Each year, Sida conducts a humanitarian allocation exercise in which a large part of its humanitarian budget is allocated to emergencies worldwide. The allocation and subsequent disbursement of funds takes place in the beginning of the year to ensure predictability for humanitarian organizations and to allow for best possible operational planning. In an effort to truly adhere to the humanitarian principles, Sida’s humanitarian assistance is grounded in the four humanitarian principles, and in particular impartiality, with its compelling urge to ensure that humanitarian action is carried out based on “needs alone”, giving priority to the “most urgent cases of distress”. Therefore, Sida’s allocation methodology is grounded in several objective indicators such as: the scale of humanitarian needs (number of people in need), the severity of humanitarian needs (including food insecurity/IPC levels), the number of people targeted for the humanitarian response, the financial coverage of the respective humanitarian appeal, national capacities to respond and underlying risks, as well as distinct indicators related to forgotten crises. Sida also strongly supports the humanitarian coordination structures. Besides this initial allocation, another part of the humanitarian budget is set aside as an emergency reserve for sudden onset emergencies and deteriorating humanitarian situations. This reserve allows Sida to quickly allocate funding to any humanitarian situation throughout the year, including additional funding to the regional Syria crisis.

For 2020, the Syria crisis is allocated an initial 379 MSEK. Close monitoring and analysis of the situation in Syria and neighbouring countries will continue throughout the year and will inform possible decisions on additional funding.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

1.1. Conflict

The conflict in Syria, soon entering its tenth year, is one of the largest displacement crises in history. Multiple displacements have left IDPs and refugees depleted of resources and extremely vulnerable to additional shocks and conflicts. Throughout Syria and the refugee hosting countries, negative coping mechanisms such as child labour and early marriage are observed and assessed to increase. In the three main refugee hosting countries (Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan) social services, such as education and health, and infrastructure are over-stretched placing host communities in strained situations. Given the protractedness of the crisis, tensions have been increasing over time in all countries even though there are significant differences.

During 2019, the conflict has mainly been active in the northern parts of Syria, with the defeat of the so called Daesh in North-East Syria (NES), a new Turkish operation in NES, and continued shelling, aerial bombardment and military action by Syrian Armed Forces backed by the Russian Federation in North West Syria (NWS). Meanwhile refugee hosting countries remain in an economically challenging situation. At the same time diminishing donor support, funding for the Regional Refugee and Resilience plan (3RP) has decreased from 53.3% 2018 and 65.7% in 2015 to 36.3% in 2019, and restricted opportunities in the refugee hosting countries further exarbrates their economically challenging situation.

Civilians in Syria continue to face an ongoing protection crisis. Breaches of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) committed by all sides of the conflict, but primarily the Government of Syria (GoS) and its allies, are continuously being reported. Indiscriminate armed attacks have caused not only human loss but also great destruction of civilian infrastructure such as health facilities, schools, market places and houses, leaving people with limited access to basic services and housing facilities. As relative stability returns to much of the country, limited returns of internally displaced and, to a lesser extent, refugees are seen. However, the main reasons for not returning are still security and protection concerns, exacerbated by the vast destruction of basic services. Further inequitable new property laws, implemented by GoS, may hinder or complicate IDP and refugee returns, and may affect future social cohesion; the house, land and property laws continue to disadvantage women. During 2019, UNHCR has recorded around 75,000 refugee returns, well below the planning figure of 250,000, and 341,000 IDP returns between January and October 2019.

In the aftermath of the conflict, displaced populations will seek durable solutions, such as local integration and return/reparation. However, as of today there are no political guarantees that allows a safe, dignified and voluntary return of refugees and IDPs. In addition, access is not granted by GoS to monitor protection needs and deliver legal aid for returnees. UNHCR may thus grant limited return assistance over the border, but is neither organizing nor facilitating/promoting returns. An organized repatriation process would require that Syria, host-countries and UNHCR establish tripartite agreements to provide a legal framework to returns. It is not yet even discussed, mainly due to intransigence of GoS. In the meantime, Turkey has initiated a return dialogue among Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan which may activate a return process in their impatience to alleviate the perceived burden of the large refugee presence on their respective economies and societies experiencing crises. During 2019, an increase in deportations from Turkey and Lebanon has been observed.
1.2. Geographical areas and affected population

Around half of Syria’s population has been displaced, either internally (6.2 million) or as refugees (5.6 million registered refugees). Refugee outflow was highest in 2011-2015, before refugee hosting countries closed their borders. The largest refugee population is hosted by Turkey (registered 3.7 million), followed by Lebanon (registered 1 million, estimated 1.5 million) and Jordan (registered 650,000, estimated 1.3 million). Children and youth comprise more than half of the displaced, as well as half of those in need of humanitarian assistance.

85% of Syrians are living under the poverty threshold, including 69% in extreme poverty. Prices for basic commodities are varying on local markets depending on contexts, access conditions and supplies, but are often challenging for households to afford, likewise rents for accommodation. Recovery will be a long process requiring peace, adequate resources and policies that are “leaving no-one behind”.

Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) are particularly vulnerable in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan respectively. Due to the proximity of PRS camps inside Syria to conflict areas most PRS have been displaced at least once and remain displaced, leaving them disproportionately affected by the conflict. Most of PRS were also facing high rates of poverty already before the conflict. Today, UNRWA estimates that 91% of PRS remaining inside Syria are dependent on humanitarian aid. Palestinian refugees are not formally citizens of another state and are therefore unable to claim the same rights as other foreigners. Access to state-provided services such as health and education is also often restricted, leaving them dependent on UNRWA services, who continues to operates with a large budget shortfall.

1.3. Critical assumptions, risks and threats

For 2020, it is expected that most of the country will continue being free from active armed conflict, however the complex situation in Syria continues to prove itself unpredictable as many actors are involved in the conflict and world politics continue affecting the situation on the ground. The main area for conflict is assumed to be NWS, Idlib. A major military intervention in Idlib (hosting almost 4 million civilians, including people associated with armed groups, and armed groups themselves) would create an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. In that case, humanitarian resources will most likely be taken from other acute programmes in other parts of Syria leaving other humanitarian response in Syria and neighbouring countries without sufficient financing. Simultaneously, the cross-border humanitarian community in Gaziantep alerts their capacity to be stretched to the maximum at current level, hence an intensification would probably leave many without adequate humanitarian support.

As GoS is retaking control, violent conflict is decreasing, while no political solution is expected any time soon, the conflict will continue being protracted. Thus, the demand for rehabilitation and early recovery projects will continue to grow in order to create a sustainable situation for the civilian population. In the absence of a political solution, traditional donors will continue to focus primarily on life saving assistance. This will increase the need for resilience mainstreaming in humanitarian programming in order to not place civilians at further suffering and prolong their aid dependency. It will be important to work with well-defined needs and prioritization, so as to not deplete funding for acute humanitarian needs, while continue discussions on recovery programming in collaboration with UN agencies and INGOs. In neighbouring countries, the need for durable solutions for refugees and host communities is ever more relevant as the protractedness puts more strains on host communities and governments.

Protection risks are prevalent throughout the region, relating to negative coping mechanisms, as resources are depleted and opportunities non-existent, post-conflict issues such as impunity for parties to the conflict and lack of political solutions leaving civilians and aid workers at risk, as well as high prevalence of weapons, ammunition and explosive remnants of war. The protracted nature of the crisis has also led to lack of various documentation which leads to problems regarding civil documentation; Housing, land and property rights; etc. Draconian security practices, including arbitrary arrests, confiscation of property, forced disappearances, etc. have continued in areas retaken by Damascus. Promises of amnesty for former opposition combatants have been rescinded and replaced by forced conscription into the armed forces. It is highly likely that these practises will continue imposing security and protection risks to civilians.

2. SIDA’S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

2.1. The role of Sida

According to the Whole of Syria (WoS) architecture, the Syria crisis is covered by both a HRP for humanitarian needs inside Syria and a 3RP covering the needs of refugees and affected host communities in neighbouring countries. For 2020, the Humanitarian Program Cycle (HPC) for the Syria HRP is delayed but tentative HNO number have been shared showing a small decrease in PIN to 11 million for 2020, compared to 11.3 million for 2019. The 3RP for 2020-2021 is launched early December. Sweden will continue being a principled donor in the Syria crisis, which is assessed to be Sweden’s strong added value in a politicised crisis.

While Sweden requires from its partners to adhere to humanitarian standards and principles and to the strategic orientations of the inter-agency response plans, it leaves partners with a high level of flexibility for prioritization and resource allocations within the larger framework agreements. Partners have been appreciative of Sida’s un earmarked or soft-earmarked regional contributions. Within the Syria response, programme-based funding has been made
available for NRC (since 2017) and AAH (since 2018). Thematic areas prioritized in Sweden’s global humanitarian strategy, like the efficiency of humanitarian coordination, the linkage between humanitarian and development, the humanitarian principles, “Do-No-Harm” and conflict sensitivity, the centrality of protection, etc, are guiding Sida’s funding decisions and follow up.

2.2. Response Priorities 2020

For 2020 Sweden will focus its humanitarian support on life-saving and protection activities in the regional crisis. A strategic decision has been taken to work through a fewer number of partners in order to enable a more holistic approach with larger supports. This will also enable a closer dialogue with partners and strengthen follow-up of the humanitarian portfolio in a challenging context. A majority of the support is targeted towards Syria, followed by Lebanon and Jordan and complemented with some unea earmarked regional support. As previous years, no humanitarian assistance will target Turkey as the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT II) continues into 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIDA’s HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE SYRIA CRISIS 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommended partner for Sida support</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGIONAL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total regional: 52</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYRIA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria Humanitarian Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria XB Humanitarian Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Against Hunger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Mission Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Syria: 245</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEBANON</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon Humanitarian Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Against Hunger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Lebanon: 50</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JORDAN</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan Humanitarian Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Jordan: 30</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INGO Forums</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL: 379</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3. Regional Partners

Regional partners are limited to OCHA, UNHCR and UNRWA. OCHA (7 MSEK) is a key actor through the coordination of Whole of Syria through three hubs: Damascus, Amman and Gaziantep. OCHA is also able to use the regional funds for their coordination in Lebanon and Jordan. UNHCR remains important for refugee and returnee response, especially in relation to protection and monitoring of displaced populations (30 MSEK). UNRWA (15 MSEK), as explained above, is the main actor for the protection of Palestine refugees in the region. The Emergency Appeal for Syria focus on Palestine refugees from Syria affected by the conflict in the region.
2.4. **Synergies and Nexus**

A strategic nexus approach in Syria is problematic in general, as transitional development aid in support to GoS policies and programmes is not an option. In opposition areas, stabilization interventions have been substantial, but are presently frozen, at least temporarily, due to new developments in NES and NWS. Large parts of Syria are, however, in need of recovery, but there is no coordinated framework for it. The HRP’s 3rd Pillar (early recovery, resilience-building and access to basic services) is the only strategic framework for this so far, but it is limited in time, volume and scope, as it is humanitarian essentially. Mainstreaming resilience is a good practice recommended across humanitarian interventions, but it is not sufficient to address existing and future rehabilitation needs.

Sweden’s Regional Syria Crisis Strategy 2016-2020 offers however a unique opportunity to link relief and recovery, as it is aimed at supporting affected populations’ access to basic services at the local level, to livelihoods, to recovery and self-reliance opportunities, including women’s empowerment and prevention/mitigation of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Most Sida-supported interventions from this strategy are within the HRP or looking forward and post-humanitarian. The Global Partnership for Education (GPE) is planning a massive Education in Emergency (EiE) intervention for Syria, as 2 million school-aged children are out of school (1 in 3 for Damascus-controlled area, 2 in 3 for NWS) and 1 school in 3 is damaged.

In refugee host-countries, the 3RP (LCRP, JRP and TRP) accommodates greater opportunities to decrease aid dependency and possibilities to support host communities as well with a longer-term perspective. However, Governments may be reluctant to policies and programmes that would encourage the refugees’ local integration as the main durable solution, besides the more preferred options of resettlement in a third-country and of repatriation. Sweden does not have a bilateral cooperation with Lebanon or Jordan, but supports these countries in coping with their respective refugee crisis with a large resilience portfolio of partners implementing Sweden’s Regional Syria Crisis Strategy 2016-2020 (1.8 billion Swedish Crowns): the World Bank’s Global Concessional Financial Facility, Unicef and UNFPA, the International Rescue Committee, Save the Children and others.

The strategic linkages between humanitarian interventions and programmes aiming at peace-building and conflict-resolution may be problematic as well in Syria, given the sensitivity of such programmes. The good practice is to plan humanitarian interventions at a community-based level which will reinforce the local social cohesion, instead of granting aid at the individual level only.
1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

1.1 Conflict

The Government of Syria (GoS) continued its gradual recovery of territory during 2019. It has regained control over large areas by ‘reconciling’ Opposition Armed Groups (OAG) or neutralizing them violently at a high cost in civilian lives, homes, infrastructures, livelihoods and markets: Aleppo in 2016, Eastern Ghouta, Yarmuk and Southern Syria in 2018, even by resorting to using chemical weapons, according to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism. Humanitarian access to these areas and others has been severely restricted by GoS, not the least through long sieges where starvation was used as a means of war. Calls for restraint and the adherence to even basic provisions of international humanitarian law have been ignored. The GoS is now reinstalling civil administration while facing many challenges. Reconstruction is not moving forward, the economy is in a disastrous state and Syria remains isolated. Simultaneously, civilians in Syria are in dire need of longer-term support to ensure access to basic services, housing and livelihoods as many parts of Syria are shifting into relative stability. The UN-facilitated Constitutional Committee on Syria met for the first time on 30 October 2019, bringing a prospect of dialogue between Syrians on their future.

In 2019 the US-led Global Coalition against Daesh finally won militarily over Daesh in its last strongholds of North Eastern Syria (NES). Civilians and civilian infrastructure took a heavy toll from the offensive while it also created another internal displacement and growth of IDP camps in NES. Further, NES experienced a new rapid onset crisis as Turkey initiated the so called Operation Peace Spring on 9 October 2019 following US announcement of a withdrawal from NES, causing massive new forced displacements. The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and its proxies seized this opportunity to carve an approximately 120 km-long by 30 km-deep band of Syrian territory along its border. This pushed the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into a military agreement with the Syrian Armed Forces. So far, this agreement has not been followed by a political agreement that could imply a shift of control over NES including border crossing points. A political agreement as such could impact access routes for humanitarian actors in NES.

The North Western Syria (NWS) area, largely controlled by the Organization for the Liberation of the Levant (HTS) which put most other OAGs under its rule including the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), is one of the last opposition enclaves not yet reconquered by Damascus. Defeated opponents in other areas of Syria and Lebanon who would not accept to be ‘reconciled’ have been sent to Idlib throughout the conflict. This governorate is under daily shelling and aerial bombardment from the Syrian Armed Forces backed by Russia since April 2018, including on deconflicted health facilities, possibly in preparation of a potential final land offensive or surrender. The OAGs besieged in NWS among which several are supported by Turkey, with around 50,000 combatants of diverse affiliations, origins and nationalities, retaliate by shelling back, including on civilian areas in Lattaqia, Hama and Aleppo governorates.

Three main features of the crisis in Syria are i) the repeated violations of International Law, including International Humanitarian, Human Rights and Refugee Laws, turning it into a severe crisis of protection and ii) the massive, repeated and protracted character of forced displacements, and finally iii) major impediments to the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection of civilians, including humanitarian workers.

Since the conflict started, more than half a million persons have been killed, according to the Syrian Observatory for the Human Rights (SOHR), and half of the Syrian population have become displaced within (6.1 million) and outside (5.6 million) Syria. The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) counted at least 98,000 forcibly disappeared persons in Syria since March 2011, while the ICRC has limited access to detention places where torture is allegedly widely practiced. Warfare has been intense: based on UNOSAT data, the Columbia University identified that 37% out of 110,000 detected structures that were hit are moderately damaged, 35% are severely damaged and the rest 28% is destroyed, estimating the rehabilitation costs to amount to US$ 200 billion. The armed conflict and the repeated displacements have had a severe and cumulated impact on the population as well who are now living under the poverty threshold now constitutes 85% of the population. Furthermore, 1 in 3 children are out of school, hospitals are 59% functioning, and 3.07 million people are living with disabilities.

1.2 Geographical areas and affected population

The humanitarian community for Syria provides 5.6 million persons in average monthly with emergency or basic assistance, including to 3 million persons from within Syria. Three hotspots are much in focus: NWS, NES and to a lesser extent Rukban in the Southeast. Half of the humanitarian assistance is delivered in areas under the control of the Government. Addressing massive protection needs, the highest priority, remains challenging due to GoS as duty-bearer not recognizing their responsibility to protect nor grant mandate for humanitarian actors to do so, including UNHCR and the ICRC.

The most severe hot spot is by far NWS, with a potential for taking catastrophic dimension in the occurrence of a land offensive by GoS. Over 4 million persons are living there now, concentrated in the northern part of the governorate,
including 2 million IDPs among whom 775,000 persons are in 368 camps and informal settlements, heavily dependent, (2 persons in 3), on external assistance delivered exclusively from Turkey across the border. More than 500,000 displacements have been recorded since April 2019, among whom many are still living in the open while winter is coming. Turkey continues to keep its border tightly closed.

Second hotspot is NES with around 3 million inhabitants, Kurds and Arabs, Syriacs and others, which was just recovering from Daesh rule and destructions when Turkey’s military Operation Peace Spring was announced. In addition to 1.8 million people already in need of humanitarian assistance in NES, for half of them acutely, including 710,000 IDPs, which is mainly delivered from Iraq, around 220,000 persons became forcibly displaced within a week. More than half of them have been able to return back to their home. Alleged Daesh ex-combatants, around 20,000 men and boys over 12 year old, and their relatives, around 92,000 persons, mainly women and children, are detained separately in 14 prisons and 5 camps, including Al-Hole, situated in NES. 50,000 children below 11 year old live in these camps. Durable solutions for camp populations are not explored at this stage.

Finally, there is a residual caseload of IDPs and opponents in the no man’s land Rukban / “the berm” between Syria and Jordan, where around 18,000 persons are still stranded in the desert with scarce availability of aid and facing severe protection issues.

Other parts of Syria are now be generally considered technically in a recovery phase, but with significant residual humanitarian needs and acute vulnerabilities. However, there is no significant recovery framework so far and few resources are granted for addressing transitional needs, beyond the inter-agency Humanitarian Response Plan’s (HRP) early recovery objective. Such a plan would infringe the international community’s red lines, including for the UN (Parameters and Principles of UN assistance in Syria, Oct. 2017), that rules out the financing of reconstruction and/or refugee returns in GoS controlled areas as long as no inclusive and sustainable political solution in line with UN Security Council resolution 2254, has been put in place. The UN in Damascus explores however narrow avenues for a renewed strategic cycle, beyond the existing humanitarian framework, that would focus on peace-building and recovery, if there is a buy-in from donors which is not granted.

1.3 Critical assumptions, risks and threats

Humanitarian actors and donors have to get prepared for addressing even a larger scale disaster in NWS under complicated access conditions imposed by Damascus and Ankara, in case armed violence further intensifies there. At the same time, they have to sustain in 2020 an already gigantic humanitarian response for this area where the cross-border aid modality is a lifeline for 4 million people. Contingency plans identify large displacement scenarios, within Syria, to Turkey and beyond. It is critical that the Security Council Resolution on cross-border assistance is renewed.

Stabilization donors suspended most of their support when HTS took over Idlib in January 2019 and when the US forces reconfigured their presence in NES in October 2019. Sida continues supporting independent human rights, gender and peacebuilding projects through Sweden’s Regional Syria Crisis Strategy (see further above). The withdrawal however alters the availability of essential social services, livelihoods and mine clearance in these opposition held areas. It is expected that an alternative recovery framework will not be put in place, thus further aggravating vulnerabilities.

Compared to past years of intense and widespread fighting, the situation in Syria has improved in regard of direct hostilities. There are no more besieged areas, and there are fewer areas declared hard to reach by the UN. UN is assessing that access is improving from Damascus. However, one should not assume that large parts of the country are no more eligible for humanitarian aid. Severe vulnerabilities are identified also in Damascus-controlled areas, that have been generated by the protracted conflict and displacements which continue to face discriminatory policies from GoS. The lack of transition programmes may sediment vulnerabilities and socioeconomic frustrations could trigger new cycles of unrest in the future as the population’s demand for longer term and dignified solutions remain unmet. Other security risks is the high contamination of explosive remnants of war throughout the country, UNMAS estimates that 50% of the population are at risk of improvised Explosive Devices, while sleeping cells and mobile Daesh combatants may continue their fight.

The operational environment is prone to high risks for aid diversion and corruption, while access to follow up and monitor is poor. This is further exacerbated due to the need for remote programming and monitoring in parts of the country. Selected partners must be principled and robust. They must exert careful due diligence checks when establishing partnerships, contracting suppliers and recruiting staff. At the same time, humanitarian actors need protection. Deconfliction notifies to parties to the conflict the exact geolocation of humanitarian facilities, but it does not spare them from being hit, often deliberately targeted by GoS and Russia as it has been seen in Idlib. Deconfliction data will be used for legal pursuits later; it is what motivates humanitarian actors to continue their notifications.

1.4 Strategic objectives and priorities of the Humanitarian Response Plan

The Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) dated November 2019 identifies over 11 million People in Need (PIN) in Syria, including 4.65 million persons in acute need, very similar figures to 2019, but 18% less compared to 2017 and 2018 figures, the worst years of the crisis in terms of humanitarian needs.
The launching of the HRP 2020 depends on the outcome of the usually challenging negotiations with the authorities in Damascus. The HRP 2019 was officially approved as late as August 2019. OCHA will however announce the amount required for 2020, estimated US$ 3.3 billion, and the number of PiN at the annual Global Humanitarian Overview (GHO) event in December. The average assistance package is US$ 300 per person/month (2,900 kr).

The newly appointed Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) for Syria, based in Damascus, a position that remained vacant for almost a year, shared with donors that the strategic objectives would remain the same as for the two previous Humanitarian Programme Cycles (HPC):

Pillar 1: Provide life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable people with an emphasis on those in areas with high severity of needs.

Pillar 2: Enhance the prevention and mitigation of protection risks, and respond to protection needs through supporting the protective environment in Syria, by promoting international law, IHL, IHRL and through quality, principled assistance.

Pillar 3: Increase the resilience of affected communities by improving access to livelihood opportunities and basic services, especially among the most vulnerable households and communities.

The third pillar is expected to be significantly larger than for previous years and than the 2 other pillars, given that recovery needs became larger since hostilities have receded. It was mentioned as well that the HRP remains essentially a humanitarian framework that must be guided by the humanitarian standards and principles, including impartiality and needs-based prioritization, focusing on the most vulnerable, when resourced and implemented. OCHA is unable to report back the level of funding for each pillar respectively, alleging that everything is integrated.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

It is estimated that Syria lost half of its qualified work force and civil servants since 2011 which affects the availability and the quality of basic services all over the country, including for health and education. Partners who decentralized their operational set-up to the deeper field are reporting easier conditions for access, thanks to committed municipalities and local duty-bearers, compared to the restrictive regime of approval for organisations as well as individual projects enforced by GoS centrally. GoS has an acute need for income and collects debts, taxes and high fees on all administrative services.

Around 7 million people in Syria are living in areas which are not under the control of the GoS. Civil administration is included among OAGs’ de facto responsibilities. The Autonomous Administration in NES and local councils in NWS and Rukban have a dire need that humanitarian actors assist them in ensuring the survival of local populations. Access and operational environments vary from permissive to restrictive. It has been reported that OAGs are dismantling and selling out civilian assets in order to finance their war efforts.

Despite massive departures, Syrian communities and individuals remain eager to find solutions by themselves. The CSOs are severely restrained by the authorities ruling them, and used either as a source of income or for supporting preferred groups. Their access is constrained, but faith-based organizations may enjoy easier humanitarian space than others. SARC and the Syria Trust for Development (both of which have close ties to the regime) occupy niches of emergency response and legal aid with quasi monopoly. They play a role of “umbrella organizations” for both local and international organizations, influencing their access and hiring of international staff. The diaspora Syrian civil society has a large impact in advocacy, programming and resource mobilization, but operates discreetly. While in NWS, civil society has grown strong and implements most of the cross-border humanitarian assistance.

People have adopted coping strategies for mitigating different risks. Displacement has been the main one to avoid violence, oppression and recruitment in armed forces. The economic challenges are tackled in diverse manners. The rate of early marriages has jumped from 7% before the war to 30% today among girls under eighteen year old, reported UNFPA. Women became both care-givers and bread-winners, both a challenge and an opportunity for new gender roles, replacing recruited, fled, detained, home-confined, killed or disabled husbands, analyzed the World Bank, denouncing as well increased child labour among boys, as another coping strategy against economic hardship.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

As parts of the WoS coordination structure, the RC/HC and the Humanitarian Country Team in Damascus are getting more traction as political shifts results in larger areas to assist, so far not reaching NWS, but more and more NES and the South. The UN leadership in Damascus cannot promote the cross-border modality mandated by the UN Security Council, which the authorities consider illegal. The UN agencies report 5,500 missions within Syria in 2019 to implement their mandates. Because the humanitarian community is fully dependent on the authorities to get access, it is challenged daily in preserving the principles and its independence for needs identification, selection of beneficiaries and programming. The Damascus-based INGO forum (DINGO, 26 organizations) is a useful counterpower to the UN organizations.
The UN may implement programmes within GoS areas, across the conflict lines and from border crossings into opposition areas. Some organizations exclude cross-border operations, negotiating cross-line access (ICRC and SARC), other organizations work only cross-border, not registered in Damascus which claims they work illegally in Syria. They may work as well through local organizations that are registered in Damascus. 25 INGOs are operating in NES with their bases in Iraq. A large INGO community does the same from Gaziantep in Turkey for NWS. If and when there is a shift of control in NES, cross-border actors may lose access, as their programmes are likely to be suspended or handed-over if possible to whomever is better placed to ensure a kind of business continuity. Their replacement by Damascus-based actors is not to be taken for granted and can take long time before being effective. This has been seen in Aleppo, Eastern Ghouta, the South, etc. Such a loss of access, and subsequent transfer of responsibilities generally disrupts the assistance. INGOs in NES have developed community-based programmes with local implementing partners, while humanitarian Damascus-based actors involved in NES are mainly providing relief items: two different ways of programming.

The UN is elaborating a new cycle of its Strategic Framework to start from 2020 which will define the role of the UN in supporting Syria in meeting its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), quite in isolation from the donor community which is not on board politically. A UN Joint Programme of 6 UN agencies delivers recovery interventions in carefully chosen areas in the Damascus-controlled areas, but with limited support. The World Bank is not operational in Syria, as decided by its board members, but maintains a readiness to become so the day it is agreed that a transition phase can be supported. The support for Syria allocated through the EU’s Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) for 2020 amounts to 15 MEUR, while ECHO has at least ten times more resources.

2.3 International and regional assistance
The big five humanitarian donors are USA, Germany, UK, ECHO and Canada, providing 74% of the total funding. With US$ 1.73 billion in humanitarian funding granted to the HRP 2019, it is 53% funded to date, US$ 550 million less than last year at the same date. It remains one of the most costly responses in the world. Sweden is the 8th largest national humanitarian donor for Syria in 2019. Most organizations receiving core funding from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs are present in Syria where they may allocate some core funding.

Syria is Sweden’s largest humanitarian contribution, amounting to almost 550 MSEK 2019; which is about 2.25 % to the total humanitarian funding to the HRP in 2019. USA, being the largest donor for Syria contributes with 18 times more resources than Sida. Sida also implements its Regional Syria Crisis Strategy 2016-2020, managed by the development section of the Swedish embassy in Beirut for Lebanon and Syria, with 1.8 billion SEK supporting robustly resilience-oriented programmes through diverse actors in Syria who are important HRP stakeholders (support to the Office of RC/HC, UNFPA’s response to gender-based violence, Save the Children’s Resilient Adolescents programme, ACTED and Mercy Corp’s livelihoods and WASH and irrigation rehabilitations, and the Syria Resilience Consortium, which includes NRC, providing an holistic resilience response to conflict-affected communities in both regime and opposition areas).

2.4 Access situation
GoS denial of access is hindering the whole humanitarian programming cycle, starting with rejection of visa applications, obstacles put to independent needs assessments, delayed or denied response, and the challenges for humanitarian actors to monitor people in need for protection and their programmes. This is the case for areas under GoS control, who are enforcing a very restrictive and unpredictable system of approvals by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and line ministries for each step of the programme cycle that hampers the timely and needs-based delivery of assistance to many communities. However, organizations report somewhat easier cooperation with line ministries and local officials. Partners have elaborated different coping strategies: working through well-established local partners, decentralizing operations to deep-field sub-offices, recruiting mainly national staff whose movements are less hindered, resorting to third party monitors and auditors with good local presence. It is not optimal, but prevents risks of rigged aid, diversion and corruption effectively. Remote control operations require control systems that partners have integrated in their management set-up.

The renewal of the mandate in UN Security Council resolution 2165 (2449), for cross-border access to Syria of UN convoys through crossing points in Turkey, Iraq and potentially from Jordan needs to take place in January 2020 at the latest. A renewal is essential for sustaining the massive UN response to NWS and NES. INGOs do not necessarily need such a resolution for continuing their own cross-border activities, but only as long as conditions allows them to continue their operations. In NES, access so far as been easier from Iraq, while access in NWS remains critical due to the security situation. There is scarce international presence in NWS and it continues being one of the most dangerous places for humanitarian workers. In relation to increased GoS presence in NES, the access situation may change, one scenario could inhibit organizations which work there from Erbil and Dohuk in Iraq without accreditation in Damascus.

Insecurity and mine risks are significant obstacles to reach out communities. The UN mine action agency (UNMAS, in discussion with Sida for support in 2020 with 10 MSEK) counts 165 explosive events per day in average in Syria, since it started monitoring them in 2014. Farmers, including women increasingly, and young boys in urban areas may be more vulnerable to such risk. One in two persons in Syria is exposed to explosive risks.
3. SIDA’S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1 Partners

Sida’s humanitarian unit prioritizes in 2020 partners implementing Pillars 1 and 2 of the HRP (life-saving and protection), as these pillars constitute the most urgent needs to be addressed and other interventions related to Pillar 3 (resilience) can be covered from other channels of funding. Sweden’s Regional Syria Crisis Strategy provides robust volume to partners aligned with the 3rd Pillar objectives. It is a prerequisite that Sida’s partners are active in the clusters and inform the HPC process. Of importance in Syria is also the ability for contingency planning, risk management and due diligence, including against aid diversion and corruption, and Duty of Care policies.

Sida’s main requirement for a principled and coordinated humanitarian response places the support for the Country-Based Pooled Funds as a corner stone in the humanitarian portfolio, in complementarity to continuous regional support for OCHA. The Syria Humanitarian Fund (SHF) and Syria Cross-Border Humanitarian Fund (SCHF) will be supported with 40 MSEK each initially. The funds do standard and reserve allocations, mastering needs-based informed decision-making involving the clusters technical advices. Sweden shares a seat at the Advisory Board of the SHF with Norway and of the SCHF with Switzerland.

Protection needs are ranked by Sida as the highest in Syria and IHL violations are deemed still severe and massive, with a particularly hard impact on women and children. Therefore, it is proposed to continue key partnerships, providing non-earmarked funding, with specialized organizations like the ICRC (25 MSEK) and Unicef for child protection (30 MSEK). Save the Children’s child protection project in displacement camps in NES is suggested to be continued (… MSEK).

It is proposed to continue offering Programme-Based Approach funding (PBA) to NRC (15 MSEK) and AAH (20 MSEK), as they have proven to be strong and principled actors bringing an advanced expertise in their respective sectors within Syria, in NWS and NES. Sida’s contribution may support NRC protection activities as well as interventions in other sectors (food security, livelihoods, water and sanitation, shelter, health and education). AAH works in WASH, food security and livelihoods, and nutrition in all of Syria except NWS.

Sida will continue to support partners implementing emergency health interventions for affected populations. In NWS Islamic Relief (IR) (25 MSEK) has proved a very efficient and principled actor. Gender-based violence prevention and response is already well supported by Sweden’s Regional Syria Crisis strategy through UNFPA (60 MSEK in 2020), therefore does not require additional attention. However, primary and mental health in GoS controlled areas has been a gap which is proposed to be supported in 2020 through SARC, in collaboration with the Swedish Red Cross (SRC) (25 MSEK) and the IFRC. Part of the contribution to SRC will support SARC’s essential emergency services as well, through the IFRC emergency appeal 2020.

Finally, ADRA’s WAVES project (11 MSEK, WASH) already supported by Sida since 2019 in Deir Ez Zor is proposed to continue. ADRA has proven an efficient and principled actor and the next phase focuses on critical geographical locations with high humanitarian needs while integrating health and education aspects to the project.
1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

1.1 Protracted refugee crisis

Since the beginning of the Syria Crisis in 2011, UNHCR has registered close to one million Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The Government of Lebanon (GoL) estimate of the total Syrian displaced population remains at 1.5 million, giving it the highest per capita proportion of refugees in the world. In addition, UNRWA has registered over 470,000 Palestine refugees and an estimated 180,000 currently reside in Lebanon, including close to 30,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS). Furthermore, more than 18,000 refugees of Iraqi, Sudanese and other origins stay in Lebanon. The presence of such a large refugee population - for a country which has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention - put pressure on infrastructure and services, trying the patience and hospitality of host communities.

GoL has been urging refugees to return to their country of origin, regardless of the security conditions and the legal and socioeconomic prerequisites for a safe, dignified, voluntary and durable return. Without a legal residency granted by the General Security Office (GSO), individuals and families are exposed to heightened risks of arrest, detention and exploitation. The annual residence renewal fee of US$ 200, which is unaffordable for many refugees, is reported to be the main barrier to obtain legal residence. Syrian refugees face several challenges trying to obtain civil documentation, especially birth registration, which endangers children’s right to an identity. During 2019, it is reported by GSO that around 2,500 Syrians have been deported, following its May 13 2019 decision to deport all Syrians who entered Lebanon irregularly after April 24 2019. This is the first time, since the commitment to not deporting Syrians since 2012, that GoL is violating the principle of non-refoulement under international human rights law.

GoL has not yet developed a refugee policy. Different political parties fight for an accelerated return process despite there is no agreement between Syria, Lebanon and UNHCR on organized returns. Pressures on refugee returns also took the face of demolishing shelters of already vulnerable refugees if they had been using any semi-permanent material during 2019. UNHCR has verified 17,249 voluntary Syrian refugee returns from Lebanon during 2019. An additional 1,407 returnees are reported by the General Security from their group returns, these individuals are not known to UNHCR. Women are overrepresented amongst individual returns and men are slightly overrepresented in group returns, both in comparison to proportion in the refugee population known to UNHCR.

The 2019 Lebanese protests - motivated by decades of government corruption, sectarian political system and economic instability - resulted in the resignation of the Government and continued political deadlock with the economy on the brink of collapse. Since the protests started 17 October, the humanitarian operations have mainly been impacted by road blockages, causing limitations in access and programme activities to pause. Restrictions on foreign currency transaction and access to dollars remains the major challenge for the humanitarian actors, for example the World Food Programme, UNHCR and other development actors, who are dependent on a functioning banking system to be able to deliver the monthly cash assistance and paying staff and suppliers.

1.2 Geographical areas and affected population

Refugees make up 30 percent of Lebanon's population: 81 percent of registered Syrian refugees are women and children, the latter constituting more than half of the refugee population. In response to the influx of Syrian refugees, GoL has adopted a “no camp” policy and prevented the establishment of formal settlements. Consequently, the vast majority of Syrian refugees live with host communities in urban, peri-urban, and rural areas. The Bekaa region in Eastern Lebanon and North Lebanon, including Baalbek and Akkar, face the highest concentration of Syrian refugees (62 percent), followed by Beirut and South Lebanon. Host community members are affected by the high presence of Syrian refugees, which has strained Lebanon’s public finances, service delivery and the environment.

UNHCR estimate that 73 percent of all Syrian refugees rent their accommodation in residential buildings: 18 percent live in fragile makeshift tents in spontaneously set-up settlements and the remaining nine percent live in non-residential structures including garages, shops, worksites and farm building. About 45 percent of the Palestinian refugees live in the country’s 12 formal refugee camps.

According to the 2019 Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR), 55 percent of the overall refugee population is estimated to be severely vulnerable. VASyR 2019 further estimate 73 percent of Syrian refugees to live under the poverty line (US$ 3.84/capita/person) and 55 percent of Syrian refugees live in extreme poverty (US$ 2.9/capita/day). Further, 65 percent of Palestine Refugees in Lebanon (PRL) and 89 percent of PRS live below the poverty line and are unable to meet their survival needs of food, shelter and health. Notably, approximately 1.5 million Lebanese are also currently living in poverty. The large presence of Syrian refugees has had substantial repercussions on Lebanon’s economic, social and political situation. The public education landscape has indicated an overload of the education infrastructure since the conflict began.
UNHCR has targeted 198,000 households (HHs) that will be supported with a lump sum of US$ 375 for winterization cash assistance during a period of five months from November 2019 to March 2020.

1.3 Critical assumptions, risks and threats

Risks of rising tension between the Lebanese and Syrians is expected in the event of a severe economic crisis, that would put more than half of all Lebanese below the poverty line and most likely result in an increase of refugees returning to Syria. Consequences could include evictions, challenges in accessing food items and health services including hospitals and Primary Health Care Centers, challenges in obtaining civil documentation, freedom of movement restrictions and extremely limited livelihood opportunities. Furthermore, in a country with sectarian tensions, the risk for social unrest is possible, with the power of sectarian militias and proliferation of small arms.

The political deadlock in Lebanon has continued to restrict Lebanon’s possibilities to benefit from flat loans and grants internationally agreed at CEDRE (Conférence économique pour le développement, par les réformes et avec les entreprises) donors’ conference in 2018, a total value of US$ 11.8 billion was pledged for the coming 10 years to support economy and stability, as well as World Bank resources. Thus, possibilities to upgrading infrastructure and at the same time providing jobs in large numbers, included to refugees if work permits were issued for them, continue to be limited. As a result, the victims of this protracted crisis, in contradiction to the spirit of the Global Compact for Refugees, are kept dependent on aid that is still delivered for most of it in an emergency mode over the years.

1.4 Strategic objectives and priorities of the Refugee Response Plan

The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) 2017-2020 is part of the 3RP and is a multi-year plan between GoL and its international and national partners to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable. The plan is co-led by UNDP and UNHCR, the latter leads the refugee pillar of the LCRP. Since 2011, more than US$ 6.7 billion has been provided to Lebanon in support of its crisis response and provision of direct humanitarian assistance and protection. For 2019, LCRP called for US$ 2.6 billion to support 2.4 million highly vulnerable people, in November it is only covered at 36 percent. In complementarity to LCRP, UNDP has developed the Lebanon Host Communities Support Programme (LHSP) which targets the poorest host communities with a higher risk of tension and conflict based on the number of Syrian refugees per capita.

The inter-agency work to maximize efficiency and minimize duplication in the delivery of humanitarian programmes. The strategic objectives of the plan follow; 1) ensure the protection of displaced Syrians, vulnerable Lebanese and Palestinian refugees; 2) provide immediate assistance to vulnerable populations; 3) support service provision through national systems and; 4) reinforce Lebanon’s economic, social and environmental stability.

Its major weakness is the absence of a Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) process led by OCHA that would result in the ability for partners to prioritize interventions based on the criteria of needs severity and scale. The financial tracking system shows that the LCRP is still mainly funded by donors’ short-term humanitarian contributions, while a “nexus” shift is expected to increase. Multiannual funding remains limited despite that the crisis context is protracted and probably will remain so in the coming years.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

Together with national and local partners, supported by the international community, GoL have provided protection and assistance to displaced Syrians, Palestine refugees and vulnerable Lebanese. The LCRP promotes the strategic priorities identified by the GoL and partners, with interventions aligned to national policies and strategies, responding to evolving needs, and seeking to complement and build on other international assistance in the country. A robust response has been mounted by the GoL in partnership with the international community, helping to avert dire consequences and support positive outcomes for Syrian refugees. This response, however, has been inhibited by insufficient funding and the crisis has exacerbated pre-existing development constraints in the country.

A particular constraint is the refugees’ access to health care and education. Lebanon’s healthcare facilities have been overstretched by an increase in utilization and 30 percent of service recipients through Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) primary healthcare centres are displaced Syrian women, men, girls and boys. Lebanese health system is highly privatized and registered refugees have to pay a contribution towards their health care, in the same way Lebanese do. Since the onset of the crisis, public hospitals have accumulated a deficit amounting to US$ 15 million. In 2019, in total 1,563,800 (51 percent female displaced Syrians and 49 percent male displaced Syrians) out of 2,473,800 people in need were targeting within the health sector.

During the last four school years, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) received international donor support through UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO and bilateral donors, which contributed to an increase in school enrolment. However, more than half of all refugee children in the age group 3-18 are still out of school, mainly adolescents and youth.
Lebanese civil society organizations (CSOs) have played a critical role in providing humanitarian assistance and the civil society has expanded in size to assist refugees and to deliver relief work. Faith-based charity organizations are delivering a significant part of the response, and the Lebanese Red Cross (LRC) as well, supported by 23 Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies, the ICRC and the IFRC.

2.2. International operational capacities and constraints
The efforts of the international community have been critical in mitigating the worst effects of the crisis. The international response is coordinated by UNHCR, for the protection of refugees and asylum seekers, and by UNDP for the mitigation on the refugees’ impact on Lebanon. In Lebanon, UNHCR is mandated to coordinate humanitarian aid amongst humanitarian agencies and organizations. OCHA supports the RC/HC Coordinator in ensuring a coherent and effective humanitarian response. Financial support remains low, the UN argues that current financial funding is enough to cover 50 percent of the humanitarian needs, while INGOs state that only 20-30 percent of the refugee population is covered by humanitarian services.

Humanitarian and development partners work alongside GoL and civil society to strengthen stabilization efforts, including longer-term programming and a focus on development outcomes. This is done within the LCRP and motivated essentially by the presence of Syrian refugees.

The response in Lebanon is unique in a way that it is using massively multi-purpose cash assistance distributed through ATM cards. UNHCR provide cash assistance which does not only strengthen the capacity of the benefitting families in covering their basic needs but also contribute to the local economy by purchases directly from local markets and shops. The WFP runs an e-card system for food purchases where e-cards are loaded each month with US$ 27 per person. UNHCR provides Syrian refugee HHs with US$ 175 in multi-purpose grant each month. A jointly initiative by partners have created a common needs assessment, communication and operational platform, called Lebanon One Unified Inter-Organisational System for E-cards (LOUISE). The LOUISE platform is built to coordinate cash assistance to Syrian refugees and poor Lebanese. The targeted household’s card can through a common card access food, cash, protection and child benefit assistance.

2.3. International and regional assistance
The six largest donors during the year of 2019 are USA, the European Union, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada and Norway, providing over 70 percent of the resources to fund the LCRP. WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF are the three major UN agencies donors. Sweden comes at the 13th position with US$ 9 million tracked in FTS. USAID, ECHO and DfID are participating to the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), but donor coordination is a challenge as they are not reaching out other donors before and after HCT meetings. The EU gathers its member states for regular consultations. The cooperation among donors is weak and could be improved. Politization of aid from donors, including for humanitarian action, complicates processes and blurs strategic orientations.

2.4. Access situation
Geographical areas with the greatest humanitarian needs are targeted for operations and include the Bekaa, North Lebanon, South Lebanon, Beirut, and Mount Lebanon. Sida’s partners for 2020 is planned to deliver humanitarian programmes in all these locations. In terms of operational problems, partners have during the end of 2019 experienced limitations in accessing areas of operations due to the consequences of the 2019 Lebanese protests, however, as of this writing, ongoing programmes have started to resume. Future access to the geographical areas of operation and continued implementation of the 2020 programming is to a high extent dependent on the impact of the protracted and deteriorating political and economic situation, which most likely will encounter difficulties in the continuity of the humanitarian response.

Conflicts through the 1980s, 1990s and in 2006 have left Lebanon heavily contaminated with landmines and cluster bombs, and the number of refugees fleeing the crisis in Syria has intensified the need to clear land. UNICEF supports mine-risk education in Lebanon, between 2016 and 2019, more than 600,000 girls and boys, and more than 400,000 community members were involved in mine awareness programmes carried out by UNICEF. According to UNMAS, 30 percent of Lebanon’s territory has not been declared free of mine risks.

3. SIDA’S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1. Partners
Sida provides humanitarian resources to partners in Lebanon implementing the LCRP through the specific strategy for the Syria crisis. Sida support partners in Lebanon working on a needs-based humanitarian response and respect for international humanitarian law and the humanitarian principles. Programme priorities will - as previous year - target the most vulnerable, strengthen protection and provide refugees with improved access to legal assistance and quality services.

To allow adaptions in real-time and to respond to acute emergencies, unearmarked funding is suggested to be provided to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (12 MSEK) and Action Against Hunger (AAH) (6 MSEK) for the
year of 2020. The actors have added value in their respective sectors and a Programme-Based Approached (PBA) funding is thus proposed to continue. NRC will for next year focus on the protection environment by improving access to rights and services for refugees and affected host communities, particularly focusing on the vulnerable groups and communities affected by displacement. AAH add major value to the WASH sector being one of the very few organizations providing WASH services integrated with food security, nutrition and protection.

Sida should continue its financial support to the Lebanon Humanitarian Fund (LHF) (15 MSEK), managed by OCHA, for its inclusive governance and programming on humanitarian needs. LHF has a relevant focus on protection and assisting people with specific needs who are falling outside the mainstream assistance system. Sweden holds a seat at the LHF’s advisory board. Furthermore, for coordinating key advocacy regarding the protection of refugees, Sida propose to continue its assistance to the Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF) (1 MSEK) to support the forum’s contribution to a stronger coordination and engagement among INGOs.

The Swedish Red Cross (SRC) (7 MSEK) has a strong Green Response in their WASH interventions which is proposed to be continued in 2020 with a focus on phase-out of SRC and handing over to Lebanese Red Cross Society (LRCS). SRC’s WASH interventions focus on increasing access to water, sanitation and hygiene. Lastly, Sida should continue to give flexible support to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (10 MSEK) that works in close cooperation with the LRCS and the Palestine Red Crescent Society. ICRC provide protection and assistance to Syrians, Palestinians and Lebanese through cash-programmes, health care, food, and improved infrastructure.
1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

1.1. Protracted refugee crisis

Jordan is the second largest refugee hosting country compared to population in the world, hosting around 2.9 million refugees with the majority being Palestinians (2.2 million), although well socioeconomically integrated for most of them. As of November 5th, 2019, there are 654,266 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan, while estimations say there are around 1.3 million Syrians in Jordan. Of the registered refugees 83.5% live in host communities and 16.5% in camps (Zaatari, Azraq and Emirati Jordanian Camp). The large refugee population in Jordan puts a heavy additional burden on national capacities and systems, including on host communities. Also macroeconomic effects of the large refugee population has been identified, such as decreasing economic growth and foreign investments, further exacerbating the economic burden on Jordan.

The Jordanian government (GoJ) continues to take ownership of the refugee response, including that the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) being in charge of the JRP planning process and approval of projects. The JRP is primarily led by line ministries in coordination with UNHCR for the refugee pillar and UNDP for the resilience pillar. GoJ has shown positive signs of implementation during 2019, for example GoJ is working towards the simplification of the JRP project-approval process, with the support of stakeholders, particularly in relation to documentation and also in respect of procedures (simplifying the process with line ministries involved).

In October 2018, the border with Syria was reopened, however the Syrian refugee population in Jordan remains stable as only 34,000 (29,000 in 2019) of Syrian refugees have returned since the opening. This emphasizes the need for continued support for the refugee response in host countries, where the humanitarian needs remain great. As refugees have been in Jordan for several years and the last intention survey notes that only 6% intends to return within the next 12 months, partners and the JRP are looking at more longer-term solutions, talking about transition and resilience, also highlighted already in 2016 in the Jordan Compact. Most Syrian refugees in Jordan are coming from South-West Syria (Quneitra, Dera’a and Sweida), just on the other side of the border with Jordan, which was ‘reconciled’ in July 2018.

There is a great need for further support in the area of livelihoods. Some 305,000 Syrian refugees of working age (18-59) are registered with UNHCR Jordan. Around 159,000 work permits have been issued through the Jordan Compact since 2016 (including renewals), however according to Ministry of Labour only six per cent of these have been issued to women. Sectors include mainly agriculture and construction. Late 2018, GoJ also decided to permit Syrian Home-Based Businesses, creating another possibility for livelihoods and self-reliance.

Changes to GoJ regulations in February 2018 meant that Syrian refugees were no longer able to access the non-insured Jordanian rate for health and should thus pay 80 per cent of the “foreigner’s rate”. However, in April 2019, GoJ announced the roll-back on this policy meaning that Syrian refugees could once again access subsidized healthcare. The multi-donor trust fund set up in 2019 to support the Ministry of Health was one key factor to this development (supported by USA, Denmark and Canada).

1.2. Geographical areas and affected population

The large majority of the registered refugees (83.5%) live outside refugee camps in Jordanian cities, towns, and rural areas. Geographically, Amman and northern parts (Irbid, Mafraq and Zarqa) host the highest numbers of Syrian refugees, nearly 90%. The three main refugee camps that host 16.5% of the registered refugees in Jordan are Zaatari camp hosting nearly 78,000, Azraq camp around 33,000 and the Emirati Jordanian camp hosting nearly 7,000 persons.

In the Vulnerability Assessment conducted in 2018 and released mid-2019, there were only minimal differences regarding vulnerabilities compared to the previous vulnerability assessment. Of concern is that expenditure continues to be higher than income, slowly diminishing the economic situation of refugees.

Jordan hosts roughly 17,000 Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS) which are registered with UNRWA. Due to their legal status, they are only entitled to support from UNRWA. Considering UNRWA’s continuous strained financial situation, support for PRS is limited, as for other Palestinian Refugees in Jordan. According to UNRWA about 95% of PRS are considered highly vulnerable, making them one of the most vulnerable groups in Jordan, as in other countries in the region.

1.3. Critical assumptions, risks and threats

As the security situation in southern parts of Syria is stabilizing no new wave of refugees is expected. However, as guarantees for safe and dignified returns continues not to be in place, no large-scale returns are expected. There are reports of assassinations in South Syria and rampant terrorist actions that generate a negative perception of a general state of insecurity in this area, influencing refugees’ decisions. This assumption is also strengthened by UNHCR’s monitoring of Syrian refugees’ intentions on return where only 6% intend to return within the next 12 months. Hence,
the refugee population in Jordan is not expected to change in any significant manner over the next year. However, like for Lebanon, ‘Go and See’ missions are planned to help potential returnees to take an informed decision.

Even though the general view is that the prerequisites for safe and dignified returns are not in place, the increased donor fatigue for the Syria crisis risks increasing pressure on Syrians to return, as Jordanians experience increasing competition for services and employment opportunities.

1.4. Strategic objectives and priorities of the Refugee Response Plan
The Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis (JRPSC), led by the MoPIC, constitutes the strategic partnership mechanism between the GoJ, donors, UN agencies and NGOs for the development of a comprehensive refugee, resilience-strengthening and development response to the impact of the Syria crisis on Jordan. Jordan Response Plan (JRP) is a three-year rolling plan covering the period 2020-2022 and integrates both refugee and resilience responses. The JRP refugee and part of resilience pillar constitute the country chapter of the 3RP 2019-2020. The JRP budget for 2020 is US$ 2.304 billion distributed over twelve combined refugee and resilience sectors. For 2020, the JRP has been updated to align its pillars and sectors with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as well as the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR).

In summary, the objectives of the JRP 2020-22 are:
- Ease pressure on Jordan as host country
- Enhance self reliance and living conditions
- Support durable solutions

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1. National and local capacities and constraints
The government has strengthened its leadership of the response since late 2014, shifting focus from a UNHCR-led refugee response to a more comprehensive developmental approach answering to longer-term structural gaps in public service delivery, which have been brought to the fore by the refugee crisis. MoPIC leads the response planning and coordination process, with significant technical support from UNHCR and UNDP.

Civil society organizations play a major role in the overall response and have increased their capacity over past years. Along with GoJ and UN Agencies, CSOs have expanded the work on social protection and strengthen the protection response for survivors of violence in camps and host communities. Provision of specialized support to survivors include health, legal, safe shelter options and other services. The response capacity of the Jordan Red Crescent (JRC) is also being developed, including by IFRC partners. For example, JRC and partners run a Cash Assistance program that provides grant to refugee families whom are distributed cash either through a debit card or they are identified in a bank. Like in Lebanon, there is an aspiration among Jordanian CSOs that the bulk of the response should be channelled directly through them and not through the UN agencies and INGOs as intermediaries, as allegedly capacities are not an issue and such scheme would be more cost efficient..

At the Syrian household level, the major need remains linked to cash for different purposes like rent, food and non-food items in addition to covering any emergency cash needs. Protection needs remain urgent with a continuation of detention cases and relocations to camps. Syrians are expected to continue seeking illegal underpaid work when they are unable to obtain work permits, and are expected to continue engaging their underage children in the informal labour market and arranged marriages. Access to education is an issue, specially for girls, not so much due to the lack of availability of services, but because of the refugees’ reluctance to let their children go to school if transport is not facilitated, by fear that they will be molested on the way.

2.2. International operational capacities and constraints
In the 3RP Jordan chapter, UNHCR acts the international counterpart for GoJ on the refugee response while UNDP does for the resilience pillar. UN agencies and line ministries will continue to co-lead the sector working groups. UNHCR also has a large multi-sectoral operational role, the heaviest components being its cash program in the basic needs sector, and a mandate to lead the protection advocacy efforts. At the same time, advocacy efforts will continue through the Jordan INGO Forum (JIF) targeted more towards the UN and donors so far but can also become more effective if certain advocacy is exercised with the Jordanian authorities.

Access from Amman is no more an option for the cross-border operations into Syria, although technically the UNSC resolution has left this option open so far. The last ‘crane-lifted’ delivery of aid to Rukban from Jordan over the border was in 2018. Since then, the RC/HC for Jordan has no more significant role to play for coordinating the humanitarian hub in Amman, which is mainly done by OCHA’s regional office, supporting the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator (RHC), who may be extended in 2020, as the INGO community and donors have demanded it to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). Still many organizations operating in NWS and NES have their bases or some support capacities in
Amman, where many UN agencies have their regional offices, making it de facto a central coordination hub for the WoS, besides Damascus, Gaziantep, Erbil and Beirut. The OCHA managed Country Based Pooled Fund for Jordan (the Jordan Humanitarian Fund - JHF) has been able to increase its funding in Jordan since 2015. However, in 2019 the RC/HC posed the question of closing the JHF at an Advisory Board meeting. The Advisory Board agreed to push for engaging in making the fund more strategic and relevant meeting critical humanitarian needs, and by showing these results engaging more donors. Since then, the JHF has managed to attract two new donors. Since GoS retook control of the southern parts of Syria in 2018, the cross-border window of the fund is no longer active.

2.3. International and regional assistance
The unique setup of the Syria crisis response has attracted international support for many years but has seen a decreasing interest over the last couple of years, which might be due to several factors, Jordan of course not being exempted. As of November 26th the JRP 2019 is only funded at 20.2%. However, the interagency part included as the 3RP Jordan chapter is funded at 61% with the refugee part being funded at 64%. Several large donors are funding the refugee response in Jordan, with Germany, the EU, UK and USA being the four largest donors.

2.4. Access situation
Access in Jordan could become a concern, while it used to be quite unproblematic. The regional hub for WoS coordination remains in Jordan with several meetings taking place there due to the relative simplicity of working in Jordan. New over-arching complexities are being reported by INGOs, NGOs or UN partners, besides delays from MoPIC in approving projects, like worrying plans to increase fees of visas and work permits for international staff and an intention to limit international staff to a couple of persons per organization, like the country representative or experts who may not be found in Jordan. Access and security throughout the country is relatively unproblematic. Restrictions to be taken into account are for Syrian refugees in camps which face freedom of movement restrictions since Jordan officially closed its borders for additional refugees in 2015.

3. SIDA’S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1. Partners
As the response in Jordan is moving into a new phase with longer term needs and priorities, Sida will streamline its portfolio to a few strategic humanitarian partners which have the capacity to identify critical gaps and humanitarian needs. For 2020, it is proposed to continue supporting the JHF (15 MSEK) while complementing with a strong follow-up, support and engagement in the Advisory Board to continue strengthening JHF’s role as a key humanitarian actor. Secondly, ICRC support is proposed to continue (5 MSEK), as ICRC continues playing a key protection role in Jordan for both Syrian refugees and host communities. Lastly, Sida proposes to continue supporting NRC with programme-based approach (10 MSEK). NRC provides support in ICLA, Education, Shelter, and Food Security and Livelihoods. The programme-based approach has proven useful in Jordan, giving NRC the possibility to shift programming in accordance with shifting humanitarian needs throughout the year. Advocacy must be supported for different purposes: protection, access, strategic orientations of the JRP. Therefore, it is proposed to continue funding Jordan INGO Forum (1 MSEK) through NRC.
1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

1.1. Protracted refugee crisis

Turkey is since 2014 home to the largest refugee population in the world. In April 2011 the first refugees from Syria arrived in Turkey and later in the same year the government declared its “open door” policy which granted Syrians and state-less people living in Syria unlimited access to Turkey. A recent survey by Kadir Has University shows an increased negative domestic opinion towards hosting Syrian refugees in Turkey. Social tensions with host communities have increased over time, especially in Istanbul, fueled by competition of jobs as well as cultural differences. Thus, social cohesion remains one of the biggest challenges in Turkey. The Turkish border to Syria remain closed, but reports witness of people being able to cross the border but on a very limited level.

According to DGMM (Directorate General for Migration Management), there are close to 3.7 million Syrian refugees in Turkey as of November 2019. Approximately 2 million being male and 1.7 million females. A bit over 1.7 million are children up to 18 years old. The planning assumption of the UN (United Nations) for 2020 – 2021 is complicated due to the many statements made by the government to move 2 million Syrian refugees to northern Syria. Turkey has also made statements about opening its borders to the European Union (EU). During the year, Syrian refugees, among others, have increasingly moved to the Greek Islands due to worsened conditions in Turkey.

Syrian refugees can apply for temporary protection status and once granted are entitled to a number of public services. As has been the case, the burden on municipalities in host communities to deliver public services within for instance education and health remains high. The four main provinces that hosts almost half of the Syrian refugee population was before the influx the most deprived ones with low socioeconomic development. The language barrier continues to constitute a challenge for integration and around 400 000 Syrian children remain out of school (UNHCR, November 2019). Enrollment rates are highest for children in primary school, but decreased dramatically for those in secondary school. Thus, there is a great risk that adolescents will become a lost generation.

Syrians under temporary protection status have the right to participate in programs of vocational training and active labor market programs facilitated by Iskur (Turkish Employment Agency). The level of beneficiaries from Iskur services remains low and access to the formal labor market is challenging due to the application process for a work permit. According to a 2019 WFP, TRC (Turkish Red Crescent) and WB livelihood report, only 87 000 out of 3.7 million have a work permit. Turkey has one of the largest informal economies in the world, many Syrians often work informally under poor conditions with no access to social benefits. Thus, income opportunities for Syrian refugee families remain scarce and many are relying on the world’s biggest cash assistance programme ESSN (Emergency Social Safety Net) which have benefitted 1.7 million Syrian refugees as of November 2019. However, many Syrian refugees are turning to coping mechanisms due to lack of income opportunities such as child labour and child, early forced marriage.

Turkey also hosts 318 000 non-Syrian refugees, mainly from Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran (DGMM, July 2019) and 115 000 individuals applied for international protection in 2018. The International Displacement Monitoring Center (established by the Norwegian Refugee Council) estimates that Turkey has over a million IDP:s (internally displaced persons) as of December 2018. The root cause of internal displacements is the ongoing armed conflict between the Turkish armed forces and the terrorist-labelled organization PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in the southeast of the country.

1.2. Geographical areas and affected population

Gaziantep, Hatay, Sanliurfa and Istanbul continues to be the provinces which together hosts almost two million Syrian refugees. DGMM together with Istanbul governorate initiated in July this summer a relocation process of Syrian refugees as well as migrants under international protection. The purpose has been to make sure refugees going back to the province of registration to ease the burden on Istanbul which has been the province hosting most refugees (555 000 as of November 2019). In August 2019, 35 000 registered Syrian refugees and 65 000 Syrian refugees not registered has been processed from Istanbul and referred to other provinces, according to the Turkish Ministry of Interior .. According to UNHCR, only 2 per cent of Syrians under temporary protection still live in camps.

1.3. Critical assumptions, risks and threats

Since the summer of 2015, an armed conflict has been on-going in the southeast of the country between the Government of Turkey (GoT) and the PKK. The situation in Turkey and the war in Syria are intertwined in several ways. With the Operation Peace Spring, Turkey now controls a third area in northern Syria in addition to Afrin and the so called Euphrates Shield area. There is a lack of insight to the areas and humanitarian access is fluid. However, the humanitarian needs are high according to OCHA. The response in Afrin and Euphrates shield is led by TRC and AFAD (The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency) and the security situation has worsened over the last months. The Turkish response is believed to invest in health facilities, schools and other services that are supporting Syrian returnees. However, the Turkish response is suffering from lack of funding. This was indicated by the governor of Hatay in a meeting with donors in March 2019.
The Turkish statement of possibly facilitating 2 million returns to north Syria will be a critical aspect to monitor. The feasibility of the statement remains unsure, for example in relation to who will support Turkey and fund such a large scale project as well as the security situation in the area. If returns are not taking place on a voluntary basis, it would violate international humanitarian laws against the principle of voluntary returns. The commitment to the EU-Turkey statement needs to be ensured going forward and the respect for voluntary returns safeguarded. The future of FRiT (Facility for Refugees in Turkey) is also key to ensure sustainable support for Syrian refugees in Turkey.

Needless to say, social tensions will remain a challenge and increase further in 2020 according to UNHCR. There is a high need to foster coexistence among Syrian refugees and Turkish host communities. 3RP partners holds this as a priority during 2020 and 2021. The Turkish economic outlook looks dire which will affect the refugee response in many sectors. An economic reform package was presented in 2019 to boost the economy and foreign investment but lacked substantial measures and did not have positive injection on the economy as expected.

1.4. Strategic objectives and priorities of the Humanitarian Response Plan
The Turkey chapter of the 3RP for 2020 – 2021 is being developed in collaboration between the UN and national authorities to ensure protection, humanitarian assistance and to strengthen the resilience of the affected population. As compared to last year, the shift from humanitarian assistance to long-term development and resilience building is growing. In tandem with the 3RP Turkey chapter the EU together with the GoT is implementing the FRiT which also will hold a stronger focus on resilience and public service delivery, as the 3RP resilience pillar. Main planning assumptions going forward are that GoT will continue to lead the response, legislation is implemented more strictly, more attention to return preparations, the economic situation of the country will worsen, social tensions increase further and the engagement of development actors and private sector will increase.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1. National and local capacities and constraints
GoT is leading the refugee response in Turkey with UN agencies having a complementary role. Main authorities are AFAD, DGMM and line ministries such as MoFLSS, MoNE (Ministry of National Education) and MoH (Ministry of Health). As a result of the change to the executive presidential system after the 2018 referendum, coordination with Turkey has been challenging but now slightly more conducive. GoT claims it has invested 40 billion USD in assistance to the Syrian refugees in the country (this number is not backed with further information). Ankara has continuously urged the EU to increase funding to Turkey for the refugee response and criticized the EU for disbursing funds slowly. Approximately a third of the total EU assistance have been allocated to line ministries, and the absorption capacity is considered as low, according to the EU. Since the situation in Turkey is not a humanitarian crisis, the UN is unable to enable its coordination mandate. This has been problematic since the government does not coordinate with all humanitarian and development actors in a sufficient way.

GoT have limited capacity and resources to provide the Syrian refugees with agreed services. The economic crisis that erupted last year continues to pose challenges in the Turkish society and adds to the social tensions between host communities and Syrian refugees in addition to competition of jobs. Some central services, such as the ESSN, is planned to be integrated into Turkish national social security assistance pending.

2.2. International operational capacities and constraints
UNHCR and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) co-leads the international refugee response through the 3RP, which in Turkey receives substantial funding from the EU as well as the USA. The level of international support to Turkey is rather high, compared to other similar refugee contexts around the world. The operating environment for international actors is however complicated. We have seen competition between UN agencies and between the UN and the EU. The main reason has been competition of resources, for instance when it comes to being awarded big cash assistance contracts. Not directly related, but the European Commission imposed a 4% cap of administrative overhead, hence excluding UN agencies from tendering under the socioeconomic call of the second tranche of the FRiT. UN has therefore a decreased role as implementing actor in Turkey, with the World Bank being awarded five new contracts with a total value of 400 million euro. The World Bank is not a direct implementer and includes partners for this purpose such as Turkish authorities and ministries. Hence, closeness to beneficiaries, transparency to follow-up on results and efficiency will be critical issues to follow-up on.

Turkey plays a role in the WoS structure with its humanitarian hub in Gaziantep, close to the Syrian border. UN resolution 2393 (formerly 2165) that allows for cross border assistance from Turkey to northwest Syria is renewed annually and is soon to be discussed in the UN security council for 2020 renewal. The cross border assistance, via Bab al Hawa and Bab al Salam border crossings reaches those not accessed from Damascus in for example Idlib governorate. The single largest actor, operating from Gaziantep, is the Syria Cross Border Humanitarian Fund (SCHF). SCHF have allocated a total amount of 78.8 million USD in 2019 as of 18 November 2019. In addition, the UN family have a large presence in Gaziantep together with other humanitarian actors such as INGOs and SNGOs operating in northwest Syria.
When it comes to access to Turkish controlled areas only a handful INGOs have access. This has been a problem for a number of years now and is likely to continue and expand given the newly controlled area in NES. OCHA regularly advocates for increased humanitarian access but barriers to retrieve INGO permits as well as renewals remains a challenge. UNFPA and WHO have access through local partners. OCHA regularly meets with Turkish authorities to advocate for increased access for INGOs but the progress is close to non-existing.

2.3. **International and regional assistance**

The EU-Turkey statement in 2016 was a response to the large refugee influx from Syria. The first and second tranche of the FRIT amounts to 6 billion euro in total (3 billion euro for 2016-2017 and 3 billion for 2018-2019). The main focus areas are humanitarian assistance, education, health, municipal infrastructure and socio-economic support. FRIT is considered as the single most important financing instrument for the Syrian crisis response in Turkey and making EU the main donor. In total, 5.8 billion euro has been committed, 4.2 billion contracted and 2.57 billion euro disbursed as of September 2019. For the second tranche, development assistance will constitute 1.9 billion euro and 900 000 million euro in humanitarian assistance, in line with the overall agreed transition due to shifting needs of the Syrian refugees.

DG ECHO is managing the humanitarian pillar, and DG Near the development pillar, working in tandem with the 3RP framework. Response sectors are education, health, livelihoods, food security and agriculture, protection and basic needs. The biggest programme, under the humanitarian pillar, is the ESSN which is being implemented by WFP until March 2020, after which IFRC will pick up implementation in collaboration with TRC and MoFLSS. Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) will continue with UNICEF as the implementer with a total contract value of 20 million euro. INGOs have also been awarded contracts in protection and health with a lump sum value of 88 million euro. 183 million euro is left to be contracted by DG ECHO under the humanitarian pillar for the second tranche of the FRIT.

Under the development pillar, large direct grants are going to line ministries, for example MoH 210 million euro for increased access to health and MoFLSS 20 million euro for institutional capacity development to be able to care for the needs of vulnerable refugee groups. Within socioeconomic support, MoFLSS receives 245 million euro to assist the most vulnerable Syrian refugees and complement ESSN support. MoNE will receive a direct grant of 400 million euro to continue implementation of PICTES (Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System).

In terms of the 3RP response UNHCR and UNDP as co-leads have indicated the financial needs for respective sector. Education, 260 million dollar for 2020 and 250 million dollar for 2021. Health, 22 million dollar for 2020 and 20 million dollar for 2021. On livelihoods, the financial requirement for 2020 is 210 million dollar and for 2021 240 million dollar. Food security and agriculture will require 45 million dollar in 2020 and 60 million dollar in 2021. Regarding protection, the estimated need in 2020 will be 115 million dollar and 110 million dollar in 2021. Finally, on basic needs, 310 million dollar for 2020 and 120 million dollar in 2021 is needed. Social cohesion is an overarching priority of the 3RP partners.

USA provided 150 million dollars to the 3RP framework in 2018 and the amount is usually around the same each year. Some donors, such as Switzerland and the Netherlands are providing bilateral funding to the refugee response, although small scale if you compare to the bigger picture with the FRIT.

3. **SIDA’S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN**

3.1. **Role of Sweden and humanitarian assistance in Turkey**

Sweden has supported the first and second tranche of the FRIT with approximately 100 million euro. As all funding will be allocated by the end of 2019. EU member states will need to discuss future funding post-FRIT II. The needs will remain high as long as the Syrian refugees have a presence in the country, especially in covering basic needs and public service delivery. Sweden is supporting UNHCR with unearmarked support to the refugee response in Turkey. Furthermore many partners to the Embassy works on the refugee situation in the country with other sources of funding.

Sweden is supporting UNICEF, IOM, UNFPA, UNHCR and UN Women with the aim to end Child, Early and Forced Marriage in Turkey, targeting both Syrian refugees and Turkish host communities. UN agencies’ mandates are linked to both the humanitarian assistance and long-term development assistance. The contribution is jointly funded by Sweden’s Reform Strategy for Turkey and the Strategy for the Syria Crisis since target groups are both Syrian refugees and Turkish host communities. Finally, the Embassy will continue to closely liaise with actors implementing projects in Turkey with funding via the Syria crisis strategy, managed by the Embassy in Beirut. For instance, SALAR (The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions) implementation of the RESLOG (Resilience in Local Governance) programme as well as UNFPA implementation of five Women and Girls Safe Spaces across Turkey.
References
- Humanitarian Response Plan Mid-Year Review, October 2019, UNOCHA
- Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, UNOCHA
- Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan Strategic Overview 2020-2021, UNHCR
- Humanitarian Implementation Plan Regional Syria Crisis, October 2018, ECHO
- 101 Facts and Figures on the Syrian Refugee Crisis, UNHCR
- Jordan Response Plan 2019-2021
- Operational updates for Jordan (October 2019) and Turkey (August 2019), UNHCR
Syria crisis Humanitarian Crisis Analysis 2020

Annex 1: Monitoring and Dialogue Plan

1) Focus organisations

- **Jordan Humanitarian Fund**: The JHF has been struggling to find and show its strategic humanitarian relevance in a context where most actors are talking about transition and durable solutions. For 2020, an early visit to Jordan including strong focus on field follow up with the JHF shall be prioritised in which a collaborative effort to delve into targeting approaches and humanitarian needs should be included.

- **Swedish Mission Council**: The project with ADRA is moving from a RRM project to a yearly project. An early field mission to previous WASH project in Eastern Ghouta should be prioritised in order to create an early and strategic dialogue with ADRA and SMC on the implementation.

- **Swedish Red Cross Lebanon**: The Green WASH project has been extended, but should include a clear focus on phasing over to LRCS from 2021 onwards. This will need focus in order to assure sustainable results and a responsible phase out of SRC.

- **Swedish Red Cross Syria**: SRC has since October 2019 a country representative in Damascus, also SRC will implement a new program on Primary and Mental Health together with SARC. In discussion with SRC, it was identified that a strong support from SRC in regard to gender and mental health to SARC is needed. Sida should stay in close dialogue with SRC throughout 2020 in order to support this ambition and the implementation of this new and relevant project through SARC.

2) Thematic focus

- **Protection**: As Syria remains a protection crisis, this area should remain high on the agenda for 2020. The possibility to engage the protection focal point should be discussed early 2020.

- **Returns, refugee and IDP**: As the crisis moves into a phase of relative stability while access remains limited and prospects for rehabilitation is close to non existent, return monitoring and follow up will be a priority issue, both in dialogue with partners and other stakeholders. This also relates to returnees right to a safe, dignified and SUSTAINABLE return, i.e. resilience and access to basic services.

**Specific dialogue issues for Syria**

- Safeguarding the integrity of humanitarian aid, humanitarian principles and the needs-basis in strategic and operational choices.

- Protection, gender and environment are reportedly mainstreamed systematically in the HRP, according to clusters and partners, but the quality of access being poor and the programme cycle often instable or under-resourced, it is legitimate to doubt that these important cross-cutting issues are addressed as they should. Key gender partners shared with Sida their disappointment of poor capacities for mainstreaming gender across the HRP among the humanitarian partners.

- It would be important that the future HRPs for Syria elaborates a real and measurable theory of change that can be monitored and reported back. It should as well rank necessary interventions to be funded in priority (high, medium, low) on the basis of the acuteness and the severity of needs, which is always controversial among HRP’s early recovery stakeholders.

- A system to track funding in the 3 pillars of the HRP would better inform funding decisions.

3) Required resources and travel

**Geographical focal point Sida HUM**: For 2020, the geographical focal point will plan at least two field trips inside Syria, one together with the Director for Humanitarian Assistance in early 2020 and the other later during the year with a focus on field follow up in areas further away from Damascus. Further, a focus on Jordan will be included in the workplan as there is limited resources to follow the Syria crisis from Amman and Beirut.

**HUM focal point Embassy Beirut**: Working 50% on the humanitarian response. Focus remains on participating in the Advisory Boards of the SHF, LHF and JHF as well as follow up humanitarian response in Lebanon and Syria. The 50% remains insufficient in order to monitor the contexts in affected countries, to follow projects and to keep a strategic dialogue with partners and other donors across the region as required.

**HUM focal point Embassy Ankara**: Working 25% on the humanitarian response. Focus for this position remains the cross-border response especially Advisory Board of the SCHF, dialogue with Islamic Relief, and donor coordination. Also monitoring of the response for Syrian refugees in Turkey in order to inform future decisions.