeal requirement amounts to 558.8 MUSD. The strategic response plan focuses on responding to food insecurity, humanitarian effects of population movements, to respond to health and sanitation needs and to be prepared to respond to sudden onset natural disasters. Major gaps in the humanitarian response in Chad are related to the needs of IDPs in the Lac-region. Sectors that are the most unresponded to are WASH, food security and protection.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

**Government**

Despite the willingness to accept refugees, the desire to let refugees settle and integrate has previously been low. A change has however occurred and the new politics of Chad is social and economic integration of refugees, but without the possibility of obtaining Chadian citizenship. Capacity from government to respond to both refugee crisis and food security crisis is low, but there seem to be few constraints in regards to willingness to grant humanitarian access and space to work for international organizations.

**Civil Society**

Chadian civil society is not particularly well developed or organised. The traditional sultanate and traditional structures to regulate issues around ownership of land and resolution of interpersonal conflicts is in place, but there are very few NGOs, in the sense of democratically organised member organizations or foundations with a board of directors, established in the country.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

**Leadership and Coordination:**

The humanitarian response mechanisms with humanitarian country team, OCHA is present both centrally and in the field, and clusters as well as sub clusters are active centrally and on field level. On field level government structures are present and in some cases lead for the sub clusters.

**Humanitarian Agencies:**

UN agencies with direct support from Sida/Hum have a well-functioning system of using and reporting on Sida contributions. Since there are no commercial domestic carriers operating in Chad, United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and humanitarian flight services will continue to be an important function. INGOs are very strong in Chad and have a presence in cluster coordination and Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO)/HRP elaboration.

2.3 International and Regional assistance

**Donors:**

In 2016 the largest humanitarian donors are the US, ECHO, Germany, the UK, Sweden and Japan. The SRP is funded at less than 50% in the beginning of December 2016. For regional organizations and support, please see the Sahel regional analysis at the beginning of this document.
3. Sida’s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1 Sida’s role

Earlier assistance and results:
Sida has supported humanitarian response in Chad for many years. The response has shifted according to changing needs and in function of climate variations and conflicts in neighbouring countries. Dialogue with partners on priorities based on observations from field visits has shown to be an efficient way of making use of Sida’s flexibility and to help partners focus on efficiency and innovation.

Lessons learnt:
Chad is increasingly becoming a forgotten crisis. The protracted refugee crisis due to conflicts in Sudan (Darfur refugees) and CAR (refugees) attracts less and less donor funding. When a new crisis occurs resources often need to be mobilized by shifting funding from protracted crisis response to the emerging situations in the country. This puts an emphasis on durable solutions and exit strategies in refugee, returnee and IDP crisis as humanitarian funding is not increasing to match the increase in needs.

3.2 Response Priorities 2017

Humanitarian Focus:
The focus for 2017 will be a partial reorientation of resources to respond to the acute crisis in the Lake Chad district due to the Nigeria crisis and its consequences in Chad. Continued support to the refugee crisis in the south and the east and particularly to be supportive of the process of social and economic integration of refugees will be prioritised. Food security will focus on infant malnutrition and response in the Lake Chad district. Coordination and access should continue to be a priority as well as humanitarian access. All Sida funded work in Chad need to include gender integration leading to gender equality and environmental consequence descriptions leading towards conservation of nature and plans for effective use of resources included in the proposals. The Humanitarian Country Team in Chad is expecting a humanitarian caseload of over 4.4 million people in 2017. This includes 389,000 refugees, primarily from CAR and Nigeria, and over 105,000 IDPs. The situation is particularly precarious in the Lac region, where over 250,000 people are affected by the regional conflict involving Boko Haram. Food insecurity across the Sahel belt of the country affects 1.8 million people. Hundreds of thousands of women and men affected by the conflict in the Lac region will go without assistance and protection. Over 4million food insecure people in Chad will be unable to meet the needs of their families, especially during the lean season.

Synergies with Development:
Since Sweden does not have a bilateral development strategy for Chad, partnering with other bilateral donors nationally and regionally is of highest importance, in order to secure responsible phasing-out and transition from recovery to development funding. The most relevant at this point would be European Commission and UNDP. Entry points for regional initiatives including Chad targeting DRR and resilience should be sought.

3.3 Partners

WFP/UNHAS: The first partner suggested for Sida allocation in Chad is WFP/UNHAS which will be supported with unearmarked funds to operate humanitarian flights for humanitarian staff to intervention areas in the country.

UNOCHA: OCHA is supported with unearmarked funds for their unique role as a humanitarian coordinator.

ICRC: ICRC are supported in Chad by an unearmarked funding for their unparalleled position in the fields of protection and IHL surveillance.

ACF: Sida has decided to support ACF for a food security, nutrition and WASH project. The intervention aims at displaced people and refugees in the LAC district, more specifically in the Fouli and Kaya prefectures.

IRC: IRC is funded for a health and WASH project in the LAC district, more specifically in the Liwa Health District. IRC is the only organization providing health services in Liwa, making them an important actor in providing timely and dignified support to people affected by the Boko Haram insurgency.
**Oxfam:** Oxfam is suggested as a new partner for 2017. Oxfam has submitted an integrated WASH and Protection project in the LAC district, targeting people affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria. The areas of intervention are the departments of Foul and Kaya.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended Sida support</th>
<th>partner</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming)</th>
<th>Proposed amount (MSEK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WFP/UNHAS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian flight services</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination, Information management</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Protection, IHL</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF Lac district</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nutrition and WASH</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC Lac district</td>
<td></td>
<td>Health and WASH</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam Lac</td>
<td></td>
<td>Multisector</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>32 MSEK</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For 2017 Mali is allocated an initial 46 MSEK. Close monitoring of the development of the humanitarian situation follows throughout the year for potential additional funds.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

Conflict

In 2012, the state lost control of the northern regions of Mali, after Tuareg armed groups from the region they call Azawad began a campaign for greater autonomy, and a separate coup d’etat further destabilised the country. In alliance with extremist Islamist groups, who had entered the country through the porous borders and increasingly established a presence in the north, they gained control over the northern regions. The fragile alliance between the Tuareg and Islamists groups was quickly broken, and the Islamists took control of key northern cities. Civilian rule was re-established in mid-2013, but Mali continues to face security and political challenges.

Background/Underlying cause:
High poverty levels, limited access to basic social services and the poor capacity of public administration are key drivers of the crisis. While the intensity of violence at present is lower than at the peak of the insurgency in 2012, still regular attacks by extremist Islamist groups continue to hamper security. The most insecure regions are the northern regions Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. Security incidents are also reported in the central and southern regions of Mopti, Segou, and Bamako since January this year. Trends indicate that violence is increasingly directed at targets in the south, and is mainly targeting Malian security forces and foreigners, including civilians and international forces. Humanitarian access in the northern region remains extremely restricted and limits humanitarian actors’ scope of intervention. Road traffic is not secure enough in major parts of the north regions and there are no commercial air services operating to the area. UNHAS and ECHO are trafficking several routes. Kidal is only reachable with MINUSMA flights, and most humanitarian actors, besides the UN, refrain from being associated with MINUSMA.

1.1 Geographical areas and affected population

The vulnerability of the population continues to be high in the northern regions Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu and parts of Mopti; the areas most affected by the conflict. Structural inequalities between men and women on all levels means that women have less access to and control over resources and basic services, and are therefore more vulnerable. A growing number of female headed households and widows are seen as a consequence of the conflict. In Mali, an estimated 3.7 million people will need humanitarian assistance in 2017. Three million people will be food insecure and of that number, 495,000 will be severely food insecure. Forecasts indicate that as many as 850,000 people will need nutrition assistance of whom 142,000 children under 5 years of age will suffer from severe acute malnutrition. Around 33,000 people are likely to remain internally displaced. Approximately 18,000 Malian refugees are expected to return in 2017. Insecurity is likely to persist in northern and central parts of the country and to hinder humanitarian access. Explosive hazards threaten the lives of thousands of people in Gao, Kidal, Mopti, Menaka and Timbuktu. Despite a dangerous and difficult operating environment humanitarian partners reached over 560,000 people with assistance in 2016, delivering food and nutritional support to over 306,000 people and health care to 537,000 people, also registering and assisting more than 559,000 IDPs, returnees and repatriated refugees. Non-food items were distributed for 5,600 households and 177,000 people gained access to permanent sources of drinking water.

Failure to provide adequate assistance in 2017 will threaten vulnerable people’s safety and dignity and expose these people to food insecurity, UNHCR facilitates the return of Malian refugee and supports these returnees with limited support (registration, shelter, NFIs). UNHCR’s analysis estimates that major steps forward in the peace process may instigate people to return from Burkina Faso, Niger and Mauritania in 2016 and onwards. However, due to the insecure situation in the areas of return (majority of refugees are originating from northern Mali), UNHCR is not promoting voluntary repatriation in countries of asylum. The deep gender inequalities in Mali make women and girls generally more vulnerable and disadvantaged. The
crisis situation, with weakening of community protection structures, displacement and lack of livelihoods also increases the risk of sexual and gender-based violence.

1.2 Risks and threats
After the signing of a peace agreement in May–June, 2015 between the Government, the pro-Azawad Movement Coalition (AMC) and the Platform Movement, the situation in the north remained volatile and attacks targeting the government and pro-government forces were still frequently occurring. After the signing of an agreement to cease hostilities between AMC and the Platform Movement (pro-government) in October 2015, a level of stability was slowly developing. Still, security has only improved in major towns; the periphery is still vastly restricted with limited access to the most vulnerable communities. The peace keeping forces, MINUSMA, is perceived as pro-government forces by some groups and remains being a target for anti-governmental forces. Criminality such as carjacking, robbery, looting and attacks with road-side bombs, IEDs/mines etc. is widespread and affects both NGOs and civilians. Several incidents are still being reported on a weekly basis. Humanitarian actors assess that they cannot operate with western staff. Malian staff from Bamako and the south is also at risk and the staff restriction risks quality of assistance being compromised.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan
OCHAs Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for Mali in 2017 estimates 3,7 million people to be in need of humanitarian assistance and 1,4 million people are planned to be targeted with assistance. The appeal requirement amounts to 293 MUSD. The 3 strategic objectives of Mali HRP are as follow:

- Provide humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable people (residents, refugees IDPs and returnees) in northern Mali and in any other area affected by any crisis.
- Enhance the access of vulnerable groups to basic services (education, health, nutrition and water and sanitation), protection as well as basic infrastructure and government services.
- Strengthening livelihoods and the resilience of the most vulnerable, and emergency preparedness.

The HRP presents gender disaggregated data on a global level and within the nutritional sector. A minimum level of a gender perspective can be found in the analysis but could be strengthened.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints
The Malian government’s capacity to address humanitarian needs remains very limited. Even before the crisis the government’s provision of basic social services was minimal, particularly in rural areas and in northern Mali. The crisis has shown the insufficient national response capacity and institutional weaknesses in managing risks and disasters. Already before the crisis, civil society had an important role in providing the population with basic social services. The national and local civil society plays an important part in the humanitarian response, participates in the cluster coordination and is (especially by the UN) used as implementing partners. Local organizations have enabled interventions in areas where insecurity is a major obstacle to international actors. At the same time their capacity is often weak in terms of management, professionalism and knowledge of protection principles.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints
The humanitarian coordination is described by both partners and donors to have great weaknesses on all levels. The HCT is chaired by the humanitarian coordinator (HC) who is also the deputy director of MINUSMA. The double role of the HC is perceived by the humanitarian community as a conflict of interest. Sweden/Sida is a donor member of the HCT together with ECHO, OFDA and Swiss cooperation. Cluster coordination on the national and sub-national level is functioning with varying levels of quality in respective cluster but generally described as rather weak. OCHA expresses that INGOs are not sharing the information requested for and INGOs find OCHA’s requests too extensive, inconsistent and demanded with unrealistic time frames. Most INGOs are participating in the cluster meetings on both levels but without seeing their added value. OCHA on national level seems to have little knowledge on the management and quality of the sub national cluster work. Inter-cluster coordination is also described as weak on both national and subnational level. Coordination between development and humanitarian donors is recognised as something there is a great
need for. This has been identified at the highest donor level and the lead of each thematic donor coordination group (PTF) has been advised to participate in the respective humanitarian cluster group meetings and vice versa to ensure exchange of information and coordination.

2.3 International and Regional assistance

Key humanitarian donors in Mali are ECHO and US Government (OFDA) together making up 57% of the humanitarian funding in Mali 2015. Other key donors are Canada and Saudi Arabia. Despite the fact that the insecure and volatile environment in the north creates a major challenge there is consensus amongst humanitarian donors and implementing partners to move away from aid delivery (dependency) and instead support the strengthening of receiving communities’ resilience capacity. Lifesaving assistance will remain a priority but is urged to have an integrated resilience component included. A strong resilience focus should also contribute to creating opportunities for development cooperation actors to link with those programs.

3. Sida’s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1 Sida’s role

A recent shift amongst donors and implementing partners takes on a strategic approach in integrating a strong resilience focus into humanitarian programs in the northern regions. Sida should support this direction and ensure a resilience component integrated when applicable. Sida should also ensure that all implementing partners clearly integrate crosscutting issues of gender and conflict sensitivity in its program design, being of high relevance in the Malian context.

3.2 Response Priorities 2017

The funding for 2017 should continue to be directed geographically to conflict affected areas in the north. Assistance is focused on basic services interventions in the sectors of health, nutrition, food security, WASH, shelter, NFI and education and all with an integrated resilience component aimed at supporting vulnerable populations to better cope with shocks and at facilitating the linkage to sustainable development. Protection is another highly prioritised area with uncovered needs and a substantial part of Sida’s allocation should be directed towards protection activities. In the HRP protection is not highlighted in the strategic objectives but present as an integrated need within several sectors. The Swedish development budget for Mali is 200-240 MSEK 2017. The two main areas of cooperation are sustainable development of natural resources and democratic governance. The development cooperation seeks to counteract the underlying factors leading to the need for humanitarian assistance in Mali, with environmental degradation and poor governance being two of the root causes for continued high acute malnutrition, for instance. In the natural resources sector programs focusing on WASH, resilience, and sustainable agriculture that provide increased livelihoods opportunities are ongoing. The second sector includes human rights, access to justice and gender equality, including protection activities such as support to victims of SGBV and increased access to justice for vulnerable groups through paralegals.

3.3 Partners

Six of Sida’s strategic partners in Mali have indicated funding requests for 2016, whereof International Rescue Committee (IRC), Action Contre la Faim (ACF), Save the Children (SCI), and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) have been approved. Besides these organizations, one partner has an amount previously agreed for 2017: Plan. In addition, four multilateral partners funded in 2016 will be taken into account for 2016: WFP/UNHAS, ICRC, OCHA and UNHCR. All organizations Sida will support in 2017 are aligned with the national HRP for Mali, with the sole exception being ICRC.

ACF: The project proposal submitted by ACF aims at providing humanitarian services in terms of Health, Nutrition, and WASH. ACF are primarily targeting children under the age of five, but also women of reproductive age. The intervention will take place in the district of Timbuktu.

IRC: IRC has a longstanding presence in the Gao and Menaka regions in eastern Mali, assuming a multisectoral approach. Working simultaneously with Child Protection, GBV, and Economic Recovery, IRC aims at improving gender equality and to strengthen the resilience among the younger population to protection risks.
**SCI:** Save the Children have been proposed for funding in 2017, operating mainly in the eastern Gao Region. Save the Children do primarily work with Child Protection issues, targeting boys and girls at risk of being subjected to forced recruitment, sexual and gender-based violence, family separation, and psychosocial stress.

**NRC:** NRC have submitted a multisector proposal in the Timbuktu and Mopti Regions. NRC will target vulnerable IDPs, host communities, and returnees in the sectors of: Food Security/Livelihoods, ICLA, and Shelter.

**Plan:** Plan’s project in Mali is now entering the third and last year of the multi-year agreement, ending in April 2018. The project aims at building resilience in the Timbuktu area, and Plan are operating in several sectors, including Child Protection, Education, Health and Nutrition, and Community Resilience.

**WFP/UNHAS:** WFP/UNHAS are supported for their unique role as a provider of humanitarian air services.

**ICRC:** The country office budget support to ICRC is to support protection and monitoring of IHL.

**OCHA:** OCHA’s office in Mali is supported for the overall coordination of humanitarian operations.

**UNHCR:** The support is directed to the UNHCR Mali operation with a focus on returnees and protection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended Sida support</th>
<th>partner for</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming)</th>
<th>Proposed amount (MSEK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Nutrition, WASH, health</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Education, shelter, food security, ICLA (protection)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCI</td>
<td>Child protection, education, health</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan</td>
<td>Child protection, maternal- and child health, nutrition</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Food security, education</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Protection, assistance, health, food security</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR Mali</td>
<td>Protection, assistance to returnees</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP (UNHAS)</td>
<td>Humanitarian Air Services</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Humanitarian coordination</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL: 46 MSEK**
For 2017 Niger is allocated an initial 37 MSEK. Close monitoring of the development of the humanitarian situation follows throughout the year for potential additional funds.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW NIGER

Conflict

Niger is politically relatively stable, but the state is weak in capacity. After the 2010 coup d’état and the 2011 elections the situation in the country has remained relatively calm. Niger has like most other countries in the region, two parallel structures of power and administration, the traditional and the official. In particular in regards to civil rights, where cases often are resolved by the traditional legislative system, breaches of human rights and IHL are common. Society is in its organization to a large extent traditional with a clear division between male and female duties and expectations. Nativity rate is the highest in the world and combined with a reduced infant and maternal mortality, as well as general improvement in health, population growth is very rapid. Internally there have been conflicts between Tuareg populations and other inhabitants of Niger. This conflict seems to be less active at the moment.

Background/Underlying cause:

Niger is affected by conflicts in Mali and Nigeria, both where Jihadist separatist movements are active in proclaiming independent Islamic states in the controlled territories, both bordering to Niger and with enforcement of sharia laws on the population. This has triggered population movements and refugees fleeing over the borders into Niger. Despite Niger not being involved in the conflicts in Mali and Nigeria, attacks have been directed to refugees from Nigeria in camps in Niger. As Niger is a very weak state, refugees from Nigeria are more likely to seek asylum and protection in Cameroon, but it is probable that more refugees are going to cross the border into Niger in 2017 due to the deteriorating situation in Nigeria. Seeing the dynamics of the crisis in Mali and Nigeria they are likely to escalate and there is also a risk that similar separatist groups are going to become more active in Niger. The recent terrorist attacks indicate that there are internal Nigerien groups that are being radicalised and that attacks are not only coming from the outside.

Natural Disaster

Niger is one of the most arid countries in the world with only a small percentage of the country’s surface being usable for agricultural production. The Sahel region, including Niger, has a climate and topography that is sensitive to seasonal drought. The natural variation from year to year is exuberated by climate change and desertification. Population increase also drives the need for increase of food production. Indications for 2017 are that it will be a normal year when it comes to agricultural production. This is a recurrent crisis that on a yearly basis leads to a situation where the household reserves and resources are not suffice to last until the next harvest. With population increase and degradation of the environment (desertification), and low usage of irrigation, the traditional coping mechanisms are not enough to cope with the protracted crisis. Since the financial resources on household level is weak, there may be severely malnourished children and adults, despite that food is readily available on the market.

1.1 Geographical areas and affected population

The food insecurity crisis is affecting the whole country. The conflict crisis is concentrated to the areas bordering to Nigeria (Diffa) in the south-east. The most vulnerable groups including women and men, girls and boys who lack social safety nets such as assets, family/extended family and/or transferrable skills are the most sensitive both in regards to the refugee crisis and the food insecurity crisis. Among mobile populations the most vulnerable are out of camp refugees and IDPs who are the least catered to when it comes to both protection and basic humanitarian needs. Also host communities are strained as IDPs settle in informal settlements close to existing communities or are integrated in host families. Communities and individuals are trying to, and have ambitions on how to cope better in the situation they live by maximizing existing resources and by either whole household migration or partial household migration to find work.
Coping strategies, such as diversification of transferrable skills, diversification of crops, improved seed, etc. do often need investments but the resources available are usually not enough to realize the ambitions.

1.2 Risks and threats

Niger is a weak state and there is a risk of spill-over from conflicts in neighbouring countries. The food insecurity analysis is revised on a yearly basis, as each year’s crop affects the next year’s lean season. As most farmers are subsistence farmers, a drought for a year may lead to low or no crop at all for consumption the following year. Internal conflicts and banditry is common and the capacity of police monitoring and the rule of law is low. As Niger is a weak state, it also harbours insurgents from neighbouring countries’ crises. As for financial risks, Niger receives the score 35, on a scale where 100 equals freedom from corruption, from Transparency International. Hence the public sector in Niger, compared to other countries, can be said to be characterised by a medium-high level of corruption. Humanitarian access is limited due to security reasons in the north and east of the country. Lack of infrastructure also makes humanitarian operations difficult.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan

Approximately 1.9 million people in Niger will need humanitarian assistance in 2017, including 1.5 million in the nutrition sector and 1.3 million in the food security sector. The country remains at high risk of flooding and it is anticipated that over 100,000 people will need assistance with recovering their livelihoods and gaining access to basic social services. As of September 2016, some 302,000 Nigerian refugees, IDPs and returnees in the Boko Haram affected region of Diffa were displaced. Food assistance in the area will be required for 340,000 people, including host communities. In addition to conflict related displacement, it is estimated that 200,000 West African and Nigerien migrants will cross the Agadez region next year on their way to Algeria, Libya and Europe. From January to October 2016, 270,000 children were treated for severe acute malnutrition and 317,000 for moderate acute malnutrition. In the same period, over 450,000 people received agricultural support. More could have been achieved with adequate funding: only 46 per cent of HRP funding requirements for Niger were met in 2016 and a 57 per cent shortfall of funding was registered for Diffa on 1 November. Without appropriate resources in 2017, 250,000 children under 5 years of age may suffer from severe acute malnutrition. Around 1.2 million people will remain without hygiene services and potable water, and therefore at heightened risk of infectious disease and malnutrition.

The strategic response plan focuses on interventions targeting humanitarian needs in relation to population movements, malnutrition, food insecurity, epidemics and flooding. The most significant gap in the humanitarian response is in the Diffa region in eastern Niger bordering to Nigeria and Chad.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

Government:
Niger is not able to provide the necessary support and assistance to its population. Niger is rated as the most under-developed country in the world and ranks 187 out of 187 countries in human development index. The Government of Niger is involved mainly through the roadmap for all interventions in Niger, the so called ‘Plan de Soutien’, which includes all humanitarian activities. The initiative 3N (les Nigeriens Nourissent les Nigeriens) provides a framework to respond to emergency needs, food insecurity and recurrent nutritional crisis over the long-term and strengthen the resilience of households. The framework and strategy should however be seen more as a long-term engagement from the side of national authorities, the reality is that their national capacity to manage the recurrent shocks in the country are very limited and resilience is in many aspects more a desk exercise than an actual operationalization. The provinces are rather decentralised and play a certain role in coordination and local ownership.

Civil Society:
Local Nigerien organizations need to develop capacity to be able to scale up support. There are only a few local organizations with national coverage. Local organizations serve as implementing partners for several INGOs in the Diffa province.
2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

Leadership and Coordination:
The coordination among government and humanitarian partners is relatively effective and operationalized through the cluster system. There are eight humanitarian clusters active at the national level and three working groups; one group on early recovery/resilience; one on refugees and the multisector response to their needs; and a third group on NFI. Clusters are present and rolled-out on a district and local level. What Sida has noted is also that UN organizations which have had a longer presence in the country and which work on both emergencies and medium-term development coordinate more closely among themselves, and not necessarily with OCHA, which does not actively integrate resilience in its work.

Humanitarian Agencies:
UN agencies with direct support from Sida/Hum have a well-functioning system of using and reporting on Sida contributions. Coordination will be increasingly important with increased response and new partners intervening in Diffa. Since there are no reliable commercial domestic carriers operating in Niger, United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and humanitarian flight services will continue to be an important function. INGOs are very strong in Niger and have a presence in cluster coordination and Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO)/HRP development.

2.3 International and Regional assistance

Donors:
In 2016 the largest humanitarian donors are the US, ECHO, Japan, the UK, Sweden and Norway. The HRP is funded to less than 50% in December 2016.

Regional Organizations:
For regional organizations please see the Sahel regional analysis at the beginning of this document.

3. Sida’s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1 Sida’s role

Earlier assistance and results:
Sida has supported humanitarian response in Niger for several years. The response has shifted according to changing needs and in function of climate variations and conflicts in neighbouring countries.

Lessons learnt:
Niger is increasingly becoming a forgotten crisis. The protracted refugee crisis due to the Mali crisis is slowly being phased out as refugees either spontaneously return to Mali or integrate in Niger. The chronic food crisis is not met by development interventions to curb the negative trend of need of food assistance to large populations. With the incrementing effects of the Nigeria crisis resources are mobilized by shifting funding from protracted crisis response to the emerging situations in Diffa. This puts an emphasis on durable solutions and exit strategies in refugee and IDP crisis as humanitarian funding is not increasing to match the increase in needs.

3.2 Response Priorities 2017

Humanitarian Focus:
The focus for 2017 will be further directed to respond to the immediate needs due to the Nigeria crisis in Diffa. Food security will focus on infant malnutrition and resilience initiatives with a high degree of learning and innovative pilot approaches will continuously be supported. Coordination and access will continue to be a priority. All Sida funded work in Niger need to have gender integration in the programming leading to gender equality and environmental consequence assessments leading to conservation of nature and efficient use of resources included in the proposals.
Synergies with Development:
Since Sweden does not have a bilateral development strategy for Niger, partnering with other bilateral donors nationally and regionally is crucial in order to secure responsible phasing out and transition from recovery to development. The most relevant at this point would be European Commission and UNDP.

3.3 Partners
Framework agreements:
Six of Sida’s strategic partners have submitted project proposals for Niger in 2017. Out of these six, five have been accepted, including Action Contre la Faim (ACF), Save the Children, Swedish Mission Council (SMC), Plan, and the International Rescue Committee (IRC). In addition, three multilateral partners will receive funding in 2017, including the ICRC, UNOCHA, and the UN Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS). All of Sida’s proposed partners for Mali in 2017 have aligned their operations with the national HRP, except for the ICRC.

ACF: In Niger, ACF is operating in the LAC region, more specifically in Diffa. Apart from the WASH project, ACF is also working with advocacy in Niger, promoting the strict application of the humanitarian principles in the deliverance of aid.

SCI: Save the Children will be supported in 2017 for their project in the Diffa Region. Save the Children has an added value in their extensive experience working with child protection issues, and will consequently establish child protection committees in the refugee populations, but also in the returnee, IDP, and host communities.

SMC: The Swedish Mission Council’s project in Niger is implemented by the organization International Aid Services (IAS). IAS are operating in the Diffa Region, where they are conducting a WASH project, targeting people affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, including refugee populations and host communities.

Plan: Plan International have received funding in 2017 for their project in Niger. More specifically, the area of intervention will be the Diffa Region, where Plan will focus on Child Protection, Nutrition, and Education.

IRC: In their Niger project, IRC will make use of their ADAPT framework when responding to the needs of the beneficiaries. The funds will not be restricted to a particular sector, rather it will be the humanitarian imperative that will guide IRC’s response. For Niger, the area of focus for the intervention will be the Diffa Region.

ICRC: In the 2017 initial allocation, ICRC is supported with unearmarked funds for protection and IHL surveillance monitoring.

UNHAS: UNHAS is allocated Sida funding in Mali for 2017 due to their important role in the humanitarian logistics cluster.

OCHA: The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNOCHA, will be supported with unearmarked funding in 2017.
## Sida’s humanitarian assistance to Niger in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended Sida support</th>
<th>partner for</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming)</th>
<th>Proposed amount (MSEK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nutrition, WASH, health</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td></td>
<td>Child protection, education, health</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td></td>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Education in emergencies</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHAS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian Air Services</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian coordination</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td></td>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Protection, IHL</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL: 37 MSEK**
For 2017 Cameroon is allocated an initial 33 MSEK. Close monitoring follows the humanitarian situation throughout the year for potentially additional funds.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW CAMEROON

During 2016 the humanitarian funding to Cameroon has increased significantly. Humanitarian needs have risen sharply during the last few years and the crisis has gradually shifted from two distinct refugee crisis (CAR crisis and Nigeria crisis) affecting the east and the north, to a mixt setting crisis including a high number of IDPs. Food insecurity and nutrition status has risen to be on pair with neighbouring countries. The previous low degree of funding to Cameroon has been connected to a low presence of partner organizations able to intervene. During the year IRC, ACF and PLAN have strengthened their presence in the north and started response programmes, both to refugees and IDPs as well as to host communities.

Conflict

Cameroon is not suffering from significant internal conflict, but need to handle the consequences of conflicts in Nigeria and CAR. Spill-over effects is being seen in the far north when elements belonging to Boko Haram start to attack villages on the Cameroonian side of the Nigeria/Cameroon border.

Natural Disaster

Cameroon is situated between the desert and semi-arid north towards Lake Chad and rainforests in the south. Some of the world’s highest annual rainfalls are recorded in locations in Cameroon with an average of over 10 000 mm/year. The northern part of the country has a typical Sahel-climate with distinct dry and rainy seasons. 2016 seems to have been a normal year in terms of rainfall and shortcomings in harvests is more due to conflict than climatic reasons.

Strategic objectives identified in the Humanitarian Response Plan

As many as 3 million people will need humanitarian assistance and protection in Cameroon in 2017. Boko Haram-related violence has displaced around 200,000 Cameroonians internally and led to an influx of some 74,000 Nigerians in the Far North region. Some 274,000 Central African refugees have sought refuge in the East, Adamou and North regions. In total, 2.6 million people in the country are food insecure to the point of crisis or emergency levels. Severe acute malnutrition (SAM) is touching the 2 per cent emergency threshold in one district in the Far North. In 2016, humanitarian actors assisted 722,000 people in Cameroon. Food was delivered to 405,000 people, health services provided to 263,000 people and nutritional support to over 100,000 people. Despite a dangerous and difficult operating environment, this year humanitarian partners reached over 266,000 people with humanitarian assistance in the Far North region. Nevertheless, the threat posed by explosive hazards in this region continues to impede humanitarian access. Without sufficient funding, the lives of 288,000 severely food insecure people and 314,000 girls and boys under 5 years old suffering from severe and moderate acute malnutrition will be endangered. Equally, tens of thousands of children will not go to school and hundreds of thousands of women and men will at the mercy of violence, especially in the Far North region.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

Government

Government generally has more resources than the countries in the rest of the Sahel region. Cameroon ranks 152 out of 176 assessed countries in the world. It is a similar level to Nigeria.
Civil Society
Civil society is active and organised in predominantly for development including human rights and environment.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

Leadership and Coordination:
OCHA is in the process of getting established and organising the humanitarian relief actions. As humanitarian actors are in the process of finding their space in Cameroon, the role of OCHA is crucial to mobilise and organise response. UNHCR has sectorial lead for coordination, but is supported by the OCHA office.

Humanitarian Agencies:
The overall response is lead and coordinated by UNHCR according to the joint statement on refugee dominated humanitarian crisis between UNHCR and OCHA. As humanitarian needs increase due to spill-over effects from the Nigeria crisis more and more humanitarian agencies are established and/or are up-scaling their activities.

2.3 International and Regional assistance

Donors:
Largest donors are US and Japan followed by ECHO and CERF has granted further funds to Cameroon for humanitarian relief.

Regional Organizations:
For many agencies Cameroon fall outside the Sahel-mandate and is organised together with CAR and/or DRC.

3. Sida's HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1 Sida's role

Earlier assistance and results:
Sida has previously funded UNHCR in Cameroon through regional CAR response and recently redirected PLAN funding to education in emergencies for Nigerian refugees. Support to the humanitarian response has also been given through secondments of experts through the MSB. During 2016 IRC has received RRM funding for the north and MSB/UNWOMEN have funding for an SGBV project in refugee camps.

Lessons learnt:
As Cameroon is an emerging country for humanitarian relief, and only few partners are present, despite high needs mostly connected to refugees from CAR and Nigeria, it is important to look into what are the delaying factors for humanitarian agencies to getting started in response in a country in a spill-over protracted crisis environment.

3.2 Response Priorities 2016

Humanitarian Focus:
The humanitarian focus for 2017 will be to answer and scale up response to reach the 2,9 million people in Cameroon with humanitarian needs. The target for 2017 is 1,2 Million beneficiaries. The total funding requirement is 309,6 MUSD.

Synergies with Development:
Durable solutions are advocated to and sought with partner both in Eastern Cameroon and Northern Cameroon. From Eastern Cameroon a lesson can be learned that durable solutions need to be started early in the response process, not to prolong humanitarian needs in the form of food and/or cash support.
3.3 Partners

All four of the strategic partners’ who submitted project proposals to Sida for 2017 will receive funding. The organizations are Action Contra la Faim (ACF), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Plan International, and the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC). Furthermore, three multilateral partners will receive Sida funding in 2017, including UNOCHA, UNHAS, and WFP. All of Sida’s partners have aligned their operations with the national HRP, except for the IFRC.

**ACF:** ACF’s programme in Cameroon aims at improving the Health situation for populations in the LAC region, more specifically in the Logone and Chari areas.

**IRC:** IRC’s programme in the Logone and Chari areas in northern Cameroon aims at assisting the crisis affected populations through Cash-Based Interventions, Psychosocial Support, and a Microfinance project.

**Plan:** Plan’s response in Cameroon is focused on the Minawao refugee camp and several host communities in the northern regions. In Cameroon, Plan are focusing on Child Protection and Early Childhood Care.

**IFRC:** The 2017 support to IFRC in Cameroon goes to a Swedish Red Cross (SRC) secondment, strengthening the Federation’s presence in the Central African region. The delegate will focus on the East and Adamawa regions.

**OCHA:** In Cameroon, OCHA is underway getting established and starting up HCT work in support to UNHCR.

**UNHAS:** The United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) provides the humanitarian response in Cameroon with necessary logistical support.

**WFP:** Support to national food security response plan.

### Sida’s humanitarian assistance to Cameroon in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended Sida support</th>
<th>partner for</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming)</th>
<th>Proposed amount (MSEK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Nutrition, WASH, environment</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td></td>
<td>Multisector</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Child protection</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHAS</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Refugees Eastern (CAR crisis allocation)</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Food Security (CAR crisis allocation)</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Refugees Eastern (CAR crisis allocation)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Food Security (CAR crisis allocation)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL: 33 MSEK**