Each year, Sida conducts a humanitarian allocation exercise in which a large part of its humanitarian budget is allocated to emergencies worldwide. This allocation takes place in the beginning of the year to ensure predictability in programming for humanitarian organisations and to allow for best possible operational running. In an effort to truly adhere to the humanitarian principles Sida bases its allocation decisions on a number of objective indicators of which the most important are related to the number of affected people, vulnerability of affected people and level of funding in previous years. One of the indicators is also related to forgotten crises in order to ensure sufficient funding also to low profile crises. Besides this initial allocation, another part of the humanitarian budget is set aside as an emergency reserve for sudden onset emergencies and deteriorating humanitarian situations. This reserve allows Sida to quickly allocate funding to any humanitarian situation throughout the year, including possible additional funding to any of the crisis affected countries in the Sahel.

For 2016 the Sahel crisis is allocated an initial 210 MSEK in January 2016. Close monitoring on the establishment of ERFs and increased humanitarian needs follows throughout the year for potential additional funds. This HCA is organised so that there is a regional analysis for the Sahel that is broken down in four full country analysis (Nigeria, Niger, Mali and Chad) and three minor country analysis (Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Mauretania) for countries in the Sahel with only some minor support, often only in a very particular sector or few organisations. Global and regional support that by decision of the recipient organisation is channelled to the Sahel is not included in this analysis.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

The Sahel regional Humanitarian Crises Analysis takes in consideration the common aspects of the crisis affected countries in the Sahel-region and facilitates shifts in funding levels between countries depending on each country’s response needs each year. The regional approach is also a way for Sida to explore how support can be given in a comprehensive, cohesive and effective way to respond to underlying causes to humanitarian needs and bridge humanitarian funding to development in the form of alignment with national and regional conflict resolution/prevention programming and resilience programming. The humanitarian situation in the Sahel has persisted and worsened in 2015 and is predicted to continue and possibly even further worsen in 2016 due to conflicts and insecurity. Conflict and displacement, erratic weather and epidemics continue to generate substantial humanitarian needs across the region. In 2016 the humanitarian action in the Sahel will be guided by the OCHA led 2014-2016 Regional Strategic Response Plan. The three-year strategy aims to deliver coordinated and integrated life-saving assistance to people affected by emergencies as well as kick-start a more tailored response to the chronic nature of much of the needs across the region by linking relief to development.

The 2015 Ebola epidemic affected the countries in the Sahel severely. Even though the bulk of actual cases were concentrated to Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, cases were detected in Mali and Nigeria and there was a high alert throughout the year that the epidemic would spread to other countries in the Sahel. Effective Ebola prevention programmes and effective case management, isolation and contact tracing curbed the epidemic, and at the end of 2015 there are only a few remaining cases in the three worst affected countries. Ebola preparedness will continuously be an issue for the countries in the Sahel in 2016 and will be monitored within the Sahel crisis analysis.

Conflict

Background/Underlying cause:
The vast desert land with great seasonal variation of rain and access to water and with porous borders between the countries have favoured a nomadic lifestyle with a lesser degree of geographically fixed community life. The region is inhabited by a large number of ethnic groups with a great diversity in religion, culture and language. As a result, national parameters including the “State” and “Judiciary” become secondary for significant numbers of people and in particular to those living outside the main cities and urban areas. Colonial and post-colonial French and British influence has been, and is still, a significant
factor affecting people in the region through administrative functions. Ethnic and cultural diversity as well as historical links and divides with superimposed colonial borders gives ground both to active conflicts as well as underlying, dormant conflicts that at the change of politics or affiliations with external powers may flare. The low degree of national identification, religious diversity in combination with poverty, uneven distribution of resources, porous and vast borders, constitute favourable grounds for rebellions, extremism and insecurity. The two major crises in the region now affecting the humanitarian situation are the Mali crisis and the Nigeria crisis. There are no international armed conflicts in the Sahel at the moment. The Casamance independence war has been going on for over 25 years but is a low intensity war with little humanitarian impact.

The Mali Crisis
The state of Mali lost control of the north of its territory in 2012, after Tuareg groups (from the region they call Azawad) began a campaign for greater autonomy. A separate coup d’etat further destabilised the country. A fragile alliance in the north between Tuareg and Islamists was quickly broken, and Islamists took control of key cities. Civilian rule was re-established in mid-2013 with the support of French military. The government and the Azawad Movement Coalition (AMC), which comprises the main Tuareg armed groups operating in the north, signed a peace agreement in mid-2015. The stability of the Sahel region relies on the presence of foreign troops. In addition to Malian forces, there are French forces, the UN peacekeeping force MINUSMA and the French deployed 3,000-strong counterterrorism operation across the Sahel region. Almost four years after the outbreak of the conflict in 2012, the volatile security situation continues to have a devastating impact on civilians. Civilians, as well as international and Malian armed forces, continue to be targeted by armed group attacks. Communities affected by the violence still struggle to access food, water, health care, education, protection and livelihood opportunities. The conflict has further exacerbated the vulnerabilities of communities whose capacity to withstand shocks has been eroded by repetitive droughts, floods, epidemics and chronic poverty. On-going unrest continues to hamper the return of the 139,000 Malian refugees in neighbouring Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger and more than 60,000 people are internally displaced due to the conflict in the north. The majority have been displaced since mid-2013, when the number of IDPs and refugees reached its peak.

The Nigeria Crisis
The armed Islamist group sometimes known as “Boko Haram” (meaning ‘Western education is forbidden’) is leading an insurgency to create an Islamic state in the predominantly Muslim regions of north-east Nigeria. The Nigerian authorities have been fighting the insurgents since 2009. The crisis in Nigeria, currently affects 14.6 million people in Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe states in the north-east part of the country. Some 7 million people are suffering from the extreme consequences of the armed conflict and are in need of humanitarian assistance. 2.2 million people have been displaced in what is one of Africa’s fastest growing displacement crises. Since the end of 2014, the conflict has taken on a more regional dimension, with insurgent attacks in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Military offensives in 2015 have regained territory in Nigeria from Boko Haram, but the group continues to have strongholds in areas that are hard to access, including the Sambisa forest, the Mandera mountains, and the Lake Chad islands. The presence of conflict in the Lake Chad Basin is affecting 30 million people living in the poorest areas of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The combined effect of the pervasive insecurity and the underlying severe vulnerability is translating into record numbers of people in need of emergency relief. As of December 2015, an estimated 9.1 million people – almost one in three – need urgent assistance and protection.

Natural Disaster

Nature of disaster:
The climatic Sahel region, which covers a vast area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea and encompasses parts of Senegal, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Sudan, and Somalia, is more than 80% comprised of arid and semi-arid desert lands. The population density of the Sahel is in the vicinity of one inhabitant per square kilometre. Population growth is around 3% which is the highest in the world. Most inhabitants in the region are small scale subsistence farmers, and a drought, even if only affecting a small part of the geographic region, may have devastating consequences for affected households. Floods and locust invasions may have the same effects and a household’s entire food resources can be devastated in an instant. Another aspect of household vulnerability is high grain prices combined with widespread poverty (including high unemployment). These factors force a large number of families into negative coping strategies to deal with the stresses. For example, children are taken out of school, lesser quality food or seeds are consumed, animals that might have been intended for
reproduction and survival migration, seasonal or permanent, are killed for sale, livelihood opportunities are sought in other places than home, predominantly in the cities, neighboring countries or as an attempt to get to Europe by crossing the Mediterranean by boat.

Prevalence:
Seasonal rains arrived later than usual in 2015, but also continued later than usual. The amounts of rain that has fallen are in the range of normal, in the northern parts of the Sahel even more abundant than usual. The agricultural yield forecast for 2016 is predicted to remain stable compared to previous year's exempt from smaller pockets in Mali and Chad where rainfall has been less than usual. The relatively good harvests the latter years have not reduced humanitarian needs in regards to needs of food support or equivalent. For 2016 it is estimated that at least 23.5 million people in the Sahel are food insecure. In 2013 the figure was 11.7 million, in 2014 it was 14 million and in 2015 it was 20.4 million. In 2016 it is estimated that 5.9 million children in the region will suffer from acute malnutrition. Conflict and insecurity in some cases affect agriculture more than weather conditions, as farmers who are not sure of being able to harvest, will not sow even if farming conditions are favorable.

Resilience and coping mechanisms:
Coping mechanisms that traditionally have been elaborated by people to adapt to the climate, are not as effective or as feasible as they used to be due to a number of reasons; national borders established by colonial powers do not reflect traditional mobility patterns, population increase is not in pair with increase of production and growth, conflict and world market prices on grains and seeds grown in the region fluctuate. Households are not as resistant as they would need to be to cope with stress and shocks and lack resources to invest to adapt, diversify and invest in order to become more resilient. The coping mechanisms that have evolved from long-term adaptation to the climate are still in practice such as the transhumance and cross-border trade, and also diversification of livelihoods, migrant work, and diversified crops and livestock.

1.1 Geographical areas and affected population

The food security and nutrition crisis is proliferated all through the region but is most severe in conflict affected regions and in rural areas of Chad and Niger. Conflict driven crisis affect all countries but humanitarian consequences of conflicts are most noticeable in Mali, Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Rural areas and border areas to countries with internal conflicts are particularly exposed. The most vulnerable are persons without resources, safety nets and flexibility in regards to livelihoods including women and men, girls and boys. Women and men are affected differently in their vulnerabilities and the burden of supporting children and elderly may quickly drain the resources from a breadwinner. Women may be more prone to rely on dependencies and through this render them more exposed to forced marriage, domestic violence and forced migration. Men face vulnerability through forced migration, forced recruitment and also risk of radicalisation to outlaw rebel and terrorist groups. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are the most vulnerable of the mobile populations, since they receive the least assistance and recognition. The number of IDPs in the region has increased drastically during the last year, especially inside Nigeria. The coping mechanisms that have evolved from long-term adaptation to the climate are still in practice such as the transhumance and cross border trade, and also diversification of livelihoods, migrant work, and diversified crops and livestock. Conflicts, climate change and epidemics hamper the existing coping mechanisms and together with population growth, interact to render the crisis more severe.

1.2 Risks and threats

Climate change and desertification/land degradation in conjunction with population growth and conflict together with generally weak states and poor social safety nets are constant risks and threats and keeps the region in a cycle of chronically exposing vulnerable households to more and more stress. The last three years of rainfall having been relatively good is by no means an indication for how rainfall will be in the years to come. In governance, there is a negative trend in political stability in the countries in the region. During 2015 there has been a successful election in Nigeria with a peaceful transition of government, but the transitional government in Burkina Faso saw an interruption by a coup d’état that interrupted the electoral process, but peaceful elections were held in November 2015. Elections are scheduled for Niger and Chad in 2016. These elections are predicted to be calm, but this could change rapidly as underlying conflicts are present. All Sahel countries in the region rank high on risk for corruption. Low degree of mechanisms of transparency and accountability hampers the possibilities to change this negative pattern. The population
growth rate is 3% per year with high fertility rate per woman (6-7 live births per woman). The highest nativity rates are noted among rural populations. The economic growth rate is high (5 or 6% per year), but growth is not redistributed in an even and inclusive way, which is a great source of stress, particularly for children, who represent over 50% of the population.

With many underlying vulnerabilities (food insecurity and conflict) and few safety nets (basic social services), the vulnerabilities are acute and high. The lack of basic social services increases peoples vulnerability - a population which otherwise could have remained in a chronically severe situation is more frequently tipped over the emergency threshold. This is manifested by the extraordinary large numbers that need humanitarian assistance in the Sahel. Lack of infrastructure such as harbours, roads and airports as well as lack of humanitarian access due to security deficits, leave some populations with humanitarian needs un-responded or insufficiently responded to. A significant gap is the phase-out of humanitarian assistance and hand-over to development partners and national governments in the Sahel region when recovery should be transformed into development and be locally owned.

Healthcare systems in the Sahel countries are weak, and there is still a risk for Ebola or other outbreaks like meningitis or cholera. The conflicts in the region affect the locust and granivorous bird control programmes and last year's infestations with loss of crops could be traced back to insecurity in Mali that hampered prevention of harmful infestation programmes.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan

The three year SRP 2014-2016 for the Sahel focuses on three overarching strategic goals:

1. Track and analyse risk and vulnerability, integrating findings into humanitarian and development programming.
2. Support to vulnerable populations to better cope with shocks by responding early to warning signals, by reducing post-crisis recovery times and by building capacity of national actors.
3. Deliver coordinated and integrated life-saving assistance to people affected by emergencies.

The first year of the regional SRP for the Sahel response priorities focused mostly on the food crisis aspect of the Sahel crisis. As humanitarian needs due to conflict have surged during the last two years due to intensification of the Nigeria crisis and the Mali crisis, there is a shift in geographic focus towards the conflict affected countries. This has for example led to a general reduction of attention to Burkina Faso and Mauritania, but instead seen in increase of attention to Cameroon and Nigeria. The sectors prioritised are:

1. Food insecurity
2. Malnutrition
3. Conflict-related needs
4. Epidemic-related needs
5. Disaster-related needs

The chronic nature of the Mali crisis and the surge of terrorism in the region as well as the rapidly increasing number of people in need of humanitarian assistance in Nigeria are challenges that puts a strain on the humanitarian response system. Humanitarian actors have had the time to shift resources in each country seeing a deterioration if the humanitarian situation, but as needs do not decrease in older crises, a new crisis with no new resources, strains response organisations to their limits. Lack of local implementing partners are also a significant challenge where in some instances UN organisations need to self-implement at a very high cost as no national organisations are established where new humanitarian needs occur.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

**Government:**
Governments of the Sahel's capacity to respond to both humanitarian and development needs have so far been weak. The Sahel countries rank among the lowest in Human Development Index (HDI) in the world.
Through strong engagement and advocacy with regional organisations and their development partners, humanitarian teams are promoting policies and investments that help Sahel's most vulnerable households to better cope with shocks, and to protect their assets. Only an integrated humanitarian response, with coordinated and sustained action from governments, humanitarian and development actors, can curb the worrying trend of spiraling needs in the Sahel. The UN integrated strategy for the Sahel is addressing some of these issues including Governance, Security and Resilience.

Civil Society:
The national civil society in the Sahel countries, including national Red Cross Societies, has remained weak and often only acting as service delivery partners for the UN and international non-governmental organisations (INGO’s) humanitarian programmes. As civil society may be seen as a potential destabilizing factor to governments lacking in democracy and respect of human rights, it is often difficult for civil society organisations to become strong advocates for change of politics and resource mobilisation/resource management. Even in Burkina Faso, where there are many NGOs, when it comes to humanitarian response capacity they are often lacking in systems and institutional resources to be efficient actors in humanitarian response.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

Leadership and Coordination:
The Sahel humanitarian response has a UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy placed in Dakar. There is another UN Special Envoy for the integrated programme for the Sahel also in Dakar. This strategy is now being merged into the UNOWA (United Nations Office for West Africa) programme. The division of labour between these are roughly that the more development oriented interventions supported through the UN system are organised in the integrated strategy and the humanitarian response through OCHA.

Humanitarian Agencies:
Regional representations both for the Sahel and for West Africa are in place both among UN and INGOs. Many donors also have regional advisers and representations, mostly in Dakar. Humanitarian coordination structures are well developed and include INGOs. The latter have shown a high degree of cost efficient service delivery, but have been somewhat lacking in capacity development strategies for local NGOs to render hand-over and phasing out possible. Among the donor agencies some new methods for supporting NGOs are seen as with UK Department for International Development’s (DFID) new approach in the Sahel, where a large part of the funds now are channelled through the European Commission Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG-ECHO). Resources for humanitarian response also include the stand-by partner agreement with surge capacity to UN partners. The MSB is an important resource to fill human resources capacity deficits in the region. Resilience and DRR will be strengthened in West Africa in 2016 by the planned opening of an UNISDR regional office in Dakar.

2.3 International and Regional assistance

Donors: The largest donors in 2015 are USA, ECHO and the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF). Other important donors are Japan, UK, Sweden and Canada.

Regional Organisations:
The engagement of locally driven regional structures such as Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) has been active, but they have not shown strength in addressing the underlying causes of food insecurity, household vulnerability and security issues. The AGIR initiative (the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative) has given guidance to national governments in developing national and local capacities for resilience and CILSS to address desertification and reduce vulnerability due to drought.

3. Sida’s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1 Sida’s role

Earlier assistance and results:
Sida’s Sahel-allocation for the last years, increased focus has been put on organisations that can provide an integrated multisectoral response package supporting various humanitarian needs at the same time ranging from nutrition to health, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and education to name a few key
sectors. There was also an increased flexibility in allowing part of the integrated programming to address underlying causes even though not qualifying as core life-saving interventions.

Lessons learnt:
Sida has had a roving position to Chad, Niger and Burkina Faso and in contact with the regional UN, INGO and donor offices in Dakar. This has increased Sida's field presence and a greater understanding of Sida's partners programming has been developed. In 2016 this position is extended to cover the whole of the Sahel. Increased presence has led to improved donor coordination, especially with ECHO. Joint donor field missions have been done with ECHO on two occasions in Chad and have proved useful.

3.2 Response Priorities 2016

Humanitarian Focus:
The focus in the region for 2016 will be on conflict related crises particularly in regards to IDP situations as well as other population movements (refugees, returnees and host communities) due to insurgency. Increased needs in the Lake Chad Basin countries will be met and funds reoriented to cover these needs. The Mali crisis response is still relevant, but there is a possibility that the situation might be on the way to stabilise enough for refugees from neighbouring countries to start returning. Protection, food insecurity and malnutrition also remain as prioritized sectors for humanitarian interventions. Contributing to efficient coordination and humanitarian access will continue to be a priority. Projects and programmes funded by Sida must include gender equality and should take in account environmental consequences of the change brought by the project, both activities and impact. Assessments of conflict sensitivity will be further stressed to account for by partners. For 2016 the flexibility remains, but in the case of Chad and Niger, the limited funding in combination with unmet humanitarian needs have forced a stricter focus on more core life-saving activities.

Synergies with Development:
It is paramount that Sida applies a holistic approach and inclusive of humanitarian/resilience/conflict prevention/conflict resolution in the elaboration of the new country strategy for Burkina Faso, Mali and the regional strategy for long term regional cooperation in Africa south of the Sahara. In that process, the regional strategies of ECHO/DEVCO and DIFD should be further consulted and analysed, to render complementarity with and catalytic dimensions to the Swedish contribution in the region. A higher degree of Sida presence in the field should be prioritized and existing capacities at the embassies (Mali and Burkina Faso) should be further involved in monitoring and participation in humanitarian country teams.

3.3 Partners

Framework agreements:
Most of the strategic partners of Sida/Hum are active in the region. The UN organisations are most of them represented both on regional level and national level, in some countries also on local level.

Other partners:
The European Union through ECHO has a regional strategy/HIP (Humanitarian Implementation Plan) for the Sahel in which the Niger is included (together with Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauretania, Mali, Cameroon, Senegal and the Gambia). There are also separate ECHO HIPs for Mali, Chad and Nigeria which focus on providing assistance to the victims of the political crises. Sida should engage with the integrated Sahel strategy for the Sahel and ECHO/DFID regional food/safety-net and resilience programme as well as other donors with a humanitarian and development focus. United Nations Development Program (UNDP) should be a priority to align humanitarian programming with on a central level to take lead in the transition from humanitarian to development partnerships with governments in the region as well as with UNFPA.
For 2016 Chad is allocated an initial 44 MSEK in January 2016. Close monitoring of the development of the humanitarian situation follows throughout the year for potential additional funds.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

Conflict

Background/Underlying cause:
Chad is politically a stable country, but with a low degree of decentralisation and democratic governance. Still ranking among the lowest in human development index, economic growth due to oil revenues have contributed to a significant degree of development and investments in infrastructure and services in the latter years. State investment in security (defence) is also significant. Chad is a secular state including large populations of both Christian and Muslim populations. Internal tensions due to religion seem to be unusual and communities co-exist from macro to local level with low or no tension between the groups. Ethnically Chad is diverse and counts over 160 local languages and dialects. Most of the population live in rural areas. There is a mix of pastoral and agriculturalist farmers, and many groups of both pastoralists and agriculturalists are nomadic or semi-nomadic. Urbanisation is rapid and city growth is both according to development plans and in form of unofficial settlements, since colonial borders do not reflect ethnicity and language nor mobility-patterns such as seasonal transhumance movement in the region, cross-border issues are further complicated. The two official languages in Chad are French and Arabic. Society is in its social organisation to a large extent traditional with a clear division between male and female duties and expectations. Chad has a dual governance system with the traditional sultanate with a hereditary order of succession and a post-colonial administration that is heavily centralised to the capital. Nativity rates remain very high and combined with a reduced infant and maternal mortality, as well as general improvement in health, population growth is very rapid. Chad is affected by conflicts in neighbouring countries and the current crises that result in an influx of refugees are the CAR conflict, the Nigeria crisis and the Sudan/Darfur crisis. The Libya crisis does also affect the stability of Chad and during 2016 it will be important to follow the evolution of humanitarian consequences of internal Libyan politics.

Main stakeholders in the conflict:
The conflicts in neighbouring countries each have their own dynamics and reasons but affecting Chad not only through refugees, but also politically. The president of Chad, Idriss Déby, has been active in peace negotiations in crises in neighbouring countries, as well as keeping close relations to France and USA. Chadian troops have intervened in the 4 country joint military operation to resolve the insurgency situation.
in Northern Nigeria. Presidential elections are planned in 2016 and are not seen as likely to generate any major political changes or humanitarian consequences. The deficits in democratic governance and decentralisation are threats to inner stability and the current calm may change rapidly. Chad has recently seen an increase of terrorist attacks conducted by militant groups with affiliations to the Nigeria crisis, both in the capital city N'Djamena and in border areas to Nigeria and Cameroon.

Cross border implications:
Borders to Chad are in general open and the possibility to seek refuge in Chad is welcoming to those who are in need of protection. The border between Chad and Nigeria is has been closed for trade and the southern border to CAR has also been closed in periods. This has affected trade in a negative way and aggravated poverty for farmers and pastoralists. Other conflicts in neighbouring countries are not at the moment creating any significant cross-border implications other than refugees arriving in Chad. The most alarming situations that may affect Chad in 2016 are Nigeria, CAR and Libya.

Trends:
The general trend in Chad is despite internal challenges and conflicts in neighbouring countries that the economic growth will continue and that security will remain stable. The situation calls for a gradual handover from humanitarian to development actors including national NGOs and the state, centrally and down to county and district level are now starting to get to the point where they may pursue their own development goals.

Natural Disaster

Nature of disaster:
The Sahel region and Chad in particular has a climate and topography that is sensitive to seasonal drought and floods resulting in food insecurity. The natural variation from year to year is exuberated by climate change and desertification. Population increase also drives the need for increase of food production. Indications for 2016 are that it will be a normal year when it comes to agricultural production in most of the country with exception of the south east of the country. Despite a rather good harvest predicted, there are many households that will struggle; especially in the period just before, and in the beginning of the rainy season (usually May to September), called the lean season, when many households run out of reserves and the number of malnourished children rises. Over 85% of rural populations live below the poverty line. Chad ranks among the least developed countries in in the world on the human development index (HDI).

Prevalence:
For 2016 the needs in food aid is expected to rise. This is to some extent due to drought in south east region of the country and because of conflict and IDP situations. Needs in the Lac province in all sectors, including food aid, are very high mostly due to the IDP situation caused by eviction of fisher folk from the islands of Lake Chad to the mainland. Around 50 000 internally displaced persons are in acute need of assistance. In October 2015 the number of persons in need of food aid is estimated to 3,4 million of which 663 000 are responded to. There are an estimate of 567 000 persons displaced either as refugees, IDPs or returnees. A total of 398 800 children are malnourished.

Resilience and coping mechanisms:
Traditionally there are resilience and risk management systems and coping mechanisms among the Sahel people. Seasonal variations and yearly variations have been dealt with through transhumance migrations and access to multiple sites for agricultural crops in different areas to alternate between. The role of the extended family and ethnic groups is also a way to cope, where resources are distributed amongst members of the extended family that live in another area of the country or abroad. Population increase and degradation of the environment (desertification), low usage of irrigation and closure of borders, the traditional coping mechanisms are not enough to deal with the protracted crisis. Since the financial resources on household level are weak, there may be severely malnourished children and adults, despite that food is readily available on the market.

1.1 Geographical areas and affected population

The Lake Chad district in Western Chad emerges as an acute crisis within the greater Sahel crisis and is connected to a similar situation in the Diffa region of Niger, northern Cameroon and Borno-state in Nigeria. Food insecurity affects the whole country, but is most pronounced in the dryer parts of the country (northern
and eastern part of the country) and parts of the country that are affected by conflict in the neighbouring country (Nigeria and CAR). The refugee crisis is mostly affecting border areas in the south, east and Lake Chad region. The most vulnerable groups including women and men, girls and boys who lack social safety nets such as assets, family/extended family and/or transferrable skills are the most sensitive both in regards to the refugee crisis and the food insecurity crisis. Among mobile populations the most vulnerable are IDPs who are the least catered to when it comes to both protection and basic humanitarian needs. Also host communities are strained of resources as IDPs sometimes settle in informal settlements close to existing communities. Communities and individuals are trying to, and have ambitions on how to, better cope in the situation they live. Diversification of transferrable skills, diversification of crops, improved seed, etc. but for most households these coping strategies need investments and often resources are not enough to realize ambitions.

1.2 Risks and threats

Chad is a fragile state and there is always a risk of spill-over from conflicts in neighbouring countries. The food insecurity is revised on a yearly basis as each year's crop affects the next year's lean period. As most farmers are subsistence farmers, a drought for a year may lead to low or no crop at all for consumption the next year. Chad is also one of the least democratic states in the world, so despite the last few years' stability, civil unrest is possible. As for financial risks, Chad receives the score 22, on a scale where 100 equals freedom from corruption, from Transparency International. Hence the public sector in Chad, compared to other countries, can be said to be characterised by a high level of corruption. Humanitarian access has improved due to the fact that the security situation has improved in the entire country. Also better and developed infrastructure makes transport and access easier. Humanitarian flights are still the only effective way to reach refugee populations both in the east and in the Lake Chad district. The IDP situation in the Lake Chad district has a risk in conflicts between IDPs and host communities. Surge of terrorist attacks is an increased risk both in cities and in refugee camps. Slow humanitarian response and unevenly distributed support adds to the risk of conflict and hostilities between communities and groups.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan

The strategic response plan focuses on responding to food insecurity, humanitarian effects of population movements, to respond to health and sanitation needs and to be prepared to respond to sudden onset natural disasters. 1,8 million people will be affected by food insecurity in 2016. Food insecurity affects the whole country. Major gaps in the humanitarian response in Chad are related to the needs of IDPs in the Lac-region. Sectors that are the most unresponded to are WASH, food security and protection.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

**Government**

Despite the willingness to accept refugees, the desire to let refugees settle and integrate has previously been low. A change has however occurred and the new politics of Chad is social and economic integration of refugees, but without the possibility of obtaining Chadian citizenship. Capacity from government to respond to both refugee crises and food security crises is low, but there seem to be few constraints in regards to willingness to grant humanitarian access and space to work for international organisations.

**Civil Society**

Chadian civil society is not particularly well developed or organised. The traditional sultanate and traditional structures to regulate issues around ownership of land and resolution of interpersonal conflicts is in place, but there are very few NGOs, in the sense of democratically organised member organisations or foundations with a board of directors, established in the country. The ones that exist are very much acting like implementing partners and are of the local affiliates of international organisations.
2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

Leadership and Coordination:
The humanitarian response mechanisms with humanitarian country team, OCHA is present both centrally and in the field, and clusters as well as sub clusters are active centrally and on field level. On field level government structures are present and in some cases lead for the sub clusters.

Humanitarian Agencies:
UN agencies with direct support from Sida/Hum have a well-functioning system of using and reporting on Sida contributions. Since there are no commercial domestic carriers operating in Chad, United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and humanitarian flight services will continue to be an important function. INGOs are very strong in Chad and have a presence in cluster coordination and Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO)/SRP development.

2.3 International and Regional assistance

Donors:
In 2015 the largest humanitarian donors are the US, ECHO, Germany, the UK, Sweden and Japan. The SRP is funded at less than 50% in the beginning of December 2015. For regional organisations and support, please see the Sahel regional analysis at the beginning of this document.

3. Sida’s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1 Sida’s role

Earlier assistance and results:
Sida has supported humanitarian response in Chad for many years. The response has shifted according to changing needs and in function of climate variations and conflicts in neighbouring countries. Dialogue with partners on priorities based on observations from field visits has shown to be an efficient way of making use of Sida’s flexibility and to help partners focus on efficiency and innovation.

Lessons learnt:
Chad is increasingly becoming a forgotten crisis. The protracted refugee crisis due to conflicts in Sudan and CAR attracts less and less donor funding. When new crisis occur resources often need to be mobilized by shifting funding from protracted crisis response to the emerging situations in the country. This puts an emphasis on durable solutions and exit strategies in refugee and IDP crisis as humanitarian funding is not increasing to match the increase in needs.

3.2 Response Priorities 2016

Humanitarian Focus:
The focus for 2016 will be a partial reorientation of resources to respond to the acute crisis in the Lake Chad district due to the Nigeria crisis and its consequences in Chad. Continued support to the refugee crisis in the south and the east and particularly to be supportive of the process of social and economic integration of refugees will be prioritised. Food security will focus on infant malnutrition and response in the Lake Chad district. Coordination and access should continue to be a priority as well as humanitarian access. All Sida funded work in Chad need to include gender integration leading to gender equality and environmental consequence descriptions leading towards conservation of nature and plans for effective use of resources included in the proposals.

Synergies with Development:
Since Sweden does not have a bilateral development strategy for Chad, partnering with other bilateral donors nationally and regionally is of highest importance, in order to secure responsible phasing-out and transition from recovery to development funding. The most relevant at this point would be European Commission and UNDP. Entry points for regional initiatives including Chad targeting DRR and resilience should be sought.
3.3 Partners

Framework agreements:
The partners suggested for the 2016 allocation are UNHCR with unearmarked funds for refugee crisis response. WFP/UNHAS will be supported with unearmarked funds to operate humanitarian flights for humanitarian staff to intervention areas in the country. OCHA is supported for coordination with unearmarked funds. FAO is supported for selected food security projects; in the LAC district an orientation for 2016 to include IDPs among beneficiaries is sought. ICRC is supported by unearmarked funds for protection and IHL surveillance. ACF is supported for a nutrition and WASH project in the LAC district. IRC is funded for a health and WASH project in the LAC district. Unicef is suggested as a new partner in Chad with unearmarked funds, but motivated primarily by increased needs due to the Nigeria crisis and in particular in WASH.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended partner for Sida support</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming)</th>
<th>Proposed amount by Sida</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Refugees, multisector</td>
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<td>WFP/UNHAS</td>
<td>Humanitarian flight services</td>
<td>5 000 000</td>
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<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>Coordination, Information management</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Resilience/Food security</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Protection, IHL</td>
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<td>ACF Lac district</td>
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<td>IRC Lac district</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
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MALI
HUMANITARIAN CRISES ANALYSIS 2016

For 2016 Mali is allocated an initial 53 MSEK in January 2016. Close monitoring of the development of the humanitarian situation follows throughout the year for potential additional funds.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

Conflict

In 2012, the state lost control of the northern regions of Mali, after Tuareg armed groups from the region they call Azawad began a campaign for greater autonomy, and a separate coup d’état further destabilised the country. In alliance with extremist Islamist groups, who had entered the country through the porous borders and increasingly established a presence in the north, they gained control over the northern regions. The fragile alliance between the Tuareg and Islamists groups was quickly broken, and the Islamists took control of key northern cities. Civilian rule was re-established in mid-2013, but Mali continues to face security and political challenges.

Background/Underlying cause:
High poverty levels, limited access to basic social services and the poor capacity of public administration are key drivers of the crisis. The main stakeholders of the conflict are: 1) Malian government; 2) Tuareg and other pro-Azawad groups, the Azawad Movement Coalition (AMC). AMC’s main agenda is striving for more autonomy of the territory they call Azawad, which includes Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, and parts of Mopti; 3) Pro-government territorial motivated groups made up of several mainly ethnic Tuareg armed groups opposing the AMC and organised in the Platform Movement. In addition there are extremist Islamist armed groups carrying out attacks. The Algiers peace agreement was signed in May–June, 2015 between the Malian
government, the Platform Movement and the Azawad Movement Coalition (AMC). The main Islamist armed 
groups operating in the country were excluded from the peace negotiations. Following inter-ethnic talks, 
AMC and the Platform Movement signed an agreement in October 2015 to cease all hostilities. The stability of 
Mali relies on the presence of foreign troops. In addition to Malian forces, there are the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the French forces. The EU 
military training mission (EUTM) provides training of the Malian armed forces mainly in Koulikoro. While the 
intensity of violence at present is lower than at the peak of the insurgency in 2012, still regular attacks by 
extremist Islamist groups continue to hamper security. The most insecure regions are the northern regions 
Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. Security incidents are also reported in the central and southern regions of Mopti, 
Segou, and Bamako since January this year. Trends indicate that violence is increasingly directed at 
targets in the south, and is mainly targeting Malian security forces and foreigners, including civilians and 
international forces. Humanitarian access in the northern region remains extremely restricted and limits 
humanitarian actors’ scope of intervention. Road traffic is not secure enough in major parts of the north 
regions and there are no commercial air services operating to the area. UNHAS and ECHO are trafficking 
several routes. Kidal is only reachable with MINUSMA flights, and most actors, besides the UN, refrain from 
being associated with MINUSMA.

1.1 Geographical areas and affected population

The vulnerability of the population continues to be high in the northern regions Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu and 
parts of Mopti; the areas most affected by the conflict. Structural inequalities between men and women on 
all levels means that women have less access to and control over resources and basic services, and are 
therefore more vulnerable. A growing number of female headed households and widows are seen as a 
consequence of the conflict. According to the recent released (Nov 2015) Cadre Harmonisé (EWS) the 
number of food insecure people prognosed in 2016 is 2.3 million with 315 000 in direct need of emergency 
food assistance (equal to IPC 3 and 4). This number is a reduction compared to 2015’s prognosis with 
2 712 000 estimated to be food insecure and 410 000 in need of emergency food assistance. More than 
700 000 children under the age of 5 suffer from acute malnutrition. At national level, the Global Acute 
Malnutrition rate (GAM) is at 12.4% and the rate of Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) at 2.8% (emergency 
threshold is at 15% respective 2% according to WHO standards). The Timbuktu region is in a state of 
nutritional emergency with GAM rates of 17.5% and SAM 3.9%. The situation in northern Mali still has an 
impact on the movement of populations. Close to 139 000 Malian refugees are still hosted by Burkina Faso, 
Mauritania and Niger. 37 702 spontaneous returnees have been registered in Mali (only 16 614 registered by 
UNHCR). UNHCR facilitates the return of any Malian refugee and supports these returnees with limited 
support (registration, shelter, NFIs). UNHCR’s analysis estimates that major steps forward in the peace 
process may instigate people to return from Burkina Faso, Niger and Mauritania in 2016 and onwards. 
However, due to the insecure situation in the areas of return (majority of refugees are originating from 
northern Mali), UNHCR is not promoting voluntary repatriation in countries of asylum. Various clashes have 
led to internal displacements with an estimated number of 62 000 IDPs (OCHA October 2015). Displaced 
persons suffer increased vulnerability while increasing the strain on host communities. The deep gender 
inequalities in Mali make women and girls generally more vulnerable and disadvantaged. The crisis 
situation, with weakening of community protection structures, displacement and lack of livelihoods also 
increases the risk of sexual and gender-based violence. From March to July 2015, a total of 716 gender-
based violence incidents were reported. The vast majority of survivors of such violence are women and 
girls (670). Moreover, it is common that victims do not file complaints for fear of reprisals or lack of 
confidence in the judiciary.

1.2 Risks and threats

After the signing of a peace agreement in May–June, 2015 between the Government, the pro-Azawad 
Movement Coalition (AMC) and the Platform Movement, the situation in the north remained volatile and 
attacks targeting the government and pro-government forces were still frequently occurring. After the 
signing of an agreement to cease hostilities between AMC and the Platform Movement (pro-government) in 
October 2015, a level of stability was slowly developing. Still, security has only improved in major towns; 
the periphery is still vastly restricted with limited access to the most vulnerable communities. The peace 
keeping forces, MINUSMA, is perceived as pro-government forces by some groups and remains being a 
target for anti-governmental forces. Criminality such as carjacking, robbery, looting and attacks with road-
side bombs, IEDs/mines etc. is widespread and affects both NGOs and civilians. Several incidents are still 
being reported on a weekly basis. Humanitarian actors assess that they cannot operate with western staff.
Malian staff from Bamako and the south is also at risk and the staff restriction risks quality of assistance being compromised.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan

OCHA’s Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for Mali in 2016 estimates 2.3 million people to be in need of humanitarian assistance and 1 million people are planned to be targeted with assistance. The appeal requirement amounts to 354.1 MUSD which is signifying a decrease with 6% compared with 2015. The 2015 HRP is covered with 34% funding. The 3 strategic objectives of Mali HRP are as follow:

- Provide humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable people (residents, refugees IDPs and returnees) in northern Mali and in any other area affected by any crisis.
- Enhance the access of vulnerable groups to basic services (education, health, nutrition and water and sanitation), protection as well as basic infrastructure and government services.
- Strengthening livelihoods and the resilience of the most vulnerable, and emergency preparedness.

The HRP presents gender disaggregated data on a global level and within the nutritional sector. A minimum level of a gender perspective can be found in the analysis but could be strengthened.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

The government’s capacity to address humanitarian needs remains very limited. Even before the crisis the government’s provision of basic social services was minimal, particularly in rural areas and in northern Mali. The crisis has shown the insufficient national response capacity and institutional weaknesses in managing risks and disasters. Already before the crisis, civil society had an important role in providing the population with basic social services. The national and local civil society plays an important part in the humanitarian response, participates in the cluster coordination and is (especially by the UN) used as implementing partners. Local organisations have enabled interventions in areas where insecurity is a major obstacle to international actors. At the same time their capacity is often weak in terms of management, professionalism and knowledge of protection principles.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

The humanitarian coordination is described by both partners and donors to have great weaknesses on all levels. The HCT is chaired by the humanitarian coordinator (HC) who is also the deputy director of MINUSMA. The double role of the HC is perceived by the humanitarian community as a conflict of interest. Sweden/Sida is a donor member of the HCT together with ECHO, OFDA and Swiss cooperation. Cluster coordination on the national and sub-national level is functioning with varying levels of quality in respective cluster but generally described as rather weak. OCHA expresses that INGOs are not sharing the information requested for and INGOs find OCHA’s requests too extensive, inconsistent and demanded with unrealistic time frames. Most INGOs are participating in the cluster meetings on both levels but without seeing their added value. OCHA on national level seems to have little knowledge on the management and quality of the sub national cluster work. Inter-cluster coordination is also described as weak on both national and subnational level. Coordination between development and humanitarian donors is recognised as something there is a great need for. This has been identified at the highest donor level and the lead of each thematic donor coordination group (PTF) has been advised to participate in the respective humanitarian cluster group meetings and vice versa to ensure exchange of information and coordination. There is also a donor coordination group for the rehabilitation of the post-conflict zones and the French Embassy has recently stepped up the leadership efforts for such coordination. These efforts are important following the signing of the peace agreement and its implementation.

2.3 International and Regional assistance

Key humanitarian donors in Mali are ECHO and US Government (OFDA) together making up 57% of the humanitarian funding in Mali 2015. Other key donors are Canada and Saudi Arabia. Sweden contributed with 3.9 % of the total humanitarian funding which makes Sweden the 8th largest humanitarian donor to Mali (FTS Dec 2015). Despite the fact that the insecure and volatile environment in the north creates a major
challenge there is consensus amongst humanitarian donors and implementing partners to move away from aid delivery (dependency) and instead support the strengthening of receiving communities’ resilience capacity. Lifesaving assistance will remain a priority but should have an integrated resilience component included. A strong resilience focus should also contribute to creating opportunities for development cooperation actors to link with those programs. ECHO is reducing its budget for Mali in 2016 with 16 M€. 3 M€ will be used for regional response in countries receiving Malian refugees. ECHO’s focus for 2016 is food security, response to victims of conflict and DRR/resilience.

3. Sida’s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1 Sida’s role

Sida’s total humanitarian funding in 2015 amounted to 64.7 MSEK divided between 10 partners and 12 contributions. 2015’s contribution slightly shifted back towards the more clear-cut humanitarian interventions whereas the resilience type interventions were reduced in size with humanitarian funding. A recent shift amongst donors and implementing partners takes on a strategic approach in integrating a strong resilience focus into humanitarian programs in the northern regions. Sida should support this direction and ensure a resilience component integrated when applicable. Sida should also ensure that all implementing partners clearly integrate crosscutting issues of gender and conflict sensitivity in its program design, being of high relevance in the Malian context.

3.2 Response Priorities 2015

The funding for 2016 should continue to be directed geographically to conflict affected areas in the north. Assistance should be focusing on basic services interventions in the sectors of health, nutrition, food security, WASH, shelter, NFI and education and all with an integrated resilience component aimed at supporting vulnerable populations to better cope with shocks and at facilitating the linkage to sustainable development. Protection is another highly prioritised area with uncovered needs and a substantial part of Sida’s allocation should be directed towards protection activities. In the HRP protection is not highlighted in the strategic objectives but present as an integrated need within several sectors. The Swedish development budget for Mali is 200-240 MSEK 2016. The two main areas of cooperation are sustainable development of natural resources and democratic governance. The development cooperation seeks to counteract the underlying factors leading to the need for humanitarian assistance in Mali, with environmental degradation and poor governance being two of the root causes for continued high acute malnutrition, for instance. In the natural resources sector programs focusing on WASH, resilience, and sustainable agriculture that provide increased livelihoods opportunities are ongoing. The second sector includes human rights, access to justice and gender equality, including protection activities such as support to victims of SGBV and increased access to justice for vulnerable groups through paralegals. These efforts will also serve to strengthen the overall synergies between humanitarian assistance programming and development cooperation which is also highlighted in the Sahel SRP 2014-2016 and is emphasized by the office of the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator.

3.3 Partners

Six of Sida’s strategic partners have indicated funding requests to Sida in Mali for 2016; Action Contre la Faim (ACF), Save the Children (SCI), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Islamic Relief (IR), Swedish Mission Council (SMR) and Swedish Red Cross (SRK). 4 proposals are a continuation of 2015 Sida-funded programs and 2 are new proposals (SMR and SRK). Besides these organisations, two partners have an amount previously agreed for 2016; FAO and Plan. In addition 4 partners funded in 2015 need to be taken into account for 2016; WFP (UNHAS) ICRC, OCHA and UNHCR. The following partners are suggested for Sida’s support in 2016. Due to a reduction in Sida’s budget for Sahel combined with the growing response needs in Nigeria and Cameroon, no new partners have been included and some of the strategic partners are allocated a lower budget than requested. All suggested partners have a resilience component integrated in their program proposals.

Action Contre la Faim
The proposed intervention is a continuation of 2015’s support in Timbuktu region and focus on the area of prevention and treatment of malnutrition (including WASH) with integration into health centres and community level. ACF’s activities in Timbuktu will also be supported by Sida’s development cooperation in
Mali 2016-2018 for financing resilience strengthening activities (income generating activities, agricultural activities etc.). This will give an opportunity for Sida’s humanitarian programming to work closely with the development cooperation programming.

**Norwegian Refugee Council**

The proposed intervention is a continuation of 2015’s support and focuses on education, shelter, food security and Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) in Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal and Mopti. The main target group is vulnerable populations affected by the conflict and insecurity in the region.

**Save the Children**

The proposed intervention is a continuation of 2015’s support and focuses on education, shelter, food security and Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) in Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal and Mopti. The main target group is vulnerable populations affected by the conflict and insecurity in the region.

**PLAN**

The proposed intervention is the second year of a 3 years agreed allocation. The program focuses on an integrated program with emphasis on maternal and child health and nutrition and child protection.

**IR**

The proposed intervention is a continuation of 2015’s support and focuses on the sectors of food security and education in Timbuktu and Mopti region.

**ICRC**

ICRC is one of the humanitarian actors with best access in the areas worst affected by conflict and as such is a key partner for Sida to support. The 2016 appeal includes interventions in the areas of protection, food, nutrition, WASH, health and livelihoods. There is a shift in emphasis from 2015 with a stronger focus on supporting health facilities.

**UNHCR**

UNHCR collaborates with the Malian government in coordinating the humanitarian and reintegration assistance for IDPs and returnees. UNHCR continues to lead the Protection, Shelter and NFI clusters. The proposed support is addressing the Mali situation, i.e. UNHCR can include response in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauretania as well. In 2015 UNHCR’s global appeal for Mali was only funded to 5%.

**UNHAS**

There are no commercial flights operating to northern Mali and maintaining the humanitarian flight services of UNHAS is therefore of critical importance to humanitarian actors in terms of access to large parts of northern Mali. UNHAS is in the process of expanding their flight route during 2016 to an area presently not accessible to many partners. Funding shortfalls in 2016 are not prognosed to be as substantial as in 2015. Sida is proposing to continue supporting UNHAS in 2016 but with a significant reduction.

**OCHA**

In addition to the service delivery interventions mentioned above, Sida will continue to support the humanitarian system and its coordination structures.

**FAO**

The proposed intervention focuses on building livelihoods and resilience for farmers and agro-pastoralist households affected by the conflict and climate change in two districts of the Gao region. The already agreed funding level of 2 MSEK for 2016 is the final year of a three-year programme.
Sida’s HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO MALI in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended partner for Sida support</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming)</th>
<th>Proposed amount by Sida</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Nutrition, WASH, health</td>
<td>7 500 000</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Education, shelter, food security, ICLA (protection)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCI</td>
<td>Child protection, education, health</td>
<td>5 000 000</td>
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<td>Plan</td>
<td>Child protection, maternal- and child health, nutrition</td>
<td>3 000 000</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>Food security, education</td>
<td>3 000 000</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Protection, assistance, health, food security</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Protection, assistance to returnees and IDP’s for Mali situation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP (UNHAS)</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Humanitarian coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Livelihood (food security)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 53 000 000

NIGER
HUMANITARIAN CRISES ANALYSIS 2016

For 2016 Niger is allocated an initial 52 MSEK in January 2016. Close monitoring of the development of the humanitarian situation follows throughout the year for potential additional funds.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW NIGER

Conflict

Niger is politically relatively stable but the state is weak in capacity. After the 2010 coup d’état and the 2011 elections the situation in the country has remained relatively calm. Niger has like most other countries in the region, two parallel structures of power and administration, the traditional and the official. In particular in regards to civil rights, where cases often are resolved by the traditional legislative system, breaches of human rights and IHL are common. Society is in its organisation to a large extent traditional with a clear division between male and female duties and expectations. Nativity rate is the highest in the world and combined with a reduced infant and maternal mortality, as well as general improvement in health, population growth is very rapid. Internally there have been conflicts between Tuareg populations and other inhabitants of Niger. This conflict seems to be less active at the moment.

Background/Underlying cause:
Niger is affected by conflicts in Mali and Nigeria, both where Jihadist separatist movements are active in proclaiming independent Islamic states in the controlled territories, both bordering to Niger and with enforcement of sharia laws on the population. This has triggered population movements and refugees fleeing over the borders into Niger. Despite Niger not being involved in the conflicts in Mali and Nigeria, attacks have been directed to refugees from Nigeria in camps in Niger. As Niger is a very weak state, refugees from Nigeria are more likely to seek asylum and protection in Cameroon, but it is probable that more refugees are going to cross the border into Niger in 2016 due to the deteriorating situation in Nigeria. Seeing the dynamics of the crisis in Mali and Nigeria they are likely to escalate and there is also a risk that similar separatist groups are going to become more active in Niger. The recent terrorist attacks indicate that
there are internal Nigerien groups that are being radicalised and that attacks are not only coming from the outside.

**Natural Disaster**

Niger is one of the most arid countries in the world with only a small percentage of the country’s surface being usable for agricultural production. The Sahel region, including Niger, has a climate and topography that is sensitive to seasonal drought. The natural variation from year to year is exuberated by climate change and desertification. Population increase also drives the need for increase of food production. Indications for 2016 are that it will be a normal year when it comes to agricultural production. This is a recurrent crisis that on a yearly basis leads to a situation where the household reserves and resources are not suffice to last until the next harvest. On a drought year, the crisis is accentuated. In November 2015 3,6 million Nigeriens are food insecure. An estimate of 267 000 persons are displaced, either internally or refugees/returnees and the number of children suffering from malnutrition are 3,1 million. Traditionally there are resilience and coping mechanisms among the Sahel people. Seasonal variations and yearly variations have been dealt with through transhumance migrations and multiple sites for agricultural crops in different areas. The role of the extended family is also a way to cope, where resources are distributed amongst members of the extended family that live in another area of the country. With population increase and degradation of the environment (desertification), and low usage of irrigation, the traditional coping mechanisms are not enough to cope with the protracted crisis. Since the financial resources on household level is weak, there may be severely malnourished children and adults, despite that food is readily available on the market.

1.1 Geographical areas and affected population

The food insecurity crisis is affecting the whole country. The conflict crisis is concentrated to the areas bordering to Nigeria (Diffa) in the south-east and border to Mali in the north-west. The most vulnerable groups including women and men, girls and boys who lack social safety nets such as assets, family/extended family and/or transferrable skills are the most sensitive both in regards to the refugee crisis and the food insecurity crisis. Among mobile populations the most vulnerable are out of camp refugees and IDPs who are the least catered to when it comes to both protection and basic humanitarian needs. Also host communities are strained as IDPs settle in informal settlements close to existing communities or are integrated in host families. Communities and individuals are trying to, and have ambitions on how to cope better in the situation they live by maximizing existing resources and by either whole household migration or partial household migration to find work. Coping strategies, such as diversification of transferrable skills, diversification of crops, improved seed, etc. do often need investments but the resources available are usually not enough to realize the ambitions.

1.2 Risks and threats

Niger is a weak state and there is a risk of spill-over from conflicts in neighbouring countries. The food insecurity analysis is revised on a yearly basis, as each year’s crop affects the next year’s lean season. As most farmers are subsistence farmers, a drought for a year may lead to low or no crop at all for consumption the following year. Internal conflicts and banditry is common and the capacity of police monitoring and the rule of law is low. As Niger is a weak state, it also harbours insurgents from neighbouring countries’ crises. As for financial risks, Niger receives the score 35, on a scale where 100 equals freedom from corruption, from Transparency International. Hence the public sector in Niger, compared to other countries, can be said to be characterised by a medium-high level of corruption. Humanitarian access is limited due to security reasons in the north and east of the country. Lack of infrastructure also makes humanitarian operations difficult.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan

The strategic response plan focuses on interventions targeting humanitarian needs in relation to population movements, malnutrition, food insecurity, epidemics and floodings. The number of people in need are 2 million. The most significant gap in the humanitarian response is in the Diffa region in eastern Niger bordering to Nigeria and Chad.
2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

**Government:**
Niger is not able to provide the necessary support and assistance to its population. Niger is rated as the most under-developed country in the world and ranks 187 out of 187 countries in human development index. The Government of Niger is involved mainly through the roadmap for all interventions in Niger, the so called ‘Plan de Soutien’, which includes all humanitarian activities. The initiative 3N (les Nigeriens Nourissent les Nigeriens) provides a framework to respond to emergency needs, food insecurity and recurrent nutritional crises over the long-term and strengthen the resilience of households. The framework and strategy should however be seen more as a long-term engagement from the side of national authorities, the reality is that their national capacity to manage the recurrent chocks in the country are very limited and resilience is in many aspects more a desk exercise than an actual operationalization. The provinces are rather decentralised and play a certain role in coordination and local ownership.

**Civil Society:**
Local Nigerien organisations need to develop capacity to be able to scale up support. There are only a few local organisations with national coverage.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

**Leadership and Coordination:**
The coordination among government and humanitarian partners is relatively effective and operationalized through the cluster system. There are eight humanitarian clusters active at the national level and three working groups; one group on early recovery/resilience; one on refugees and the multisector response to their needs; and a third group on NFI. Clusters are present and rolled-out on a district and local level. What Sida has noted is also that UN organisations which have had a longer presence in the country and which work on both emergencies and medium-term development coordinate more closely among themselves, and not necessarily with OCHA, which does not actively integrate resilience in its work.

**Humanitarian Agencies:**
UN agencies with direct support from Sida/Hum have a well-functioning system of using and reporting on Sida contributions. Coordination will be increasingly important with increased response and new partners intervening in Diffa. Since there are no reliable commercial domestic carriers operating in Niger, United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and humanitarian flight services will continue to be an important function. INGOs are very strong in Niger and have a presence in cluster coordination and Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO)/HRP development.

2.3 International and Regional assistance

**Donors:**
In 2015 the largest humanitarian donors are the US, ECHO, Japan, the UK, Sweden and Norway. The SRP is funded to less than 50% in December 2015.

**Regional Organisations:**
For regional organisations please see the Sahel regional analysis at the beginning of this document.

3. Sida's HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1 Sida’s role

**Earlier assistance and results:**
Sida has supported humanitarian response in Niger for many years. The response has shifted according to changing needs and in function of climate variations and conflicts in neighbouring countries.
Lessons learnt:
Niger is increasingly becoming a forgotten crisis. The protracted refugee crisis due to the Mali crisis is slowly being phased out as refugees either spontaneously return to Mali or integrate in Niger. The chronic food crisis is not met by development interventions to curb the negative trend of need of food assistance to large populations. With the incrementing effects of the Nigeria crisis resources are mobilized by shifting funding from protracted crisis response to the emerging situations in Diffa. This puts an emphasis on durable solutions and exit strategies in refugee and IDP crises as humanitarian funding is not increasing to match the increase in needs.

3.2 Response Priorities 2016

Humanitarian Focus:
The focus for 2016 will be further directed to respond to the immediate needs due to the Nigeria crisis in Diffa. Food security will focus on infant malnutrition and resilience DRR initiatives with a high degree of learning and innovative pilot approaches will continuously be supported. Coordination and access will continue to be a priority. All Sida funded work in Niger need to have gender integration in the programming leading to gender equality and environmental consequence assessments leading to conservation of nature and efficient use of resources included in the proposals.

Synergies with Development:
Since Sweden does not have a bilateral development strategy for Niger, partnering with other bilateral donors nationally and regionally is crucial in order to secure responsible phasing out and transition from recovery to development. The most relevant at this point would be European Commission and UNDP.

3.3 Partners

Framework agreements:
In the 2016 initial allocation of funds MSF is supported with unearmarked funds for emergency health. ICRC is supported with unearmarked funds for protection and IHL surveillance monitoring. ACF is supported for a WASH project in Diffa. Save the Children is supported for a child protection project in Diffa. Unicef receives unearmarked funding for humanitarian response; IRC receives funding for a WASH project in Diffa. Islamic Relief receives funding for a nutrition project in Kollo District. FAO receives project funding for selected resilience initiatives. OCHA receives unearmarked funding for coordination. UNHAS receives unearmarked funding to operate humanitarian flights. SMC receives funding for a WASH project in Diffa and PLAN receives funding for an education in emergencies in Diffa.

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<th>SIDA’s HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO NIGER in 2016</th>
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<td>Recommended partner for Sida support</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
For 2016 Nigeria is allocated an initial 41 MSEK in January 2016. Close monitoring on the Nigeria crisis follows throughout the year for potentially additional funds.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

**Conflict**

The crisis in northern Nigeria, precipitated by Boko Haram-related violence, currently affects 14.6 million people in Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe states in the north-east. The collapse of basic services, endemic food insecurity, and the destruction of livelihoods, underdevelopment and conflict-induced displacement are likely to persist in 2016. Some 7 million people are suffering from the extreme consequences of the armed conflict and need humanitarian assistance, including 4 million people who are severely food insecure. The country has the highest number of malnourished children in Africa - 1.7 million children suffering from acute malnutrition - mostly in the 11 most Northern states. An estimated 756 000 children under five die every year from undernutrition and related causes.

**Background/Underlying cause:**

Since May 2013 more than 200 000 people have fled to neighboring Cameroon (74 000), Chad (29 000) and Niger (100 000). 2.2 million people have been displaced in what is one of Africa’s fastest-growing displacement crises. More than 90% of the IDPs live in host communities whose coping capacity has been significantly overstretched. This is causing tension between host communities and could result in the secondary displacement of IDPs. Nigeria is also home to one of the world’s largest number of displaced children. 1.3 million children are displaced, and 600 000 children who have not been able to attend school in 2015 will be more vulnerable to radicalization and forced recruitment by armed groups. Women and girls are most affected by the crisis. Kidnapped by BH they have experienced physical and psychological abuse, forced marriage and labour, and sexual slavery. Women are at particular risk of sexual violence and trafficking in displacement sites. So far in 2015, women have carried out the majority of the largest suicide attacks. Children have also been disproportionately impacted by this crisis and are believed to constitute more than half (58 %) of the IDP population. Some have been subjected to grave human rights violations as a direct result of the crisis. Children are also exposed to heightened risk of sexual violence and physical abuse as a result of displacement and separation from, or loss of, their families. There is limited provision for identification, documentation and tracing and interim care.

**Main stakeholders in the conflict:**

Farming, planting and trade in agricultural goods and livestock within north-east Nigeria and across borders have been hindered due to the on-going conflict, insecurity and large-scale displacements. Levels of food insecurity and malnutrition are high, with 20 per cent of households in Borno and Yobe states facing extreme food-consumption gaps. Basic services - notably schools and health facilities - are being systematically destroyed by insurgents. More than 300 schools have been severely damaged or destroyed in the north-east. Health-care services have largely collapsed as doctors, nurses and pharmacists flee the violence. Less than 40 per cent of health facilities in conflict-affected areas are operational, as hospitals and clinics have been raided, medical staff kidnapped and pharmacies looted. Mortality rates - particularly maternal and infant mortality - are increasing, and vaccination programmes for children are compromised. Nigeria is also battling cholera, measles and meningitis outbreaks, and the situation worsens with the onset of the rainy season (from June to October in northern Nigeria). The lack of adequate water and sanitation and increasing malnutrition rates are of concern.

**Trends:**

The outlook for 2016 is challenging. The security situation remains volatile and the armed conflict is shifting in dynamics and over borders. Most IDPs report wanting to return home but conditions have not been conducive for voluntary, safe and dignified returns. OCHA’s focus for the humanitarian response in 2016 will promote the centrality of protection, and will seek to overcome the challenges of access, where feasible, as approximately 3 million people remain inaccessible.
2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

Government:
At the federal and state level the two main governmental agencies operational in crisis situations are NEMA (the National Emergency Management Agency) and SEMA (the State Emergency Management Agencies). In addition there are also presidential committees and other parts of the government that can be involved. The Nigerian Red Cross is the key civil society actor operational in responding to the conflict situation in the north-east and in situations of natural disasters, but there are a wide number of local NGOs engaged as well, not least in the current IDP response. The security situation is severely restricting international staff from working with direct implementation.

Civil Society
Humanitarian international presence in Nigeria has been minor, but is rapidly expanding. The general impression is still that the UN-presence has been very development oriented and has not yet managed to adapt to the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis. Systematic data collection remains a challenge throughout the country and especially in the north-east. Thus far, humanitarian needs of IDPs have largely been served by national authorities, who have requested that UN agencies strengthen their response capacities. 90% of the IDP population live outside assisted settlements and the few humanitarian organisations working in the north-east have not yet built programmatic capacity to reach those living outside camps. As a consequence a large part of the IDP population has not been assisted and host communities resources are now being overstretched.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

HRP funding requirements for humanitarian response in Nigeria was receiving little attention from international donors in 2014; only 18% of funding requirements were met. The humanitarian community have continuously made an effort to draw the attention of the donors to respond to the quickly growing unmet needs. 2015’s SRP requirements were met with 55% (FTS Dec 7th, 2015). The SRP requirements for 2016 counts for 247.9 MUSD, which is an increase with 147% compared to 2015’s requirement.

2.3 International and Regional assistance

For 2015 UNHCR launched an Inter-Agency Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) covering the humanitarian response related to the Nigeria crisis in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. In 2015 the appeal reached 46% coverage (FTS Dec 8th, 2015). The requirements for 2016 stand at 198.8 MUSD, an increase with 14% compared to 2015.

Donors:
United States stands alone for covering more than 44% of the total humanitarian funding for Nigeria in 2015. ECHO places itself as the second largest donor with more than 16% of the total humanitarian funding. After a CERF contribution of 6.5%, Sweden places as the 4th largest donor with 4.9%. For 2016 ECHO has decided on an additional 2 MEUR additionally to the HIP for the on-going emergency response in Nigeria and the spill-over consequences to Niger.

The Government and humanitarian country team in Nigeria has established and are managing a response monitoring framework. The cluster coordination has not been activated but instead a sector coordination structure has been put in place.

3. Sida’s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

Earlier assistance and results:
2015 was the first year Sida launched a Humanitarian Crisis Analysis (HCA) for Nigeria. During 2015 the humanitarian situation in Nigeria has deteriorated remarkably and the number of IDPs has increased from 1.5 million (Nov 2014) to 2.2 million one year later. With the growing number of people in need and the
restricted access to many parts of the north-east, Nigeria is now considered as one of the humanitarian crises fastest deteriorating. The initial allocation for Nigeria in 2015 amounted to 28 MSEK. Throughout the year Sida has continuously reassessed the situation and enabled humanitarian response within prioritised areas by allocating additional funds to ICRC, MSB, UNICEF, NRC and Save the Children. In December 2015 the total allocation reached 62.5 MSEK. Given the aggravated humanitarian situation compared with

Lessons learnt:

Last year’s situation at the time of Sida’s yearly allocation process, it is recommended that Nigeria’s entry value for 2016 is increasing. Sida’s support should be geographically directed to the north-eastern states affected by Boko Haram attacks, in particular the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. These three states together count for 1.96 million out of Nigeria's 2.2 million IDPs. Due to the control and/or threats of Boko Haram on the population of these states, the feasibility of delivering humanitarian assistance is restrained. Only a few of Sida’s cooperation partners are at all working in north-east Nigeria and those working in the region are facing huge limitations in terms of access and implementation capacity.

Response Priorities 2016

Humanitarian Focus:

Sectors of priority adheres to what OCHA has prioritised; delivery of basic services within the health- and WASH sectors, protection, in particular of women, girls and children, prevention of malnutrition, provision of emergency shelter and NFIs, and education. With the large number of IDPs living within host communities (90%), Sida’s support should also address some of the needs of those host communities. An integration of a gender sensitive program design and implementation is essential with women and girls being the most vulnerable target group. Four strategic partners submitted Initial Submission to Sida indicating a funding request: ACF, IRC, MSF and NRC. IRC and MSF received financial support in 2015. MSF requests financial support for a different project from 2015. The 2016 proposal covers a project in north Nigeria but does not correspond to Sida’s priorities made in 2016 not being a conflict related project. ACF was rejected in 2015 due to Sida’s funding priorities rather than to the relevance of their program. NRC has established its operations through 2015 by the help of RRM funding from Sida. Other partners to be considered in 2016 are ICRC and OCHA. UNICEF received 10 MSEK in November 2015 addressing malnutrition and child protection needs. Due to the late-of-the-year allocation, UNICEF is not suggested in the table below, even though child protection is a prioritised sector. A re-assessment in relation to the 2016 Mid-Year Review should instead take place. It should be noted that the few proposals submitted to Sida does not cover all the prioritised sectors and therefore Sida should maintain a generous approach towards RRM funding for Nigeria. The following partners are proposed to receive financial support for its operations in Nigeria in 2016:

International Rescue Committee

The proposed intervention is a continuation from 2015’s support and focuses on health and protection targeting IDPs and host communities in Adamawa state with particular focus on especially vulnerable people including pregnant women and children or those at high risk to protection concerns.

ACF

The proposed intervention targets IDPs and host communities in Yobe and Borno states. Nutrition, WASH, food security and livelihoods are identified as priority needs. Malnutrition will be addressed through CMAM and IYCF, WASH through rehabilitation of damaged infrastructures and promotion of safe hygiene practices, while protection of livelihoods will be achieved through cash/voucher based interventions.

NRC

NRC established its presence and started operations in August 2015. The geographical area is Maiduguri in Borno state in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. The targeted populations are IDPs, refugees, returnees and vulnerable host communities hosting IDPs. The sectors addressed are WASH, shelter, food security and ICLA whereas Sida will be asked to fund the WASH- and shelter component.

ICRC

ICRC is seemingly the humanitarian actor with the best access by far among the limited number of actors present. Sida will contribute with unearmarked support to their emergency appeal which includes interventions in the areas of protection, food, nutrition, WASH, health and livelihoods.
In addition to the service delivery interventions mentioned above, Sida will also prioritize the strengthening of the humanitarian system and its coordination structures through support to OCHA and its development of a fully-fledged in-country presence.

### Sida’s HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO NIGERIA in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended partner for Sida support</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming)</th>
<th>Proposed amount by Sida</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Health, Nutrition, Protection in Borno state</td>
<td>5 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Nutrition, WASH, Livelihood in Yobe and Borno State</td>
<td>8 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>WASH, Shelter in Borno State</td>
<td>6 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Protection/assistance</td>
<td>20 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordination</td>
<td>2 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>41 000 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### BURKINA FASO HUMANITARIAN CRISES ANALYSIS 2016

For 2016 Burkina Faso is allocated an initial 10 MSEK in January 2016. Close monitoring follows the humanitarian situation throughout the year for potentially additional funds.

#### 1. CRISIS OVERVIEW BURKINA FASO

As the support to Burkina Faso for 2016 is very limited, a very brief description of the humanitarian situation, systems in place and needs will be given.

**Conflict**

Government turnover in 2014 (including an interruption of an unsuccessful coup d’état the following year) lead to presidential elections that were held in November 2015. Fair and just elections could be organised with no signs of conflict or civil unrest. The conflict in Mali affects Burkina Faso, mainly through an influx of refugees. The Malian refugees are welcomed in Burkina Faso and a tri-party agreement has been signed between UNHCR, Burkina Faso and Mali to facilitate two options for the refugees, to repatriate or to socially and economically integrate in Burkina Faso. By this UNHCR is planning to begin phase out its operation in Burkina Faso for Mali refugee support.

**Natural Disaster**

The rains in 2015 have been normal and the harvest is predicted to be normal. Floodings as well as hard winds have affected some localities during 2015. This is part of the erratic weather patterns of the climate zone. A combination of root causes (lack of access to WASH, health facilities, education, SRHR) contribute to high rates of malnutrition.

**Strategic objectives identified in the Humanitarian Response Plan**

The HRP for 2016 focuses on refugees, food security and nutrition.
2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

**Government**
The national disaster management agency CONASUR has stepped up as a significant responder to the recent flooding crisis and offered help such as food assistance to affected households. Strong cooperation with UNDP has strengthened the agency’s capacity to coordinate and to plan response both on their own and in cooperation with national NGOs and international relief agencies.

**Civil Society**
Civil society in Burkina is well organised, but lacks capacity and knowledge to fully step in as a humanitarian responder in a UN lead response. Strengths are good knowledge of local conditions and needs, but weaknesses are capacity to mobilise resources and logistical access necessary to deliver relief as well as knowledge and acceptance of the humanitarian principles and architecture.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

**Leadership and Coordination:**
OCHA is phasing out its presence in Burkina Faso in 2016. The humanitarian country team will continue to operate for monitoring and preparedness through the leadership of head of UNDP.

**Humanitarian Agencies:**
The agencies that remain in Burkina Faso are agencies that directly intervene in one or several of the three focus areas of the HRP or have a double mandate in both development and humanitarian interventions such as Unicef.

2.3 International and Regional assistance

**Donors:**
In 2016 with the new government in Burkina Faso in place, the donor picture and future bilateral cooperation will be clearer to assess.

**Regional Organisations:**
Regional structures for DRR such as AGIR and CILSS will be monitored to assess how they will progress with the new government.

3. Sida’s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1 Sida’s role

**Earlier assistance and results:**
Sida has supported humanitarian relief in Burkina Faso, primarily to the Mali refugee crisis, resilience and in nutrition and health to children under five. Small support has also been distributed through the RRM functions of NRC and SMC for response to weather related minor disasters such as strong winds and floodings.

**Lessons learnt:**
Sida’s support has been monitored jointly between the humanitarian unit and the humanitarian focal point at the Swedish Embassy. Attendance to HCT has been assured by the Swedish Embassy and been instrumental in monitoring the flooding situation in 2015.
3.2 Response Priorities 2016

Humanitarian Focus:
The humanitarian support to Burkina Faso in 2016 will focus on nutrition with a phase-out plan for responsible, sustainable and durable phase-out and handover to development. This will be done in close cooperation with ECHO.

Synergies with Development:
The new Swedish cooperation strategy for bilateral cooperation with Burkina Faso is planned to be elaborated and adopted in 2016. The Humanitarian unit will offer assistance in contributing input in the process to ensure humanitarian, DRR and resilience aspects are included if possible.

3.3 Partners

Framework agreements:
The partners proposed for humanitarian support in 2016 are ACF and Unicef, both in nutrition and prevention of malnutrition. Sustainability, SRHR and environmental concerns are going to be specially monitored during the 2016 year agreement with partners.

Other partners:
Partners with RRM agreements with Sida HUM will continuously be able to receive support if sudden needs occur during the year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended partner for Sida support</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming )</th>
<th>Proposed amount by Sida</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unicef</td>
<td>Multisector</td>
<td>4 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Nutrition, WASH, environment</td>
<td>6 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL: 10 000 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CAMEROON
HUMANITARIAN CRISES ANALYSIS 2016

For 2016 Cameroon is allocated an initial 10 MSEK in January 2016. Close monitoring follows the humanitarian situation throughout the year for potentially additional funds.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW CAMEROON

As the support to Cameroon for 2016 is very limited, a very brief description of the humanitarian situation, systems in place and needs will be given.

Conflict

Cameroon is not suffering from any internal conflicts, but need to handle the consequences of conflicts in Nigeria and CAR.

Natural Disaster

Cameroon is situated between the desert and semi-arid north towards Lake Chad and rainforests in the south. Some of the world’s highest annual rainfalls are recorded in locations in Cameroon with an average of over 10 000 mm/year.
Strategic objectives identified in the Humanitarian Response Plan

The Humanitarian overview November 2015 states that 1.9 million people are food insecure, 217 000 children are malnourished and approximately 323 000 displaced persons seek protection in Cameroon.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

Government
Government generally has more resources than the countries in the rest of the Sahel region. Cameroon ranks 152 out of 176 assessed countries in the world. It is a similar level to Nigeria.

Civil Society
Civil society is active and organised in predominantly for development including human rights and environment.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

Leadership and Coordination:
OCHA is in the process of getting established and organising the humanitarian relief actions. As humanitarian actors are in the process of finding their space in Cameroon, the role of OCHA is crucial to mobilise and organise response.

Humanitarian Agencies:
The overall response is lead and coordinated by UNHCR according to the joint statement on refugee dominated humanitarian crises between UNHCR and OCHA. As humanitarian needs increase due to spill-over effects from the Nigeria crisis more and more humanitarian agencies are established and/or are up-scaling their activities.

2.3 International and Regional assistance

Donors:
Largest donors are US and Japan followed by ECHO and recently the CERF has granted funds to Cameroon for humanitarian relief. The HRP for 2015 is funded to 44%.

Regional Organisations:
For many agencies Cameroon fall outside the Sahel-mandate and is organised together with CAR and/or DRC.

3. Sida’s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1 Sida’s role

Earlier assistance and results:
Sida has previously funded UNHCR in Cameroon through regional CAR response and recently redirected PLAN funding to education in emergencies for Nigerian refugees. Support to the humanitarian response has also been given through secondments of experts through the MSB.

Lessons learnt:
As Cameroon is an emerging country for humanitarian relief, and only few partners are present, despite high needs mostly connected to refugees from CAR and Nigeria, it is important to look into what are the delaying factors for humanitarian agencies to getting started in response in a country in a spill-over protracted crisis environment.
3.2 Response Priorities 2016

Humanitarian Focus:
The direction of support to Cameroon will be towards coordination and emergency response in nutrition targeting refugees and IDPs in the north of Cameroon.

Synergies with Development:
No synergies are sought at this stage.

3.3 Partners

Framework agreements:
OCHA is getting established and starting up HCT work in support to UNHCR. ACF’s programme is targeting malnourished children in the north of Cameroon. Funding to PLAN International from 2015 is being implemented in 2016, but is not part of this HCA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended partner for Sida support</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming )</th>
<th>Proposed amount by Sida</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>4 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Nutrition, WASH, environment</td>
<td>6 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>10 000 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MAURITANIA

HUMANITARIAN CRISES ANALYSIS 2016

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW Mauretania

As the support to Mauretania for 2016 is very limited, a very brief description of the humanitarian situation, systems in place and needs will be given.

Conflict

Mauretania is not suffering from any internal conflicts, but need to handle the consequences of conflicts in Mali. Given the fragile security situation in Mali, no massive return movements by the 50 000 Malian refugees in Mauritania is expected.

Natural Disaster

Mauretania is characterized by food insecurity due to a prolonged lean season related to insufficient rainfall. The country is already facing an alarming nutrition situation and a nutrition crisis resulting in high malnutrition rates is anticipated. Some 1.4 million people are predicted to become food insecure, and 370 000 children need therapeutic treatment for acute malnutrition. Seven of the country’s 13 regions have exceeded the emergency moderate acute malnutrition levels.

Partners:
Sida supports UNHCR in 2016 with unallocated funds for the Mali situation which allows UNCHR to use those funds to address the needs of Malian refugees in Mauritania. Regarding other humanitarian needs, close monitoring of the humanitarian situation throughout the year for potentially additional funds and/or response through Sida’s RRM mechanism, will take place.
Other partners:
Partners with RRM agreements with Sida HUM will continuously be able to receive funding if sudden needs arise during the year.