Each year, Sida conducts a humanitarian allocation exercise in which a large part of its humanitarian budget is allocated to emergencies worldwide. The allocation and subsequent disbursement of funds takes place in the beginning of the year to ensure predictability for humanitarian organizations and to allow for best possible operational planning. In an effort to truly adhere to the humanitarian principles, Sida’s humanitarian assistance is grounded in the four humanitarian principles, and in particular impartiality, with its compelling urge to ensure that humanitarian action is carried out based on “needs alone”, giving priority to the “most urgent cases of distress”. Therefore, Sida’s allocation methodology is grounded in several objective indicators such as: the scale of humanitarian needs (number of people in need), the severity of humanitarian needs (including food insecurity/IPC levels), the number of people targeted for the humanitarian response, the financial coverage of the respective humanitarian appeal, national capacities to respond and underlying risks, as well as distinct indicators related to forgotten crises. Sida also strongly supports the humanitarian coordination structures. Besides this initial allocation, another part of the humanitarian budget is set aside as an emergency reserve for sudden onset emergencies and deteriorating humanitarian situations. This reserve allows Sida to quickly allocate funding to any humanitarian situation throughout the year, including additional funding to Mali/Sahel.

For 2019, the Mali crisis is allocated an initial 51 MSEK. Close monitoring and analysis of the situation in Mali will continue throughout the year and will inform possible decisions on additional funding. For funding humanitarian interventions in Burkina Faso and Mauretania an additional 21 MSEK is requested.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

1.1. Type of crisis

Conflict

- **Background/Underlying cause:** The armed conflict in Mali started in 2012 with a separatist movement aiming to establish an independent Islamic caliphate in northern Mali. The uproar was quickly defeated by the intervention of French troops but left behind a fragmented conflict area where a status quo of a "no peace-not war" like condition prevails. Several micro-conflicts flame up and since the Algiers peace treaty of 2015 only include some of the parties to the conflict. A UN led protection of civilian’s military security operation (MINUSMA) was set in place by the invitation of the Malian regime. The security situation is precarious despite the continuous presence of national Malian army, MINUSMA, the French Sahel operation Barkhane, the G5 joint forces and the platform of government allied independent armed groups. In the last year an increase of armed conflict by jihadist groups is seen in the central part of Mali. Another conflict dimension is between pastoralists (Peul) and farmers (Dougon) populations. With an increase of number of cattle paired with shrinking pasture land due to desertification and climate change, the agropastoral conflict in Mali, and in border regions, is killing more people than political and extremist violence.

- **Main stakeholders in the conflict:** The Mali conflict sees some implications of proxy-war, but is mostly an internal conflict between national stakeholders about resources (water, land, natural resources) and control of trans Sahara transit routes for arms, migrants and illicit drugs. The number of armed groups who are outside of the platform of armed groups who are part of the Algiers peace treaty is increasing, but the actual number of armed soldiers in these groups is low. An estimate done by MINUSMA is that there are about 500-550 rebel/jihadist soldiers in total in Mali.

- **Cross border implications:** Neighbouring countries (Niger, Mauretania, Burkina Faso) are currently hosting 142,000 Malian refugees, and an additional 59,000 are internally displaced within the borders of Mali. Tripartite agreements have been agreed between Mali, UNHCR and the refugee hosting countries on voluntary safe and assisted returns, but the security situation in Mali is still a hindrance for many refugees to return. In the last year attention has been given to the increase in violence in the Liptako-Gourma area with borders between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Previous insurgency in
this area has been seen as spill-over conflict from Mali but is developing into a regional hot-spot with increase in displacement and in humanitarian needs.

**Trends:** Security has further deteriorated in the last year. A fragmentation of armed groups as well as a gradual transformation of armed groups with political ambitions to more become delinquents and bandits makes the negotiations for peace and security less likely to succeed. Moreover, the close-to absence of the Malian state in the conflict and banditry affected areas makes it into much like lawless land. A weak or fragile state is also the case in Burkina Faso and Niger in the Liptako Gourma region. Armed attacks and insecurity in Burkina Faso contribute to a deteriorating humanitarian situation with an increased number of internally displaced people and a worrying impact on basic infrastructure such as schools and health facilities. The border between Mali, Senegal and Mauretania is seeing an increase in agorpastoral conflicts around access to natural resources.

### Natural disaster

- **Nature of disaster:** West Africa, the Sahel and Mali have a climatic and geological specificity of being particularly prone to droughts and floods. Heavy rains in the tropical parts of the region results in flooding in the desert areas where rivers from the tropics run, such as the Senegal river, The Volta River and the Niger river. Farming is also heavily depending on the seasonal rains ranging from 4 months of the year in the southern parts of the Sahel to 1 month of rain per year in the northern most inhabited areas of the Sahel. The nature of the rains, being too heavy, erratic over the rainy season or being late or early affects the harvests of the two main cultivated grains in the region, Millet and Sorghum. In the areas where the rainfalls are generally higher, rice and maize are also important crops but very sensitive to rainfall variations. The agricultural land is often along river basins, so harvests are at risk to be destroyed by flooding, even if the local rainfall is normal, heavy rains in the tropical areas where the rivers have their sources can cause floods. Other natural hazards include locust invasions, and invasions of large flocks of granivorous birds may ruin the harvest. There is also a competition for land and water resources between pastoralist and agriculturalist populations that in the time of the seasonal migrations generate conflicts. In the tropical parts of West Africa landslides are a problem, often because of deforestation. Overall poverty and lack of resources and services is the main underlying cause to vulnerability of the people in Mali, the Sahel and West Africa.

- **Frequency:** The Sahel climate pattern has historically been shifting, wherein periods of rains have been reliable far north in the climatic region, to other periods shift to a more southern rainfall, leaving the northern part of the Sahel in drought. The rainfalls in 2017 were erratic and in many areas lower than usual. This resulted in a food security and nutrition alert in early 2018 that was responded to by the humanitarian stakeholders in the region to curb the most acute crisis. The effects of the shifting climate and desertification is exacerbated by a very rapid demographic increase, and paired with an increase herds of livestock and areas cultivated making the region more and more vulnerable to change in climate conditions.

- **Resilience and coping mechanisms:** The populations of the Sahel are resilient by culture and historic adaptation. Local knowledge, diversification and migration strategies like the yearly transhumance make people survive in conditions that are very harsh. The challenge to these traditional resilience mechanisms are conflicts, that are often about resources, and linked to an increased population or the control of natural resources, mainly oil, uranium and gold. Remittances from family members working in other countries of the West Africa (ECOWAS) region or in Europe, USA or Gulf States is an important resilience mechanism for many households. The G5 is increasingly showing political interest in development related activities for peace building efforts and the UNISS (United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel) is being relaunched and focusing on the triple nexus aspects of reducing vulnerability and thereby reducing risk of conflict.

### Geographical areas and affected population

- The general Sahel chronic crisis has been phased out by the UN as an emergency food crisis response as of 31 December 2017. This was reverted in March 2018 when WFP declared an internal L3 food security and nutrition crisis across the Sahel. The main conflict related crisis (Mali Crisis and
Lake Chad Basin Crisis) have remained and even increased with in tension in the Liptako Gourma region and the Cameroon Anglophone (North-West and South-West crisis). Spill over effects are still seen from the Libya situation and the CAR crisis into neighbouring countries. The Darfur crisis is settling, and a triparty agreement has been signed between Sudan, Chad and UNHCR on safe and assisted returns by Sudanese and Chadian refugees in respective countries. The migration crisis is evolving, and lower numbers of migrants are transiting through Niger and Agadez. Attention needs to be kept on the transformation of migratory routes and attention to protection and rescue needs of migrants and asylum seekers.

- The vulnerability of the population of Mali, The Sahel and West Africa is generally high and encompass crises affected women and men, girls and boys. A pattern is that in the early stages of a conflict, men are most vulnerable to direct and deadly violence, but as conflict matures and become more structural, women become more vulnerable. Low coverage of social services, school attendance and health services contribute to children’s vulnerability and is very high in Mali in general and particularly in conflict affected areas. The analysis done through the multi-dimensional poverty and vulnerability analysis instrument developed by Sida showed a near 100% poverty and vulnerability definition of the Malian population.

- The number of people in need is giving the impression of being on decline, this is mostly due to new and finer methods of counting and assessing needs. The figure 3,2 million people in need for 2019 is hiding an increase in the number of people in need. The number of people targeted in the 2019 HRP is 2,3 million people.

1.3. Critical assumptions, risks and threats

- Failure to provide life-saving aid and support resilience could perpetuate inter-community violence, further destabilizing Mali. Millions of Malians will continue to suffer from food insecurity, malnutrition and epidemics. With nearly half of its inhabitants now under age 18 and a population expected to double within two decades, failure to meet humanitarian needs now will worsen the crisis’ impact in Mali and the region, fuelling migration towards Europe and exposing youth to higher risk of recruitment by non-State armed actors and criminal groups. The rainfalls in 2018 looks promising for all but the western part of the Sahel. If this is translating into good harvests is still to be determined. An increase of armed conflict in the region is likely to happen and the key question is how large displacements and loss of livelihoods this will cause.

- The Sahel crisis is exuberated by the general low-level development/poverty level in the region. Economic development is paradoxically at risk of fuelling conflict related crisis, as the resources generated are not equitable distribute din the population. The weak presence of state actors in border areas and operational difficulties for humanitarian actors to access these areas hampers humanitarian efforts and leave people in need unserved. The system reforms of the UN is both a risk and opportunity as development actors may become more active in working in conflict areas, but it is also a risk that humanitarian assistance will become more and more politicised and access used as a conflict strategy, both by state and non-state actors. Mali has the unique opportunity to put in practice the nexus between development and humanitarian agendas. The above stated risks could be reduced by development initiatives looking at human security beyond arms and guns.

1.4. Strategic objectives and priorities of the Humanitarian Response Plan

- The response plan is targeting crisis affected persons due to natural disaster and conflict, both recent conflict such as in the central parts of Mali and populations affected by floods during the rainy season 2018 as well as the populations suffering from precious conflict situations and general food insecurity.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1. National and local capacities and constraints

- Government: Government capacity to respond to humanitarian needs is very low. In conflict affected areas of northern Mali government structures are either very weak, or non-existent. Basic social services such as health, water, schools have low coverage and are in decline.
Civil Society: Prior to the conflict civil society had a role in development and increasingly national and local NGOs are shifting to be able to cooperate with international humanitarian agencies including INGOs.

Community and household level: Northern Mali like the rest of the Sahel and West Africa has largely similar both positive and negative coping strategies. Diversification of household activities and seasonal migration being examples of the positive ones, and asset liquidation, early marriage of girls, petty crimes and non-consensual transactional sex being examples of negative coping strategies. The reduced opportunities for international work migration reduce the possibilities for households to benefit from remittances.

2.2. **International operational capacities and constraints**

- **Leadership and Coordination:** The humanitarian response is coordinated by OCHA under the leadership of the RC/HC who is also deputy head of MINUSMA. A humanitarian country team (HCT) is in place and provides overall coordination and leadership. The concept of the one UN is also extensively developed in Mali. The cluster sectoral response is activated, and new for 2018 is that early recovery is integrated in all cluster work. However, the clusters need capacity strengthening and in particular a better organisation concerning the yearly needs assessments process. Sub-national coordination is also functional, and the response is well localised to meet beneficiaries’ needs in the areas where they are. Sweden has commended the joint approach as well as the humanitarian and development nexus but highlighted the necessity to keep a functional separation between security, development and humanitarian goals and interventions, as to not create further conflicts or disadvantage for certain groups of people or certain geographic areas of the country. The nexus dialogue with development actors also needs to continue and strengthened. During 2018 a discussion has been initiated to advocate for an instalment of a Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator placed in Bamako or Gao to assist the coordination of the HCT and in Civil-Military Coordination.

- **Humanitarian Agencies:** Mali is an underfunded crisis and is part of the long list of forgotten crises in the world. Humanitarian funding is on the decrease, and development funding or national economic growth is not enough to alleviate the loss when humanitarian interventions are not being implemented due to lack of funding. Mali has had several payments from the CERF under their underfunded and forgotten crises funding window and needs as well as potential capacity both with UN partners INGOs and national NGOs is higher than the available resources.

- **Implementing partners:** The Mali crisis is a mature crisis and the participation and needs assessments are being conducted in a systematic and participatory way. The main constraint in the response system is the mixing of mandates where MINUSMA is conducting humanitarian like interventions in the form of QIPs (Quick Impact Projects) under the winning “hearts and minds” initiative. From a humanitarian perspective this could be seen as problematic. During 2018 humanitarian actions done by armed actors in Mondoro has created a heated debate on IHL and the respect (or lack of respect by state actors and MINUSMA) for the Humanitarian Principles.

- **Development actors:** The migration crisis and the threat of violent extremism has activated some European development initiatives such as the EUTF Valetta and the Alliance for the Sahel (FR and DE). The EUCAP Sahel mission has been extended and agreements have been made with the G5 secretariat on security and border control issues. Decentralisation and economic empowerment of the most marginalised people in the region has been lagging behind and a distrust between the state and remote populations made decentralisation and local democracy a politically sensitive issue. The Sahel countries (from Mali to Somalia) are more and more standing out as the last geographical area in the world were poverty patterns remain similar to what they were 50-100 years ago.

2.3. **International and regional assistance**
• **Donors**: The main donors to Mali according to OCHA FTS is USA (32.8%), followed by EU (22.6%). Other important donors are CERF(8.7%) Sweden (8.2%) Canada (5.3%) Germany (4.0%) and Denmark (2.3%) The appeal for 2018 is funded to 52.3%.

• **Regional Organisations**: Mali is member of ECOWAS, G5 and AU. Regional resilience programmes that include Mali are for example AGIR and CILSS. Several regional structures for development, security and humanitarian action are including Mali. All major UN agencies have regional programmes both in development and humanitarian response. Many INGOs are also present in the region. Virtually all INGO and UN organisations have their regional offices in Dakar. G5 is as an exemption located in Nouakchott and CILSS in Ouagadougou.

2.4. **Access situation**

• Access is difficult to the areas where most humanitarian needs are recorded, which are in the north and central parts of Mali, in particular in border areas. Security is an issue and the humanitarian principles seem to carry some respect, but the surge of banditry is severely affecting how humanitarian interventions can be planned. Long distances and lack of road infrastructure makes the humanitarian air services UNHAS paramount to reach beneficiaries with services and resources. Criticism has been directed to MINUSMA by humanitarian INGOs where the presence of the international troops (in total around 11,000 armed troops) has not curbed the security risks and given further access for humanitarian assistance.

3. **SIDA’S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN**

3.1. **The role of Sida**

• **Earlier assistance and results**: Sida has had a humanitarian portfolio that has been directed to partners intervening in the north and the centre of the country. Response has been looking mostly at filling gaps in service delivery to beneficiaries in need, with a clear direction towards protection priorities. Funding has remained stable in amount, but has shifted from mostly acute needs towards more durable solutions. The evolution of this approach has also shifted the direction of assistance form INGOs in favour of support to UN agencies.

• **Lessons learnt**: According to experience from field follow-up, there has been an expression of satisfaction among partners with Sida’s funding approach being both flexible and reliable. Humanitarian multiyear funding has made way to open for more development funding directed towards the north of Mali, as development was earlier mostly directed towards the south. Participation in the HCT by the Swedish embassy focal point has been pivotal to an in-depth analysis and follow-up of partners and to take part in the dialogue issues around the development/humanitarian/security nexus issues. Donor coordination has not been very evolved but the Mondoro situation has accentuated the need for closer cooperation between donors.

3.2. **Response Priorities 2019**

**Humanitarian Focus**: In West Africa and Sahel, Mali is the focus of the Sida HCA with an opening to Mauretania and Burkina Faso for humanitarian needs. Armed attacks and insecurity in Burkina Faso contribute to a deteriorating humanitarian situation and Sida is closely monitoring the situation to reinforce its support if needed. Sida is recognising that there are humanitarian needs in other Sahel and West African countries, but that will be covered through Swedish core funding to UN agencies and/or the CERF. In the event of a rapid onset crises or an increase of humanitarian needs in the existing crises, Sida RRM (Rapid Response Mechanism) resources will be availed, as well as surge capacity humanitarian experts to the UN through MSB. Protection needs, and protection sectoral coordination will be highlighted in 2019 and modalities to support reinforcement to cover these needs will be explored. Evaluation of impact on nexus development/humanitarian will be done as well as monitoring of the human security aspect, this in particular in cooperation with FBA. Cash based interventions are the preferred mode for all partners when possible. Access and coordination will continue to be central to the Sida allocation to Mali. The WASH sector has been severely underfunded, and this will be an area of interest for Sida to follow-up on how to improve support in
this area. All Sida funded interventions must include gender integration and environmental consequence descriptions leading towards conservation of nature and plans for effective use of resources included in the proposals. Conflict analysis and a “do no harm” analysis is also required.

- **Field follow-up:** The plan for 2019 are two in depth field visits, one to the north and one to the centre of Mali. Northern Mali is interesting in order to follow-up on the stabilisation process and the FAO support to recovery of pasture land, and in the centre of Mali and border areas to Niger and Burkina Faso, the deterioration of the security and monitoring of access and compliance with humanitarian principles and IHL. Both of the field visits are planned as joint field monitoring between Sida HUM and the SE Embassy in Mali. One follow-up mission is also planned to Mauretania.

### 3.3. Partners

#### Mali:

**IRC:** IRC has a longstanding presence in the Gao and Menaka regions in eastern Mali, assuming a multisectoral approach. Working simultaneously with Child Protection, GBV, and Economic Recovery, IRC aims at improving gender equality and to strengthen the resilience among the younger population to protection risks.

**UNICEF:** UNICEF will continue to reach affected communities with social services and treat SAM cases (target 170,000 children under 5 years), provide vaccinations (target 980,500 children under 5 years) and assist people in accessing clean water.

**NRC:** The objective of NRC’s work in Mali is to move from emergency response to durable solutions by supporting vulnerable individuals and communities affected by the conflict and/or by natural disasters, especially in hard-to-reach areas, to overcome their immediate needs and rebuild a safe and resilient future.

**WFP/UNHAS:** WFP/UNHAS are supported for their unique role as a provider of humanitarian air services.

**ICRC:** The ICRC seeks to protect and assist violence-affected people, who also often struggle with adverse climatic conditions. Despite several security incidents forcing temporary suspensions or scale down of activities, the ICRC remains the main international humanitarian organization active in northern Mali.

**OCHA:** OCHA’s office in Mali is supported for the overall coordination of humanitarian operations.

**UNHCR:** The support is directed to the UNHCR Mali operation with a focus on protection.

**Church of Sweden (CoS):** Multisector responds to the needs of flood affected households.

### SIDA’s HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO Mali Crisis in 2019

(Insert total sum allocated to country. If another sum is proposed, please indicate that sum with a second/separate table)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended partner for Sida support</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. cross sectoral/multipurpose programming) and response modalities (e.g. in-kind, services, CVP or a mix)</th>
<th>Proposed amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRC Mali</td>
<td>Child protection, SGBV, Social cohesion</td>
<td>8 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>HAC includes WASH, Education, Health, Nutrition</td>
<td>8 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Multisector</td>
<td>9 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP/UNHAS</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>4 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Protection, IHL</td>
<td>8 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>5 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Earmarked for Protection in Mali</td>
<td>5 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoS/DIAKONIA</td>
<td>Multisector</td>
<td>4 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>51 000 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4. Partners in other Sahel countries

- For the greater Sahel (Excluding the countries of the LCB crisis is recommended the following support).

Mauretania:

**AAH**: The programme reaches vulnerable households who are food insecure and prevention of malnutrition for under 5 years old children. AAH has a strong position among INGOs in Mauretania and has a country wide reach.

**SMC**: SMC/PMU will provide food assistance to the most vulnerable population and strengthen resilience among targeted communities through hygiene, sanitation and disaster risk reduction.

**UNICEF**: WASH and refugee support for Malian refugees. UNICEF is an important partner in the UN country team.

**UNHAS**: Logistics. To reach the Malian refugees in the East of Mauretania the UNHAS flights are necessary.

Burkina Faso:

**AAH**: Support to conflict affected people in the Gourma area bordering Mali. This is a crisis that is evolving rapidly, and response is needed to be set up rapidly. Sida has previously supported AAH in Fada N’Gourma with a nutrition project. In 2019, the purpose of AAH’s proposed response is to provide access to health and nutrition services for people affected by insecurity and to contribute to the reduction of community conflicts in the East Region of Burkina Faso. The response will, among other things, support at least 15 health facilities impacted by insecurity to maintain a level of performance consistent with SPHERE standards to deliver quality health and nutrition services to affected populations, and especially women and children.

**UNICEF**: UNICEF will facilitate SAM treatment and prevention for 133,066 children under 5 years and 465,000 pregnant and lactating women will receive IYCF (Infant and Young Child Feeding)counselling, 29,302 children will be vaccinated against measles. Also, the education services will be increased during 2019.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIDA’s HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO Sahel Crisis in 2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommended partner for Sida support</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAH Burkina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF Burkina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAH Mauretania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF Mauretania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC Mauretania</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHAS Mauretania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5. Strategic funding in protracted crises

**FAO**: Recovery and resilience targeting pastoralists and farmers in the north and the centre of Mali, with a transformation and value chain component to enhance durable solutions and self-reliance for persons previously depending on humanitarian assistance. 2019 is the third year of the project and it will be monitored closely to investigate outcomes and impact results from this type of humanitarian bridging funding.

**Action Against Hunger (AAH)**: The AAH project aims at providing phase-out of humanitarian services in terms of Health, Nutrition, and WASH targeting children in Timbuctoo region in Northern Mali. AAH are primarily targeting children under the age of five, but also women of reproductive age. The phase-out
strategy is to replace AAH assistance with funding resources from district development budgets to cover costs for therapeutic feeding products, salaries and costs for pharmaceutical drugs. The phase-out strategy is a very welcome initiative and will serve as a test towards local governments on priorities on nutrition and health. The north of Mali has seen opportunities to shift to development approaches in several sectors, and this AAH will add to this approach and make it possible to direct humanitarian lifesaving funding in acute crisis to be directed elsewhere in the country.

### SIDA’S MULTIYEAR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO (CRISIS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended partner for Sida support</th>
<th>Sector/focus of work (incl. cross sectoral/ multipurpose programming) and response modalities (e.g. in-kind, services, CVP or a mix)</th>
<th>Category:</th>
<th>Time-span (2019-2020)</th>
<th>Proposed amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAH</td>
<td>Nutrition, Health and WASH</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>2019-2020</td>
<td>6 MSEK + 4,5 MSEK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Recovery and resilience</td>
<td></td>
<td>1017-2019</td>
<td>6 MSEK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.6. **Synergies with long-term development assistance**

The Swedish development cooperation in Mali aims to contribute to a strengthened social contract and reduced vulnerability to relapse into conflict. The contributions fall within the following major result areas: (1) strengthened democracy and gender equality, and greater respect for human rights, (2) human security and freedom from violence and (3) better environment, limited climate impact and greater resilience to environmental impact, climate change and natural disasters. For 2019, the preliminary budget amounts to about 300 M SEK out of which a significant amount is allocated to natural resource management and contributions related to resilience which is considered to be closely linked to conflict sensitivity in Mali.

Mali is a Sida priority country for resilience and the Embassy continues to implement the resilience plan. The support to AAH, FAO and UNICEF are examples of areas in which Sweden supports actors in both development and humanitarian aid. The flexibility of the Swedish support reinforces the interplay between the two types of assistance. The Wetlands programme (PDD DIN) also contribute to strengthen resilience and decrease the need for humanitarian assistance in the vulnerable and conflict-affected inner delta area. The Embassy will continue to make a strong effort to further develop the link between humanitarian assistance and long-term development. This link will be explored during the midterm review of the bilateral strategy. The revision of the multi-dimensional poverty analysis also provides for an opportunity to ensure that the bilateral strategy is informed by risk and vulnerability. The contributions to AAH and FAO will be evaluated in 2019 with a specific focus on the added value of contributing humanitarian and development contributions to the same partner in the respective areas of work.

The nexus-dialogue has lost some momentum in Mali. Sweden implements and encourages flexible financing mechanisms, programmatic support and using resilience as an entry point to bridge the gap. Additionally, analysis of root causes, risk and vulnerability as a means to define joint outcomes should be promoted. The evaluation of FAO and AAH with respect to the nexus could be used to share lessons learned. The Embassy continues to implement through NGOs, UN agencies and state actors and at various levels.