LAKE CHAD BASIN CRISIS
HUMANITARIAN CRISES ANALYSIS 2018
(with country chapters on Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger)
December 2017

Each year, Sida conducts a humanitarian allocation exercise in which a large part of its humanitarian budget is allocated to emergencies worldwide. This allocation takes place in the beginning of the year, as to ensure predictability for humanitarian organisations and to allow for best possible operational planning. To truly adhere to the humanitarian principles, Sida bases its allocation decisions on a number of objective indicators and parameters of which the most important are related to the number of affected people, vulnerability of affected people and level of funding in previous years. One of the indicators is also related to forgotten crises in order to ensure sufficient funding to low profile crises. Besides this initial allocation, another part of the humanitarian budget is set aside as an emergency reserve for sudden onset emergencies and deteriorating humanitarian situations. This reserve allows Sida to quickly allocate funding to any humanitarian situation throughout the year, including additional funding to the Lake Chad Basin Crisis.

For 2018, the Lake Basin Crisis allocated an initial 257.2 Million Swedish Kronor (MSEK). Close monitoring of the situation in the four affected countries will continue throughout the year for potential additional funding or amendments.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

1.1. Type of Crisis/ Disaster

Conflict

- **Background/Underlying cause:** The conflict in the countries covering the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad) has its roots in the Islamic salafi-jihadi movement called Boko Haram which used to be based in Maiduguri in Borno state of Nigeria. The movement has an ambition to impose a stricter interpretation of Sharia laws to, as the movement claim, fight widespread corruption, that is a result from western (colonial) education and values. From the formal establishment of the group in 2009 internal violence in Nigeria escalated. In 2014 it reached a level were in a short period of time about 2.3 million people fled their homes. Of these over 200,000 fled across the border to neighbouring countries, most of them to Niger and Cameroon. An increased offensive of Nigerian army to fight the Boko Haram movement, establishment of multi-national joint force, and probably other factors, have led to a spread of Boko Haram aggressions in the neighbouring countries. For a long time, there was a denial in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, that there was a “home grown” extremist movement, but as borders between the countries were closed and security tightened up, a slow realisation has evolved showing that there are fractions of the movement that are part of national security concerns in all four countries. The area around Lake Chad in all four countries have the commonality of being the least developed part of each country, and in large being very far from the capitals. An internal cross-border trade and economy has evolved, but in combination with population growth and environmental degradation, as well as the feeling among people that they were being neglected by their states, created a growing-ground for an anti-governments movement.

- **Main stakeholders in the conflict:** The conflict is an asymmetrical conflict with on one side the Boko Haram, and later the fraction calling itself IS West Africa. Early in the process it was decided that an international UN stabilisation/peacekeeping mission was not the desired way to move forwards with the security concerns of the Lake Chad Basin area. Instead a four-country joint mission was created and gained funding from the respective governments and internationally. The multi-national joint force has tried to secure the lake area, by evacuating the people living on the islands, but this has led to massive displacements and the loss of livelihoods of many people.

- **Cross border implications:** The refugee situation of Nigerians in Chad, Niger and Cameroon has triggered different types of refugee response in the respective countries. In Cameroon, there is an encampment only policy and all Nigerian refugees are placed in one camp outside of Maroua in the extreme north of the country (Minawao Refugee Camp). In Chad, a similar approach was chosen and
the establishment of the Dar es Salaam camp near Baga Sola was the only refugee option for Nigerians in Chad. In Niger, the initial approach was to host Nigerian refugees in host communities, but as security issues and some doubts that some of the refugees also could have affiliations with Boko Haram, a mixed approach was elaborated in cooperation with UNHCR.

- **Trends:** Triparty agreements have been elaborated between Nigeria UNHCR and Cameroon, Chad and Niger respectively on the safe return of Nigerians to their homes. In Cameroon, this has taken on a dimension were the returns are more of a refoulement nature and discussions on the safety of returning Nigerians is being questioned, as they for the most part are not able to regain their homes, but are instead hosted in IDP camps in Nigeria.

**Natural Disaster**

- **Nature of disaster:** The effects of climate change, lack of livelihoods, demographic growth and insecurity are central driving forces in the Lake Chad Basin Crisis. The two rivers running up into Lake Chad (Logone and Chari) are heavily exploited for irrigation along their river basins. Lake Chad is an endorheic lake basin with very shallow open water surfaces. The deepest parts of the lake are just over 10 metres deep. This makes the lake extremely sensitive to fluctuations in water inflow and temperature that affects evaporation with a consequence that the open water surface today is only 10% of what was observed during the 1970s. The dried-out lake basin is mostly decertified and are saline due to a large concentration of natron.

- **Frequency:** The vulnerability of households is part of the yearly weather conditions, but also the general cyclical climate pattern, where three distinct seasons (March-July hot, dry; July-October, wet warm; and November-March, cooler, dry) define what can be grown and where water can be found. A rainy season that has been dryer than normal can result in devastating effects as well as heavy rains that can cause flooding and flash-floods that inundate fields and wash away crops.

- **Resilience and coping mechanisms:** Populations are generally used to and have adapted to the climatic conditions and lack of basic services. Many children have never been to school, because there has never been one there for them; and health facilities are rarely or never visited, because of the lack of them or poor services. For livelihoods, diversification and semi-nomadic lifestyles as well as trade and seasonal migrant work has kept the population afloat. However, with conflict, climate change and population growth, these coping mechanisms have been undermined or completely eroded.

1.2. **Geographical areas and affected population**

- The geographic area affected by the crisis is relatively limited. The number of people affected in the greater lake area are in the excess of 17 million and people in need are close to 11 million. Most of the beneficiaries are found in Nigeria, followed by Cameroon, Niger and Chad.

- The general level of vulnerability is very high and depends specific aspects of vulnerability and conditions and perspectives for crisis affected women, men, girls and boys, including the displaced persons, refugees, the elderly and persons who belong to marginalised social and ethnic groups.

1.3. **Critical Assumptions, risks and threats**

- The outlook when writing this analysis is that there is a process of normalisation in all four countries, but with the large number of persons displaced and the need to recover infrastructure and livelihoods as well as rebuilding, or building infrastructure and basic services, the task of return to normalcy is a long-term commitment between governments, humanitarian agencies and development partners.

- Security threats and unpredictable political scenarios make any assumption on either improvement or deterioration difficult to foresee. Elections will be held in the coming years in Cameroon and Nigeria, and that presents risk that could trigger civil unrest.

1.4. **Strategic Objectives and Priorities of the Country Humanitarian Response Plan**
The targeted population in relation to people in need has increased over the last year due to improved security and access. Needs are a mix of crisis related needs and development deficit needs and that is reflected in the Lake Chad Basin Response Plan where durable solutions and humanitarian needs are integrated in the response plan.

- The strategic objective of the response plan has a focus on protection issues and reduction of vulnerabilities and is a multisectoral response. Clusters are activated in all four countries.
- The 2018 LCB HRP targets 7.8 million of 10.7 million people in need. It has a funding requirement of USD1.6 billion. The funding requirement of the Nigeria Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) is USD156.6 million.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1. National and local capacities and constraints

- **Government** (national, sub-national, local): There is a great difference in national capacities in the four countries. Nigeria has better capacity, followed by Cameroon both having relatively good government infrastructure and services. The case for Chad and Niger is that there is a deficit in government infrastructure and services. There is a commission in place for the Lake Chad that deals with security, environmental and economic issues regarding the area. This commission has been more active lately and the first conference in a series of three has been organised in N'Djamena in November 2017.

2.2. International operational capacities and constraints

- **Leadership and Coordination**: Humanitarian coordination is done on a country by country level. However, some regional functions are starting to be put in pace such as a regional civil-military coordination officer in N'Djamena. UNHAS is also flying directly between N'Djamena to Maroua, and are exploring opportunities to start connecting also Maiduguri, Diffa and Bol in a more regular manner.

3. SIDA’s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1. The role of Sida

- **Earlier assistance and results**: Sida humanitarian (?) support has been focused on the Lake Chad Basin areas of the four concerned countries since the start of the crisis. Several partners are supported in all four countries.
- **Lessons learnt**: The regional aspect of the crisis as well as the cross-border aspects have been largely overlooked as security has made it virtually impossible to travel overland between the countries. Four separate HCTs have not brought regional aspects to the analysis, other than the UNHCR Nigeria RRRP and the Humanitarian Needs and Requirement Overview compiled by UNOCHA.

3.2. Response Priorities 2018

- **Humanitarian Focus**: Sida will continue to support humanitarian response in all four concerned countries to respond to the needs due to the Lake Chad Basin crisis. Regional support will focus on access and refugee response. All Sida funded interventions must include gender integration and environmental consequence descriptions leading towards conservation of nature and plans for effective use of resources included in the proposals. Conflict analysis and a “do no harm” analysis is also required.
3.3. **Partners**

- Each country support to partners is presented in a separate HCA with its own analysis, but kept together under the understanding of the Lake Chad Basin Crisis response. The only regional partners are WFP Chad to provide a regional UNHAS support to facilitate access between N’Djamena, Maroua, Maiduguri, and Diffa, and support to the UNHCR Nigeria situation RRRP.

3.4. **Strategic Funding in Protracted Crises**

FAO has been selected as a strategic partner for durable solutions in the four countries with multiyear agreements in Chad, Niger and Cameroon which started in 2017, making 2018 year two of a three-year support. Nigeria had a one-year support in 2017 and will be considered for a three-year intervention starting 2018.

Plan, Swedish Red Cross, OXFAM and IRC are also supported provided funding for multi-year projects.

3.5. **Synergies with Long-term Development Aid**

Sweden has no bilateral support to any of the countries in the Lake Chad Basin. Sweden has an Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria that monitors trade and politics, but has no Sida staff. The Sida regional strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa could play a role in the future to link interventions that address root causes of the crisis.

### SIDA’s HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO Lake Chad Basin in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming)</th>
<th>Proposed amount by Sida (SEK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR Nigeria RRRP</td>
<td>Refugee response</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Multisector</td>
<td>138,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Multisector</td>
<td>35,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Multisector</td>
<td>39,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Multisector</td>
<td>39,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>261,2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Sida multi-year humanitarian investment is made with one of the following purposes:

A. Humanitarian assistance in protracted crises, in line with multi-year Humanitarian Response Plan (only in contexts with multi-year humanitarian planning).

B. Transition/phase out of humanitarian assistance (handing over to development and national/local actors according to a proposed plan within a specific time-frame).

C. Humanitarian assistance in specifically hard-to-reach areas. Based on the observation that in many of today’s humanitarian contexts, few actors tend to have access to those with the greatest needs, Sida would like to encourage partners to build strong and durable relations with concerned stakeholders in a view to facilitate swift and efficient access also to areas considered more challenging to reach.
1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

1.1. Type of Crisis/ Disaster

Conflict

- **Background/Underlying cause:** The conflict between Nigerian security forces and the armed group that calls itself the Islamic State’s West Africa Province, also known as Boko Haram, continues in Nigeria’s north-eastern states. Hostilities escalated into conflict in May 2013, and in 2014 Boko Haram had reportedly seized control of a territory the size of Belgium. Despite government forces regaining control in most of the Local Government Areas of the three states most affected by the conflict (i.e. Borno, Yobe and Adamawa), their control is limited to major towns and roads, and Boko Haram still has a substantial capacity for inflicting destruction and casualties. Among other tactics that the group employs, it is noted for its use of suicide bombers. Since mid-2016, Boko Haram has been split into two rival factions – one operating in the Sambisa forest in the eastern part of Borno state and loyal to Abubakar Shekau, the group’s leader since 2009; the other operating in the north of Borno along Lake Chad and the Niger border, led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi proclaimed to the group’s commander-in-chief by the Islamic State. Although violence erupted in 2009, the underlying causes are what many refer to as a development crisis dating back to the days of the British colonial rule. The disparities between north and south that were established then have since been further exacerbated by the oil-induced economic upswing of the south and extensive neglect of the north. The petroleum industry has created revenues that have enabled Nigeria to become a middle-income country and Africa’s largest economy, something that is difficult to comprehend when visiting the desperately poor north-eastern Nigeria. In fact, 46% of the population in Nigeria and 77% in the northeast live below the poverty line and has no, or very limited, access to health care, education, safe drinking water or other basic goods and services. More than a religious fundamentalist movement, Boko Haram should consequently be understood as the result of the longstanding neglect of the people living in the north-eastern part of the country.

- **Main stakeholders in the conflict:** In addition to the Nigerian army, forces deployed by Cameroon, Chad and Niger are also fighting the group near their borders, in particular as part of the Multinational Joint Task Force. The United States and United Kingdom are also known to be undertaking advise-and-assist missions throughout Nigeria and the Lake Chad area. But even though the Nigerian government receives foreign support and the conflict has a spill-over effect on neighbouring countries, this is in essence a conflict between the Nigerian state and a Salafi-jihadi insurgency whose stated goal is to overthrow the state and create an Islamic state.

- **Cross border implications:** The conflict in Nigeria has led to over 200,000 refugees crossing the border to neighbouring countries, mainly Cameroon and Niger. An intensification of the Nigerian army’s military operations to defeat Boko Haram has contributed to the group crossing the borders into neighbouring countries and carrying out attacks on the territories of Cameroon and Niger in particular.

- **Trends:** The present humanitarian situation should be understood within a context of protracted conflict where a large portion of the population remains displaced and in dire need of humanitarian protection and assistance. The improvements that have been made since the last quarter of 2016 would most likely not be sustained if humanitarian support was discontinued. A shift can however be observed with an increasing focus on early recovery and more sustainable outcomes.

1.2. Geographical areas and affected population

The conflict has in particular affected Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states, with Borno being the epicentre of the crisis. The humanitarian consequences are dire and include massive destruction of vital infrastructure, a collapse of livelihoods and markets, widespread displacement and brutal attacks on the civilian population. Over 20,000 people have been killed, more than 4,000 people have been abducted, 1.7 million remain
displaced, mainly in Borno state, and over 200,000 Nigerians have fled to neighbouring countries. The number of people estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe has been reduced from 8.5 million in 2017 to 7.7 million. The massive scale up of humanitarian assistance since late 2016 has been critical to this reduction. It is estimated that during the next lean season (June-Aug 2018), approx. 3.7 million people may be within the three critical food insecurity situations (Cadre Harmonisé 3-5) with over 12,000 facing famine. 6.7 million people are considered to be in need of protection and 2.7 million out of those are targeted in the HRP. Under-five and maternal mortality rates are amongst the highest in the world. An estimated 930,000 people still remain in areas controlled by Boko Haram and are cut off from basic services and humanitarian assistance. These people are, without any doubt, extremely vulnerable. In addition, women- and child-headed households are considered to be amongst the most vulnerable including a higher risk of sexual and physical violence. Men and adolescent boys are at risk of forced recruitment by armed actors, arrest and detention, as well as being disadvantaged in terms of access to assistance because of suspicions that they might be members or supporters of Boko Haram.

1.3. Critical Assumptions, risks and threats

Having been thwarted in its insurgency, Boko Haram appears to be increasing its use of suicide bombers. A trend, where the level of hostilities has been reduced but asymmetric warfare has increased, can be expected to continue as government forces continue their efforts to defeat the group. This increases the risk of civilians, including humanitarian staff, being killed in suicide attacks. Many fear that the elections in 2019 might have a negative impact on the conflict dynamic, such as politicians using military operations in the northeast to profile themselves in the running for elections. Risks related to humanitarian operations include challenges to recruit qualified and experienced staff leading to poor quality of the response, corruption (Nigeria ranking 136/176 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, 2016), and decreasing levels of funding that could be seen already in 2018. Attacks directly targeting humanitarian operations could have an immediate and devastating impact on humanitarian support being provided as it would most likely lead to a suspension of humanitarian operations.

1.4. Strategic Objectives and Priorities of the Country Humanitarian Response Plan

While an estimated 14.5 million people across six states in north-eastern Nigeria are in need of humanitarian assistance, the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2018 will focus only on the needs in the three most affected states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. An estimated 7.7 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in these three states and the HRP targets the needs of the most vulnerable 6.1 million people.

The Strategic Objectives of the Nigeria HRP 2018 are:

- Provide life-saving emergency assistance to the most vulnerable people in conflict-affected areas.
- Ensure that all assistance promotes the protection, safety and dignity of affected people, and is provided equitably to men, women, boys and girls.
- Foster resilience and early recovery, and strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus by working towards collective outcomes.

As a result of the scaling up of food, livelihoods and nutrition assistance in 2017, food security and nutrition levels have improved throughout the northeast. Nevertheless, with 3.5 million people in need of nutrition interventions and 3.7 million projected to be food insecure and considered to be in crisis or emergency phases of food and nutrition insecurity (Cadre Harmonisé 3-5) during the upcoming lean season (June to August 2018), food security and nutrition account for almost half of the HRP budget (49.5%). There will also be an increased focus on protection, in particular the issue of sexual violence.

As the crisis enters its 9th year, the UN shifts to a multi-year strategy to cover the period 2018-2020. This move represents a paradigm shift that is accompanied by a commitment from the international humanitarian community to align with the Government’s Economic and Recovery Growth Plan (2017-2020), the Buhari Plan for the comprehensive humanitarian relief and socio-economic stabilization of the North-East and the UN Sustainable Development Partner Framework (2018-2022), and to bridge the humanitarian and development divide in north-east Nigeria. The overall objective of the 2018-2020 strategy is to continue to deliver life-saving assistance and protection in the North East of Nigeria, while simultaneously strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus to lay the foundations for recovery and development, and advocate with government and development actors to effectively address the drivers of vulnerabilities, underlying structural
issues and the root causes of the crisis. A shift that is to some extent similar to the UN’s shift can be noted in the operational priorities of the ICRC projecting to shift the focus of assistance activities in the northeast to livelihood support. The ICRC will also continue to expand its protection and assistance activities, prioritizing remote areas that few or no other organisations can reach while gradually handing over some activities in other areas to organisations that have been scaling up their operations.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1. National and local capacities and constraints

- **Government** (national, sub-national, local): Although the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) is responsible for disaster response according to national legislation, other government institutions compete to play a lead role in the humanitarian response. This contributes to making an already challenging coordination with the government even more problematic. The government has addressed humanitarian needs to some extent and has provided assistance to affected people during 2017, mainly food. However, considering the strong Nigerian economy they should be able to do more which indicates that the willingness to provide resources to the crisis is limited. In Nigeria, the government has the lead in the humanitarian response, UN agencies and NGOs being partners and co-lead in the sectors. At the state level, the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) coordinates the humanitarian response. NEMA coordinates the crisis response between OCHA and relevant ministries. Both NEMA and SEMA have limited capacities though, both when it comes to response to existing humanitarian needs and coordination between the different actors involved resulting in the humanitarian community taking a greater responsibility.

- **Civil Society** (national, sub-national, local): Civil society organisations in Nigeria have a low capacity to manage humanitarian operations. As the need for implementing partners is big the number of national/ local NGOs engaged in the crisis has increased and the establishment of a CBPF has opened up the opportunity for these organisations to get direct funding. An important national humanitarian actor is the Nigerian Red Cross Society (NRCS). In the North-East, the NRCS works in close collaboration with the ICRC and can reach areas inaccessible to other actors.

2.2. International operational capacities and constraints

- **Leadership and Coordination**: Nigeria has a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), supported by a Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator, who leads the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). OCHA plays a critical role in coordination and information management, and assists the HC in the management of the Nigerian Humanitarian Fund (NHF). Cluster/sector coordination mechanisms exist to provide sector level coordination and leadership. In 2017, Sida’s engagement and key messages to both humanitarian organisations and donors to the crisis have focused on the importance of improving the quality of the response as well as ensuring the response reaches people in hard-to-reach areas. Support to the establishment of humanitarian hubs outside of Maiduguri and field trips to hard-to-reach areas to follow up on the implementation of projects have been important elements of this engagement. Sida also sits on the Advisory Board of the Nigerian Humanitarian Fund (NHF).

- **Humanitarian Agencies**: Sida’s partners all work in the most severely affected areas that are accessible to humanitarian organisations. The ICRC is focusing on hard-to-reach areas that cannot be reached by others and there appears to be a good coordination between the ICRC and other humanitarian actors when it comes to geographical coverage. The organisations working in Nigeria have since late 2016 focused extensively on scaling up humanitarian assistance. It was noted during 2017 that many organisations were facing difficulties to absorb the funding received and there is now a need to focus on improving the quality of the response and ensure that staff with the right expertise and experience are recruited.

2.3. International and Regional assistance

**Donors**: As of 5 December 2017, the US$1.1 billion HRP appeal was funded by 69.3% (US$731 millions). The US alone contributed to approximately 37% of the funding of the HRP, followed by the UK (18%), Germany (13%) and ECHO (12%). Sweden is the fifth largest institutional donor to the Nigeria HRP (4%).

2.4. Access Situation
Although access to affected populations has improved, it remains a major challenge. Most places in Borno State, outside of Maiduguri, can only be reached by helicopter. This limits the possibility for humanitarian staff to visit project sites for support to implementing staff and partners, and follow up on the implementation which has a negative impact on the quality of the response. Access to affected populations is only possible in areas controlled by Nigerian security forces which poses challenges for a principled humanitarian approach.

3. SIDAs HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1. The role of Sida

- **Earlier assistance and results**: Prior to 2016, Sida’s humanitarian support to Nigeria was limited to only a few partners and projects. As the extent of the crisis unfolded, and humanitarian organisations began to gain access to affected populations, Sida increased its support. At the end of 2017, Sida’s support had reached 240 MSEK, including 105 MSEK to the new CBPF established in February 2017. Sida’s contribution at the launch of the fund (35 MSEK) helped swift recruitment and setting up of the fund was made possible. Sida’s support to MSB in 2016 (55 MSEK) has also allowed MSB and IOM to move on from the establishment of a base camp for humanitarian staff in Maiduguri to the establishment of field hubs in, so far, 4 strategic field locations in Borno state. Other organisations that were supported in 2017 were OCHA, WFP, FAO, UNICEF, IOM, ICRC, ACF, IRC and Plan International.

- **Lessons learnt**: Through its visits to follow up on its strategic partners’ implementation of projects and programs, Sida notes that there is a need to consolidate the humanitarian operations that have been established and massively scaled up since late 2016, as well as a need to improve the quality of the response. Sida’s initial allocation for Nigeria in 2018 will therefore remain the same as for 2017.

3.2. Response Priorities 2018

- **Humanitarian Focus**: The focus of Sida’s humanitarian support in Nigeria will, as in the HRP, be on life-saving emergency assistance to the most vulnerable people in conflict-affected areas. Enhancing the protection of affected populations will also be critical. While early recovery and livelihood support will be in focus in areas with relative stability, expanding to newly accessible areas will also be in focus. Geographically, the most affected states, Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, will be prioritised.

- **Field follow-up**: Sida will continue its efforts to follow up the implementation of partner organisations’ interventions as far out in the field as possible. As there is a risk that the situation deteriorates in terms of food security and nutrition during the next lean season, this will be followed closely. The appropriateness of the response will also be assessed in terms of emergency response versus early recovery, as well as the geographical focus to avoid duplication on the one hand, and little or no services on the other, in particular in hard-to-reach areas.

3.3. Partners

Based on the needs and priorities in the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), as well as on operational capacities and technical expertise, Sida will provide support to OCHA, NHF (CBPF), WFP, FAO, UNICEF, IOM, ICRC, NRC, ACF, IRC and Plan International. Sida monitors each partner’s adherence to gender marker codes, conflict sensitivity and resilience, and reviews project proposals for 2018 to ensure that supported projects are coordinated within the broader humanitarian response to the crisis.

OCHA: Sida will continue to support OCHA who plays a critical role in the coordination of the humanitarian response in Nigeria, and has contributed to an improvement in coordination amongst humanitarian organisations as well as with local and national authorities.

NHF (CBPF): The NHF is another critical instrument for ensuring a better coordination of the humanitarian response and also enables local NGOs to receive direct funding. The fund has encountered challenges in staffing but does now have most of its staff in place. Sida’s support to the NHF in 2017 was very significant to allow the fund to be set up quickly after its launch and to enable a first allocation. As of 2018, the level of funding will be lower to pair with Sida’s support to CBPFs in other contexts.
WFP: The scale up of food assistance has been massive since the third quarter of 2016 and WFP has been absolutely critical in averting the famine that was threatening the north-eastern part of Nigeria in early 2017. Not reaching the initial target set at the beginning of the year, WFP will have to carry over part of the 2017 budget to 2018. Sida will therefore, in its initial allocation, focus its support to WFP’s contributions to the humanitarian community’s logistics (UNHAS and ETC).

FAO: In order to prevent people from falling back into extreme food insecurity, a balance between lifesaving support and more durable solutions is essential. With a large portion of the population in north-eastern Nigeria being farmers, FAO’s support to agriculture is therefore critical. Sida will consequently continue its support to FAO in 2018.

UNICEF: UNICEF is sector lead in nutrition, education, WASH and the child protection sub-sector in Nigeria and an important partner in especially nutrition and health. Like other actors, UNICEF has scaled up its operations in the northeast and Sida will continue to support them in 2018.

IOM: IOM plays an important role in camp coordination and camp management and does also provide the humanitarian community with critical data on displacement through its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). They are also an important provider of psychosocial and livelihood support. As they have experienced difficulties in implementing their planned activities in 2017, Sida will reduce its support in its initial allocation.

NRC: During field follow-up, Sida has noted that NRC is a strong humanitarian actor who provides an effective and adequate response. In 2018, NRC will continue to focus on food security and livelihoods, shelter, WASH, and ICLA. They do also intend to provide support to education. Sida will continue to support them.

ICRC: The ICRC is a critical actor when it comes to ensuring that humanitarian assistance and protection reach affected people in hard-to-reach areas. As other humanitarian organisations have scaled up their operations outside of Maiduguri, ICRC has moved into new areas not covered by others and in 2018 they are planning to expand further. The ICRC is also a central actor when it comes to protection interventions visiting people held in relation to the conflict, and urging respect for IHL and other norms through dialogue with the authorities, weapon bearers and civil society.

ACF: Follow-up in the field has allowed Sida to note that ACF’s interventions have an important impact for affected populations and Sida will continue to provide support to ACF in 2018. ACF’s is proposing an intervention that is similar in focus as the one Sida supported in 2017, addressing needs in the areas of nutrition and health, food security and livelihoods and WASH.

IRC: IRC is an important actor when it comes to addressing nutrition and health in particular, and with their mobile clinics they can respond quickly to needs that emerge. The programme that IRC is planning to implement in 2018 does also include focus on protection which Sida sees as a strategic approach for addressing violations committed against the civilian population.

Plan International: Many other humanitarian actors focus on IDP camps and one of Plan International’s added values is their choice to provide support outside of the camps. In 2018, the organisation is embarking on a two-year project that will focus on providing child protection, GBV and livelihood support to at-risk children and survivors of violence. Enhancing the protection of affected populations is priority for Sida who will support Plan to implement this project.

3.4. Strategic Funding in Protracted Crises

Two of Sida’s partners will receive multiyear funding in Nigeria as of 2018, FAO and Plan International. FAO will receive multi-year funding that falls in the category of Humanitarian assistance in protracted crises, in line with multi-year Humanitarian Response Plan (or in the case of Nigeria multiyear strategy underpinning the HRP) (Category A). Funding provided late in the year from many donors has been a challenge for FAO and Sida wants to allow for more predicable funding to ensure improved and efficient planning and programming of agricultural interventions. Plan International will receive multiyear funding that falls in the category of Transition/phase out of humanitarian assistance (handing over to development and national/local actors according to a proposed plan within a specific time-frame) (Category B). Multiyear funding should allow Plan International to address humanitarian needs in a more effective and sustainable way, as well as to phase out of a humanitarian assistance approach to a long-term development focused approach with support from a development donor.
3.5. **Synergies with Long-term Development Assistance**

Several development donors have or will engage in support to north-eastern Nigeria, such as the World Bank, DfID and EU for whom Nigeria is one of six pilot countries for the operationalisation of the humanitarian-development nexus. Moving towards early recovery and development in north-eastern Nigeria is also the goal of the Nigerian government. Sida also provided development funding from its peace and human security strategy, as well as from the unit working on strengthening civil society movements and organizations (CIVSAM). The development funding covers for instance rule of law programs, peace initiatives and support to those affected by leprosy.

**SIDA’s HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO NIGERIA IN 2018**

*Insert total sum allocated to country. If other sum is proposed please indicate that sum with a second/separate table*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended partner for Sida support</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming)</th>
<th>If support indicate category A or C</th>
<th>Multi-year support category A or C</th>
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**ADDITIONAL MULTI YEAR RESILIENCE FOCUSED FUNDING**

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1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

1.1. Type of Crisis/ Disaster

Conflict

- **Background/Underlying cause**: Cameroon has not been suffering from significant internal conflict, but needs to handle the consequences of conflicts in Nigeria and CAR. Spill-over effects is being seen in the far north when elements belonging to Boko Haram start to attack villages on the Cameroonian side of the Nigeria/Cameroon border. Humanitarian needs have risen sharply during the last few years and the crisis has gradually shifted from two distinct refugee crises (CAR crisis and Nigeria crisis) affecting the east and the north, to a mixed setting crisis that includes high number of IDPs. In November 2017 indications of insecurity has been recorded in the anglophone parts of Cameroon and asylum seekers have been registered in Nigeria. Elections will be held in 2018 and this may also trigger civil unrest.

- **Main stakeholders in the conflict**: The conflict in Cameroon is an asymmetric conflict between the state and armed groups like Boko Haram and IS for West Africa. The emerging conflict internally in Cameroon are anglophone groups against what they perceive as an unequal representation in deciding forums and part of the country’s resources.

- **Cross border implications**: Cameroon is host to about 150,000 Nigerian refugees and approximately 237,000 CAR refugees. Borders to Nigeria have been closed, but some border posts are now open for trade, which helps economic recovery.

- **Trends**: Following a tripart agreement between Nigeria, Cameroon and UNHCR return of Nigerians have increased. There are suspicions that some of these returns are not so voluntary and that there are elements of refoulement.

Natural Disaster

- **Nature of disaster**: Cameroon is situated between the arid and semi-arid north towards Lake Chad and rainforests in the south. Some of the world’s highest annual rainfalls are recorded in locations in Cameroon with an average of over 10 000 mm/year. The northern part of the country has a typical Sahel-climate with distinct dry and rainy seasons. 2017 seems to have been a normal year in terms of rainfall. There are some shortcomings in harvests which are primarily due to conflict than climatic reasons.

- **Resilience and coping mechanisms**: Since the country covers several climate zones, coping mechanisms and resilience strategies differ depending on where in the country this is being studied. In the Sahelian parts of the country, vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies are similar to the neighbouring countries. The restriction on using boats on Lake Chad due to the security situation has affected fishing adversely.

1.2. Geographical areas and affected population

- The Nigeria crisis and Boko Haram attacks have affected the extreme north and along the border down to Adamawa state of Nigeria. The CAR crisis has also affected the western parts of the country and refugees are either hosted in camps or in host communities, depending on when they crossed the border.
• Vulnerabilities are widespread in affected areas, but the group that seems to have the least support are IDPs.

• Large-scale displacement has generated urgent humanitarian needs and affected host communities, putting pressure on already scarce resources. In the Far North Region, an estimated 329,000 people have been driven into displacement due to ongoing attacks from Boko Haram, military operations and natural disasters. Only 24% of the IDPs intend to return back to their areas of origin because of persistent fear, destroyed housing and lack of basic services and livelihood opportunities.

1.3. Critical Assumptions, risks and threats

• The major risks for the general population is an escalation of conflict, both internally and in neighbouring countries. A year of drought may also result in increased food insecurity. Lack of basic social services due to a slowness of government structures to resume activities in areas where IDPs are returning is a risk for children to miss out of school and lack of access to functioning health services.

• The likelihood that the return of Nigerian refugees will continue is high, despite the volatile situation in Nigeria. Social and economic integration for CAR refugees will continue to be difficult, since poverty is also general among host communities.

• Internal conflict between francophone areas and anglophone areas of Cameroon is the largest threat at this moment, and an escalating conflict will have negative consequences for the people.

• Humanitarian access has improved and areas that were unreachable just a year ago, such as the Logone et Chari district in the extreme north, are now accessible for humanitarian organisations. On some roads military escorts are still necessary and humanitarian flights continue to be crucial to humanitarian access.

1.4. Strategic Objectives and Priorities of the Country Humanitarian Response Plan

• In 2018 about 3.3 million people need humanitarian assistance and protection, an increase of 14% compared to 2017, and 1.3 million are targeted. The food insecurity situation will continue to affect over 2.6 million people and nearly 177,000 children under five are expected to face severe malnutrition.

• Food security, recovery and protection will continue to be a focus in 2018. The response plan is drawn for 2017-2020 and looks at longer term solutions, both for the CAR refugees in the east as well as the acute humanitarian needs in the extreme north, and in particular in the Logone et Chari district. The total funding requirement for 2018 is USD306 million.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1. National and local capacities and constraints

- **Government** (national, sub-national, local): Cameroon is a country with more resources than the G5 countries. Despite this, distribution of wealth and development of infrastructure is uneven. Insecurity in the northern parts of the country has led to many schools and health centres to be closed. The National Cameroonian army has a strong presence in the north.

- **Civil Society** (national, sub-national, local): Civil society is weak and national NGOs act more like contractors to INGOs and UN than representatives of an independent civil society.

- **Community and household level**: Household capacity to cope is strong in the shorter term, as diversification and alternative incomes quickly are adapted. Negative coping strategies such as survival sex is noted among CAR refugees.
2.2. **International operational capacities and constraints**

- **Leadership and Coordination**: OCHA is now established in Cameroon as a permanent support to UNHCR who has the overall responsibility in accordance with the principle of sectoral coordination in refugee crisis. As many new humanitarian actors are in the process of finding their space in Cameroon, the role of OCHA is crucial to mobilise and organise response.

- **Humanitarian Agencies**: The number of humanitarian actors (INGOs) have increased significantly in the last years. The movement now is to increase coverage in the extreme north in the Logone et Chari district, where most IDPs with humanitarian needs are found. A recovery process is also necessary to assist former IDPs who have been able to return when the security situation has improved.

- **Implementing partners**: The HCT is functional and the sectoral coordination is also active. Relevant UN agencies have been able to shift from development oriented interventions towards a humanitarian intervention strategy. This is particularly valid for UNICEF. The Red Cross has also successfully developed their programme towards a humanitarian profile.

2.3. **International and Regional assistance**

- **Donors**: The main donors are USA, EU, Cerf and Germany. The 2017 HRP was 47% funded in December 2017.

2.4. **Access Situation**

- Access has improved in Logone et Chari in the Extreme North and most of the major UN agencies and INGOs are looking to expand in this area. Infrastructure is a problem and there are plans to consider the possibility to prepare a landing strip to be used by UNHAS in Kousseri.

3. **SIDAs HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN**

3.1. **The role of Sida**

- **Earlier assistance and results**: Sida has responded to the humanitarian needs in Cameroon by approving Rapid Response Mechanisms (RRM) funding and subsequently continued with project funding for subsequent years. The current multiyear HRP is for 2017-2020 and the possibility to fund multiyear initiatives is being explored.

- **Lessons learnt**: The humanitarian intervention has grown significantly over the last three years, and the learning from this is that a mix of funding opportunities to start quickly with their interventions, such as the Sida RRM mechanism has opened space for other funding opportunities from other donors. Several Sida strategic partners are also implementing partners for UN agencies, and could only become so from having staff on the ground.

3.2. **Response Priorities 2018**

- **Humanitarian Focus**: Despite the volatile situation, the focus of Sida support will be on direct lifesaving interventions, but with a recovery perspective in mind. Security will only be stable when shelter and economic activities are restored. This is also a way to avoid dependency between beneficiaries and humanitarian agencies. Cameroon is part of two crisis allocations from Sida and gets funding both from the LCB crisis allocation and the CAR crisis allocation. All Sida funded interventions must include gender integration and environmental consequence descriptions leading towards conservation of nature and plans for effective use of resources included in the proposals. Conflict analysis and a “do no harm” analysis is also required.
3.3. **Partners**

**IRC:** IRC’s programme in the Logone et Chari areas in northern Cameroon aims at assisting the crisis affected populations through Cash-Based Interventions, Psychosocial Support, and a Microfinance project.

**Plan:** Plan’s response in Cameroon is focused on the Minawao refugee camp and several host communities in the northern regions including the Logone et Chari district. In Cameroon, Plan are focusing on Child Protection and Early Childhood Care. The support will be an 8 MSEK for 2018 and a guarantee 3 MSEK for 2019 and 2020, that may be adjusted upwards.

**Red Cross:** The 2018 support to IFRC in Cameroon goes to a Swedish Red Cross (SRC) secondment, strengthening the Federation’s presence in the Central African region. The delegate will focus on the East and Adamawa regions. In 2018 IFRC will also start a cooperation with the Cameroonian Red Cross for the north of Cameroon.

**OCHA:** In Cameroon, OCHA is now established and will continue to coordinate HCT work in support to UNHCR.

**UNHAS:** The United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) provides the humanitarian response in Cameroon with necessary logistical support.

3.4. **Strategic Funding in Protracted Crises**

FAO is supported with a three-year durable solutions project where 2018 is the second year with 4 MSEK per year. IRC and Plan are also funded in line with the multiyear HRP for protracted crises.

3.5. **Synergies with Long-term Development Aid**

Sweden has no bilateral development cooperation with Cameroon. Some Sida global thematic or regional development cooperation strategies may however include Cameroon.

### SIDA’s HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO CAMEROON IN 2018

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<th>Recommended partner for Sida support</th>
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1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

1.1. Type of Crisis/ Disaster

Conflict

- **Background/Underlying cause**: The current conflicts that affect Chad are the Boko Haram/IS West Africa conflict that affects the Lake District and the Capital N'Djamena through terror attacks; the CAR conflict; the Darfur conflict; and instability in Libya. Chad is politically a stable country, but with a low degree of decentralisation and democratic governance. Still ranking among the lowest in human development index, economic growth due to oil revenues have contributed to a significant degree of development and investments in infrastructure and services in recent years. State investment in security (defence) is also significant. Chad is a secular state with large Christian and Muslim populations. Urbanisation is rapid and depends both on development plans and in form of unofficial settlements. Since colonial borders do not reflect ethnicity and language nor mobility-patterns such as seasonal transhumance movement in the region, cross-border issues are further complicated.

- **Main stakeholders in the conflict**: The conflicts in neighbouring countries each have their own dynamics and reasons but affecting Chad not only through refugees, but also politically. The president of Chad, Idriss Déby, has been active in peace negotiations in crisis in neighbouring countries, as well as keeping close relations to France and USA. Chadian troops have intervened in the 5-country joint military operation to resolve the insurgency situation in Northern Nigeria. The deficits in democratic governance and decentralisation are threats to inner stability and the current calm may change rapidly. In December 2017, the USA introduced a ban for entry visas for Chadian nationals.

- **Cross border implications**: Borders to Chad are in general open and the possibility to seek refuge in Chad is easy to those who are in need of protection. The border between Chad and Nigeria has been partially closed for trade and the southern border to CAR has also been closed in some occasions. This has affected trade in a negative way and aggravated poverty for farmers and pastoralists.

- **Trends**: The general trend in Chad is that the economic growth will continue and the security will remain stable, despite internal challenges and conflicts in neighbouring countries. Low prices on petrol affect the national economy adversely, but as an effect led to a multisector development approach to be adopted by the government. The stable situation calls for a gradual handover from humanitarian to development actors including national NGOs and the state. Central and down to county and district level authorities are now starting to get to the point where they may pursue their own development goals. The local integration of refugees is a key topic for the humanitarian and development nexus agenda.

Natural Disaster

- **Nature of disaster**: The Sahel region and Chad in particular has a climate and topography that is sensitive to seasonal drought and floods resulting in food insecurity. The natural variation from year to year is exacerbated by climate change and desertification. Population increase also drives the need for increase of food production. Indications for 2017 are that it will be a normal year when it comes to agricultural production in most of the country with the exception of the north-east of the country. Despite a rather good harvest predicted, there are many households that will struggle; especially in the period just before, and in the beginning of the rainy season (usually May to September), called the lean season, when many households run out of reserves and the number of malnourished children
rises. Over 85% of rural populations live below the poverty line. Chad ranks among the least developed countries in the world on the human development index (HDI).

- **Frequency:** Chad suffers from a chronic crisis with a cyclical pattern where the harvest is largely relying on the rains that fall in the rainy season (June to September), with longer rainy period in the south of the country and gradually reaching to total dryness in the north where rain doesn’t fall at all.

- **Resilience and coping mechanisms:** Traditionally there are resilience and risk management systems and coping mechanisms among the Sahel people. Seasonal variations and yearly variations have been dealt with through transhumance migrations and access to multiple sites for agricultural crops in different areas to alternate between. The role of the extended family and ethnic groups is also a way to cope, where resources are distributed among members of the extended family that live in another area of the country or abroad. Due to population increase and degradation of the environment (desertification), low usage of irrigation and closure of borders, the traditional coping mechanisms are not enough to deal with the protracted crisis. Since the financial resources on household level are weak, there may be severely malnourished children and adults, despite that food is readily available on the market.

1.2. **Geographical areas and affected population**

- The Lake Chad district in Western Chad emerges as severe crisis within the greater Sahel crisis and is connected to a similar situation in the Diffa region of Niger, northern Cameroon and Borno-state in Nigeria. Food insecurity affects the whole country, but is most pronounced in the dryer parts of the country (northern and eastern part of the country) and parts of the country that are affected by conflict in the neighbouring country (Nigeria and CAR). The refugee crisis is mostly affecting border areas in the south, east and Lake Chad region.

- The most vulnerable groups including women and men, girls and boys who lack social safety nets such as assets, family/extended family and/or transferrable skills are the most sensitive both in regards to the refugee and the food insecurity crises. Among mobile populations the most vulnerable are IDPs who are the least catered to when it comes to both protection and basic humanitarian needs. Also host communities are strained of resources as IDPs sometimes settle in informal settlements close to existing communities.

1.3. **Critical Assumptions, risks and threats**

- Chad is a fragile state and there is always a risk of spill-over from conflicts in neighbouring countries. The food insecurity is revised on a yearly basis as each year’s crop affects the next year’s lean period. As most farmers are subsistence farmers, a drought for a year may lead to low or no crop at all for consumption the next year. Chad is also one of the least democratic states in the world, so despite the last few years’ stability, civil unrest is possible. As for financial risks, Chad receives the score of 22, on a scale where 100 equals freedom from corruption, according to Transparency International. Hence the public sector in Chad, compared to other countries, can be said to be characterised by a high level of corruption. Humanitarian access has improved due to the fact that the security situation has improved in the entire country. Also, better and developed infrastructure makes transport and access easier. Humanitarian flights are still the only effective way to reach refugee populations both in the east and in the Lake Chad district. The IDP situation in the Lake Chad district has a risk of conflicts between IDPs and host communities. Surge of terrorist attacks is an increased risk both in cities and in refugee camps. Slow humanitarian response and unevenly distributed support adds to the risk of conflict and hostilities between communities.
1.4. **Strategic Objectives and Priorities of the Country Humanitarian Response Plan**

- Chad is among the countries in Africa hosting the largest number of refugees (405,674). Some 3.5 million people are food-insecure in central Chad. Meanwhile, new assessments show an alarming and deteriorating nutrition situation, and a nutritional emergency has been declared in 12 regions (mostly in the Sahel belt). Global acute malnutrition stands at 13.9% nationally (a two-point increase compared to 2016), with rates exceeding the 15% emergency threshold in 12 out of 23 regions. The severe acute malnutrition rate is at 3.9% for the whole country (compared to 2.6% in 2016), which is also above the 2% emergency threshold. Urgent assistance is required to save lives and reverse this trend. The low level of funding in 2017, which did not reach 40% of the funding requirement, translated into limited humanitarian coverage.

- The number of people in need of humanitarian assistance in 2018 is about 4.4 million persons. The targeted number of people is 1.9 million. Poverty, weak structures and services, and logistic challenges are the main reason for targeting such a low number of people in need. The funding requirement for 2018 HRP is USD558 million.

2. **IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES**

2.1. National and local capacities and constraints

- **Government**: Despite the willingness to receive refugees, the desire to let refugees settle and integrate has previously been low. A change has, however, occurred and the new politics of Chad is social and economic integration of refugees, but without the possibility of obtaining Chadian citizenship.

- **Civil Society**: Chadian civil society is not particularly well developed or organised. The traditional sultanate and other traditional structures to regulate issues around ownership of land and resolution of interpersonal conflicts is in place, but there are very few NGOs, in the sense of democratically organised member organizations or foundations with a board of directors, established in the country.

- **Community and household level**: Household capacity to cope with development and crisis related needs are based on a community and extended family model and the state is of low significance to many people as basic social services are weak. Schools and health clinics exist, but are often not functional outside of urban centres if there is no international support linked to the service. International migration is an option for some, especially for the Darfur refugees.

2.2. International operational capacities and constraints

- **Leadership and Coordination**: The humanitarian response mechanisms is coordinated through the humanitarian country team (HCT). OCHA is present both centrally and in the field, and clusters as well as sub clusters are active centrally and in field level. At field level, government structures are present and in some cases, lead the sub-national clusters. Sweden doesn’t have an embassy or bilateral cooperation with Chad.

- **Humanitarian Agencies**: UN agencies with direct support from Sida/Hum have a well-functioning system of using and reporting on Sida contributions. Since there are no commercial domestic carriers operating in Chad, United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), and Airserv humanitarian flight services will continue to be an important function. INGOs are very strong in Chad and have a presence in cluster coordination and in Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and HRP elaboration.

- **Implementing partners**: Chadian civil society is weak, and the outlook of living up to the Grand Bargain (GB) localisation agenda goal of 25% of humanitarian resources to local actors will be difficult to reach. AAP (Accountability to Affected Population) is high on the HCT agenda and Sida is supporting Chad in further improving the achievement of this GB goal.
2.3. **International and Regional assistance**

- In 2017 the largest humanitarian donors are the US, ECHO, Germany, the UK, Sweden and Japan. The HRP was funded at 38.6% in the beginning of December 2017. The projection is that humanitarian funding will decrease further in 2018.

2.4. **Access Situation**

- There seem to be few constraints in regards to willingness to grant humanitarian access and space to work for international organizations. Security has improved and humanitarian travel can be done without armed escorts all over the country.

3. **SIDAs HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN**

3.1. **The role of Sida**

- **Earlier assistance and results**: Sida has supported humanitarian response in Chad for many years. The response has shifted according to changing needs due to climate variations and conflicts in neighbouring countries. Dialogue with partners on priorities based on observations from field visits has shown to be an efficient way of making use of Sida’s flexibility and to help partners focus on efficiency and innovation.

- **Lessons learnt**: Chad is a forgotten crisis, outside the attention of the Lake Chad Basin Crisis. The protracted refugee crisis due to conflicts in Sudan (Darfur refugees) and CAR (refugees) attracts less and less donor funding. When a new crisis occurs resources often need to be mobilized by shifting funding from protracted crisis response to the emerging situations in the country. This puts an emphasis on the necessity to work with durable solutions and exit strategies in refugee, returnee and IDP crisis as humanitarian funding is not increasing to match the increase in needs.

3.2. **Response Priorities 2018**

- **Humanitarian Focus**: The focus for 2018 will be a continuation of the reorientation of resources to respond to the acute crisis in the Lake Chad. Continued support to the refugee crisis in the south and the east and particularly to be supportive of the process of social and economic integration of refugees will be continued. Food security will focus on infant malnutrition and response in the Lake Chad district. Coordination and access continue to be a priority as well as humanitarian access. All Sida funded interventions must include gender integration and environmental consequence descriptions leading towards conservation of nature and plans for effective use of resources included in the proposals. Conflict analysis and a “do no harm” analysis is also required.

3.3. **Partners**

**WFP/UNHAS**: WFP/UNHAS will be supported with unearmarked funds to operate humanitarian flights for humanitarian staff to intervention areas in the country.

**OCHA**: OCHA is supported with unearmarked funds for humanitarian coordination.

**ICRC**: ICRC are supported in Chad by an unearmarked funding in the fields of protection and IHL surveillance.

**ACF**: Food security, nutrition and WASH project. The intervention aims at displaced people and refugees in the LAC district, more specifically in the Liwa area.

**IRC**: IRC is funded for a health and WASH project in the LAC district. SRH is an important component of the project.
**Oxfam:** Oxfam was added as a partner 2017. The continuation of this WASH and multisector intervention in the LAC district, targeting people affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria is suggested as a three-year funding on grounds of access (remoteness) of the intervention area.

### 3.4. Strategic Funding in Protracted Crises

FAO is supported with a three-year durable solutions project where 2018 is the second year with 6 MSEK per year. OXFAM will also receive multi-year funding.

### 3.5. Synergies with Long-term Development Aid

Sweden has no bilateral development cooperation with Chad. Some global thematic or regional development cooperation strategies may include Chad. The humanitarian-development nexus dialogue is held with ECHO/DEVCO where Chad is a pilot country for the European Union on bridging the gap between development and humanitarian support.

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<th>Recommended partner for Sida support</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming)</th>
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<td>OCHA</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

1.1. Type of Crisis/Disaster

**Conflict**

- **Background/Underlying cause**: Niger is politically relatively stable, but the state is weak in capacity. After the 2010 coup d’état and the 2011 elections the situation in the country has remained relatively calm. Niger has like most other countries in the region, two parallel structures of power and administration, the traditional and the post-colonial official administration. In particular in regards to civil rights, where cases often are resolved by the traditional legislative system, breaches of human rights are common. Society is in its organization to a large extent traditional with a clear division between male and female duties and expectations. In late 2017 the intra-community conflicts seem to be on the rise, and an increased spill-over form the Mali conflict is affecting the western parts of the country. International troops are also increasingly becoming a target for insurgent attacks. There are also reports of international humanitarian law (IHL) violations.

- **Main stakeholders in the conflict**: Despite Niger not being a main stakeholder in the conflicts in Mali and Nigeria, attacks have been directed to refugees from Nigeria in camps in Niger. As state capacity Niger is are weak, refugees from Nigeria are more likely to seek asylum and protection in Cameroon. Seeing the dynamics of the crisis in Mali and Nigeria they are likely to escalate and there is also a risk that similar separatist groups are going to become more active in Niger.

- **Cross border implications**: The recent terrorist attacks indicate that there are internal Nigerien groups with affiliations to Boko Haram that are being radicalised and that attacks are not only coming from the outside targeting Nigerians.

- **Trends**: There is likely of probable deterioration of security and escalation of conflict in Niger. The participation in the Lake Chad Basin conflict joint forces and in the Mali conflicts G5 intervention also increase the attention to Niger as an active player in the security situation in the Sahel.

**Natural Disaster**

- **Nature of disaster**: Niger is one of the most arid countries in the world with only a small percentage of the country’s surface being suitable for agricultural production. The Sahel region, including Niger, has a climate and topography that is prone to seasonal drought. The natural variation from year to year is exacerbated by climate change and desertification. Moreover, the population growth rate of 3.9% puts pressure on natural resources and leads to significant land degradation. However, indications for 2018 are that it will be a normal year when it comes to agricultural production, despite general food production deficits.

- **Frequency**: This is a recurrent crisis that on a yearly basis leads to a situation where household reserves and resources are not sufficient to last until the next harvest. With population increase and degradation of the environment (desertification), and low usage of irrigation, the traditional coping mechanisms are not enough to secure the challenges due to the protracted crisis. Since the financial resources at household level is weak, there may be severely malnourished children and adults, despite that food is readily available on the market.
Resilience and coping mechanisms: Traditionally there are resilience and risk management systems and coping mechanisms among the Sahel people. Seasonal and yearly variations have been dealt with through transhumance migrations and access to multiple sites for agricultural crops in different areas to alternate between. The role of the extended family and ethnic groups is also a way to cope, where resources are distributed amongst members of the extended family that live in another area of the country or abroad. Very few cases of Nigeriens on irregular migration routes towards Europe are registered.

1.2. Geographical areas and affected population

The Diffa region in the east of Niger is the most affected by the Lake Chad Basin Crisis. Malian refugees are mostly found along the western border of Niger. The general food insecurity affects the whole country.

The most vulnerable groups, including women and men, girls and boys who lack social safety nets such as assets, family/extended family and/or transferrable skills, are the most needy both in regards to the refugee/IDP crisis and the food insecurity crisis. Among mobile populations the most vulnerable are IDPs who are the least catered to when it comes to both protection and basic humanitarian needs. Some host communities are also strained of resources as refugees sometimes settle in informal settlements close to existing communities.

Chronic vulnerabilities related to food insecurity, malnutrition, epidemics and floods are being compounded by growing insecurity in the regions bordering Mali and in the Diffa region. Further, overcrowding in camps and displacement sites have worsened the living conditions of the displaced population and exacerbated the protection risks faced particularly by children and women.

1.3. Critical Assumptions, risks and threats

Niger has weak state capacity and there is a risk of spill-over from conflicts in neighbouring countries. The food insecurity analysis is revised on a yearly basis, as each year's crop affects the next year's lean season. As most farmers are subsistence farmers, a drought for a year may lead to low or no crop at all for consumption the following year. Internal conflicts and banditry is common and the capacity of police monitoring and the rule of law is low. As Niger is a fragile state, it also harbours insurgents from neighbouring countries' crises. As for financial risks, Niger receives the score 35, on a scale where 100 equals freedom from corruption, from Transparency International's report. Hence the public sector in Niger, compared to other countries, can be said to be characterised by a medium-high risk level of corruption.

1.4. Strategic Objectives and Priorities of the Country Humanitarian Response Plan

In 2017, the humanitarian response made a major difference in the lives of the most vulnerable. Food assistance reached over 720,000 people. Further, over 237,162 children were treated for severe acute malnutrition and 243,602 for moderate acute malnutrition, while over 106,000 pregnant women received nutritional supplements (as of September). Some 112,000 people were reached with protection activities, and a network of community-level protection mechanisms was also established. Military operations against Boko Haram in the Diffa region and terrorist groups in regions bordering Mali continue.

The prediction for 2018 is that 2.3 million persons will have humanitarian needs. The HRP is targeting 1.8 million persons. The increase from last year is 400,000 persons. With USD338 million requirement in 2018, increased funding is required to respond to the growing needs in almost all sectors.
▪ **Government**: The Nigerien government is not able to provide the necessary services and assistance to its population. Niger is rated as one of the most under-developed countries in the world and ranks 187 out of 188 countries in the human development index for 2017. The Government of Niger is involved mainly through the roadmap for all interventions in Niger, the so called 'Plan de Soutien', which includes all humanitarian activities. The initiative 3N (les Nigeriens Nourissent les Nigeriens) provides a framework to respond to emergency needs, food insecurity and recurrent nutritional crisis over the long-term and strengthen the resilience of households. The provinces are rather decentralised and play a certain role in coordination and local ownership.

▪ **Civil Society**: Local Nigerien NGOs are weak and need to develop capacity to be able to scale up support. There are only a few local organizations with national coverage. Some local organisations serve as implementing partners for INGOs in the Diffa-province.

▪ **Community and household level**: Household capacity to cope with development and crisis related needs are based on a community and extended family model and the state is of low significance to many people as basic social services are weak. Schools and health clinics exist, but are often not functional outside of urban centres if there is no international support linked to the service. International migration seems to be an uncommon coping mechanism for poorer households.

2.2. **International operational capacities and constraints**

▪ **Leadership and Coordination**: The humanitarian response mechanisms is coordinated through the humanitarian country team (HCT). OCHA is present both centrally and in the field, and clusters as well as sub clusters are active centrally and in field level. At field level, government structures are present and in some cases, lead the sub-national clusters. Sweden doesn't have an embassy or bilateral cooperation with Niger.

▪ **Humanitarian Agencies**: UN agencies supported by Sida have a well-functioning system of using and reporting on Sida contributions. Since there are no safe and reliable commercial domestic air carrier operating in Niger, United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and its humanitarian flight services will continue to be an important function for the response. INGOs are relatively strong in Niger and have a presence in cluster coordination and Humanitarian Needs Overview HNO/HRP elaboration.

▪ **Implementing partners**: Nigerien civil society is present as implementing partners in the humanitarian response, but capacities need to be further developed to fully implement the GB (Grand Bargain) targets.

2.3. **International and Regional assistance**

▪ **Donors**: In 2017, the largest humanitarian donors were the USA, DG-ECHO, Germany and CERF. The HRP was 83.43% funded in the beginning of December 2017.

2.4. **Access Situation**

▪ The long distances between major cities in the country makes all logistics and access a challenge. Security has deteriorated and many UN organisations are using armed escorts when travelling on major roads.

3. **SIDAs HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN**

3.1. **The role of Sida**

▪ **Earlier assistance and results**: Sida has supported humanitarian response in Niger for many years. The response has shifted according to changing needs due to climate variations and conflicts in neighbouring countries.
- **Lessons learnt**: Chronic crises are going to demand development programmes run by the government to reduce the underlying cause to vulnerability. Apart from the conflict related crisis in the east (Diffa) and refugees from Mali, the cause of the general crisis is underdevelopment. Humanitarian interventions have proved not efficient in assisting longer term challenges, for example in the area of nutrition.

3.2. **Response Priorities 2018**

- **Humanitarian Focus**: The focus for 2018 will be a continuation of the reorientation of resources to respond to the acute conflict crisis in the Lake Chad area around Diffa and Bosso. Where possible durable solutions are being sought to be integrated in the programme setup. Coordination and access will continue to be a priority. All Sida funded interventions must include gender integration and environmental consequence descriptions leading towards conservation of nature and plans for effective use of resources need to be included in the proposals. Conflict analysis and a “do no harm” analysis is also required.

3.3. **Partners**

**ACF**: In Niger, ACF is operating in the Lake Chad Basin region, more specifically in Diffa with a WASH project.

**SMC**: The Swedish Mission Council’s project in Niger is implemented by International Aid Services (IAS). IAS are operating in the Diffa Region, where they are implementing a WASH project, targeting people affected by the Lake Chad Basin Crisis, including refugees, IDPs and host communities.

**IRC**: The area of focus for the intervention will be the Diffa Region, and follow the national IRC response plan.

**ICRC**: In the 2018 initial allocation, ICRC is supported with unearmarked funds for country wide protection and IHL surveillance monitoring, etc.

**UNHAS**: UNHAS is allocated Sida funding in Niger for 2018 due to their important role in the humanitarian logistics cluster.

**OCHA**: The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNOCHA, will be supported with unearmarked funding in 2018.

**UNICEF**: Budget support to the HAC 2018.

3.4. **Strategic Funding in Protracted Crises**

FAO is supported with a three-year durable solutions project where 2018 is the second year with 4 MSEK per year. The Red Cross of Niger is supported through the Swedish Red Cross with a 2-year contribution to a health and WASH initiative in Diffa with 4.2 MSEK/year 2018 and 2019.

3.5. **Synergies with Long-term Development Aid**

Sweden has no bilateral development cooperation with Niger. Some global thematic or regional development cooperation strategies may include Niger, such as Swedish Support to Lake Chad Basin Commission.

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<th>SIDA’s HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO Niger in 2018</th>
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<td><strong>Recommended partner for Sida support</strong></td>
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**Key References:**
- Lake Chad Humanitarian Needs and Requirement Overview, 2018
- 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview for Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger
- 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan for Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger
- ICRC Operations Appeal, 2018
- Nigeria Regional Refugee Response Plan (NRRRP), 2018