This Humanitarian Crisis Analysis for the Syria crisis applies a regional approach, covering Syria and the refugee hosting countries that are included in the regional appeal (3RP), i.e. Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. The HCA regional overview includes a summary of trends in context and response, and Sida’s priorities for 2016. In addition, the HCA includes country annexes for Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. On Iraq, Sida applies a country approach by including the refugee response into the Iraq HCA. Regionally unearmarked Syria crisis funding may however also be used for refugees in Iraq.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

As the conflict in Syria enters its sixth year, the country and the region is trying to cope in a situation of increasing violence and further complexity. Events in 2016 show very little cause for optimism that the situation will improve in the short of medium term. In Syria, flagrant breaches of humanitarian law have reached new highs, Aleppo being the most central, but far from the only case in point. In Syria indiscriminate and deliberate attacks on densely populated civilian areas continue unabated. Health services are increasingly targeted, and controlling access to water as a war tactic is increasing. The tactical use of siege is at its top, and the number of people living under siege has doubled in the past year, reaching close to 1 million.

The Syria crisis is the largest displacement crisis of our time. More than 11 million people have left their homes since the beginning of the conflict. Of those, 4.8 million are registered as refugees in Turkey (2.7 million), Lebanon (1.0 million), Jordan (656,000), Iraq (228,000), and Egypt (115,000). In these countries the refugee case load has stabilized due to increasingly restrictive border policies. In Syria, the total number of IDPs remains at 6.3 million, almost half of the remaining population. Secondary displacement is rampant with an average of 180,000 people being displaced every month.

Besides the conflict related protection concerns, Syrians both inside and outside the country are extremely vulnerable to an array of more indirect protection threats; legal, economical and social. Seven out of ten Syrians in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon are now living under national poverty lines. With assets rapidly depleting, families fall back on harmful coping strategies. Children are the most vulnerable, across the board. Harmful coping also has strong gender dimensions. Girls and women are at a higher risk of early marriage, domestic and sexual violence, reduced freedom of movement and access to services, whereas boys and men risk forced recruitment, detention and dangerous child labour. Preventing and responding to negative coping is forming the bulk of the humanitarian protection agenda, and community based protection services have been strengthened both in Syria and in refugee hosting countries. The scale-up is showing some results, like in Syria where compared to 2015 a significantly larger share of people now turn to positive coping by accessing protection services (WoS Protection Needs Overview 2017). In Syria, UNHCR intends to double the number of community centres, around which many of the services are built.

In neighbouring countries, vulnerability is compounded by a range of legal restrictions on refugees, the lack of legal livelihoods opportunities and often issues around residency permits. In Lebanon most refugees live without legal residency, making them vulnerable in their contacts with authorities and in seeking services. The lack of civil documentation like birth certificates is a major challenge, both in Syria and in among refugees, increasing the risk for statelessness for those affected.

In total, there are 18.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in the Syria region, 13.5 million inside Syria and 4.8 million registered refugees in neighbouring countries (GHO 2017), all of them targeted for humanitarian assistance. In addition, there is a formal figure of 4.7 million vulnerable citizens of refugee hosting countries, also targeted for assistance. In these countries, most affected by the refugee influx are the poorest social strata, hit by an increased demand on services, rising prices and increased competition for jobs. However, the legal discrimination that Syrian refugees and
Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) are subjected to, places them in particularly unfavourable position and in need of targeted humanitarian assistance and protection. Inside Syria, prioritizing of the response has long placed priority on people in hard-to-reach areas, where needs are deemed to be the highest. Today some 5.5 million people live in these areas, of which almost 1 million in besieged areas. Due to access realities however, and the meager number of IDPs, a large share of the response in Syria is in accessible areas, serving long-term IDPs and host community populations.

Palestine refugees, a regional population with a long history of vulnerability and aid dependency, have been disproportionately affected by the ongoing crisis. More than half of the 560,000 Palestine refugees registered in Syria have been displaced and more than 100,000 have left the country. In Syria, Palestinian camps are heavily affected by fighting and besiegement. Palestinians’ access from Syria to Jordan and Lebanon was stopped already in 2013 and 2014 respectively and the ones who have been able to register are subjected to heavy restrictions, even compared to Syrian refugees.

In 2016 there was a significant shift in donor countries approach to the region. The refugee crisis in Europe created a new willingness to fund the response and a more forthcoming approach to relations with refugee hosting nations. At the Supporting Syria & the Region Conference in London in February 2016, donors pledged an unprecedented USD 12 billion in assistance to Syria and the region, and USD 41 billion in concessional loans to refugee hosting countries. The conference also brought in a critical mass of development actors, representing a welcome shift in the response to more sustainable approaches. The EU also signed an agreement with Turkey to contain refugee flows against a EUR 3 billion aid package. This implied that the wavering aid levels of 2015 were, at least temporarily, stabilized. Of the USD 6 billion that was pledged for 2016, close to 5 billion has been disbursed. The new dynamics also brought some adjustments to the politics of many donor counties, as some put it, placing the stability of the region first, which may have had a dampening effect on protection advocacy in many contexts.

In exchange for the generous financial pledges in London, the refugee hosting countries committed to taking certain steps to open up the labour market for Syrian refugees and ease aspects of legal restrictions affecting refugees. The Jordan Compact promised 200,000 work permits for refugees. The laws are now in place and 30,000 permits have been granted, but challenges still remain. In Lebanon the government has been successful, with substantial donor support, to strengthen the public school system with the aim to put all children into education. Despite partial steps toward the promised changes to the residency permit system, which currently puts the majority of refugees in Lebanon outside the realm of legal stay, GoL still requires refugees to pay 200 USD per person when applying for residence. Host countries, Lebanon particularly, have shown disappointment with levels of funding directed directly into their systems, noting that most of the funding in still channelled through UN agencies and INGOs.

1.2 Risks and threats

Unless there are tangible successes on the political track, the conflict will continue and escalate, creating further humanitarian needs. The intensified fighting in Syria will create further waves of displacement, and the need for emergency operations will continue. As the resilience of people and communities risk deteriorating further, protection risks and vulnerabilities, as described above, are likely to increase in scope and scale.

In Syria access constraints will continue to be the single most significant threat to humanitarian operations. As the humanitarian community continues its push to access hard-to-reach areas, efforts will likely continue to be politicised as parties to the conflict use humanitarian assistance as a political bargaining chip and military tactic. In 2016, this has happened under the auspices of the Humanitarian Task Force under the US and Russian-led ISSG, used for negotiating access for convoys into besieged locations. In the current conflict dynamics, it is unlikely GoS will become more lenient in providing access. Ongoing anti-DAESH operations in Raqqa and Al Bab is expected to, besides creating new displacement, also increase access to some of those areas in the medium term. Cross-border assistance will continue to depend on shifting border policies of
neighbouring countries. The threats to aid workers' security continues to be high, local staff and implementing partners bearing the brunt of the dangerous working environment.

Humanitarian operations will also continue to manage a high risk of corruption and aid diversion, particularly in Syria, where the conflict economy is growing and possibilities for first hand monitoring are extremely limited. Recent protection cluster report point at wide-spread perceptions among Syrian beneficiaries of exploitation and discrimination in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Accountability to affected populations (AAP) should be strengthened, as well as due diligence and remote monitoring mechanisms.

The refugee caseload in the region will likely stay stable as both inflow and outflow is now restricted. Neighbouring countries will continue strict border controls, while the EU-Turkey agreement and other control measures will keep people from moving onward to Europe. Resettlement to third countries will not have a significant impact on the refugee population. Currently resettlement pledges cover some 240,000 refugees. While steps towards giving refugees access to livelihoods will continue, the pace will likely be slow. Developmental approaches will also increase. For example, the World Bank concessional lending facility will likely have a positive impact on public services provision in refugee hosting countries. None of these measures, crucial as they may be, will however have immediate impacts on the well-being of refugees, and the need for targeted humanitarian assistance will remain in the short and medium term.

After a relatively well-funded response in 2016, spurred by the London conference, unpredictability of humanitarian assistance may return in 2017. While it is unlikely there will be significant cuts in the short term, it is important that actors continue decreasing the dependence on humanitarian financing, and phase in other approaches. There are promising signs in some refugee response contexts that humanitarian cash prgrammes are transformed into social safety net schemes, which can eventually be funded from development budgets. Also in Syria there is a need to increase resilience programming and development funding in more stable areas.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan

The 2017 response to the Syria crisis relies, as in previous years, on two main appeals, the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for Syria, and the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP 2015-16) for the response in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt.

The HRP for 2017 is the third annual appeal within the Whole of Syria (WoS) framework. The funding requirement is USD 3.4 billion, with a slight increase from the 2016 HRP (3.15 billion). The Strategic Objectives are to (1) provide life-saving assistance to the most vulnerable people; (2) prevent, mitigate and respond to protection risks; and (3) increase affected people’s access to basic services and to resilience-building and livelihood opportunities. The HRP provides a new inter-sectoral framework for prioritization of the response, based on geographical severity and protection risks. This, if applied well, may improve the needs-based nature of the response. While accessing priority areas (e.g. besieged areas) will continue to be constrained, Sida assesses that the categorization system will be particularly useful in its lower categories, providing a basis for more systematically moving away from food and NFI distributions in areas where there is relative stability, increasing cash-based approaches and resilience programming, for example.

The 3RP 2017-18 is presented as a ‘nationally-led, regionally coherent’ plan to respond to the needs of refugees and the overall burden the crisis has caused to the neighbouring countries. It covers the needs of 4.7 million refugees, and 4.7 million vulnerable members of hosting communities. The 3RP is a vehicle for raising support for an integrated humanitarian and development assistance, reflecting the need to shift focus into more sustainable, nationally led responses. It is divided into two components, one for the refugee response, lead by UNHCR, and one for resilience, lead by UNDP. The total appeal for 2017 is USD 5.6 billion, of which 4.7 billion is the inter-agency requirement (i.e. the part which is included in GHO and tracked in FTS), and the rest for government programmes. As response planning is increasingly nationalized, the 3RP has become more of a fund raising instrument than an actual response plan. The national plans in Lebanon and Jordan constitute the respective
country chapters, while chapters for Turkey, Egypt, and Iraq are still UN-led. The refugee component, which is the focus of Sida’s humanitarian assistance, addresses the protection and assistance needs of refugees living in camps, settlements or local communities, as well as the most vulnerable members of host communities. One of its central aim is to strengthen community-based protection services.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

Governments’ capacity and position to respond to the crises varies widely over the region. In Syria, where the government is a party to the conflict, wide-ranging restrictions have been imposed on the humanitarian community. Meanwhile line-ministries continue to deliver services in various degrees to parts of the country including to a limited extent in areas controlled by the opposition. In opposition areas local councils provide some services, and engage with relief actors.

In Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, governments have in 2017 consolidated its leadership role in the planning, coordination, and increasingly the implementation of the response. In Jordan and Lebanon this is done with heavy technical assistance from international organizations. Through the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) and the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), the governments are aiming to increase focus on national needs, pointing to the vulnerabilities of refugee hosting communities and the needs of overburdened public service systems. As discussed above, host governments are also taking policy measures to open up labour markets to refugees, but progress is gradual. Turkey has since the beginning led and funded the bulk of the refugee response, and has in 2016 been further empowered by the EU-Turkey agreement and the EUR 3 billion support facility, the use of which it controls (together with EU institutions).

National non-governmental responders are becoming increasingly central. In Syria, the reliance on national and diaspora NGOs is increasing, since access for international actors is very limited. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) continues to be the main implementor of humanitarian programming in government controlled areas and cross-line assistance. In opposition controlled areas, local or Turkey-based Syrian NGOs implement most humanitarian programmes and have become an influential constituency in the overall response system. There is a continued need to build the capacity of national NGOs, however, and ensure the partnerships with international counterparts are constructive. Among refugee hosting countries, Lebanon stands out as a promoter of the national NGO sector as part of its larger agenda to nationalise the response. INGOs are increasingly, but to a varying degree, handing over implementation of services to national counterparts.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

The international response to the Syria crisis has long been characterised by diffused coordination structures, lack of overall strategic leadership, on the regional as well as on country level. Disagreement over coordination structures and mandates have been disruptive to the overall response.

The most significant achievement has been the continued implementation of the regional Whole of Syria (WoS) approach, kept intact despite significant tensions between stakeholders. The WoS was mandated in late 2014 by the UNSC with aim to make the response in Syria more effective by putting in place a single coordination system encompassing all hubs. It connects Damascus based operations, which reaches mainly government controlled areas, with the cross-border operations from Turkey and Jordan with access to opposition controlled areas. The WoS system is lead by a Regional HC in Amman and the designated RC/HC in Damascus. An external review of the WoS system was made in 2017, and will lead to enhancements in the coordination structures in 2017. The fundamental challenge to the WoS system, however, is the continuing lack of trust and to some extent politicization of the relationship between Damascus and cross-border hubs. The Syrian NGOs in Turkey are growing in influence, closely supported by some donors. A major challenge for the humanitarian leadership is to build trust with this constituency to keep them from
disengaging from WoS framework. As part of the same dynamics, the UN has in 2016 also been subjected to increasing public criticism of allegedly being to close to the regime and failing to ensure assistance to those in need. These tensions will likely continue if not increase in 2017. Donors will have an central responsibility in taking a balanced approach, avoiding a further politicization of the response.

In neighbouring countries, there has been questions about the division of labour between UNHCR, who has the coordination mandate for the refugee response, and the HC/OCHA. While OCHA’s value added has been questioned, particularly in Lebanon, cooperation between the agencies has improved in line with the global UNHCR-OCHA MoU. The HC/HC’s in Jordan and Lebanon have a central role in promoting links between relief and development.

The Syria crisis response is by far the most costly humanitarian operation on a global scale. The combined HRP and 3RP (the inter-agency component) financial appeal for 2017 is more than USD 8 billion. As of November 2016, the 3RP is 55% and the HRP 42% funded. A perhaps larger challenge than underfunding, however, is that a large part of international donor financing is outside the UN-led appeals. In Syria, around 75% and in the refugee hosting countries 56% of the total reported humanitarian financing in FTS is not attributed to the appeals. This is explained by several factors, including by significant underreporting into FTS, and certain projects being anonymized due to safety or political reasons. Nonetheless, the fact remains that many large donors do not base their funding on the HRP or 3RP, and do not require partners to do so, which contributes to a undermining of humanitarian leadership and a coordinated response. This is a particularly critical issue in the Syria response.

2.3 International and regional assistance

The top five donors to the region include the EC/ECHO, the US, Germany, UK/DFID, and Norway. As mentioned, donors’ have been increasingly generous in the aftermath of the refugee crisis in Europe, also with more development oriented financing coming in as the crisis continues. The EU’s so called Madad Fund (EU Trust Fund) begun disbursements in 2016, complementing the regional total of EUR 200 million through ECHO in 2016. Regional donors, institutions and individuals are involved in the response. Gulf countries are a growing factor in humanitarian financing, and efforts are ongoing to bring them closer to the UN lead coordination structures. Also this funding is still largely outside of the appeals.

3. SIDAs HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1. Sida’s role

The Sida strategy has since the beginning of the crisis focused on flexible funding to multi-sectoral assistance with a strong emphasis on protection. Sida has also been in the forefront promoting improved coordination, needs-based targeting and needs assessments, as well as adherence of IHL and gender mainstreaming. Sida has also emphasised the need for capacity building of local actors. The case study in the Evaluation of Sida’s Humanitarian Assistance 2011-2014 (InDevelop, 2015) confirmed the relevance of Sida’s strategy. In the rapidly changing context, the flexibility of Sida funding has been the most valuable aspect for Sida partners. Lightly earmarked funding to UN agencies and the pooled funds, as well as the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement has given partners the ability to fill funding gaps and respond to unexpected needs, while other donor contributions are more tightly earmarked. Moreover, the fact that Sweden is perceived as a neutral actor in an otherwise highly politicised context has given Sida credibility in its dealings with UN agencies and provided Sida with a larger influence than its financial contribution would imply. A greater field presence would however have given Sida better possibilities to use its voice, the evaluation found.

In 2016 Sida’s humanitarian support to the Syria crisis reached its highest level so far, SEK 412 million. This is an increase by SEK 59 million or 16 % compared to 2015. Support was channelled through UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement and INGOs. Some 65% was allocated to Syria itself, with Lebanon as the largest recipient of funding among the refugee hosting countries.
Sida provided unearmarked funding on the appeal level to UN agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA, and OCHA) and ICRC in order to ensure needed flexibility. Sida further built on long-term partnerships with the Swedish Red Cross (SRC), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and Save the Children Sweden (SC), all receiving funding in more than one country context. The RRM mechanism was used for six MSB secondments of coordination, information management, and gender experts and one environmental expert into UN agencies, as well as two response projects, both by Action Contre la Faim (ACF), in Syria and Jordan.

3.2. Response Priorities 2017

Sida’s response priorities will build on and refine further the strategy of previous years. The allocation for the Syria crisis is its largest globally in 2016, but it is still limited compared to magnitude of needs in Syria and the region. Sida is currently the 13th largest donor to the crisis (FTS). Sida will therefore build on its specific value added, as reflected by the evaluation of 2015, being a principled and a flexible donor. Sida’s engagement is firmly based on IHL and the centrality of protection. Sida will contribute to empowering the UN-led, coordinated response. Sida will promote a response that is needs-based and firmly based on humanitarian principles.

Priorities in 2016 include:

1. **Flexible financing to enable a needs-based, multi-sector response and emergency responses.** This means a continuation of lightly earmarked support to UN and RCRC partners. The OCHA country-based pooled funds will be another key strategic tool, and an active participation in Advisory Boards will continue. In the Syria response, Sida will seek to increase WoS level funding (instead of funding for a specific hub), while funding to the refugee response will continue to be regional.

2. **Support for protection with a focus on the most vulnerable**, both through targeted protection programming (responsive and remedial programmes) and by considering protectiveness of other forms of support (preventative programming, incl. protection mainstreaming). This will include a continued cooperation with long-term INGO partners on e.g. child protection, psychosocial services, referral systems, and ICLA. Dialogue will focus on IHL and protection. Sida will advocate for strategic approaches to protection in all country contexts.

3. **Strengthen the national response**, through capacity building of national and local response actors, particularly NGOs. The CBPF will be Sidas main tool for supporting national NGO projects. Sida will also require sound partnership practices from its international partners, and allow funding to be used for capacity building of national responders. As part of the refugee response, Sida will support gradual handing over of services to national partners, as and when feasible.

4. **Strengthened coordination**, better targeting and prioritisation. Coordination will be supported both through a sustained support for OCHA and UNHCR and and through dialogue. Sida will be an active partner promoting a strengthened Whole of Syria system. Sida will only fund organizations and projects that are within the HRP and 3RP. Sida will promote coordination between humanitarian and development actors.

Sida will support all principled means of delivery to reach populations in need, including in all parts of Syria, from all operational hubs inside and outside Syria, irrespective of political or other considerations. Sida will continue to require a high level of conflict sensitiveness along its entire programme. While funding increases, the number of partners will be contained to enable monitoring with limited human resources.

**Creating synergies with development programming is a major priority.** Sida (MENA) will begin its second year of implementing the five-year regional strategy for the Syria crisis, with the aim of building resilience in Syria and neighbouring countries, by focusing on basic services, livelihoods, GBV, and human rights. The strategy comes with some SEK 350 million per year in development funding, almost doubling the total Sida contribution to the crisis and with the explicit aim to relieve the burden of and complement humanitarian assistance.
Complementarities between the two streams of funding have actively been sought, both through joint analysis and financing choices. Contributions under the strategy, that are particularly relevant for complementarity include, for example, UNHCR’s guarantee mechanism for micro-lending for refugees in Jordan and Lebanon (in pipeline), an INGO consortium (incl. NRC, IRC) strengthening access to livelihoods in Syria, and UNFPA’s GBV programme in the region, which is closely linked to the humanitarian protection response.

The strategy has also enabled humanitarian financing to stand even more firmly on its life-saving mandate. Sida made already in 2016 adjustments to its humanitarian assistance by increasing the share of funding to emergency and front-line humanitarian responders and multi-sector refugee response by increasing its support to the CBPFs, SRC, UNHCR, and NRC. At the same time, in the protracted crisis setting, also humanitarian programing must contribute positively, when and as much as possible, to the resilience of the population.

Going forward, within the framework of Sida’s humanitarian assistance, Sida will prioritize the following as part of its approach to strengthening synergies with relief and development.

(a) creating further **complementarities with Sida development funding**, particularly when partners are shared, including by promoting the phasing-in of development funding when relevant;
(b) advocating for the HCTs and the **humanitarian leadership** (HC, UNHCR) to take a **catalytical role** in linking planning and programming with parallel processes in the area of resilience/stabilisation/development, including in order to **bring in development funding** to strengthen the resilience of the population and public institutions, including in the more stable areas of Syria;
(c) building **local capacities**, particularly those of civil society actors, to respond to crises, and where possible enable international partners to hand over services (like GBV, CP) to national counterparts;
(d) promoting a further consolidation of cash programmes as part of the refugee response and their transformation into **social safety net** systems; and promoting a transition to cash assistance, also in Syria, where possible;

### 3.3. Partners

Among multilateral partners, Sida will continue its partnership with **OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNRWA**. As for UNICEF, it will remain a major partner in Syria, but unlike previous years, UNICEF will not be part of Sida’s initial allocation to the 3RP counties. UNICEF is well-funded in the region, and is increasingly benefitting from development funding, including from Sida. HUM funding may be considered in the mid-year allocation 2017 if there are large funding gaps in its emergency operations (e.g. emergency WASH). **ICRC** will continue as a major partner in Syria, but also in Lebanon. The four **Humanitarian Funds** (or CBPFs) remain a key channel for Sida funding.

Eight of Sida’s Strategic Partners (NGOs) have included concept notes for the Syria crisis in their initial submission. These include in addition to current partners (SRC, NRC, IRC, Save the Children, Oxfam, and Islamic Relief), also SMC, ACF, and Plan. Sida will however not broaden the partner base from 2016, in order to limit the burden on monitoring in an extremely risk prone environment. **NRC** will remain Sida’s most significant INGO partner in the region, moving in 2017 to programme support. In Syria, both Damascus based (Oxfam, NRC) and cross border NGOs (IR, IRC, NRC, SCI) are supported.

The following **new elements** to partnerships may be highlighted.

- Sida will open for a three-year proposal from **Save the Children** in Lebanon (pending review of the full application). The suggested project is expected to fill Sida’s criteria of multi-year funding, as it will focus on building the capacity of local partner NGOs and handing over service provision to them by the end of the three year period. In Lebanon, there is also a multi-year response plan.
- With **SRC**, Sida will include support to IFRC cash programme implemented by Jordanian Red Crescent, which will reach unregistered refugees unable to attain assistance from UNHCR or others.
- In Jordan, Sida will support the **Jordan INGO Forum** with a max. 1 million grant, channelled through the NRC agreement. Sida sees this as a strategic injection into advocacy around protection and humanitarian space in Jordan.

**Suggested initial Sida allocation for the Syria crisis, SEK 315 million**

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<th>Organization</th>
<th>Regional 3RP</th>
<th>Regional (Syria, Jordan, Lebanon)</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Total amount (MSEK)</th>
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1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

Well into its sixth year, the war in Syria has further evolved as a full-fledged international conflict. In this context, the protection environment has further deteriorated. Over 300,000 people have been killed since the beginning of the conflict, including tens of thousands of children, and 11 million have been forced to leave their homes. The flagrant and systematic abuses of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights Law (IHRL) that have characterized the crisis have reached new highs in 2016. The use of siege as a military tactic is increasing, with the number of people in besieged areas doubling in a year, reaching almost 1 million in late 2016. Indiscriminate and deliberate attacks on densely populated civilian areas and civilian objects, particularly medical infrastructure and personnel have increased. Today most hospitals, and to an extent schools in heavily targeted areas are operating under ground. Controlling public services like water and electricity supply is used for tactical purposes by many parties to the conflict. With the current military focus on Aleppo, Syria's second city has become the most visible case in point for aforementioned IHL violations, but many other areas are similarly affected.

The past year also witnessed a further politicization of humanitarian assistance in Syria. The Humanitarian Task Force was established in late 2015 in the framework of the US and Russian led negotiation body ISSG, to enhance access of humanitarian assistance, particularly to besieged areas by inter-agency convoys. A total of 1,2 million people we reached by the convoys and air-drops, but the process has been highly controversial, seen by many as a mechanism where granting access for assistance is used increasingly as a political bargaining chip. Due to deadlock in negotiations, the task force is currently not meeting. Parties to the conflict are also among the largest donors to the humanitarian response.

There are widespread and increasing humanitarian needs. The Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017 (HNO, Dec 2016) identifies 13.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance (figure uncancelled from 2016). From that overall figure, the HNO highlights an estimated 5.7 million with critical needs due to a confluence of factors related to where they live (incl. conflict intensity, IDP to host population ratio, availability of services, prices). Most of these are located in so-called ‘hard to reach’ areas, of which some 1,4 million in DAESH held areas, and close to 1 million in besieged locations. Accessing this priority case load will be difficult and costly.

The total number of IDPs in Syria is estimated at 6.3 million, which reflects no significant change from last year. However, the actual rates of displacement are enormous, with an average of 6,150 people displaced per day, much of it reflecting secondary or tertiary displacement due to the conflict. Also, increasing as resources are depleting, people move in search of affordable shelter. The most vulnerable end up in formal or informal camps, while the majority live as long-term IDPs in cities and towns creating pressures also on host communities. The option for Syrians to claim their right to asylum has de facto been erased as all neighbouring countries have effectively closed their borders. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians have settled in various border areas, unable to pass, often living in very difficult circumstances. In 2016, there were also for the first time significant returns of IDPs, a total of 600,000. The specific needs and vulnerabilities of returnees needs further analysis as the humanitarian community defines its role in supporting this politically sensitive caseload. There is also a new pattern of forced displacement of civilians from besieged areas as part of local seize fire agreements.

As assets and resilience of the population are depleted and sevices are strained, the scale of needs are reaching extreme levels, creating further protection risks. Almost 70% of Syrians live in extreme poverty. The deepening economic recession has led to inflated cost of food and fuel, and climbing unemployment is making lives even in relatively stable government-held areas increasingly difficult. At the same time, access to basic social services continues to deteriorate. Services in the most conflict affected locations suffer from lack of staff, damage to infrastructure and security concerns, while in IDP hosting locations services are overstretched. The health system especially is at brink of collapse, with less than half of pre-conflict hospitals functional. One out of four schools are
no longer accessible, and at least 2 million children are out of school. A major consequence of the depletion of assets on all levels of society is the increase in negative coping strategies such as drop out from school, child labour, early marriages, and reducing food consumption. Negative coping is shaping the growing protection response. Results of the scale-up of community-based protection services are beginning to show. A recent nation-wide survey suggests that the share of people turning to ‘positive coping’ by seeking assistance from community centres or similar has grown significantly since 2015 (WoS Protection Needs Overview for 2017).

The gender and age dimensions of vulnerability and protection needs are significant. **Children** continue to be the most vulnerable, not least due to the proliferation of negative coping strategies, as discussed above. Child labour and recruitment is perceived to be a problem in 70% of the country (HNO). **Girls and women** are at a higher risk of early marriage, domestic and sexual violence, reduced freedom of movement and access to services. Women are particularly vulnerable in relation to their reproductive health, particularly when pregnant. There are also reports of conflict related sexual violence by all parties to the conflict. **Boys and men** risk forced recruitment, detention and dangerous child labour.

Close to all of the remaining 460 000 **Palestine refugees** are in need of assistance. Palestinians are disproportionately affected by the conflict, camps heavily affected by fighting. Two Palestinian camps with a total of some 20,000 people are currently under siege, Yarmouk and Khan al-Shish.

1.2 Risks and threat

Since a political solution in 2017 remains unlikely, a further escalation of violence, loss of life and displacement is to be expected. Humanitarian needs, as described in the section above, will likely increase and deepen.

**Access constraints constitute the most significant risk for the humanitarian response inside Syria.** Despite UN SC resolutions calling for actors to facilitate humanitarian access, overall access is increasingly limited and politicised. It is object to the systematic obstruction by Syrian authorities, but also – albeit still to a lesser extent – by armed opposition groups. With the current conflict dynamics, it is unlikely GoS will become more lenient in this regard. Cross-line missions will likely continue to be instrumentalized by the approval processes, delivery of certain relief items like surgical items is systematically hindered. DAESH areas have for long been entirely closed off from international assistance, but with ongoing anti-DAESH military campaigns, there will likely be new access to some areas, like Raqqa and Al-Bab, but also further mass displacement. There is also a risk that parts of Raqqa may be besieged during the military operation (ACAPS). **Cross-border** assistance will continue to depend on shifting border policies of neighbouring countries. The threat to aid workers continues to be high.

The response is characterized by high risks of aid diversion, corruption and lack of adhering to humanitarian principles. The level of corruption has soared as a result of the breakdown of governance, and the emergence of a war economy. Despite investments in capacity building of implementing partners and innovative approaches to remote management and monitoring, like third party and peer-to-peer monitoring, huge challenges remain. A recent survey points at wide-spread perceptions among Syrian beneficiaries of exploitation and discrimination in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Also, the Turkey-based response has in 2016 been tarnished by a large-scale fraud investigation implicating several humanitarian organizations. While further efforts are needed, the fact remains that effective assistance in Syria requires a higher-than-average acceptance of risks.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Humanitarian Response Plan

**The Humanitarian Response Plan for 2017 is the third annual appeal within the Whole of Syria (WoS) framework,** drawing on the second comprehensive Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO). The funding requirement is USD 3.4 billion, with a slight increase from the 2016 HRP (3.15 billion),
despite an initial effort by the humanitarian leadership to cap the HRP at a lower figure. The Strategic Objectives are to (1) provide life-saving assistance to the most vulnerable people, (2) prevent, mitigate and respond to protection risks, and (3) increase affected people’s access to basic services and to resilience-building and livelihood opportunities.

The HRP provides a new framework for prioritization of the response, which, if applied well, may make the response more needs-based. The first criteria for prioritization looks at geographical severity of needs. A severity categorization is made of different locations in the country, ranging from ‘catastrophic’ to ‘minor’ needs, besieged areas tending to represent the top end of severity. This is meant to enable adjusting responses more systematically to different types of needs. The severity map will be updated on a rolling basis, as needs evolve. While access will continue to dictate responses in the top-end of the severity scale, in the areas on the lower scale however, resilience programming can (and should) be more systematically phased in.

The second criteria for prioritization is based on an assessment of protection risks. The protection cluster has created a tool for all clusters for assessing vulnerability in order to prioritize among populations. This is part of a larger push to increase protection mainstreaming in the response. A protection risk analysis was also a mandatory part of the vetting process of each sector strategy and project in the HRP.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

The main burden of the humanitarian crisis in Syria is carried by Syrian host communities, and as a result their own resources and resilience levels are decreasing. The government continues to be involved in all aspects of the response within areas of its control, not least by continuing to provide certain basic services. It controls the international response through granting or limiting access and permits to humanitarian actors. In areas no longer controlled by the government, local councils have been set up, to sustain the provision of some basic services, however, in many areas their influence has decreased since the arrival of radical groups. International assistance is given to many local councils as part of so called stabilisation efforts in opposition areas.

The response in Syria is increasingly dependent on national and local civil society actors. National staff and national organisations are implementing most of the response, taking enormous risks in their work. More than a hundred aid workers have been killed during the conflict. Between January and October 2016, at least 184 attacks against NGO workers were reported (ACAPS, NGO Safety 28/10/2016).

The Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) continues to be the main implementer of humanitarian assistance, particularly of deliveries of food and NFI s. It works mainly in government controlled areas, but also retains many functioning branches in opposition areas and is a major acor in cross-line assistance. SARC is managing a complicated balancing act between protecting its neutrality while managing its auxiliary role with the government. It is, for example, acting on the government’s behalf as a regulator of Damascus-based INGOs, controlling many aspects programming. Beyond the politics of Damascus, very few question the value and bravery of SARC’s vast network of volunteers. In September airstrikes directly hit a humanitarian convoy in Aleppo, killing 34 people, all local SARC staff and volunteers.

The Syrian NGO sector has drastically grown during the crisis. While the environment in government controlled areas is still very restrictive – there are currently some 135 national NGOs authorised to work with the UN – the NGO sector working in opposition areas is growing in both scope and strength. There are currently close to 200 Syrian and diaspora NGOs operating from neighbouring countries through cross-border assistance, many of them Turkey-based. While capacities are clearly improving, there are still significant capacity gaps, particularly in specialized areas like protection. Partnerships with some of the local organizations provide the system with invaluable access, including to many besieged areas. Partnerships polices and capacity building programmes have become an central part
of international organizations' work in Syria. As the capacities of implementing NNGOs increase, it is arguably contributing to building a future civil society in Syria.

In addition to the formal humanitarian system, there is an estimated 600-700 local groups, professional bodies, charities, activist networks, diaspora organizations, fighting groups, etc. also giving assistance. Their work is usually not captured by the formal structures, and they do not necessarily adhere to the humanitarian principles, but they play a vital role in responding to needs, particularly where the 'system' cannot reach.

### 2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

The humanitarian community continued to scale up its response during 2016 through both regular, cross line and cross border operations in all 14 governorates, reaching more people than previous years. The UN led response alone reached 6.5 million people within monthly food assistance; 16.5 with WASH systems support, and 1.3 million children with learning opportunities.

The international response in Syria is organized from a set of 'hubs' based on access. In all of the hubs a regular cluster approach is applied, with respective hub-level humanitarian leadership. The RC/HC for Syria, based in Damascus, provides leadership for the regular response to government controlled areas and the cross-line response (i.e. convoys into hard-to-reach areas). Currently 56% of people in need live in areas that are accessible only by Damascus-based actors (HNO). Some 76% of the UN's operations in Syria are from the Damascus hub. The 16 INGOs that have registered in Damascus are in a secondary position compared to the UN, given lesser access by GoS and usually not allowed to partner with local NGOs nor establish sub-offices.

The Deputy RHC leads the cross-border response from Turkey, which accesses opposition controlled areas in the North and the RC/HC in Jordan the (smaller scale) cross-border deliveries into the South of Syria. Close to 30% of people in need in Syria live in the opposition controlled areas that can be reached cross-border (but also cross-line from Damascus). While UN agencies and partners are since 2014 authorized by the Security Council to also deliver assistance cross border, the cross-border response is still dominated by the 50 or so INGOs and close to 200 Syrian NGOs operating cross-border. The UN directs 23% of its total support from these hubs.

Coordination across the hubs continues under the Whole of Syria (WoS) framework. The WoS was mandated by the Security Council in 2014 with the aim to maximize efficiency through a single coordination system encompassing operations from Damascus and the cross-border hubs. The strategic leadership on the WoS level is shared through a dual leadership model by the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator in Amman and the designated RC/HC for Syria based in Damascus. They co-chair the WoS Strategic Steering Group (like a HCT). WoS clusters provide harmonization between hub level clusters. The major achievement of WoS is the fact that for three years, despite the difficult relationships between hubs, it has produced two full HNOs and three HRPs, covering the collective response. Each year a larger share of the de facto response, including national actors, have entered the framework of the HRP and WoS coordination structures.

The WoS system underwent external review in 2016, pointing at a number of inefficiencies in the system and improvements to the coordination structures will be implemented from January 2017 onwards. The most 'existential' challenge to the WoS system, however, is the continuing lack of trust and to some extent politicization of the relationship between Damascus and cross-border hubs. The Syrian NGO constituency in Turkey is growing in influence, closely supported by some donors, and is highly suspicious of the UN in Damascus. NGOs disengaging from the WoS framework is a constant threat. As part of the same dynamics, the UN has in 2016 also been subjected to increasing public criticism, including in international media, of being too close to the regime and thus failing to ensure assistance to those in need. The most debated aspect of the WoS review is therefore the question of the above described dual leadership model. The review recommended a change where WoS would be led only by the Amman-based RHC, strengthening accountability and clarity of decision making. This received the support of NGOs and many donors alike. The UN is however wary of the effects a weakening the RC/HC may have on humanitarian space in Damascus, and will likely decide
to keep the dual leadership model. The tensions between response actors will likely continue in 2017 and beyond.

Three pooled funds serve the WoS response, the Turkey HF and Syria HF exclusively and the Jordan HF partially through a cross-border window.

3. SIDA’s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

For the overall response priorities for the Syria crisis, see section 3 in the regional chapeau. For the Syria response specifically, the following can be highlighted.

Support will be given in full alignment with the HRP 2017, and support will only be given to projects within the HRP and partners that work within the WoS coordination structures (with the exception of ICRC/IFRC). A large share of Sida funding will be flexible, in order to empower coordination systems and enable partners to prioritize according to the established severity ranking systems and vulnerability criteria (see 1.3 above). Priority will be given to life-saving emergency response and for reaching people in hard-to-reach areas, for example through ICRC and SARC, Islamic Relief, and others (see below). At the same time, due to access realities, a large part of Sida’s support particularly to UNICEF, UNHCR and UNRWA – will be used for the long-term IDP response. Sida monitoring and dialogue will increasingly focus on quality aspects of these operations. Sida will advocate for more sustainable programming in areas with relative stability, including cash-based approaches and resilience programming, for which development financing should be brought in. Sida will expect the humanitarian leadership and partners to take a catalytical role in linking with development actors and financing.

Sida partners in Syria include both UN, Red Cross movement, and INGO partners, working from all WoS hubs.

- OCHA will remain a key strategic partner as Sida continues to advocate for a well-functioning coordination structure, both on the WoS level and in hubs. Support to OCHA is unearmarked, including all Whole of Syria hubs (and Lebanon).
- The three CBPFs for Syria remain a key instrument in 2017. Sida will support the Turkey Humanitarian Fund, which is a key tool for supporting emergency response as well as regular IDP support programmes in opposition controlled areas, and to a large extent through Syrian NGOs. The Syria Humanitarian Fund complements the THF by supporting a response by Damascus-based actors, including the national NGO sector, and increasingly in hard-to-reach areas. The Jordan Humanitarian Fund also partly funds projects in Southern Syria (see Jordan chapter). Sida will continue as an active member of all three Advisory Boards.
- UNICEF is Sidas largest UN partner in Syria, a main actor in e.g. emergency WASH, education, and Child Protection, and leading several clusters. Funding is on the WoS level, meaning UNICEF can use it as needs arise from all hubs.
- UNHCR remains a key protection partner. Sida will particularly support and monitor the scale-up of community-based protection activities in Syria. UNHCR’s role as protection cluster lead is also of strategic importance.
- UNRWA will continue as a key partner due to the specific protection needs of the Palestine refugee population in Syria and due to its well-advanced multi-purpose cash programme in Syria.
- Support through ICRC and SARC (SRC) continues. Both are main actors in emergency response with relative access, not least through the remaining SARC branches across the country, and are key actors in the cross-line response.
- Islamic relief and IRC will remain major emergency health partners, though cross-border programming from Turkey to the North of Syria. IR will focus on delivery of life saving medical supplies to clinics and hospitals, while IRC will in 2017 focus on primary health services in IDP camps in Idleb.
- Save the Children’s child protection services in the North.
- NRC will receive programme-based support on a WoS level. Sida has in 2016 supported NRC’s development of its partnerships work in Syria, including capacity building of national partners, and will continue following this aspect of its programme.
- Oxfam remains Sidas Damascus-based INGO partner, and a key emergency WASH actor.

Sida will be open to supporting all principled means of delivery to reach populations in need, in all parts of Syria, from all operational hubs inside and outside Syria. Funding on the WoS level is preferred. Sida will consider the high risk nature of programming and limitations in monitoring, by limiting the number of partners in Syria and by strengthening its resources for monitoring in the region.

Annex 2: LEBANON

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

Six years into the Syrian conflict the Government of Lebanon (GoL) estimates that the country hosts 1.5 million Syrians who have fled the conflict in Syria (including 1.017 million registered as refugees with UNHCR), along with 31,500 Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS), 35,000 Lebanese returnees, and a pre-existing population of more than 277,985 Palestine Refugees in Lebanon (PRL). Syrian refugees live in over 2,125 communities and locations across the country. Women and children account for 80% of the refugee population, with 54% below 18 years of age. The largest concentrations of refugees in Lebanon are in Bekaa (360,700), Mount Lebanon (287,650), and the North (251,300) and the south (117,750) (UNHCR, Nov 2016). GoL refers to individuals who fled from Syria after March 2011 as “temporarily displaced individuals”, GoL does not officially acknowledge the use of “refugee” term due to political and historical dynamics.

Determining the real number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon remains a challenge. It is believed that the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has decreased after the imposition of the restrictive policies by GoL in January 2015 followed by a GoL request for UNHCR to suspend the registration of Syrians in May 2015 – with a controversial de-registration (or deactivation of files leading to de-registration) and the wave of migration to Europe in 2015. Syrian refugees can still approach UNHCR and have their bio-data recorded and vulnerabilities assessed to be referred to services. Unlike 2015, it is believed that a small number of refugees migrated to Europe in 2016 after the introduction of restrictive policies for Syrians entering Turkey.

The restrictions on Syrian refugees were expected to loosen after the London Conference. The international community made pledges to support GoL and in turn GoL promised in its Letter of Intent to enhance the situation of refugees through abolishing the residency fees rule and opening the labor market. However, since then, the situation of refugees has not progressed. Restrictions on legal stay create significant protection risks. Syrians seeking renewal of residency permit must pay USD 200 for each person above 15 years. In a positive development, the notarized pledge not to work has been finally lifted in June. The legal disincentives force an increasing number of Syrians not to renew their residency permits and to live illegally in the country. According to UNHCR, the majority of Syrians do not have a valid residency and this is steadily increasing. VASyR 2016 findings show that only 20% of the population have a valid residency permit compared to 58% in 2014 and 28% in 2015.

As a result of the deteriorating protection environment, lack of livelihoods opportunities, and unpredictable assistance, vulnerability among refugees is growing. 70.5% of refugees continue to live below the national poverty line, which explains an increase in negative coping strategies. These include reducing household expenditure on food (90%) and buying food on credit (82%) (VASyR 2016). Refugees are particularly dependent on the monthly cash and food voucher assistance. Other negative coping mechanisms imply serious protection concerns such as begging, child labour, and early marriage. Families rely on adolescents as the primary bread winners. As a result, adolescents, particularly boys, are forced into the worst forms of child labour
exposing them to physical and sexual violence. Humanitarian partners are giving more attention to youth and adolescents, this is in-line with the priorities set in the *No Lost Generation* campaign. Negative coping mechanisms largely affect women and girls’ exposure to gender-based violence. Persons with disabilities and the elderly are also at high risk of violence and exclusion. Needs in shelter remain significant, there are no formal refugee camps for Syrians and refugees tend to resort to substandard dwellings in urban centres, informal tented settlements, or existing Palestinian camps (VASyR 2016).

**Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS)** suffer from double vulnerability due to the already disadvantaged position of Palestine refugees in Lebanon (PRL). PRS have been unable to legally enter Lebanon since May 2014. Some 31,000 PRS currently live in Lebanon (UNRWA, 2016), a significant decrease from 42,000 in 2015, mainly due to migration to Europe or return to Syria due to hardship in Lebanon. Currently, 65% of PRL and 90% of PRS live below the poverty line. Almost 80% of PRS are women and children. The vast majority of PRS live a precarious situation, unable to regularize their legal status or access civil registration procedures and basic social services. They are largely dependent on UNRWA for basic subsistence needs, including food and shelter, as well as basic education and health care.

The conflict in Syria, the inflow of refugees, its economic effects, and spillover of conflict has had a significant effect on the economy and stability of Lebanon, leading to an increase in vulnerability among Lebanese in host communities. Managing the refugee crisis is therefore a sensitive balancing act for the already fragile Lebanese government, a state running without a functioning parliament. A president was finally elected in Oct 2016, after more than two years of political deadlock, which raises hopes for further stability in the country. The World Bank estimates that Lebanon has incurred losses of USD 13.1 bln since 2012. Thus, investment in the strengthening of public systems and economic opportunities remains essential for Lebanon.

In light of the above, refugees are increasingly dependent on humanitarian assistance that is expected to continue despite the presence of other stabilisation/resilience interventions in the LCRP and complemented by the recently-established Concessional Financing Facility.

### 1.2 Risks and threats

In a likely scenario, **Lebanon will continue its strict border control and strict measures over the refugee population.** It is expected that the **refugee caseload will not increase,** but would rather decrease at a slow rate. **The scope of humanitarian needs will likely increase.** However, post-London conference, there is still hope for opportunities for refugees in the formal labor market and advocacy efforts will continue for the abolishment of residency fees. Funding will continue to be unpredictable, dependency on a cash-and food assistance and protection implications will continue.

GoL increased ownership and control over the LCRP planning and coordination process, and the increasing political focus on the stability of Lebanon, some humanitarian actors in Lebanon see a risk that funding may move towards more stability related programmes away from immediate humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable in the context where most basic service delivery is privatised and a public sector that lack the needed absorption capacity. Also, discriminatory policies create barriers to refugees’ access to services. In this context, the need for targeted humanitarian action remains.

**INGOs registration restriction and obtaining residency and work permits for expat staff** is becoming more challenging with GoL imposing the “nationalization” policy, these restriction also apply on recruiting PRL staff which was not an issue prior to the crisis. Restrictions are mainly imposed by the Ministry of Labour that is perceived as uncooperative.

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1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan

GoL has established a Crisis Cell as the highest national authority for international partners supporting the crisis response in Lebanon, with the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) mandated to oversee the Government’s response to the crisis. GoL along with national and international partners come together to draft a plan for an integrated and mutually reinforcing humanitarian and stabilization interventions. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) 2017-2020 is a joint UN-GoL plan, and in large a continuation of the 2016 LCRP. LCRP forms the 3RP country chapter for Lebanon. The total budget of the Lebanon 3RPs chapter is USD 2.12 bn for partners appeal (UN and NGOs) for 2017. The population planning figures includes four target groups: 1.5 million vulnerable Lebanese; 1.5 million displaced Syrians; 31,500 Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS); and 277,985 Palestine Refugees from Lebanon (PRL).

The Strategic Objectives of the LCRP 2017-2020 are: (1) Ensure protection of vulnerable populations and (2). Provide immediate assistance to vulnerable populations; (3) Support service provision through national systems; and (4) Reinforce Lebanon’s economic, social and environmental stability.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

The government continues to strengthen its leadership role on the planning and coordination of the response. As described above, there has been a move towards addressing needs within host communities, not only humanitarian needs of refugees. It is also the explicit aim of the government to gradually nationalize the response, requiring the UN and (particularly) INGOs to hand over to either public structures or Lebanese NGOs. The LCRP increasingly aims at strengthening public services at national and local level but the process takes time. The central government is still weak, not least politically but also in terms of its capacity and reach. Service provision is mostly privatized in Lebanon. On the other hand, the capacity of civil society organizations in Lebanon is relatively strong and there are several well-capacitated organizations who can participate in the response and increasingly take over functions and service provision from international organizations. Also the Lebanese Red Cross (LRC) is a strong actor with a long history, benefitting from a high level of social acceptance and access. The main coordination challenge of the response is related to the inter-governmental coordination between ministries, security apparatus and the judicial systems. The weak inter-governmental coordination is attributed mainly to the political, partisan and sectarian divide in the country. The UN-Government coordination is still challenging but progressing.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

The humanitarian response is dominated by UNHCR who is mandated to lead coordination of the international refugee response. Formally it shares the coordination lead with UNDP on the LCRP with Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA). In addition, the RC/HC, supported by a small OCHA office (and an RC Office), provides leadership on the wider humanitarian and development response in the country. The OCHA office also manages a relatively small country-based pooled fund. The cooperation and division of labour between UNHCR and HC functions has progressed compared to 2015 partly due changes in RC/HC and the leadership of lead agencies.

UN agencies are increasingly shifting their support from INGOs as implementing partners to local NGOs, partly influenced by directions by GoL but also due to the developing capacities of CSOs in Lebanon.

GoL officials often complain that the pledges promised to Lebanon have not been met by pledging countries and this is often the excuse GoL gives for justifying not meeting promised made by Lebanon in London. According to data collected from donors, almost 14% of the pledges were for the response in Lebanon. However, it is worth noting that over a quarter of the pledged funding (27%) for 2016 does not currently specify a recipient country (US$1.9 billion) and over two-thirds (67%) of the grant pledges for 2017–2020 do not specify a recipient country. (Post London Conference Financial Tracking Report, Sep 2016).
3. SIDA's HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

For the overall response priorities for the Syria crisis, see section 3 in the regional chapeau.

Due to the heightened humanitarian needs, Lebanon will in 2017 continue to receive the largest share of targeted Sida support among the refugee countries. Sidas support will be directed to the most urgent humanitarian, including protection needs. Flexible, multi-sector support will be channelled through the UNHCR (regional) and ICRC (targeted to Lebanon). Unlike previous years, UNICEF will not be part of Sida's initial allocation in 2017.

Sida will continue to support the Lebanon Humanitarian Fund in 2017 and will actively monitor quality and relevance aspects of the fund, including through its membership in the Advisory Board. Sida will promote a strengthening its strategic value-added in responding to the most acute humanitarian needs in Lebanon.

Sida will continue its support through three long-term INGO partnerships with a focus on protection: Save the Children (child protection), IRC (GBV), and NRC (multi-sector). Sida will however increasingly support a gradual shift from international direct implemented projects to national implementation, as long as it still caters to answering humanitarian needs.

- Sida will therefore enter into a multi-year financing arrangement with Save the Children with an aim to phase out SCI support and handing over to national partners by the end of the three-year agreement period. The three year programme is also in line with the three-year LCRP, and will build on SCI's long experience in Lebanon of implementing psychosocial support and strengthening case management for children. SCI is an active member in interagency coordination structures on child protection, case management, mental health and psychosocial support.

- Support to IRC will continue, focusing on protection of women and girls, including GBV services, empowerment and psychosocial support. IRC has large outreach in Lebanon and partners with a number of national NGOs. IRC is an active member of the national SGBV Taskforce as well as of the Case Management WG.

- NRC is one of Sida's most strategic INGO partners. In 2017 Sida will enter a programme based support model to ensure a flexible and needs based response. The programme includes interventions on education, shelter/WASH, legal status advocacy and legal aid of refugees and focuses on strategic advocacy with the government and the UN. NRC has a large geographical coverage in North, center and south of Lebanon. NRC programmes target Syrian refugees, PRS, as well as PRL.

Also the support through SRC to the Lebanese Red Cross will continue in the WASH and protection sectors, as it contributes clearly both to the needs of the most vulnerable (often unregistered refugees) and strengthens the capacity of the national Red Cross. WASH programmes target particularly Informal Tented Settlements (ITS), where LRC adopts higher technical standards than other actors. SRC works closely with LRC to build their capacity and introduce new interventions that have sustainable benefits. This includes solid waste management and grey water treatment. Emergency WASH is also one of the sectors that has suffered from a lack of funding.

Particular focus will be given the refugee community due to its increasing (legal, social, and economic) vulnerability, but needs of vulnerable host communities will be regarded as well, but primarily from the conflict sensitivity perspective. Interventions must be designed in a way that they at a minimum do not contribute negatively, but ideally even contribute positively to the increasingly tense social relationships between refugees and host communities and other intercommunal conflicts. Dialogue will focus on key protection concerns, coordination, and improving the needs-based nature of the humanitarian response.
Annex 3: JORDAN

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

Currently some 656,000 Syrian refugees are registered with UNHCR in Jordan (Nov, 2016) in addition to 16,000 Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) who are registered with UNRWA before Jordan closed its borders to PRS in January 2013. The large majority of the registered refugees (close to 80%) live outside refugee camps in Jordanian cities, towns, and rural areas. Geographically, Amman and northern parts (Irbid, Mafraq and Zarqa) host the highest numbers of Syrian refugees. Three main refugee camps where established since 2012, Za’atari (80,000), Azraq (54,000) and the Emirati Jordanian Camp (EJC) (7,400), host a total of 141,400 refugees. The official figure used by Government of Jordan (GoJ) of Syrian refugees in Jordan is 1.2 Million based on the Jordan census 2015.

Jordan has continued its strict control of its borders with Syria, a policy since 2014. Unlike the GoL, GoJ does use the term refugee to refer to Syrian asylum seekers in Jordan and in documents like the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) and other official documents it is worth mentioning that Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.

GoJ has imposed new registration requirements for Syrian refugees where in March 2015 an urban verification exercise has been launched to document all refugees. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) is responsible for all refugee related issues in Jordan, including those related to PRS. The MoI card in particular is an important legal documentation issued for refugees outside of camps that does not only grant refugees the freedom of movement in Jordan but also to access public health and education services at subsidized rates. Refugees without the required documentation are increasingly under the risk of forced relocation to camps or even deportation, especially in cases of breaking the law. There are some 150,000 refugees who do not hold MoI cards, mainly due to leaving the camps illegally or not possessing proper Syrian documentation. This group of refugees is more vulnerable given that limited number of actors provide them with services and assistance and the fear to become in contact with Jordanian security systems. Sida’s partners, such as NRC through the ICLA programme, assists refugees in regularizing their legal situation and obtain proper documentation.

The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) approves humanitarian and resilience aid projects in coordination with relevant line ministries. A MoPIC requirement on projects is to include a minimum of 30% of Jordanian vulnerable families in all refugee-related programming, this continues to strain limited humanitarian aid budgets.

Until the end of 2015 refugees remained outside the formal labor market with a majority working in the informal sector in poor conditions and minimal income. However, with the signing of the “Jordan Compact” at the London Conference 2016, Jordan labor market has finally opened for formal employment for refugees. GoJ committed to providing up to 200,000 work permits for Syrians over a three-year period. The process is not without challenges, as only refugees with the new MoI card are eligible to receive work permits. There is also a lack of clarity by refugee on terms on employment and fear of losing asylum status or humanitarian assistance if a work permit is granted. These reasons partially explain why as of Nov 2016 only around 33,000 work permits has been granted out of the 200,000. Where less than 2% of these permits were granted to women.

The refugees’ situation remains fragile with a growing needs, leading to negative coping strategies. According to the national Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF), 86% of refugees are below the national poverty line. There are still immense basic needs among refugees, including for assistance to cover the cost of food, health care, shelter, and education. Most prominent of these needs is the ability to pay rent with a lack of available accommodation and poor quality housing with 75% of refugees deemed shelter vulnerable (VAF 2015). Cash for rent continues to be the primary need for Syrian refugee families in 2016, reflected by the fact that the majority of Syrian refugees live in rented accommodations. The cost of rent continues to comprise over half of
Syrian families’ monthly expenditures. **Access to food** is another pressing need. These growing costs are leading many Syrian refugee families to adopt negative coping strategies, including resorting to child labour in order to meet the family’s basic needs (CARE, 2016). Increased poverty is also leading to increasing gender based violence, including domestic violence, early marriage among girls.

In addition to refugees in camps and host communities, **approximately 80,000 Syrians are stranded at the North-Eastern Jordanian border at the Berm.** Aid delivery was regularly taking place with challenges during the first half of 2016. By June 2016, over 20,000 Syrian asylum seekers were admitted into Jordan to Azraq camp as agreed in the Jordan-US high-level deal. However, all operations were suspended as a result of a suicide attack that took place in 21 June 2016 in Rukban. The border with Syria remained closed for months, until an agreement was reached with the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) in October to resume aid delivery. Throughout the process, negotiations for access were rather influenced by a political and a security discourse rather than the humanitarian imperative. Information on the stranded population shows that it mainly constitutes of families including women, children and elderly stranded for months in extremely harsh conditions but also includes groups of bedouins, smugglers and armed groups members including ISIS combatants, making the politics around it sensitive. The advocacy efforts of the international community towards the Berm is seen by many commentators as a failure.

In addition to Syrian Refugees, **some 16,000 Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS)** are currently in Jordan, half of them children. Since the beginning of the crisis but particularly after the introduction of GoJ policy of non-admission in 2014, PRS face a particularly restrictive protection and assistance environment even compared to other refugees. Conditions for PRS in Jordan will likely remain precarious, 80% will remain reliant on UNRWA emergency support. Jordan will likely continue to enforce a policy of non-admission for PRS. The government has excluded the PRS caseload from the JRP, but their support through UNRWA is included in the 3RP.

Jordan has so far been spared of significant spill over of the conflict in Syria. **Effects of the refugee crisis have however been significant on vulnerable Jordanians.** Refugees have laced an unprecedented burden on national systems – overcrowding of schools and hospitals, impacting on the performance of the education and health sectors. Refugees continue to have access to free primary and secondary education. **Development donors have increasingly answered the government’s call for more investment in the public sector to deal with the burden.** As in the case of Lebanon, the World Bank Concessional Financing Facility (CFF) has been established in Jordan to address the impacts of the refugee crisis, amounting to USD 340 million. Other initiatives to boost the Jordanian economy includes the agreement between the EU and Jordan on the relaxation rules of origins on imports, and IMF extended fund facility of USD 700 million.

Jordan is a cross-border hub for humanitarian support to southern Syria as part of the **Whole of Syria** coordination structure (see Syria annex). The GoJ facilitates cross border assistance within the remit of UNSCR 2165/2191.

### 1.2 Risks and threats

Considering Jordan border policy, the refugee caseload is expected to stay relatively stable in the coming years with some expected voluntary returns. With the partial opening of the labor market for refugees there is hope that the deterioration in refugees’ economic situation can be slowed down. However, given the challenges, it is still expected that a big proportion of refugees will suffer from increased vulnerability, aid dependency and resorting to increased negative coping mechanisms. The need for targeted humanitarian interventions remain in 2017 and beyond.

MoPIC is increasingly in control of the JRP planning process and the approval of its projects, while this is welcomed as a sign of increased government engagement and ownership, it can be also perceived limiting for the humanitarian space. There have been more restrictions and demands on INGOs related to the project approval process lastly presented by the new MoU provisions (*MoU to be signed by MoPIC and INGOs for each project*). In 2016, there has been particular restrictions in the approval of the psychosocial support where a number of projects have been rejected, claiming the
PSS sector is overfunded. Advocacy efforts are in place to influence reversing these decisions. The Jordan INGO Forum is a central actor in advocating for the required humanitarian space for INGOs in Jordan. Some 55 organizations form the Jordan INGO Forum. The INGO community has expanded its presence and capacity in Jordan since the beginning of the crisis, implementing a large share of the refugee response.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the humanitarian response plan

In Jordan, led by the MoPIC, the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis (JRPSC) constitutes the strategic partnership mechanism between the GoL, donors, UN agencies and NGOs for the development of a comprehensive refugee, resilience-strengthening and development response to the impact of the Syria crisis on Jordan. JRP is a three-year rolling covering the period 2017-2019 and integrates both refugee and resilience responses. The JRP is the country chapter of the 3RP 2017-2018. The total cost of interventions is USD 7,683,961,082, including a programmatic component worth USD 4,680,513,721 and a budget support component worth USD 3,003,447,361 for the three years. The budget for the programmatic response for 2017 is approximately USD 1.7 bn and 2.6 bn with budget support. In summary, the objectives of the JRP 2017-19 are:

1. Meet the immediate humanitarian needs of Syrian refugees in and out of camps and the vulnerable Jordanians affected by the Syria crisis;
2. Upscale critical capacities of the central, regional and local authorities to plan, program, coordinate and implement the development response, in order to manage and mitigate the impact of the crisis in a timely, efficient and effective manner. Through fostering the resilience of the service delivery system, at the national and local levels, and mitigate the negative impact on health, education, water and sanitation, in a cost-effective and sustainable manner. And the municipal services and infrastructure in areas critically affected by demographic stress, including solid waste management, housing, and energy sectors, thereby advancing more cost effective and sustainable solutions.
3. Ensure that all Syrian children are in education;
4. Create new employment and livelihood opportunities for vulnerable Jordanians and Syrian refugees, and strengthen the coping mechanism of the most vulnerable segments affected by the crisis;
5. Address social imbalances and improve social cohesion in host communities;
6. Support the government budget to cope with the financial burdens resulting from the Syria crisis;
7. Mitigate pressures on the natural resources, environment and ecosystem services;

The JRP is a rolling plan, i.e. at the end of each year it is reviewed and another planning year is added.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

The government has strengthened its leadership of the response since late 2014, shifting focus from a UNHCR-led refugee response to a more comprehensive developmental approach answering to longer-term structural gaps in public service delivery, which have been brought to the fore by the refugee crisis. MoPIC leads the response planning and coordination process, with significant technical support from UNHCR and UNDP.

Civil society organizations play a major role in the overall response and have increased its capacity over past years. The Jordanian NGO sector however has its particularities due to a number of big organizations were established by a Royal decree. The response capacity of the Jordan Red Crescent is also being developed, including by IFCR partners.
2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

In the 3RP Jordan chapter, UNHCR provides the international counterpart for GoJ on the refugee response while UNDP does for the resilience pillar. UN agencies and line ministries co-lead the sector working groups. UNHCR also has a large multi-sectoral operational role, the heaviest components being its cash programme in the basic needs sector, and a mandate to lead the protection advocacy efforts.

As of 2016 the JRP has been 58% funded, the refugee component of the JRP was 77% funded. According to data collected from donors, almost 15% of the pledges were for the response in Jordan. However, it is worth noting that over a quarter of the pledged funding (27%) for 2016 does not currently specify a recipient country (US$1.9 billion) and over two-thirds (67%) of the grant pledges for 2017–2020 do not specify a recipient country. *(Post London Conference Financial Tracking Report, Sep 2016)*

In addition to the regular role of the RC/HC, the Hc with support of OCHA also has a role in coordinating the Jordan hub of the Whole of Syria response, i.e. the cross-border support to Southern Syria. The OCHA managed pooled fund for Jordan has gained momentum since late 2015, in addition to increasing its funding in Jordan, been able to activate a window for Southern Syria (including with Sida support).

3. SIDA’s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

In previous years, including 2016, Sidas support to Jordan has been based mainly on its unearmarked regional funding to the UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNRWA appeals. Jordan-specific funding was in 2016 given to the HPF and NRC for its urban shelter and ICLA programme.

For the overall response priorities for the Syria crisis in 2017, see section 3 in the regional chapeau.

In Jordan, flexible multi-sector programming will continue through regional funding to **UNHCR and UNRWA**.

Sida will continue supporting the **Jordan Humanitarian Fund** and engage actively both in strategic issues through the Advisory Board and by participating in project monitoring. Dialogue will focus on key protection concerns. Synergies with development programming will be sought.

**NRC** will continue to be Sida’s main INGO partner in Jordan. In 2017, the cooperation with NRC will move into programme support, further increasing flexibility. NRC is one of the strongest INGOs operating in Jordan in both camps and host communities with over 500 staff in the field. NRC interventions are in education, WASH, Shelter, Youth, PSS support, legal aid including civil documentation and access to livelihoods. All interventions have a conflict sensitivity approach. NRC has strong coordination engagement in the JRP working groups and provides full support to the Protection, Shelter, Basic Needs, Education, Livelihoods sector working groups. NRC is a steering committee member and the admin agent of the JIF.

In 2017 Sida will introduce a small grant (1 MSEK, through NRC) to support the **Jordan INGO Forum** (JIF) secretariat. JIF is a network of 55 international INGOs implementing humanitarian programmes in Jordan. JIF activities include information sharing, coordination, and advocacy on behalf of INGOs and their beneficiaries. Sida sees this as a strategic injection into advocacy around protection and humanitarian space in Jordan.

In 2017 Sida will also introduce support through **SRC** in Jordan, to the IFRC Cash Transfer Programme implemented by Jordanian Red Crescent Society (JRCS). The intervention has an important humanitarian gap-filling function as it will reach unregistered refugees unable to attain assistance from UNHCR or other humanitarian actors due to the lack of legal status. This support will also enable SRC to focus on the capacity building of the national society.

Conflict sensitivity is a priority requirement of Sida funded programmes in Jordan. Interventions must be designed in a way that they at a minimum do not contribute negatively, but ideally even contribute
positively to the tense social relationships between refugees and host communities. Particular focus will be given the refugee community due to its increasing (legal, social, and economic) vulnerability, but needs of vulnerable host communities will be regarded as well, primarily from the conflict sensitivity perspective.

Annex 4: Turkey

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

In April 2011 the first refugees from Syria arrived in Turkey, who in the same year declared an “open door” policy which granted Syrians and state-less people living in Syria unlimited access to Turkey. The official policy has not changed but in reality crossing the border have become increasingly complicated for Syrians, one reason being that pre-registration needs to be completed ahead of entering Turkey. Registration is experiencing a heavy backlog and can take up to one year due to both internal capacity and security checks. The number of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey are estimated to be above 3 million (ECHO), however the exact number is uncertain. DGMM and UNHCR are currently carrying out a verification process which aims to map the number and location of Syrians in the country. Less than 10% of the Syrian refugees live in government and municipality administered camps (around 250 000). The remaining 90% resides all across the country.

Registered Syrians living in Turkey obtain the legal status of “temporary protection”, which ensures access to fundamental rights such as the right to education and health care. This has lead to an increased burden in host communities, mainly situated in the south and southeast of the country which were the most deprived areas even before the refugee influx. The reality includes overstretched public services, increased rents and living costs, increased competition over jobs and declining salaries within the informal sector. Access to education remains problematic with one of the most evident issues being that of language barriers. As school enrolment is low and income opportunities remain scarce negative coping mechanisms such as child labor and early marriages is being spread across both refugee and host community populations.

Another pressing issue is the possibility for Syrians to enter the labor market. The temporary protection status does not give access to the labor market automatically, rather employers must seek work permits for the applicant. In January 2016 a regulation to the law on Foreigners under Temporary Protection was adopted which gives exemptions for work permits in seasonal agriculture and husbandry work. However these are the sectors where informal employment is most common, which puts in question the real outcome of the initiative in regards to access to formal employment for refugees. In the end of 2016 some 10 000 work permits were issued.

With the agreement between Turkey and EU member states the Facility for refugees in Turkey (FRiT) was created during 2016, it has become the single most important instrument for the Syrian crisis response in Turkey. It includes a total budget of 3 billion euro over the period 2016-2017 for service delivery and capacity building of public authorities and service providers in Turkey. Sweden’s share of the budget is 61,3 million euro (570 million SEK) for the full period, and is administered by the MFA. The budget is divided between the NEAR and ECHO. NEAR is working on longterm service provision and capacity building in close collaboration with the different Ministries while ECHO delivers humanitarian support mainly through international NGOs and UN agencies. The largest program launched is the Emergency Social Safety Nets (ESSN) which aims at targeting the 1 million most vulnerable refugees in Turkey with multipurpose cash-based assistance. While ECHO builds up the programme, it is in the long term meant to be integrated into regular activities of the Ministry for Family and Social Planning. As the scope of refugee response in Turkey broadens, NGOs that traditionally have been working on the cross-border assistance to Syria are increasingly starting operations in Turkey. Coordination is a challenge in regard to the increasing number of actors, the role and policies of Government of Turkey as well as the limited role of UN.
1.2 Risks and threats

Since the attempted coup d'etat on July 15th 2016 the human rights situation has deteriorated rapidly, most importantly this led to a declaration of state of emergency under which the government has undertaken a widespread purge of officials, teachers, lawyers, etc. Over 100 000 people have been dismissed from various occupations. Freedom of expression is being limited as journalists are arrested and media institutions are closed. Civil society experience tougher times with increasing suspicion from governmental agencies, for example 370 organizations were closed down on November 11th. These activities are most likely to continue and will surely further affect non-state actors supporting refugees.

As Turkey entered the Syrian armed conflict in August 2016 the risk of the conflict spilling over to Turkey has increased, both with regards to an armed conflict in Turkey and terror activities from PKK, ISIS and others. Prospects for economic growth still appear bleaker than previous years, one reason being that tourism is decreasing as a result of developments in the area. IMF projects that Turkey’s economic growth in 2016 will be around 2,9%, compared to 8,8% in 2011. Further, there is a risk for growing tensions between refugees and host communities as the climate in Turkey hardens and public services continue to be scarce.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

The government in Turkey has taken full leadership for the humanitarian response in the country with UN agencies having only a complementing role in providing authorities with technical expertise and assistance. By the arrival of the first refugees in 2011 Turkey’s emergency response authority AFAD was tasked to respond to the influx. In April 2014 the migration management body DGMM was established, acquiring the responsibility for refugees concerning legal issues, including registration. AFAD remain in charge of the response, with special focus on camps which in many respects exceed SPHERE standards. It should be acknowledged that Turkey has put a great effort and resources into the refugee response. When including the spending on humanitarian response inside its country, Turkey is the most generous donor when it comes to humanitarian assistance globally representing some 11% of total humanitarian aid 2015 (Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2016).

Since most of the refugees reside in host communities rather than in camps the pressure on local services are vast. Local municipalities should provide basic services according to policies and the legal status of temporary protection, however considering both the large number of refugees and the slow growth of service facilities in practice service provision is limited. National NGOs, specifically the Turkish Red Crescent and ASAM, are supporting service delivery at the local level. Also FRiT have contracted two large agreements with the Ministry of National Education and Ministry of Health for Education facilities and Health facilities around the country.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

UNHCR leads the international refugee response through the 3RP process, which includes a Turkey response plan. For the first time in 2016 the government participated fully in the development of the Turkey chapter of the 3RP. The 3RP 2016 reached a funding level of 50%, 420 million USD. The total external funding for the Syrian Crisis in Turkey for 2016 reached 1 088 million USD. Thereby 3RP funding constitutes around 40% of total funding. A sector system is continuously being strengthened for the Turkey response while still in need of improvements, and a full fledged cluster system strong and working for the cross-border operations in Gaziantep.

With the implementation of the FRiT the EU agencies have taken a greater role, and some have noted that the UN has lost some of its influence as a result. Both UN and EU agencies are working closely with the government of Turkey when it comes to both service provision and policy change. INGOs are increasing their presence in Turkey even though the space for NGO activities are shrinking with the political developments. Registration continues to be problematic.
3. SIDA’s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

In 2017 Sida will continue to respond to the needs in Turkey mainly through its un-earmarked regional contributions to UN agencies. Due to the large Swedish contribution to the FRiT, of which half is channeled to humanitarian programmes, and with support from the Sida crisis strategy in the pipeline, Sida will not allocate any specific (humanitarian) funding to the Turkey response in the initial allocation 2017.

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