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# Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance

Case Study Report Indonesia



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**Sida**

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

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## Foreword

In the UTV Working Paper Series, Sida publishes background material and annexes to Sida Evaluations and Sida Studies in Evaluation, and other forms of working material which we believe to be of interest for a wider audience. This working paper includes the case study on Indonesia prepared as part of the evaluation of Sida's humanitarian assistance (Sida Evaluation 2010:4). For information on other publications prepared as part of the evaluation of Sida's humanitarian assistance please visit [www.sida.se/publications](http://www.sida.se/publications).



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## Abbreviations

AIFDR	Australia Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction	BAPPEDA	Badan Perencana Pembangunan Daerah
BAPPENAS	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional	BNPB	Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund	DaLA	Damage and Loss Assessment
DFID	Department for International Development	DI	Development Initiatives
DIPECHO	Disaster Preparedness ECHO	DPRR	Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction	ECB	Emergency Capacity Building project
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Aid Office	ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
ERF	Emergency Response Fund	EWARR	Early Warning and Rapid Response
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery	GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship
Gol	Government of Indonesia	HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team	HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
HRF	Humanitarian Response Fund	HRNA	Humanitarian Recovery Needs Assessment
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan	IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IDR	Indonesian Rupiah	IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation	IOM	International Organization for Migration
LoU	Letter of Understanding	MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs	MSB	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
NCE	No-Cost Extension	NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation	OSOCC	On-Site Operations Coordination Centre
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment	PRIME	Preparedness and response, Reducing risk, Influencing policy: a Model for Emergencies
PWD	Public Works Department	RC	Resident Coordinator
RCD	Rubble Clearing and Demolition	RISE	Recovery Initiatives for Sumatra Earthquakes
SCDRR	Safer Communities through Disaster Risk Reduction	SEK	Swedish Kronor
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency	TPT	Tim Pendukung Teknis/ Technical Support Team
T-shelter	Temporary shelter	UN	United Nations
UN-CMCoord	United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	UNOCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development	USD	United States Dollars
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	WFP	World Food Programme
WG	Working Group	WHO	World Health Organization

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## Executive Summary

This case study forms an integral part of the overall Evaluation of Swedish International Development Agency's (Sida) Humanitarian Assistance from 2005–2010. Since Sida does not have a humanitarian representative in Indonesia, its engagement is based on funding, rather than including advocacy and policy, as in the other case study countries. This report analyses how Sida's funding to Indonesia is contributing towards meeting the 8 sub-goals of its Humanitarian Strategy, and attempts to learn lessons to inform Sida's future humanitarian programming. This included asking humanitarian agencies and affected communities to describe the “*elements of effective humanitarian assistance*”. Now collated, these elements will help support the development of Sida's next five-year humanitarian strategy.

The evaluation covers three channels for Sweden's humanitarian assistance to Indonesia – bilateral funding, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)-managed Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) – but it is not intended as an assessment of the performance of specific funding instruments<sup>1</sup>. It is instead an assessment of whether the various funding instruments employed by Sida are helping it to achieve the goals of its humanitarian strategy. The case study also examined issues that are critical for ensuring effective disaster response in Indonesia, such as the role of the government and donor coordination.

This report is based largely on a field visit that two Development Initiatives (DI) staff members made to Indonesia from 26<sup>th</sup> July – 9<sup>th</sup> August (to Jakarta and West Sumatera). The team consulted a broad range of stakeholders – government representatives, United Nations (UN) agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (international and Indonesian), donors and crisis-affected communities. The team conducted interviews and focus group discussions (that included the use of the ‘spokes’ participatory technique). To inform local communities in West Sumatera about the evaluation and its findings, the team and UNOCHA, participated in an hour-long radio interview in Padang. For ease of reference, the report lists recommendations at the end of each sub-section.

### **Engagement through HRF with the country second-most at-risk from natural disasters**

The 2010 Natural Disaster Risk Index rates Indonesia as the country second most at-risk from extreme weather and geophysical events. These hazards include earthquakes, landslides, floods, drought, forest fires and tsunamis. Of these, earthquakes tend to have the greatest impact (with the exception of the 2004 tsunami) and this case study focuses on the humanitarian response to the West Sumatera earthquake of 30<sup>th</sup> September 2009. Although Sida does not have a humanitarian representative in-country, it recognises a continuing need for assistance “until vulnerability and, consequently, risk is reduced” (Sida 2008 contribution decision). Therefore, Sida has used the HRF, set up in 2001, as the main channel for its support to Indonesia since 2007. However, in 2009, in response to the West Sumatera earthquake, it provided bilateral grants to UNDP (around USD 700,000) and Plan (around USD 400,000) in addition to providing extra funding to the HRF (about USD 2.1 million).

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<sup>1</sup> Since, for example, UNOCHA has commissioned a 5-year evaluation of the CERF, due to be completed in the first part of 2011.

## **Good Humanitarian Donorship largely delivered though longer-term approaches need more support**

The 8 sub-goals of Sida's humanitarian strategy are all drawn from the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) but its first sub-goal focuses on:

- Timeliness, flexibility and predictability of funding
- Supporting quick response to rapid onset disasters by providing unallocated funds to suitable organisations
- Encouraging and supporting a long-term perspective in partners' programming.

The evaluation found that Sida's bilateral funding is timely and flexible. Its decision for the West Sumatera earthquake response is dated 1<sup>st</sup> November 2009 but partners could back date their expenditure to the start of their response and had flexibility to allocate funds to appropriate programme objectives. Although the HRF is generally quick to approve projects and is flexible to allow NGOs to adapt to rapidly changing situations. However, NGOs gave examples of delays, particularly with the disbursement of funds. For example, one NGO submitted a proposal in December 2009 but did not receive its funding till May 2010. Some CERF recipient agencies felt that it was fairly timely but one, in particular, experienced a delay in getting its project approved. All the CERF recipient organisations found its 3-month timeframe for project implementation too short.

Although Sida generally supports longer-term approaches with its bilateral funding, it focused on emergency response in the West Sumatera earthquake. The HRF and CERF both have an emphasis on short-term, life-saving activities though the HRF has expanded its remit to be able to cover prevention and recovery activities. However, its funding will still be very small (maximum of USD 100,000 per grant) and for a maximum of 6 months. So, it will not be designed to support longer-term approaches and Sida will need to support these through its bilateral funding.

### **Recommendations:**

- Sweden should monitor the timeliness of the implementation of projects that it funds (including through pooled funds such as Emergency Response Funds (ERFs)/HRFs and the CERF).
- NGOs have experienced delays with the HRF largely due to administration issues in Geneva. UNOCHA is establishing an administrative unit specifically for ERFs/HRFs and should ensure that this speeds up disbursements. This unit should systematically inform UNOCHA field offices when it has disbursed funds to NGOs so that they can monitor the timeliness of implementation.
- To ensure that the HRF remains a flexible mechanism and supports the most appropriate forms of response, it would be helpful if it did not set specific percentages on the amount of funding that can be used to support prevention, response and recovery. This will enable NGOs to take a holistic approach and include elements of preparedness and recovery into their emergency response programmes.

## **Responding to needs, yes, but how are these needs being prioritised?**

The UN system worked with NGOs and the government to produce the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) within 9 days of the West Sumatera earthquake. This should have stimulated international funding for the response but was only 38% funded. International NGOs pointed out that the HRP process took a lot of time and effort at a crucial period in the response but did not increase their access to fund-

ing. Perhaps as a result, NGOs listed their activities in the HRP and also appealed to donors directly. Hence, donors received NGO proposals with the same content through different channels.

It is not clear how Sida decided on its allocation of SEK 23 million (approximately USD 3.2 million) to the earthquake response but it used the HRP to analyse funding needs and then a list of internal criteria to select two grants for funding (although the grant to Plan was based on a separate project proposal, not what was included in the HRP).

Sida does not earmark its contributions to the HRF or direct its funding towards a particular type of emergency. This has given the HRF great flexibility. It generally relies on NGOs' own needs assessments, supplemented by UNOCHA's knowledge of the situation on the ground. In the case of the West Sumatera earthquake, the HRF relied on Clusters to identify needs and gaps. This appears to have worked in the initial emergency phase but there were challenges with overlaps during the second round of HRF funding (see below).

To access CERF funding, UN agencies needed to have their projects in the HRP. The Cluster leads identified funding gaps which helped the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), chaired by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), to allocate the USD 7 million available from the CERF. Unlike in other countries, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Humanitarian Forum Indonesia (as representative of National NGOs) and Oxfam GB (as representative of International NGOs) were involved in the HCT discussions. Although the government was not directly involved in developing the HRP, the UN shared the results of the inter-agency rapid assessment, which formed the basis of the HRP, with the National Disaster Management Agency, the [Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana](#) (BNPB) and the West Sumatra government before the launch of the HRP. The UN also held meetings with the Government of Indonesia (GoI) to discuss priorities. The team was not able to verify the extent to which Cluster members were involved in the analysis of gaps and prioritisation.

#### **Recommendations:**

- At a global level, Sida needs to develop or adopt a severity of crisis model to guide the determination of geographical funding envelopes, so as to ensure that its funding for each emergency is truly in proportion to the severity of needs. It should also ensure that criteria used to allocate funding within a specific crisis are used consistently.
- NGOs (both international and Indonesian) commonly complain that participating in UN Appeals does not result in funding. If donors and UN agencies expect NGOs to continue to invest in participating in these Appeals, they should ensure that NGOs see participation translate into funding.
- Although the CERF remains accessible only to UN agencies, allowing non-UN agencies to become members of the HCT and participate in the decision making process is good practice and one that should be followed in countries where this does not happen currently.

#### **Coordination needs to be more inclusive and local government capacity strengthened**

In the aftermath of the West Sumatera earthquake, provincial and district government agencies were supposed to coordinate the response (since it was declared a provincial, not national, disaster). However, they had no experience of how to do this and their capacity was severely reduced due to the damage caused by the earthquake so the international community activated the Cluster approach. Although international NGOs were very positive about the operation of the Clusters, government agencies and local NGOs do not seem to have participated actively. This may be because many Cluster meetings were in English (with some exceptions, like the agriculture Cluster) and access to information about the meetings was also reportedly a problem for some

local NGOs. Clusters were also unable to involve the private sector actors that provided a range of assistance (with the exception of the Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications Cluster that engaged some private organisations).

The HRF supports coordination by requesting NGOs to liaise with the government and by ensuring that all Clusters are now represented on the Review Board. UNOCHA consulted Cluster leads when reviewing proposals for the West Sumatera earthquake. Despite this, NGOs used different approaches to temporary shelter (e.g., some gave cash grants while others provided building materials. Even the NGOs that gave cash grants did not give the same amounts). There was also some duplication of programme areas and overlap in beneficiaries.

#### **Recommendations:**

- In future, Clusters should provide translation facilities to enable local NGOs, the private sector and government representatives to participate fully in meetings (as is the case with the monthly coordination meetings in Padang) or run meetings in Bahasa Indonesia.
- The international community should strengthen the capacity of local government bodies in Indonesia to take a lead in coordinating emergency response activities.
- When considering proposals, the HRF Review Board should ensure that they are promoting coordinated approaches, e.g., ensuring that NGOs provide the same size of cash grant.
- Sweden should encourage Clusters globally to raise awareness of the Cluster concept amongst all relevant stakeholders. This would enable all actors, including the private sector, to participate in Clusters when a disaster occurs. In the event of a natural disaster, Clusters should also align with both the host government's administrative structure as well as the disaster response coordination body (such as the national platform), which should include the private sector, academia, media and other civil society members.

#### **Efforts to strengthen local capacity need to be better focused, particularly on sustainability**

UNDP's Rubble Clearing and Demolition (RCD) activities in the Recovery Initiatives for Sumatra Earthquakes (RISE) project, supported by Sida's bilateral funding, included training for the local Public Works Department (PWD) in safe demolition and rubble clearance. However, it lacks the funding to take over from UNDP now that the RCD component of the RISE project has closed. UNDP also provided technical assistance to local government agencies but its training efforts, and those of the international community more broadly, have not tackled the challenge of staff turnover. When there is a change of government, staff at all levels are transferred and take their knowledge and skills with them (in West Sumatera, there was a gubernatorial election shortly after the earthquake so most of those that UNDP trained on budgeting for disaster management etc have been or will be transferred). AusAID through the Australia Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR)<sup>2</sup> is now considering a large-scale training programme, delivered by provincial universities and able to provide a critical mass of local government officials with at least a basic level of disaster management training. This appears to be a promising option.

Several donors and international agencies are engaged in projects to strengthen the government's capacity at both national and local level but there is no formal mechanism to coordinate their support and ensure that they are complementary. As a result, BNPB's experience is of being bombarded by different initiatives.

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<sup>2</sup> [www.aifdr.org](http://www.aifdr.org)

In most countries with ERFs/HRFs, UNOCHA does not have the human or financial resources to help local NGOs develop response and management capacities. ERFs/HRFs can fund local NGOs but this has been challenging in Indonesia. This is because of the sheer number of Indonesian NGOs and also because UNOCHA's administrative requirements (e.g., for proposals in English and USD bank accounts) are barriers. UNOCHA has encouraged international NGOs to partner with local NGOs in their HRF applications to increase local NGO access. However, it was not clear whether the arrangement will enable them to access funding in their own right in future.

In 2008, the HRF funded an Islamic NGO to undertake a pilot project to provide disaster risk reduction (DRR) and disaster management training to preachers. UNOCHA felt that such projects were important for supporting Islamic NGOs and mosques to move beyond a religious focus alone. For similar reasons, AusAID began its disaster management partnerships with Islamic NGOs in 2005.

UN agencies used CERF funding to support the government in specific sectors, e.g., health, where the Ministry of Health as well as provincial and district health offices had limited funds. However, they implemented very little through local NGOs though UNDP worked with one in its RISE project. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was unable to assess local NGO capacity during the emergency response and sub-contracted international NGOs instead.

The evaluation team observed that donor Embassies, UN agencies and international NGOs have a lot of very competent and highly efficient Indonesian staff. This suggests that some form of skill transfer or mentoring scheme may be a way to strengthen capacity in government agencies and local NGOs.

#### **Recommendations:**

- UNOCHA should ensure that its administrative requirements for ERFs/HRFs (e.g., requiring proposals in English) do not become barriers that prevent local NGOs from accessing funds.
- To increase direct funding from the HRF to local NGOs, Sida should support UNOCHA in undertaking a capacity assessment of Indonesian NGOs that have received HRF funding or are likely recipients to identify specific areas where they need support and then perhaps commission a suitable INGO to provide this support.
- Sida should emphasise its focus on local capacity strengthening (in whichever form is the most appropriate) in its partner agreements and to pooled fund administrators. This should encourage multilateral partners in particular to work more closely with local organisations.
- Sida could consider providing additional funding to the HRF to continue its engagement with preachers as one way of communicating key messages on disaster management and DRR to local communities.
- It would be helpful if donors and international aid agencies coordinated their efforts to strengthen government capacity, which would reduce the burden on the government and ensure that the efforts were complementary.
- AusAID's plan to deliver disaster management training through provincial universities to build up a critical mass of trained government officials is a promising way to tackle the challenge of staff turnover in government agencies. Other donors should consider supporting this initiative.

### **The government is trying to strengthen disaster preparedness and risk reduction but needs coordinated support**

Currently, Sida focuses its funding for disaster prevention and risk reduction (DPRR) activities at the global and regional levels and its current funding to Indonesia does not contribute directly to DPRR.

Although the HRF has not formally started funding disaster prevention, it has supported activities in a small way. For example, Plan received an HRF grant for flood preparedness in Solo, Central Java. It is also considering funding the pre-positioning of non-food items (NFI) stocks in disaster-prone areas of the country. In addition, UNOCHA has encouraged NGOs to include some DRR training for local communities in their humanitarian response programmes. The CERF's mandate to provide short-term, life-saving activities means that it does not finance disaster prevention activities even though this has the potential save more lives than a response programme.

In 2010, the government launched its second Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction. If the activities listed in the Action Plan are fully implemented, the government's spending on DRR will reach 1.6% of the government budget, which will be a significant achievement. The challenge for the National Development Planning Agency, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (BAPPENAS) is that it lacks a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to assess whether the government departments and the international community are delivering on the activities in the Action Plan. At provincial level, many government staff are struggling to develop disaster mitigation plans because, despite receiving training, they are still unclear about what DRR means in practice and how to translate a policy framework into concrete programmes.

Donors have a range of activities and approaches to DPRR, with Department for International Development (DFID) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) starting to focus more on climate change and adaptation. Although there are several fora to discuss DPRR issues, there is no mechanism to coordinate their activities and ensure that they are complementary.

#### **Recommendations:**

- Sida's policy of focusing on DRR at global and regional levels has not had any visible impact on reducing disaster risk for vulnerable communities in Indonesia. It is important for Sida to ensure that DRR, particularly disaster preparedness, is mainstreamed in its funding decisions and that all partners include a preparedness/risk reduction focus in their humanitarian response programmes.
- The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) suggested that Sida should consider seconding a staff member to his office to advocate with the government and UN system on disaster preparedness. He believed that this would give the staff member access to UN contacts and greater influence with the UN system as well as the government.
- Sweden should work with like-minded donors to ensure that the CERF can finance prevention activities. This would enhance its effectiveness and contribute to its life-saving objective.
- Given that Indonesia is the second most at-risk country to natural hazards, DPRR is vital for effective assistance to the country. Sida should mainstream DPRR into its humanitarian programming.
- As Sida does not have a country presence, it should consider funding already established programmes. Options include funding the Safer Communities through Disaster Risk Reduction (SCDRR) programme or Oxfam's Preparedness and response, Reducing risk, Influencing policy: a Model for Emergencies (PRIME) programme.

#### **Lack of adequate international funding for recovery**

Aid agencies agreed that there was a lack of funding for the recovery phase of the West Sumatera earthquake response, with the result that many organisations had left the province after providing short-term emergency assistance. There has also been a lack of funding for livelihoods and long-term psychosocial support, which has undermined recovery efforts. As a result, the Indonesian government has decided to establish a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for reconstruction and rehabilitation after

future disasters. However, the GoI has not made any progress on establishing a suitable mechanism and AusAID's allocation of USD 1 million to the MDTF is on hold because of this.

Sida's bilateral funding for the West Sumatera response focused largely on emergency response though the Plan project that it supported had a recovery element. To date, UNOCHA Indonesia has tended to interpret the HRF's mandate quite narrowly. This is partly because its staff were unaware of Sida's goal of supporting recovery activities. However, it has now recognised that the HRF needs to address recovery needs, which is why it has changed the fund's name from *Emergency* to *Humanitarian Response Fund* and advocated a broader remit.

Due to its emphasis on short-term, life-saving activities, the CERF does not fund recovery programmes. This proved to be something of a challenge, for example, in the health sector because the earthquake damaged the major health facilities.

#### **Recommendations:**

- It would be helpful for Sida to communicate its goals and approaches to partners in more detail so that mechanisms like the Humanitarian Response Fund retain the flexibility and support for recovery and longer-term approaches that Sida provides through its bilateral funding.
- Sida could make a greater effort to support the recovery elements of projects that it is supporting with bilateral funding.
- Once the government's MDTF for reconstruction and rehabilitation is operational, Sida could consider funding it, if it is disbursing in a timely way.

#### **Field studies are useful and there should be more of them**

The evaluation team came across several efforts to analyse humanitarian response and identify good practice. For example, Cordaid funded a short exercise to capture lessons learned from the different approaches to temporary shelter that its local partners used, to explore technical issues and to help partners share good practice. Such studies can be very useful, if well disseminated, and donors should support them.

Strengthening the humanitarian system in Indonesia is very much about ensuring an effective local response system. UNOCHA Indonesia has worked closely with the government but UNOCHA headquarters has been attempting to close the office due to resource constraints. The occurrence of large-scale disasters every few years has prevented this but there is a risk that, if the UNOCHA Indonesia office is closed, the government will not receive the support that it continues to require.

Pooled funding mechanisms are part of the humanitarian reform process and are expected to strengthen the role of the HC. In Indonesia, both the HRF and the CERF appear to have played a role.

#### **Recommendations:**

- Field level research promotes better operational decision making and guides longer term planning. To ensure that the HRF supports the most effective humanitarian response, UNOCHA should commission a review of the different approaches to temporary shelter that it supported and identify what worked best. It could build on the Cordaid review.
- UNOCHA Indonesia is playing an important role in strengthening the humanitarian system so Sida should consider funding it directly to ensure that it can continue its work on DRR and support to BNPB even if there is no major emergency in the country.

## **Need for raising private sector's awareness of humanitarian principles and international standards**

The promotion of International Humanitarian Law is not particularly relevant to humanitarian response in Indonesia. However, the private sector is playing an increasing role in humanitarian response, not just as contractors but by raising funds and donating goods and services. It is important that these private sector actors are aware of the international standards with which their assistance should comply and also of humanitarian principles.

Also, Indonesian and international armies are often active in responding to the various natural disasters that affect the country so it is important to ensure that they are trained in humanitarian principles, gender issues etc. and understand the modus operandi of humanitarian actors.

### **Recommendations:**

- Since the Indonesian army often provides emergency assistance in the aftermath of natural disasters, Sida could consider supporting actors such as the Red Cross Movement to provide it with training on humanitarian principles, gender and other relevant cross-cutting issues. Sida could also consider strengthening the capacity of UNOCHA's Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord).
- Sida could consider working with appropriate partners to promote international standards and humanitarian principles amongst the private sector at a global level.

## **Some good examples of accountability to affected populations but need for better information**

Sida's sub-goals do not address accountability specifically, though this is part of the GHD principles. The team found some good examples of accountability to affected populations. This included Plan Indonesia's innovative approach to involving children in monitoring its temporary shelter programme by training them to make films to document progress with programme implementation. However, affected communities did not always feel that they were adequately consulted (see Table 1 for the results of the team's consultation with beneficiaries). An evaluation by Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) project members also found that there was a lack of clarity on beneficiary selection criteria in the villages where the NGOs were providing temporary shelter and that this had created 'social tension and envy'.

### **Recommendations:**

- UNOCHA should update the Review Board regularly on the progress of HRF-funded projects and make final reports available to Board members.
- Sida should make project visits and/or commission beneficiary surveys to ensure that its partners consult affected communities and involve them in all stages of their programmes, including monitoring and evaluation. It should also support Plan in sharing its innovative approach to involving beneficiaries in monitoring.
- The ECB joint evaluation is an example of good practice that should be replicated in future emergencies in Indonesia as well as globally. The lessons from the evaluation are also applicable broadly so Sida and other donors should support the dissemination of these lessons.

## **Government has an important role to play but local levels require considerable support**

The Government of Indonesia has put in place structures and processes to play a leading role in disaster management in the country. However, the West Sumatera earthquake response demonstrated that these are weak at local levels. Accountability lines between national and local government agencies are also complex. This meant that the BNPB could not take over the coordination function in West Sumatera and its technical support to local structures has not been very effective.

Due to the local government's lack of capacity, the international community activated the Cluster approach in the aftermath of the earthquake. While this seems to have worked relatively well during the emergency phase, the Recovery Network is much weaker.

### **Recommendations:**

- International aid agencies urgently need to strengthen the operation of the Working Groups in the Recovery Network on data collection and coordination of members' activities.
- Donors and international aid agencies should make the case for the need for coordination to local government agencies and strengthen their capacity to lead it, either directly or by strengthening BNPB's Technical Support Team (Tim Pendukung Teknis (TPT)).

## **Donors also need to strengthen their coordination**

Though there are no formal mechanisms to coordinate the various initiatives to strengthen government capacity, donors do not believe that there is any overlap between them. However, from the BNPB perspective, the government is 'bombarded' by piecemeal efforts. Also, although there are a number of fora to discuss DRR issues, these do not extend to ensuring that donor and government activities are coordinated. This suggests that it would be helpful if donors established a coordination mechanism to reduce the burden on government agencies and ensure complementarity.

### **Recommendations:**

- It would be helpful if donors established a coordination mechanism to reduce the government's perception of being 'bombarded' by piecemeal assistance and to ensure complementarity of their capacity strengthening and DPRR efforts. One option is for donors to join the SCDRR Steering Committee meetings.
- Sida should periodically attend DPRR events to co-ordinate its DPRR support with other actors. This could be a Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) meeting or the annual Convergence Group workshop.

## **'Elements of effective humanitarian assistance' are similar to Sida's existing sub-goals**

The evaluators asked Team Sweden in Stockholm, members of the humanitarian community in Indonesia and a group of beneficiaries in West Sumatera to describe the '*elements of effective humanitarian assistance*'. A combination of the responses has resulted in the following ten key elements, which can be used to guide Sida's humanitarian strategy:

1. Using multiple entry points for holistic programming, i.e., complementing Sida's funding to partners with advocacy (e.g., with national partners), joint research and policy work.
2. Ensuring that response is appropriate, given the severity of the crisis and the context.

3. Working with effective partners that have a good track record
4. Providing operational flexibility that allows for independence, longer-term vision (including exit strategies) and programmes as opposed to projects. This is particularly important in transitional contexts and in rapidly changing emergency contexts.
5. Supporting sustainable programming, including longer-term approaches that take account of recovery and reinforcing local capacities (local communities or NGOs and/or local structures, depending on the goal of the programme). Promoting local coping capacities and not undermining them.
6. Efficient coordination mechanisms, including donor coordination mechanisms
7. Supporting and advocating for prevention: peace-building and disaster preparedness and risk reduction.
8. Strong beneficiary involvement, including consultation, feedback, information flows and keeping promises
9. A constructive working relationship with local authorities
10. Supporting improvements in quality of response by promoting international standards and lesson-learning.

# 1. Introduction

This case study of Sweden's humanitarian support to Indonesia is a part of the evaluation of Sida's humanitarian funding, which will contribute to the revision of Sida's Humanitarian Strategy. Two Development Initiatives staff members conducted the case study, visiting Indonesia from 26 July – 6 August 2010. In addition to interviews in Jakarta, the team members made field visits to West Sumatra and to Pandeglang on Java. The team has supplemented field visits with a review of various documents, including project documents. In order to provide feedback to crisis-affected communities in West Sumatra, the team, together with UNOCHA, participated in an hour-long radio interview on Siaga FM, a local radio station based in Padang and specialising in disaster management and risk reduction issues. Annex B provides a description of the methodology for the case study, a list of those interviewed as well as a list of the projects that the team visited.

## 1.1 Overview of humanitarian situation in Indonesia

Indonesia is an archipelago of over 17,000 islands that are prone to a large number and wide variety of natural hazards (floods, drought, landslides, cyclones, tsunamis and eruptions from around 130 active volcanoes). The 2010 Natural Disaster Risk Index rates Indonesia as the country second most at-risk from extreme weather and geophysical events. BNPB recorded 662 natural disasters in 2009 alone<sup>3</sup>. Of these, earthquakes tend to have the greatest impact (with the exception of the 2004 tsunami). The Yogyakarta earthquake of May 2006 and the West Sumatra earthquake on 30<sup>th</sup> September 2009 were the two most devastating ones in recent years (though an earthquake measuring 7.0 in West Java on 2<sup>nd</sup> September 2009 also required a humanitarian response). West Sumatra is particularly prone to earthquakes, with a major one in 2007 as well. The country is in urgent need of greater investment in disaster preparedness and risk reduction (DPRR) to prevent the impact of these hazards from turning into major disasters. Section 3 discusses the international community's efforts to support DPRR in Indonesia.

Apart from natural hazards, the country experiences sporadic violence in Central Sulawesi and Maluku and the isolated and under-developed province of Papua remains at risk of communal violence, particularly from separatist movements. Also, people on the relatively poor island of Madura, displaced by conflict in Kalimantan that has occurred since the late 1990s, have still not been able to return. Thus, the country has pockets of conflict but this case study has focused on natural disasters, particularly the 2009 West Sumatra earthquake, to complement the other case studies that form part of this evaluation.

Since Indonesia is a middle-income country, its government plays a major role in responding to disasters though its capacity to cope is overwhelmed by significant disasters. Section 3.1 provides an overview of the government's role in disaster management, together with a brief description of structures and some of the challenges that the government faces.

## 1.2 West Sumatra Earthquake

This case study focuses on the humanitarian response to the West Sumatra earthquake of 30<sup>th</sup> September 2009<sup>4</sup>. The earthquake struck at 17:16 local time and measured 7.6 on the Richter scale. The epicentre was 45 km West-North-West of the port city of Padang. A second quake, measuring 6.2,

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<sup>3</sup> BNPB's Indonesian Disaster Data and Information (DIBI) database gathers information on events that local governments report as having had a significant impact.

<sup>4</sup> The details of the earthquake are drawn from the UN's Humanitarian Response Plan.

struck 22 minutes later. This was followed by a third quake, measuring 6.8, early the following morning. This struck an inland area, 225 km South-East of Padang. Padang Pariaman District was most severely affected by the earthquakes and the subsequent landslides. The international community estimated that around 1,200 people died (according to the information used for HRF grants) and about 1.2 million were affected.



**Earthquake damage**

the emergency phase would last for 2 months). However, most humanitarian organisations continued to address the ongoing emergency needs on the ground for a few months.

The HRP was a very quick assessment of immediate needs so the international community then conducted more detailed needs assessments. The World Bank undertook a Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA) while UNDP conducted a Humanitarian Recovery Needs Assessment (HRNA). These comprised the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) that informed the government's Recovery Action Plan (Renaksi), which was published in November 2009.

### **1.3 Sida's humanitarian funding to Indonesia**

Sida does not have a humanitarian representative in Indonesia but one person in the Swedish Embassy in Jakarta to manage its 'partnership-driven cooperation'. The aim of this is to forge partnerships between Swedish and Indonesian actors, whether private sector, public sector or civil society. The cooperation focuses on three areas:

- Private sector development
- Environmental issues and climate change
- Human rights (supporting strategic initiatives by local institutions).

A Humanitarian Team member in Stockholm, who is responsible for humanitarian aid to South and South-East Asia, covers Indonesia<sup>6</sup>. He was based in Indonesia previously and so has a good understanding of the context. This has also helped relations with his successor at the Jakarta Embassy though there is very little consultation on humanitarian funding issues<sup>7</sup> and no involvement with the Humanitarian Response Fund because she does not have a humanitarian background and very little time

Despite the severity of the quakes, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) did not declare this as a national disaster, but a provincial one. This made it more difficult for international donors to release funding<sup>5</sup> though the international community undertook a very rapid assessment of the assistance required and issued a Humanitarian Response Plan (in conjunction with the GOI) on 9<sup>th</sup> October 2009. This requested just over USD 38 million in funding.

The government was keen to move quickly towards recovery and declared that the emergency phase had ended 1 month after the earthquake (though it had originally announced that

<sup>5</sup> The HRF has an advantage in such situations. As a country-based fund, it does not require the government to declare a disaster or issue an Appeal and was able to provide relatively quick funding for the West Sumatera response.

<sup>6</sup> Other countries in his portfolio include Philippines, East Timor, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, India and Nepal.

<sup>7</sup> The Humanitarian Team did consult the Embassy about which UN agency to fund to respond to the West Sumatera earthquake. But it overrode the Embassy's advice and based its decision on its experience of the humanitarian performance of the agencies rather than their development performance.

to follow up on Sida’s humanitarian contributions. For example, the Sida representative in Jakarta was away and so unable to attend a meeting at Bappenas (the national development planning agency) to discuss the Humanitarian Response Plan.


Sida did not raise the issue of applying GHD vs. aid effectiveness principles in Indonesia. This is probably partly due to the fact that there is no connection between its humanitarian and development programmes and because it does not have a humanitarian field presence. It may also be due to the fact that the humanitarian situation in Indonesia is largely due to natural disasters so there is little tension between the two sets of principles.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) does not ask the Sida representative in Jakarta for input on humanitarian issues but consults her regarding the performance of UN agencies. However, in 2010, the agencies that the MFA selected for review were not organisations with which Sida is engaging in Indonesia so the field input was limited.

Sida does not have a humanitarian staff member based in Indonesia but it recognises that “Indonesia is extremely disaster prone” and there will be a continuing need for assistance “until vulnerability, and consequently risk, is reduced” (Sida 2008 contribution decision). Figure 1 (based on FTS data) shows Sweden’s humanitarian funding to Indonesia from 2005–2009. The 2009 spike was due to funding for the West Sumatera earthquake. Sweden has not given funding in 2010 since there have been no major disasters and the HRF is expected to cover small scale situations though the response to the West Sumatera earthquake has used up all the funds.

In 2008, Sida decided to provide 2-year funding to the UNOCHA-managed HRF (SEK 6.5 million – or just under USD 1 million – each year for 2008 and 2009). Established as a pooled fund in 2001, the HRF has been a useful mechanism to enable Indonesian and international NGOs to respond to small and medium-scale disasters and also to respond quickly to larger-scale disasters such as the West Java and West Sumatera earthquakes in September 2009. Sida is currently the only donor to the HRF (Annex A provides a short overview of the fund, including a list of grants made in 2009–2010).

In response to the West Sumatera earthquake, Sida made two bilateral grants in 2009: SEK 5 million (around USD 700,000) to UNDP for its RISE (Recovery Initiatives for Sumatera Earthquakes) programme and SEK 3 million (around USD 400,000) to Plan Sweden, channelled to Plan Indonesia. In addition, Sida supplemented its funding to the HRF with SEK 15 million (around USD 2.1 million) to support the earthquake response. These three funding decisions, dated 1<sup>st</sup> November 2009, totalled SEK 23 million.



**Figure 1** Sweden’s humanitarian funding to Indonesia: 2005–2009

In addition, Sweden contributed to the response to the West Sumatera earthquake through the CERF, which provided just over USD 6.9 million through its Rapid Response window<sup>8</sup>. The Emergency Relief Coordinator visited Indonesia two weeks after the earthquake and committed CERF funding for the response. Sweden's funding to the CERF comes from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) rather than Sida but this case study has covered this funding channel because DI is examining the complementarity of Sida and MFA funding as part of the overall evaluation.

#### 1.4 Assessment of Sida's humanitarian sub-goals

All three case studies (Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Indonesia) have focused on evaluating whether Sida's humanitarian funding contributes to meeting the following 8 sub-goals of its humanitarian strategy:

1. Promoting the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship
2. Promoting needs-based humanitarian assistance
3. Strengthening humanitarian coordination
4. Strengthening local capacity
5. Supporting the link between humanitarian contributions and prevention
6. Reducing the gap between humanitarian support and recovery contributions
7. Strengthening the humanitarian system
8. Strengthening the humanitarian principles

As noted in the previous section, Sweden supported the response to the West Sumatera earthquake with bilateral funding, through the HRF and the CERF. These funding channels operate in very different ways so section 2 presents the evaluation findings on each sub-goal separated by funding channel. Section 3 covers key findings on humanitarian issues in Indonesia that go beyond funding. These include the role of the government, disaster preparedness and risk reduction, the international community's approach to building disaster response capacity in Indonesia and donor coordination. It also highlights opportunities for Sida to broaden its engagement.

As part of the case study, and to support the development of Sida's revised humanitarian strategy, the evaluation team undertook a participatory exercise with HRF recipient NGOs and beneficiary communities to identify what they regarded as *"the elements of effective humanitarian assistance"* Section 4 analyses the responses received against the responses from Stockholm (from the exercise undertaken during Sida's Humanitarian Days in May 2010). This highlights field priorities that Sida could use to guide the development of its revised humanitarian strategy.

## 2. Evaluation of Sida's strategic goals

This section assesses how Sida's portfolio in Indonesia has performed against each of its strategic humanitarian sub-goals. The assessment of each sub-goal is divided under the headings of bilateral funding, HRF and CERF.

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<sup>8</sup> Since the CERF was set up, it has provided funding to Indonesia three times – in response to the Aceh floods in December 2006, to the Jakarta floods in February 2007 and then to the West Sumatera earthquake.

## 2.1 Promoting the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship



**Focus group discussion with women beneficiaries – spokes exercise**

The 8 sub-goals in Sida’s humanitarian strategy are all drawn from the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). Therefore, the first sub-goal, on promoting the GHD principles, focuses on three aspects in particular:

- Timeliness, flexibility and predictability of funding
- Supporting quick response to rapid onset disasters by providing unallocated funds to suitable organisations
- Encouraging and supporting a long-term perspective in partners’ programming.

Of these elements, Sida puts perhaps the greatest emphasis on the timeliness and flexibility of its funding. However, this does not necessarily translate into timely implementation and assistance to affected populations. The spokes exercise reported in section 4 shows that local communities felt that they had not received timely assistance (they scored it 0 out of 5 stars).

### **Bilateral funding**

In years where there is no major crisis in Indonesia, Sida usually channels funding only through the HRF. In 2009, however, it provided bilateral funding to UNDP’s RISE programme and to Plan International. UNDP Indonesia accessed internal funding (TRAC 3) for the immediate aftermath of the earthquake and then USD 500,000 from BCPR’s Thematic Trust Fund for Recovery in December 2009. UNDP received Sida’s USD 700,000 in Indonesia in mid-January 2010. Although Sida allocated the money to the Rubble Clearance and Demolition (RCD) element of the RISE programme, UNDP had the flexibility to allocate money to other programme activities as appropriate<sup>9</sup>.

Plan Indonesia received Sida funding through Plan Sweden (outside Sida’s Framework Agreement with Plan Sweden) one month after the West Sumatera earthquake struck. It was able to begin its emergency response on 1<sup>st</sup> October because it used its own funds and it really appreciated Sida’s flexibility in allowing it to back date expenditure to the start of the emergency operation. Plan Indonesia also received Sida funding to respond to the West Java earthquake, a grant of SEK 713,951 (USD 101,591) provided through Plan Sweden’s Framework Agreement “General grants for minor humanitarian projects”. Plan received the funding quickly, with the grant running from 21<sup>st</sup> September 2009 (3 weeks after the earthquake) to 31<sup>st</sup> January 2010. The two grants had different administrative and audit requirements because one was within the Framework Agreement while the other was outside and this proved challenging.

Sida’s bilateral funding can support its partners to take a longer-term approach since Sida can provide multi-annual funding. Sida’s grants for the West Sumatera earthquake have a 16-month timeframe, rather than the tradition 6–12 month timeframe for emergency response. Also, UNDP’s RISE programme is, by definition, a recovery programme with livelihoods and building back better components although the RCD element that Sida supported ended in July 2010.

### **Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF)**

The HRF is able to approve emergency response projects quickly. Following the West Java earthquake on 2<sup>nd</sup> September, UNOCHA approved 3 projects to start on 10<sup>th</sup> September and a further 3 projects to start on 17<sup>th</sup> September.

<sup>9</sup> The Sida-funded RCD activities were completed in a timely way but UNDP experienced some delays with providing computers to government agencies.

Sida transferred its 2009 allocation of SEK 6.5 million (just under USD 1 million) for the HRF to UNOCHA shortly before the West Sumatera earthquake on 30<sup>th</sup> September so the HRF could use this funding to support the emergency response. UNOCHA approved 7 projects to start by 15<sup>th</sup> October with another two approved to start on 1<sup>st</sup> November. The HRF was depleted by the response to the two earthquakes and UNOCHA requested further funding from Sida. UNOCHA and Sida signed the funding agreement in early December so the HRF made a second round of allocations, with 1 WASH and 9 temporary shelter projects starting on 10<sup>th</sup> January.

Although the HRF can be very quick to approve projects, some NGOs gave examples of delays. One International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO) submitted a proposal in December 2009 but did not get a signed agreement till 25<sup>th</sup> March, possibly due to delays with a decision by the Review Board (though the organisation was not clear about the reason for the delay). Other NGOs submitted proposals in December and received their funds in May. One INGO signed an MOU on 25<sup>th</sup> March but did not receive its funds from Geneva for a further month. This caused a problem because it had already signed an agreement with a contractor on the strength of the MOU. UNOCHA requests the Administrative Office in Geneva to disburse funds on the dates that projects are supposed to start (or a day or so after). Since Geneva takes at least 2–3 weeks to disburse, NGOs have a shorter implementation period unless they can start operating with their own funds.

The NGOs are also experiencing a significant delay with receiving the remaining 20% of project funds (since UNOCHA pays 80% in advance and 20% upon submission of the final reports). This is because UNOCHA's Administrative Office in Geneva suggested that UNOCHA Indonesia change from allowing NGOs to charge for audit costs in their project budget and hire an auditor itself to audit all the NGO projects. UNOCHA is obliged to use UNDP's procurement procedures so the process has taken 5–6 months and the NGOs were still waiting for the audits and the payment of the remaining funds. Apart from the delay in receiving the remaining funds, the NGOs were concerned about the change in exchange rates over this long period because the USD had decreased in value.

Despite such delays, the NGOs have found the HRF a very useful mechanism. This is because UNOCHA is flexible and the NGOs have been able to adapt their programme to the changing situation on the ground. The NGOs have regular and very good communication with UNOCHA so they are able to explain the reasons for changes and get UNOCHA's agreement quickly (as long as they provide adequate justification). Also, by providing small amounts (a maximum of USD 100,000) of relatively quick money, the HRF has enabled them to respond to small and medium-scale disasters overlooked by other donors.

In June 2010, UNOCHA Indonesia recommended to the HRF Review Board that the fund should change its name from *Emergency* Response Fund to *Humanitarian* Response Fund. This is because it recognised the need to finance both disaster prevention and recovery activities in order to address the humanitarian needs in Indonesia more effectively. The Board agreed, though it has not discussed how UNOCHA should operationalise this, e.g. whether it should set percentages for how much money could be allocated to the different elements (perhaps 50% for response and 25% each for prevention and recovery). However, setting percentages is likely to reduce the HRF's flexibility.

In the Indonesia context, it will be very useful for the HRF to finance prevention and recovery activities. But ERFs/HRFs are not designed to support longer-term responses. As one HRF recipient organisation pointed out, the size of HRF grants (maximum USD 100,000) and the timeframe for project implementation (maximum 6 months) limits the scope of interventions and prevents NGOs from adopting a longer-term approach. Therefore, it is useful that, in West Sumatera, Sida complemented the HRF with bilateral funding.

## CERF

Some UN agencies (like United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)) received CERF funding very quickly (signing the Letter of Understanding on 22<sup>nd</sup> October and receiving funding 11 days later). UNDP also received funding by November. However, others experienced delays with the CERF. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) had extensive correspondence with the CERF Secretariat about the eligibility of its proposal and finally signed the Letter of Understanding (LOU) on 19<sup>th</sup> November. It had a further delay with receiving funds in-country but this was because WHO changed its financial system and froze all internal fund transfers from mid-November 2009 to mid-January 2010.

Although most UN agencies received funding fairly quickly, they found the CERF's 3-month implementation period too short<sup>10</sup>. As a result, UNFPA and WHO had to request no-cost extensions (NCEs) of a month.



**Damage to agricultural land and irrigation systems**

CERF recipient agencies found it quite flexible in funding a range of different activities, such as child protection. In addition, they found the CERF useful because:

- It supported activities ignored by other donors. According to FAO, the CERF was the only source of funding for agriculture even though most of those affected were farmers.
- It enabled UN agencies to fill gaps. WHO found it useful to fill gaps in the emergency-early recovery phase, when the Ministry of Health did not have much funding available.

While the CERF is relatively quick and flexible and can make funds available for a quick response to a rapid onset disaster, its mandate limits it to short-term, life-saving activities. As a result, it is unable to support longer-term approaches though it funded UNDP's early recovery efforts to restore local government capacity to restart public services and the RCD element of the RISE project.

### Recommendations: Promoting the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship

- Sweden should monitor the timeliness of the implementation of projects that it funds (including through pooled funds such as ERFs/HRFs and the CERF).
- NGOs have experienced delays with the HRF largely due to administration issues in Geneva. UNOCHA is establishing an administrative unit specifically for ERFs/HRFs and should ensure that this speeds up disbursements. This unit should systematically inform UNOCHA field offices when it has disbursed funds to NGOs so that they can monitor the timeliness of implementation.
- To ensure that the HRF remains a flexible mechanism and supports the most appropriate forms of response, it would be helpful if it did not set specific percentages on the amount of funding that can be used to support prevention, response and recovery. This will enable NGOs to take a holistic approach and include elements of preparedness and recovery into their emergency response programmes.

## 2.2 Promoting needs based humanitarian assistance

As noted earlier, the UN system worked with NGOs and the government to produce the HRP within 9 days of the West Sumatera earthquake even though this was the first time that many of those

<sup>10</sup> This has been the case in other countries as well so the CERF Secretariat has had an informal agreement since early 2007 that UN agencies could use 3 months to commit funds and a further 3 months to complete implementation. This will be formalised in the revised Secretary-General's Bulletin. However, it appears that the CERF Secretariat and UN agency headquarters did not communicate this informal agreement to the UN agencies in Indonesia.



**Temporary shelter**

involved in the response had participated in the development of an Appeal. The Appeal should have stimulated international funding for the emergency response but was only 38% funded so the CERF provided USD 6.9 million. International NGOs pointed out that the HRP process took a lot of time and effort at a crucial period in the response. However, it did not increase their access to funding. Perhaps as a result, NGOs listed their activities in the HRP and also appealed to donors directly. Hence, donors received NGO proposals with the same content through different channels.

A UNOCHA interviewee pointed out that while donors insist that aid agencies prioritise needs, this can lead to a focus on some sectors (such as food or shelter) at the expense of others (such as agriculture or livelihoods), particularly when donors concentrate their funding on particular sectors. Donors do not just pick sectors but also define what is ‘humanitarian’ through the duration of funding. So, a donor representative pointed out that many donors pulled out of the shelter sector after meeting urgent shelter needs. Since it is donors and aid agencies that prioritise and define the duration of assistance, rather than crisis-affected communities, this can result, for example, in people having a temporary shelter but no means to improve it. This was borne out by consultations with local communities in West Sumatera. Therefore, a focus on ‘priorities’ should not be at the expense of an integrated, sustainable response.

### **Bilateral funding**

Sida’s decision document of 1<sup>st</sup> November 2009 for its two bilateral grants and contribution to the HRF for the earthquake response cites the Humanitarian Response Plan extensively and this was clearly the needs assessment on which its funding decision was based (although Plan submitted a proposal that was broader than its project in the HRP). It is not clear how Sida decided to allocate a total of SEK 23 million (approximately USD 3.2 million) to the West Sumatera response but it then allocated this amount according to the following criteria:

- Support to sectors that Sida had supported in Indonesia in the past and therefore had knowledge and experience of (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), protection and early recovery). This ruled out the health, agriculture and education sectors.
- Support to sectors that are less likely to receive support. This ruled out shelter, which has traditionally received strong support from the government. However, without a humanitarian presence in the field, it was difficult for Sida to know what other donors were likely to fund.
- Ruling out the World Food Programme (WFP)-led sectors – food and nutrition, and logistics and communication – because Sweden provides substantial un-earmarked funding to WFP each year.
- Limiting the number of recipient organisations to facilitate monitoring and follow-up.

### **Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF)**

Unlike other donors to the HRF (see Annex A), Sida does not earmark its contributions to the HRF or direct funding towards a particular type of emergency. This has left the HRF free to respond to the greatest needs, wherever in Indonesia they occur.

The HRF generally relies on NGOs to conduct their own needs assessments, supplemented by UNOCHA’s own knowledge of the situation on the ground. NGOs interviewed for this evaluation gave examples of how they had gathered data to strengthen their proposals. For example, the local

NGO partner of one INGO prepared household profiles at sub-village level to add detail to UN mapping at village level and ensure that it had not missed pockets of need. Another INGO reported doing a rapid assessment to verify data that it had obtained from district authorities.

In the case of the West Sumatera earthquake, in addition to the HRP, the HRF relied on Clusters to identify needs and gaps. This appears to have worked well during the initial emergency response phase, when the HRF funded NGOs mainly to undertake NFI and shelter kit distributions and WASH interventions (during the ‘spokes’ exercise with HRF recipients, the NGOs were very positive about coordination – see Section 4). However, there were challenges with overlaps in the second round of HRF funding (see section 2.3).

### **CERF**

To access CERF funding, UN agencies needed to have their projects in the HRP. Once the CERF Secretariat had given UNOCHA an indication that it would provide around USD 7 million, UNOCHA asked the Clusters to provide information on the funding they had received or expected to receive. This led UNICEF, for example, to say that it was relatively well-funded by its national committees but required funds for WASH activities. Also, just before the agencies decided on CERF allocations, UNOCHA learned that ECHO had approved a grant to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) so some of the funding intended for IOM was allocated to UNDP’s rubble clearance activities instead. Thus, UNOCHA and UN agency representatives in Jakarta used Cluster information to analyse gaps in the response and allocate funds across sectors.

The Humanitarian Coordinator chaired a United Nations Humanitarian Country Team (UNHCT) meeting (comprising UN agencies, IFRC and Oxfam) to agree on priority areas and the allocation of funding. The discussion took into consideration the funding and activities of other agencies, such as IFRC, as well. The amount of funding required to address the gaps/priorities identified matched the funding available from the CERF so the agencies reached a consensus on the allocations fairly quickly. The agencies deemed rubble clearance to be the top priority because experience from Aceh had shown that, if this is not done immediately, it can result in further injuries and also hinder transport and communication. Water, logistics and transport, seeds and tools and health were the other priorities. In the allocation of funding, UNOCHA ensured that the CERF and HRF complemented each other.

According to the UN, the CERF decision-making process took account of the government’s position though the HC and UN agencies did not meet with the government to decide on the priorities. The team was not able to ascertain whether the UN agencies shared information on CERF funding with Cluster members and discussed their prioritisation as well as the allocation of funding to implementing partners.

### **Recommendations: Promoting needs based humanitarian assistance**

- At a global level, Sida needs to develop or adopt a severity of crisis model to guide the determination of geographical funding envelopes, so as to ensure that its funding for each emergency is truly in proportion to the severity of needs. It should also ensure that criteria used to allocate funding within a specific crisis are used consistently.
- NGOs commonly complain that participating in UN Appeals does not result in funding. If donors and UN agencies expect NGOs to continue to invest in participating in these Appeals, they should ensure that NGOs see participation translate into funding.
- Although the CERF remains accessible only to UN agencies, allowing non-UN agencies to become members of the HCT and participate in the decision making process is good practice and one that should be followed in countries where this does not happen currently.

## 2.3 Strengthening humanitarian coordination

When the international community introduced the Cluster approach in the aftermath of the West Sumatera earthquake, this was a new concept for local government actors and Indonesian NGOs. This meant that Cluster leads had to try to explain the approach while managing their own response at the same time. This proved to be a major challenge and Indonesian NGOs lost interest in participating in Clusters after attending a few meetings. This may have been because they could not see the benefits of participation or simply because many Cluster meetings were in English (with some exceptions, like the agriculture Cluster). Clusters were also unable to involve the private sector actors that provided a range of assistance (e.g., Indonesian TV stations and newspapers raised funds to provide food, non-food items and assistance to schools).

As discussed in section 3.1, provincial and district government agencies were supposed to coordinate the earthquake response. However, they had no experience of how to do this and their capacity to take on the role was severely reduced due to the damage caused by the earthquake. The BNPB probably had the capacity to coordinate the response but could not intervene in a provincial disaster and its technical support unit has not been able to provide effective support to local structures. The Cluster approach has now been changed to the Recovery Network with greater government involvement in theory.

### **Bilateral funding**

Sida did not fund coordination activities specifically with the SEK 23 million that it allocated to the West Sumatera earthquake response and its grants to UNDP and Plan did not aim to support coordination. However, according to Sida's contribution decision document, Sweden supported a UN On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) through modules provided/transported and managed by MSB (the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency).

### **Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF)**

The HRF does not fund coordination activities but it supports coordination by asking applicants to liaise with the government to identify areas where there are gaps in assistance and the NGOs sometimes provide a letter from the local government as supporting evidence for their application. To strengthen coordination further, UNOCHA is working to ensure that all the Clusters are represented on the HRF Review Board (though the Cluster approach is not activated in small-medium size disasters in Indonesia). To this end, it has invited FAO and IFRC to join the Board. If each Cluster lead agency takes the responsibility to check that the proposal for its sector is responding to identified needs and gaps, this will considerably strengthen the HRF's operation.

UNOCHA works very closely with BNPB and considered inviting it to join the Review Board. However, it was concerned that BNPB would be too stretched during disaster situations to be able to review HRF applications and enable the Board to approve them quickly.

In the case of the West Sumatera response, the HRF relied on the Cluster approach to coordinate activities. The second round of funding supported temporary shelter construction almost exclusively (15 of 19 projects)<sup>11</sup>. So, UNOCHA consulted the Shelter Cluster lead agency (IFRC) before allocating funding. Nevertheless, the NGOs used different approaches in their projects (e.g., some gave cash grants while others provided building materials. Even the NGOs that gave cash grants did not give the same amounts). There was also some duplication of programme areas. While one HRF recipient was waiting for its funds (which were delayed by some weeks) another NGO began to assist households in the same area, including those identified by the HRF NGO. When the money arrived, this NGO did not have the capacity to find a different area and so assisted the households that it had previously identified

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<sup>11</sup> The remaining projects were to build temporary classrooms (3) and one WASH intervention.

(on the grounds that these were the most vulnerable households and required assistance from both NGOs), although it adapted what it was providing to fill gaps in what the households needed. Neither NGO was informed through the cluster system that the other was working in the same village. An international NGO funded by DFID to provide temporary shelter encountered the same problem and obtained a letter from the shelter Cluster coordinator to explain to DFID that the problem was not the INGO's fault.

Other NGOs also found themselves working in the same villages. In these cases, they held informal talks at field level to coordinate their approaches because they did not feel that the shelter Cluster was the appropriate forum to discuss programme details. The NGOs also felt that, despite the Cluster approach, they failed to take advantage of opportunities to work together and link their activities. Nor did they sit together and examine needs across sectors once the immediate emergency phase was over.

In the education sector, the government specified the design of temporary classrooms, the materials to be used and the cost so NGOs had to follow this standard (though they could adjust the design if appropriate). However, the government did not specify the method of disbursement (e.g., cash vs. materials) so NGOs did adopt different approaches.

### **CERF**

According to CERF recipient agencies, they discussed allocations in the Clusters but the amount per sector was agreed at the UNHCT meeting chaired by the HC. Most UN agencies felt that UNOCHA was instrumental in coordinating the different recipient agencies, acting as the bridge between the international community and the government. WHO tried to use CERF funding to fill gaps that other Cluster members could not cover. It was not possible for the team to assess whether the CERF had supported coordination because the Cluster approach had changed to the Recovery Network and almost all the CERF recipient agencies had left West Sumatera.

#### **Recommendations: Strengthening humanitarian coordination**

- In future, Clusters should provide translation facilities to enable local NGOs, the private sector and government representatives to participate fully in meetings (as is the case with the monthly coordination meetings in Padang) or run meetings in Bahasa Indonesia.
- The international community should strengthen the capacity of local government bodies in Indonesia to take a lead in coordinating emergency response activities.
- When considering proposals, the HRF Review Board should ensure that they are promoting coordinated approaches, e.g., ensuring that NGOs provide the same size of cash grant.
- Sweden should encourage Clusters globally to raise awareness of the Cluster concept amongst all relevant stakeholders. This would enable all actors, including the private sector, to participate in Clusters when a disaster occurs. In the event of a natural disaster, Clusters should also align with both the host government's administrative structure as well as the disaster response coordination body (such as the national platform), which should include the private sector, academia, media and other civil society members.

## **2.4 Strengthening local capacity**

Strengthening humanitarian capacity at local level can take three broad forms:

1. Strengthening the coping capacities of at-risk communities and/or
2. Management and technical development of local organisations (faith based, women's groups, NGOs etc.) to provide humanitarian assistance (beyond sub-contracting) and/or
3. Strengthening/rebuilding state institutions/systems (e.g. health system strengthening) to provide the basic services.

Section 3.2 describes how the international community is trying to strengthen the government's disaster management capacity. This section focuses on Sida's contribution.

## **Bilateral funding**

As part of the RCD component of its RISE project, UNDP trained the local Public Works Department (PWD) in safe demolition and rubble clearance. However, as described in section 3.1, it lacks the funding to take over from UNDP now that the RCD component of the RISE project has closed.

## **Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF)**

In most countries with ERFs/HRFs, UNOCHA does not have the human or financial resources to help local NGOs develop capacity to respond to disasters and manage international funding. However, it can try to facilitate funding to local NGOs, as it has tried to do in Indonesia. This has proved to be a challenge for the following reasons:

- There are thousands of NGOs in Jakarta alone, in addition to NGOs at local level. UNOCHA does not have the means to identify which of these organisations is credible and capable of providing effective humanitarian aid though it has consulted international NGOs and UN agencies working with local partners on occasion.
- Many Indonesian NGOs do not have standby funds that they can use to start activities while waiting for Geneva to disburse HRF grants. Since these disbursements can take a few weeks, this delays implementation<sup>12</sup>.
- HRF proposals have to be in English and this is an obstacle for some Indonesian NGOs.
- UNOCHA's Administrative Office in Geneva requires NGOs to have USD bank accounts for HRF grants. Most Indonesian NGOs do not have them because they are required to deposit USD 1,000 to open a USD bank account.

To address these challenges, UNOCHA has encouraged international NGOs to partner with local NGOs in their applications. This is a major responsibility for the international NGO because it is the contract holder and responsible for quality assurance and also has to finance any capacity building by itself (since the ERF does not do so). In addition, it is challenging for international NGOs to strengthen the capacity of their local partners in an emergency context because NGOs tend to deploy additional contract (not permanent) staff for emergencies and emergency funding is too short-term. As a result, only a few international NGOs, such as Cordaid, have agreed to partner local NGOs. The system has worked relatively well, with UNOCHA reporting only one problem with financial reporting, and increased local NGO access to HRF funding. However, it was not clear whether the local NGOs will be able to access funding in their own right in future – Cordaid estimated that only one of its three recent HRF partners is now capable of accessing direct funding. This is because it is a large national organisation and already has experience of working with various international donors. A donor suggested that, to build Indonesian capacity in a sustainable manner, local NGOs should have access to a GoI-managed emergency fund, which Sida could support.

One Review Board member suggested that a greater number of local NGOs may apply to the HRF when it starts to finance disaster prevention because local NGOs are more experienced in this area. In 2008, the HRF funded an Islamic NGO, Nahdlatul Ulama, to undertake a pilot project to provide DRR and disaster management training to Islamic preachers. The NGO produced three publications:

- The role of preachers in disaster situations
- Preaching on disaster management
- How disaster management relates to the Koran

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<sup>12</sup> The disbursement process takes longer if the NGO has not received UNOCHA funding before and its details are not registered in UNOCHA's system.

It distributed these to preachers throughout Indonesia<sup>13</sup>. UNOCHA followed up on project implementation with visits to one district in each of three provinces – Eastern, Central and Western Java – to attend sermons in mosques. UNOCHA feels that its ability to fund local Islamic NGOs is important because it can help them to broaden their activities from supporting mosques to supporting schools and WASH projects. It also argues for the need to understand the role of mosques better and to support them in moving beyond a religious focus alone. For similar reasons, AusAID began its disaster management partnerships with Islamic NGOs in 2005.

### **CERF**

UN agencies work with government so they used CERF funding to support them in specific sectors, e.g., health, where the Ministry of Health as well as provincial and district health offices had limited funds. The UN agencies implemented very little through local NGOs though UNDP worked with one to support local communities to manually demolish damaged parts of their houses and repair them. FAO tried to distribute seeds and fertilizer through local NGOs but it was unable to assess their capacity during the emergency response and sub-contracted international NGOs instead.

#### **Recommendations: Strengthening local capacity**

- Sida should work with UNOCHA to ensure that its administrative requirements for ERFs/HRFs (e.g., requiring proposals in English) do not become barriers that prevent local NGOs from accessing funds.
- To increase direct funding from the HRF to local NGOs, Sida should support UNOCHA in undertaking a capacity assessment of Indonesian NGOs that have received HRF funding or are likely recipients to identify specific areas where they need support and then perhaps commission a suitable INGO to provide this support.
- Sida should emphasise its focus on local capacity strengthening (in whichever form is the most appropriate) in its partner agreements and to pooled fund administrators. This should encourage multilateral partners in particular to work more closely with local organisations.
- Sida could consider providing additional funding to the HRF to continue its engagement with preachers as one way of communicating key messages on disaster management and DRR to local communities.

## **2.5 Supporting the link between humanitarian contributions and prevention**

### **Bilateral funding**

Currently, Sida focuses its funding for disaster prevention and risk reduction (DPRR) activities at the global and regional levels and its current funding to Indonesia does not contribute directly to DPRR. So, for example, UNDP's RISE project is part of its Disaster Risk Reduction, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (DR4) programme, which is based in BNPB, but Sida is not funding the broader risk reduction elements. Similarly, Plan Indonesia is strengthening the capacity of communities to respond to disasters through contingency planning (working with BNPB and UNOCHA to support contingency planning at district and village level). Plan Sweden has contributed to this but not with Sida funding.

Section 3 describes how other donors are focusing increasingly on DPRR since the government (particularly at local level) continues to require support to plan and implement DPRR activities.

### **Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF)**

Although the HRF has not formally started funding disaster prevention, it has supported activities in a small way. For example, Plan received an HRF grant for flood preparedness in Solo, Central Java. Also, beneficiaries of Islamic Relief's drought response programme in Pandeglang felt that they are better prepared for future droughts (see list of project visits in Annex B). In addition, UNOCHA has encouraged NGOs to include some DRR training for local communities in their humanitarian response programmes (e.g., teaching school children how to protect themselves in the event of an earthquake).

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<sup>13</sup> This included preachers outside mosques because, while only men can preach in mosques, both men and women preach in other settings.

An NGO that was able to respond immediately to the West Sumatera earthquake with an NFI distribution pointed out that it was only able to do this because it had pre-positioned stocks and it could finance transportation and distribution with its own funds. It had then found it a challenge to get donors to finance the replenishment of its stocks, which is vital to maintain a response capacity. This is a common problem so, at the time of the evaluation, UNOCHA was considering using the funds left over after the earthquake response (around USD 100,000) to finance stock replenishment in Eastern Indonesia, which has less well developed infrastructure for disaster response.

### **CERF**

The CERF's mandate to provide short-term, life-saving activities means that it does not finance disaster prevention activities even though this has the potential to save more lives than a response programme. For example, WHO had to enter into a back-and-forth exchange with the CERF Secretariat to secure funding for its Early Warning and Rapid Response (EWARR) programme. This is because the CERF Secretariat did not consider early warning to be life-saving.

#### **Recommendation: Supporting the link between humanitarian contributions and prevention**

- Sida's policy of focusing on DRR at global and regional levels has not had any visible impact on reducing disaster risk for vulnerable communities in Indonesia. It is important for Sida to ensure that DRR, particularly disaster preparedness, is mainstreamed in its funding decisions and that all partners include a preparedness/risk reduction focus in their humanitarian response programmes.
- The Resident Coordinator (RC) suggested that Sida should consider seconding a staff member to his office to advocate with the government and UN system on disaster preparedness. He believed that this would give the staff member access to UN contacts and greater influence with the UN system as well as the government.
- Sida should work with like-minded donors to ensure that the CERF can finance prevention activities. This would enhance its effectiveness and contribute to its life-saving objective.

## **2.6 Reducing the gap between humanitarian support and recovery contributions**

NGOs interviewed for the evaluation argued that the greatest gap in the response to the West Sumatera earthquake has been a focus on livelihoods and few aid agencies have operated in this sector. This is partly because they felt that the scale of assistance required was beyond them and required government intervention. They also lacked the funding for livelihoods activities. A DFID evaluation of assistance to West Sumatera found that the response did not include debate about poverty and livelihoods and that there was a lack of understanding of how to address livelihoods. This was a shame because local communities are keen to rebuild their lives and strengthen their resilience because they have experienced a major earthquake twice in 3 years.

Aid agencies also agreed that there was a lack of funding for the recovery phase of the earthquake response, with the result that many organisations had left the province after providing short-term emergency assistance. One area that has suffered due to this, and partly because it has not been prioritised adequately, is psychosocial support to help communities, particularly children, recover from the trauma of the earthquake. University students and aid agencies provided some short-term counselling but then did nothing further. This may have a negative impact because trauma is a long-term problem and short-term counselling could bring deep-seated problems to the surface and then leave them untreated. The journalist who conducted the radio interview at Siaga FM highlighted the scale of the problem. As a result of the lack of funding for recovery, the Indonesian government has decided to establish a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for reconstruction and rehabilitation. The Secretariat will be located in BNPB and the Steering Committee will include the World Bank, UN, BNPB, Bappenas, Ministry of Finance and other relevant Ministries. However, the government has not made any progress on establishing the mechanism and AusAID's allocation of USD 1 million to the MDTF is on hold because of this.

## Bilateral funding

One of the five objectives of the Plan project that Sida funded was to support recovery: ‘To strengthen the resilience, physical and psychological protection of children, women and other vulnerable groups



**Plan temporary shelter project funded by Sida**

through psychosocial support programmes and ongoing Disaster Risk Reduction activities’. The 30 children that Plan trained in film-making in order to monitor its temporary shelter programme certainly seemed to have benefited psychologically from participating in this activity. However, the evaluation team did not have the opportunity to follow up on Plan’s psychosocial support activities (through child friendly spaces).

UNDP’s RISE project has recovery components, such as livelihoods (although this had not started at the time of the evaluation visit), helping local communities to build back better and supporting the Recovery Network. However, Sida has not contribut-

ed to these elements of the project but focused its contribution on the more urgent demolition and rubble clearance element.

## Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF)

As noted in section 2.1, UNOCHA has recognised that the HRF needs to address recovery needs, which is why it has advocated a change of name for the fund as well as a broader remit. In other countries, such as Kenya, ERFs have interpreted their mandate far more broadly and financed a wide range of activities from animal vaccination to food security in urban slums. In Indonesia, UNOCHA has tended to interpret the HRF’s mandate more narrowly. This has meant, for example, that it has insisted that NGOs build semi-permanent rather than permanent latrines<sup>14</sup> even though these would have a greater long-term impact. In discussions with UNOCHA staff, it emerged that they were unaware of Sida’s goal of supporting recovery activities.

## CERF

Due to its emphasis on short-term, life-saving activities, the CERF does not fund recovery programmes. This proved to be a challenge in the health sector because the earthquake damaged the major health facilities. However, WHO did use the CERF to finance some training activities.

### Recommendations: Reducing the gap between humanitarian support and recovery

- It would be helpful for Sida to communicate its goals and approaches to partners in more detail so that mechanisms like the Humanitarian Response Fund retain the flexibility and support for recovery and longer-term approaches that Sida provides through its bilateral funding.
- Sida could make a greater effort to support the recovery elements of projects that it is supporting with bilateral funding.
- Once the government’s MDTF for reconstruction and rehabilitation is operational, Sida could consider funding it, if it is disbursing in a timely way.

## 2.7 Strengthening the humanitarian system

Humanitarian actors in Indonesia have built up considerable experience with disaster response since 2005. One donor interviewee felt that, despite this, aid agencies had not analysed lessons learnt from

<sup>14</sup> Even though permanent latrines are not much more expensive than semi-permanent ones and only involve building up the solid walls. In some cases, local communities have been willing to pay the difference in cost.

previous response efforts but ‘plunged in’ after the West Sumatera earthquake. However, the team came across some efforts to analyse experiences and identify best practice. For example, DFID has commissioned Oxfam to conduct a study on whether DRR efforts in West Sumatera made a difference to communities affected by the earthquake in 2009 and whether investment in DRR has made a measurable difference. Cordaid’s three local partners providing temporary shelter have used different approaches, with different costs associated with each approach, so Cordaid has funded Build Change to review the results of these different approaches and identify good practice and technical lessons. Also, Oxfam has funded a report on cash transfer programmes in West Sumatera, covering conditional and unconditional transfers as well as vouchers.

Strengthening the humanitarian system in Indonesia is very much about ensuring an effective local response system. As described in sections 2.4, 3.2 and 3.3, UNOCHA Indonesia is doing a lot on this, particularly with BNPB and by supporting various technical working groups. However, due to resource constraints, UNOCHA has been trying to close the Indonesia office. It has not been able to do this because of the constant occurrence of natural disasters but, even when there are no major disasters, the Indonesia office plays an important role.

An UNOCHA interviewee also made the important point that the focus of humanitarian reform has been on structures and systems, particularly those of the UN system, rather than on crisis-affected communities. Therefore, the international system tends to focus, for example, on coordination mechanisms and how these operate rather than on the outcomes that they help to achieve for local communities. To redress this, the international community, particularly donors, should put greater emphasis on evaluating how humanitarian reforms have improved results for those affected by crises rather than individual elements of the reform process, such as Clusters or pooled funds.

#### **Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF)**

The HRF is designed to be a short-term, quick response mechanism so strengthening the humanitarian system is beyond its remit. However, it has supported the relationship of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) with the government, which appreciates the fact that he can mobilise funds quickly.

#### **CERF**

One of the objectives of the CERF is that it is supposed to strengthen role of HC. In Indonesia, it is positive that the HC chaired the UNHCT meeting to agree on priorities and allocate CERF funding. Also, like the HRF, the CERF has supported the HC’s relationship with the government.

#### **Recommendations: Strengthening the humanitarian system**

- Field level research promotes better operational decision making and guides longer term planning. To ensure that the HRF supports the most effective humanitarian response, UNOCHA should commission a review of the different approaches to temporary shelter that it supported and identify what worked best. It could build on the Cordaid review.
- Since UNOCHA Indonesia is playing an important role in strengthening the humanitarian system, Sida should consider funding it directly to ensure that it can continue its work on DRR and support to BNPB even if there is no major emergency in the country.

## **2.8 Strengthening humanitarian principles**

The promotion of International Humanitarian Law is not particularly relevant to humanitarian response in Indonesia and Sida does not fund this activity in Indonesia. However, Indonesian and international armies are often active in responding to the various natural disasters that affect the country. In West Sumatera, the Indonesian army was involved in demolition, the Australian army provided water bladders and the US army assisted with transport and logistics. The armies may have very different approaches so an UNOCHA interviewee emphasised the need for ensuring that they are trained

in humanitarian principles, gender issues etc. and understand the modus operandi of humanitarian actors. There may also be a need to strengthen UNOCHA's Civil Military coordination capacity.

The private sector is also playing an increasing role in humanitarian response, not just as contractors but by donating goods and services. It is important that these private sector actors are aware of the international standards with which their assistance should comply and also of humanitarian principles.

#### Recommendations: Strengthening humanitarian principles

- Since the Indonesian army often provides emergency assistance in the aftermath of natural disasters, Sida could consider supporting actors such as the Red Cross Movement to provide it with training on humanitarian principles, gender and other relevant cross-cutting issues. Sida could also consider strengthening the capacity of UNOCHA's Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord).
- Sida could consider working with appropriate partners to promote international standards and humanitarian principles amongst the private sector at a global level.

## 2.9 Accountability

Sida's sub-goals do not address accountability specifically, though it is part of the GHD principles. The evaluation did not examine accountability issues in detail (other than exploring the extent to which aid agencies had consulted local communities during focus group discussions). But the team obtained an overview of the monitoring and evaluation procedures that the recipients of Sida funding have in place.

In addition to this, the team learned of an evaluation by Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) project members in Indonesia (4 of which are HRF recipients)<sup>15</sup>. In December 2009, ECB members conducted a joint evaluation of their response to the West Java and West Sumatra earthquakes. This focused on evaluating programme results against the ECB goals of improving the speed, quality and effectiveness of the humanitarian community. It also reviewed the extent and effectiveness of coordination, within the consortium and also between the consortium and other key stakeholders, such as government and other international and national NGOs.

The evaluation concluded that the 8 NGOs achieved significant coverage in West Sumatra because they had funds from multiple sources. The agencies distributed NFIs quickly and equally across villages to households with damaged houses and this met immediate needs. However, each agency distributed different types of kits, with different items and used different names for their NFI kits. The rationale for these differences is not clear. Similarly, the size and implementation speed of the NGOs' T-shelter programmes varied considerably.

The evaluation found that some of the NGOs provided clear information to beneficiaries and involved them in decisions while others were not doing this well. The greatest concern was the lack of clarity on beneficiary selection criteria in the villages where the NGOs were providing T-shelter support because this created 'social tension and envy'.

The established relationships between ECB members and their collaboration meant that they were able to map the areas affected by the earthquake more quickly, minimise the overlapping of relief efforts and identify gaps in targeting.

### Bilateral funding

For the first three months of the West Sumatra response, UNDP's programme staff undertook monitoring against mainly process indicators because UNDP was still in the process of formulating the RISE

<sup>15</sup> ECB project members are: CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, International Medical Corps (IMC), Masyarakat Penanggulangan Bencana Indonesia (MPBI) or the Indonesian Society of Disaster Management, Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, Save the Children, and World Vision Indonesia.

project. Since January, though, project staff have undertaken monitoring that results in quarterly monitoring reports that UNDP uses to report back to donors. This covers a range of areas – finance, project outputs and cross-cutting issues such as gender. UNDP tried to apply UNDP’s standard Monitoring and Evaluation framework to its activities during the emergency phase of the earthquake response though this was a challenge. The other main challenge has been the lack of capacity of local staff in Padang to understand what recovery is and how to measure outcomes (as opposed to collecting activity data or monitoring outputs).

In addition to monitoring by project staff, programme staff monitor projects every 6 months and ensure consultation with stakeholders. This has included answering local community questions on radio. The government is a key stakeholder and must agree to all UNDP activities.

Plan Indonesia has adopted an innovative approach to monitoring its temporary shelter programme. Working with an Indonesian media company, Axis, it trained 30 children from 6 villages to use video cameras and make documentaries. It then gave the children cameras and asked them to visit those who had received cash grants from Plan to build temporary shelters and follow their progress with building the shelters. The children thoroughly enjoyed the film-making process and enthusiastically visited the project beneficiaries almost every day. They were able to identify challenges with the project as well as positive aspects. Although the temporary shelter project has ended, the children are keen to make environmental films and get further training in the use of editing equipment.

### **Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF)**

NGOs are required to provide financial and narrative reports before receiving the final 20% of HRF grants. But UNOCHA does not rely on the reports alone and has been active in visiting projects funded by the HRF, even when these are in remote locations. However, once the Review Board has approved a project, members do not receive any further information on project implementation, not even the NGO reports. This is common practice with ERFs/HRFs but, in Indonesia, the Review Board recently requested UNOCHA to share NGO reports and the tracking of progress with HRF projects. Review Board members have also suggested that they join UNOCHA in visiting HRF-funded projects.

### **CERF**

The CERF Secretariat has developed a Performance and Accountability Framework (PAF) to assess the operation of the CERF. However, this does not cover project implementation. Currently, the UN agencies apply their internal monitoring and evaluation procedures to CERF funding so UNOCHA has no oversight function. It can only review the reports that CERF recipients submit. As a result, UNOCHA Indonesia staff members were unable to identify the locations of CERF projects in West Sumatera and arrange for the evaluation team to visit them (with the exception of UNDP, all the CERF recipient agencies have closed their operations and left the province). An UNOCHA staff member contrasted this with the HRF’s demanding requirements and suggested that Clusters could play a greater role in monitoring the implementation of CERF projects.

#### **Recommendations: Accountability**

- UNOCHA should update the Review Board regularly on the progress of HRF-funded projects and make final reports available to Board members.
- Sida should make project visits and/or commission beneficiary surveys to ensure that its partners consult affected communities and involve them in all stages of their programmes, including monitoring and evaluation. It should also support Plan in sharing its innovative approach to involving beneficiaries in monitoring.
- The ECB joint evaluation is an example of good practice that should be replicated in future emergencies in Indonesia as well as globally. The lessons from the evaluation are also applicable broadly so Sida and other donors should support the dissemination of these lessons.

### 3. Role of Government, Local Capacity, DPRR and Donor Coordination

This section discusses some of the issues raised in section 2 in greater detail and also explores issues that are not covered by Sida's strategic sub-goals but that are critical to an effective humanitarian response in Indonesia. Specifically, the section covers the role of the Indonesian government, strengthening local capacity, disaster preparedness and risk reduction (DPRR) and donor coordination.

#### 3.1 Role of the Government of Indonesia

Since 1999 the Indonesian government has followed a policy of decentralisation with both decision-making and funding being transferred to provincial and district levels. This is reflected in the Disaster Management Law, passed in 2007. The law requires the government to establish Disaster Management Agencies at national, provincial and district level. The National Disaster Management Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB)) was established in 2008 and the President wishes it to be ambitious in its scope. At the President's request, in December 2009, BNPB set up a Rapid Response Team. This has two parts – one based in East Java and the other in West Java. Each part has 550 members, with 70 on stand-by each week. BNPB deployed the Rapid Response Team within 6 weeks of its establishment, to respond to the Haiti earthquake in January 2010, although the operation was beset with difficulties<sup>16</sup>. The Rapid Response Team's performance is one of the targets against which the government is assessing BNPB's performance and this may be a reason why BNPB did not score well in the first review in 2010<sup>17</sup>.

Local authorities have not made the same progress with disaster management structures as BNPB. In 2007, the national government gave the governor of West Sumatera substantial funding to establish provincial and district-level disaster management agencies because the province is particularly prone to earthquakes. But no structure was in place when the earthquake struck on 30<sup>th</sup> September 2009. Therefore it was left to the Provincial Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (BAPPEDA)) to respond. However, BAPPEDA itself was badly affected by the earthquake because its offices collapsed, leaving it in a weak position and unable to coordinate effectively. The governor finally set up a Regional Disaster Management Agency (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah (BPBD)) in response to the earthquake and this started functioning on 31<sup>st</sup> March 2010 (6 months after the earthquake struck). The province still lacks district-level BPBDs though some interviewees questioned whether these are necessary when they are not required by the disaster management law, there may be adequate coordination mechanisms (e.g., ad hoc multi-agency bodies under the Governor's leadership) and the creation of new district BPBDs is likely to lead to the expectation of increased international funding.

The weakness or absence of adequate government coordination at provincial level can be a major challenge for effective disaster response in Indonesia. This is because the 2007 disaster management law states that the government's declaration of the level of a disaster will determine which agency is responsible for coordinating the response. So, the BNPB is responsible in the case of a national disaster while a provincial BPBD is responsible for provincial disasters. The government declared the West Sumatera earthquake to be a provincial disaster so, despite the absence of a provincial BPBD, the BNPB could

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<sup>16</sup> The team was unable to reach Haiti so it was forced to leave the supplies that it had taken in the WFP warehouse in Santo Domingo. Eventually, the YMCA distributed the items in Haiti.

<sup>17</sup> In 2010, the President established a unit to monitor the work of all government departments against their goals and indicators. The unit reported to the President after 6 months and BNPB was one of 5 agencies that had not performed well. The government is strongly urging these departments to improve their performance over the next 6 months.

not coordinate the response. Instead, since January 2010, a BNPB technical support team (TPT) has been providing technical support and strengthening the capacity of BAPPEDA and then the BPBD (when it was established in March). The TPT also gave the provincial government IDR 313 million to finance the BAPPEDA to address emergency needs in 5 sectors. However, since the TPT is a new entity, its role has not proved to be very effective<sup>18</sup> and both BAPPEDA and the BPBD have required additional support from UN agencies and NGOs. The TPT has been chairing general coordination meetings, bringing together UN Agencies and international, national and local NGOs in Padang, since January 2010. However, it too has relied on support from UNOCHA and UNDP.

Although the government is responsible for overall coordination, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) activated the Cluster approach immediately after the West Sumatera earthquake. The Clusters were led by the global Cluster lead agencies with an international NGO as co-chair in some cases (e.g., education). Although government line ministries participated in the Clusters, many do not appear to have participated actively.

Once international agencies (particularly UN agencies) had completed their emergency response programmes, the coordination structure shifted from Clusters to a 'Recovery Network' with Working Groups (WGs). This was established in May 2010 and the secretariat is based in TPT with former UNOCHA staff now located in the Resident Coordinator's office. The current WGs are for shelter, education, health, WASH, DRR, livelihoods, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and gender<sup>19</sup>. Each WG has a focal point, usually an international NGO (e.g., CARE for WASH World Vision for livelihoods) though a local NGO provides the secretariat function for the gender WG. The health and education WGs are based in the provincial health and education offices. The Recovery Network secretariat has an information management function (with 2 staff members) but it is clear that the WGs suffer from a serious lack of baseline data as well as data on basic indicators that could measure their progress (e.g., the livelihoods WG did not have data on how many people had lost their jobs as a result of the earthquake or on how many families had lost their main source of income due to the death or disability of the key earner).

Every month, the TPT hosts an inter-WG meeting at which the WGs report on their progress. This helps the TPT to report to the Governor. The Recovery Network's information management team has developed standard formats for WG reporting to the BPBD and TPT. During the evaluation team's visit, the provincial BPBD suggested that it could take over hosting these monthly meetings. As a newly established entity, it has not played a significant role in coordination but it is the focal point for the DRR WG.


Separate accountability lines within the government's disaster response structure have exacerbated this problem of responsibility for disaster management. TPT, though working with the BPBD, is accountable to BNPB, which has no authority over the BPBD. This is because the BPBD is accountable to the Governor while BNPB reports to the President. Therefore, it is the governor who is responsible for addressing any problems with the way that the BPBD operates, not BNPB.

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<sup>18</sup> For example, at the monthly humanitarian response coordination meeting in Padang on 30th July, BPBD stated that it was fully staffed (with 43 people) and had the capacity to host future coordination meetings. TPT, though responsible for building this capacity, seemed to be surprised but very willing to transfer responsibilities. NGO interviewees also reported witnessing BPBD and TPT staff members meeting for the first time at district level meetings even though they were supposed to have been working together.

<sup>19</sup> When the Recovery Network was set up, it had agriculture and governance and infrastructure working groups (WGs). However, agriculture was merged with livelihoods because there was a significant drop in the number of organizations working in this sector. The governance and infrastructure WG has been replaced by the DRR WG. There was some debate about a separate DRR WG, as it had not been a Cluster in the emergency phase, but it was decided that it should be a separate group instead of mainstreamed in the other WGs.

The government has played other roles in the response to the earthquake. For example, the water supply company (PDAM) had repaired around 4,000 leaks (an estimated 40–50% of the damaged water pipes). The Public Works Department is responsible for demolishing buildings and clearing rubble and it does have heavy machinery for this as well as human resource capacity (through UNDP training) but lacks the financial resources. This is a challenge because several collapsed government buildings in Padang are still awaiting demolition (once the provincial government has given permission). With the UNDP RISE programme now closed, it will be left to the Department of Public of Works to complete this demolition and clearance work.



**Figure 2** Lines of accountability and support in the Indonesian government disaster management structure and planning and development structure

The government has also committed itself to an ambitious programme to provide compensation to all whose homes were damaged by the earthquake. It is providing a cash grant of Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) 15 million per family to build a permanent home. By December 2010, the government aims to have supported the construction of 142,000 homes, with a further 31,000 constructed in 2011. However, local communities consulted during the evaluation are concerned that this assistance will not materialise because many of those affected by the 2007 earthquake have still not received any compensation. It is also unclear whether the government will pay compensation to those who have received a permanent shelter from NGOs, which is stopping many households from turning their temporary shelter into a permanent one.

**Recommendations: Role of Government**

- International aid agencies urgently need to strengthen the operation of the Working Groups in the Recovery Network on data collection and coordination of members' activities.
- Donors and international aid agencies should make the case for the need for coordination to local government agencies and strengthen their capacity to lead it, either directly or by strengthening TPT.

## 3.2 Strengthening local capacity

The Indonesian government requires support with capacity strengthening, particularly at local levels, because many provincial disaster management structures are new and local government officials are struggling to grasp what the paradigm shift from disaster response to DPRR means in practical terms. A BNPB representative pointed out that the provincial government in West Sumatera did not know how to translate the national reconstruction and rehabilitation plan (Renaksi) into provincial level programmes that would fit with the provincial government's medium-term plans. Several donors and international agencies, such as AusAid, GTZ, and UNDP, are engaged in projects to strengthen the government's capacity but there is no formal mechanism to coordinate their support and ensure that they are complementary<sup>20</sup>.

GTZ has just begun a 5-year programme, working closely with the Home Affairs Ministry, to support provincial disaster management structures to establish minimum service requirements. Through the AIFDR's Training and Outreach programme, AusAid is trying to develop training modules to operationalise the 60+ BNPB disaster management guidelines. Although every government department has a training unit, the government worked with universities after the Yogyakarta earthquake to develop disaster management plans. AusAID believes that it would be effective to work with provincial universities. A large scale training programme, delivered by provincial universities and able to provide a critical mass of local government officials with at least a basic level of disaster management training, will address one of the greatest challenges to strengthening the capacity of local government structures – staff turnover. To date, disaster management capacity building projects have not been very successful because, when there is a change of provincial government, staff at all levels are transferred and take their knowledge and skills with them (in West Sumatera, there was a gubernatorial election shortly after the earthquake so most of those that UNDP trained on budgeting for disaster management etc will be transferred).

Following DIPECHO's calls for applications for the 7<sup>th</sup> Action Plan in 2010, capacity building for local institutions in Indonesia emerged as a need so DIPECHO included it as a priority in its preparedness approach. It is one of the only donors providing consistent support at community level. In addition, NGOs are running several programmes to try and build the capacity of local communities, whether households or schools, but these efforts do not appear to be well coordinated.

While the international community is largely focused on strengthening government capacity, Indonesian CSOs are struggling to become financially sustainable and self-reliant (since the influx of international funding after the tsunami has largely dried up). The challenge for them is to find adequate resources to scale-up community-based activities. AusAID is exploring with the World Bank whether CSOs engaged in humanitarian and DRR activities can access PNPM (National Programme for Community Empowerment)<sup>21</sup> funds, which they are currently not eligible to do. This could prove to be a useful and sustainable source of funding for these CSOs.

Although local government bodies have limited disaster management capacity and local NGOs are short of both funding and management capacity, the evaluation team observed that donor Embassies, UN agencies and international NGOs have a lot of very competent and highly efficient Indonesian staff. This suggests that some form of skill transfer or mentoring scheme may also be a way of strengthening local capacity in government agencies and local NGOs.

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<sup>20</sup> Capacity building is a small component of ECHO's DRR work through DIPECHO funding

<sup>21</sup> This is a programme established in 2006 with the aim of providing block grants from the national government to every village in Indonesia in order to create employment, stimulate the local economy and build community participation (World Bank (April 2007) *East Asia Update*). The World Bank is the Trustee.

### Recommendations: Strengthening local capacity

- It would be helpful if donors and international aid agencies coordinated their efforts to strengthen government capacity, which would reduce the burden on the government and ensure that the efforts were complementary.
- AusAID's plan to deliver disaster management training through provincial universities to build up a critical mass of trained government officials is a promising way to tackle the challenge of staff turnover in government agencies. Other donors should consider supporting this initiative.

### 3.3 Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction (DPRR)

Indonesia faces a very broad range of natural hazards – earthquakes, landslides, floods, drought, forest fires and tsunamis. The Government of Indonesia as well as donors have realised that the impact of all of these can be minimised with effective DPRR, resulting in a shift in focus from disaster response to DPRR.

In 2007, the government developed its first Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction, a policy framework for integrating risk reduction into development planning. In 2010, Bappenas, in collaboration with BNPB, developed and launched the second Action Plan, which will run till 2012. The plan indicates what the government activities are and what it intends to do over the next 3 years, the amount of funds that each Ministry has budgeted for DRR, and where assistance is needed from the international community. It also clarifies the roles of the government and international community. The budget that the government dedicates to DPRR has increased and, if the Action Plan is implemented, it will reach 1.6% of the government budget, which will be a significant achievement. The Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction (GFDRR) is also supporting the Indonesia government to implement the 2007 Disaster Management Law and Strategic National Action Plan for DRR. The challenge for Bappenas is that it lacks a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to assess whether the international community is delivering on the activities in the Action Plan and how government departments are spending the money that it has allocated.

The national government is providing funding to BPBDs to mainstream DRR. However at provincial level many government staff are struggling to develop disaster management plans. Despite receiving training they are still unclear what DRR means in practice. As one West Sumatera provincial government staff member said:

*“I know I'm meant to include disaster mitigation in my city plan but I don't know what that means, so I pretend we don't have disasters here”.*

Donors have different approaches to Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). DFID, which some donors regard as the leader in conceptual thinking on DRR issues, is now focusing on climate change and adaptation because it feels that there is a need for this, together with DRR. USAID is in the process of reviewing proposals for a Climate Adaptation and Disaster Resilience (CADRE) programme, which is a new area for them in Indonesia. Disaster Preparedness ECHO (DIPECHO) has been funding projects in Indonesia since 1995 with the office in Jakarta taking full responsibility for all DIPECHO country files in 2008. As part of DRR implementation under the 7<sup>th</sup> Action Plan, DIPECHO is funding 4 NGOs to implement DRR projects at community level in Indonesia, as well as one multi country project and two regional projects (with an Indonesia component). DIPECHO funded Oxfam's PRIME programme for three years between 2006 and 2009<sup>22</sup> (while AusAID has committed to supporting the PRIME programme for another three years from 2009).

After DFID, AusAID is the second largest donor to disaster management in Indonesia. It announced the establishment of the Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR) in November

<sup>22</sup> PRIME is linking response, recovery and development, taking a holistic rather than a sector-specific approach. It is bringing together local communities, the government, universities and other actors.

2008<sup>23</sup>. Australia is providing specialist staff and AU\$67 million over 5 years (till 2013) while Indonesia is providing counterpart staff, services and support arrangements. The facility has two co-directors – one Australian and one Indonesian. It “uses Australian and Indonesian science to better identify and quantify the prevailing natural disaster hazards and risks in Indonesia and then uses these facts to support activities, training and planning exercises for national-level and provincial-level disaster managers”. The facility has four programme areas: risk and vulnerability, training and outreach, research and innovation and partnerships. No single government agency in Indonesia covers the full range of hazards that the country faces so the AIFDR is helping to bring the various responsibilities under BNPB’s umbrella. Providing skills training as part of this and the Indonesian government has used AIFDR money to train BNPB’s Rapid Response Team.

UNDP (with funding from various donors, including DFID and AusAID) is implementing the Safer Communities through Disaster Risk Reduction (SCDRR) programme through BAPPENAS and BNPB. Bappenas chairs the SCDRR Steering Committee, with BNPB as Vice-Chair. Key line ministries are Steering Committee members while UNDP provides technical support. It aims to support the implementation of the Disaster Management Law and the Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction as well as supporting the formation and operation of the Indonesia National Platform for DRR. The project objectives are to develop:

1. A disaster risk reduction policy, legal and regulatory framework integrated with the development decision-making process at national, provincial and district levels;
2. Institutional systems that support decentralised disaster risk reduction;
3. Education and awareness programs to make disaster/development linkages; and
4. Ways to demonstrate how disaster risk reduction actions can make communities safer.

There has been a capacity assessment at local level to facilitate these activities but BNPB has yet to follow up on this.

#### Recommendations: Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction

- Given that Indonesia is the second most at-risk country to natural hazards, DPRR is vital for effective assistance to the country. Sida should mainstream DPRR into its humanitarian programming.
- As Sida does not have a country presence, it should consider funding already established programmes. Options include funding the SCDRR programme or Oxfam’s PRIME programme.

### 3.4 Donor Coordination

There are different perceptions of the donor efforts to build the capacity of BNPB. One interviewee pointed out that although donors and international aid agencies are supporting several different initiatives to strengthen government capacity, there is no overlap between them, even though there are no formal mechanisms to coordinate these efforts. However, from the BNPB perspective, the government is ‘bombarded’ by piecemeal efforts. As part of its GFDRR programme, the World Bank organises a stakeholder meeting (including UN agencies, NGOs and donors) with the government every 6 months. Although all the major donors are represented at these meetings, their focus is on GFDRR activities only. This suggests that it would be helpful if donors established a coordination mechanism to reduce the burden on government agencies and ensure complementarity.

There are a number of fora to discuss DRR issues though these do not extend to ensuring that donor and government activities are coordinated. Since 2005, there has been a UN Technical Working Group for DRR, supported by UNOCHA. Also, in 2005, donors, government, UN agencies, international

<sup>23</sup> For further details, see [www.aifdr.org](http://www.aifdr.org)

NGOs and the Red Cross set up a Convergence Group to discuss DRR issues. In addition to regular meetings, the Convergence Group holds an annual workshop. When it was first set up, the Group focused on raising awareness of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) and the need for a national platform. Since then, it has been involved in legal issues, supporting the development of the disaster management law of 2007 and Government Regulation 23, on the role of the international community in disaster management, in 2008.

UNOCHA has been proactive in supporting BNPB to work with the Convergence Group and compile its inputs. In 2010, UNOCHA helped BNPB to develop guidelines on the international community's role in disaster management and the Convergence Group was due to discuss these in August. BNPB is also keen for UNOCHA's support in developing guidelines on the government's monitoring and evaluation of the international community's disaster management activities and guidelines on inter-institutional collaboration in disaster management (which would be applicable to government departments and the international community). UNOCHA has also helped to establish smaller coordination mechanisms, such as the Consortium for Education, which looks at mainstreaming DRR into the school activities, a Capacity Development Working Group that supports BNPB's Centre for Training and Education and the Community-based Disaster Risk Management Working Group.

#### Recommendations: Donor coordination

- It would be helpful if donors established a coordination mechanism to reduce the government's perception of being 'bombarded' by piecemeal assistance and to ensure complementarity of their capacity strengthening and DPRR efforts. One option is for donors to join the SCDRR Steering Committee meetings.
- Sida should periodically attend DPRR events to co-ordinate its DPRR support with other actors. This could be a GFDRR meeting or the annual Convergence Group workshop.

## 4. Effective humanitarian assistance

This evaluation also aims to support the development of Sida's next humanitarian strategy. To aid this process, and to guide the setting of overall goals for this new strategy, the question "what are the elements of effective humanitarian assistance?" was asked of three sets of people:

1. Sida, MFA and MSB staff in Stockholm
2. HRF recipient NGOs in Jakarta
3. A men's group in Ganting village, Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, beneficiaries of an HRF funded project implemented by PADMA and PSPP (temporary shelter) and APF (temporary classrooms).

The results are listed in the table below, with an attempt to reconcile them across the different groups. Each group was asked to rate how aid agencies had performed against each element (i.e., to rate the effectiveness of the assistance). Their scoring is presented as 5 stars, with 5 representing a score of 100% (the scoring for the exercise conducted in Stockholm is presented in the interim report).

**Table 1: Elements of Effective Humanitarian Assistance**

	Sida/MFA/MSB Stockholm		HRF recipient NGOs		Men's group (Padang Pariaman)	
<b>Multiple-entry point programming</b>	Policy coherence	★★★★☆				
<b>Resources</b>	Donor Will	★★★★★				
	Timeliness	★★★★☆	Timeliness	★★★★★	Timeliness	★★★★☆
	Flexibility	★★★★☆				
	Money	★★★★★	Funding (emergency phase)	★★★★★		
			Funding (recovery phase)	★★★☆☆		
	Staff	★★★★☆	Human resources	★★★★★		
<b>Operational</b>	Security and Access	★★★★☆	Access	★★★★★	The right thing at the right time and place	★★★★☆
	Communications/ Logistics	★★★★☆	Simple working/ minimal bureaucracy	★★★★☆	Media/ communications	★★★★☆
	Effective implementing partners	★★★★☆	Awareness by all actors (e.g. private sector, local NGOs) and adherence to standards and codes	★★★★☆		
<b>Sustainable programming</b>	Local capacity strengthening	??	Local capacity strengthening	★★★★☆		
			Balanced between response and preparedness	★★★★☆		
<b>Coordination</b>	Donor coordination	★★★★☆	Coordination	★★★★★		
	Coordination (funding for)	★★★★★				
<b>Response design</b>	Needs analysis	★★★★☆	Needs assessment/ data in emergency phase	★★★★★	Clothing	★★★★☆
	Context analysis	★★★★☆			Shelter	★★★★★
			Needs assessment/ data in recovery phase	★★★★★	Money (cash transfers)	★★★★☆
	Quality standards	★★★★☆			Toilets	★★★★☆
				Trauma healing	★★★★☆	
				Food	★★★★☆	
<b>Relationship with authorities</b>	Host Country Will	★★★★☆	Government support	★★★★☆		

	Sida/MFA/MSB Stockholm		HRF recipient NGOs		Men's group (Padang Pariaman)
<b>Monitoring</b>	Accountability/ follow-up	★★★★☆			
<b>Community involvement</b>	Beneficiary involvement	★★★★☆	Communication with local communities	★★★★☆	Empowerment ☆☆☆☆☆

Combining the results from the different levels yields the following as essential elements of effective humanitarian assistance, which could guide Sida's future humanitarian strategy:

1. Using multiple entry points for holistic programming, i.e., complementing Sida's funding to partners with advocacy (e.g., with national partners), joint research and policy work.
2. Ensuring that response is appropriate, given the severity of the crisis and the context
3. Working with effective partners that have a good track record
4. Providing operational flexibility that allows for independence, longer-term vision (including exit strategies) and programmes as opposed to projects. This is particularly important in transitional contexts and in rapidly changing emergency contexts.
5. Supporting sustainable programming, including longer-term approaches that take account of recovery and reinforcing local capacities (local communities or NGOs and/or local structures, depending on the goal of the programme). Promoting local coping capacities and not undermining them.
6. Efficient coordination mechanisms, including donor coordination mechanisms
7. Supporting and advocating for prevention: peace-building and disaster preparedness and risk reduction.
8. Strong beneficiary involvement, including consultation, feedback, information flows and keeping promises
9. A constructive working relationship with local authorities
10. Supporting improvements in quality of response by promoting international standards and lesson-learning.

## 5. Conclusions

This section draws together the key messages emerging from the Indonesia case study.

### **Sida has missed opportunities to support disaster preparedness and risk reduction**

Although Indonesia is the country second most at risk of extreme weather and geophysical events on the 2010 Natural Disaster Risk Index, these hazards need not turn into large-scale disasters. The government as well as donors have realised this and shifted their focus from disaster response to disaster preparedness and risk reduction. Sida, too, has acknowledged that the country will continue to require humanitarian aid until people's vulnerability is addressed. Despite this, Sida's main channel for funding to Indonesia is the HRF, which is only just starting to consider supporting disaster preparedness. Sida's

bilateral funding to the West Sumatera earthquake response was also focused on emergency response. This approach is understandable to an extent because Sida does not have a humanitarian presence in the country and its DRR support, to date, has been focused on the global and regional levels. However, in a country like Indonesia, Sida's failure to support DPRR in general and recovery activities after the West Sumatera earthquake is a missed opportunity.

### **Funding for recovery has been inadequate**

The evaluation findings show that aid agencies have found it challenging to link humanitarian response to the West Sumatera earthquake to longer-term assistance and provide support for livelihoods. The lack of focus on livelihoods is a shame because local communities are keen to rebuild their lives after experiencing the second major earthquake in 3 years.

The lack of funding for the recovery phase of the earthquake response meant that many organisations had left West Sumatera after providing short-term emergency assistance. The situation has been exacerbated by the fact that government compensation to those who lost their homes has been extremely slow to arrive and left many of those affected unclear about whether they will receive government help at all. Due to the lack of funding for recovery, the Indonesian government has decided to establish an MDTF for reconstruction and rehabilitation but it has not made any progress on establishing the mechanism and this has blocked international assistance as well.

The HRF focused on emergency response because it cannot support longer-term approaches (both due to its mandate and the terms on which its funding is provided). But Sida's bilateral funding also concentrated on emergency activities, even within the RISE project, which has recovery and livelihoods components.

### **The HRF has been a useful and largely effective channel for Sida's funding**

The HRF has a limited mandate that excludes recovery and only covers preparedness in a very limited way. But it has been a useful way for Sida to support relatively quick and fairly flexible responses to the many small- and medium-scale disasters that afflict Indonesia but tend to be ignored by other donors. The HRF can also fund local NGOs, which Sida cannot. Although it has only done this to a limited extent, the HRF's support to Islamic NGOs and mosques has provided an example of how donors can engage with them and support them to move beyond a religious focus alone. In addition, OCHA is careful to monitor the projects that it funds, which is useful given that Sida does not have a humanitarian presence in-country. Despite experiencing some delays with receiving funding, NGO recipients of HRF funding were largely positive about the mechanism.

### **Sida needs clear, transparent criteria for funding allocations and prioritisation**

Currently, Sida does not have established criteria for allocating funds across crises or within a crisis. So, it is not clear how it decided to allocate SEK 23 million to the West Sumatera response. But it then used the HRP and a set of internal criteria for selecting two projects in the HRP and one outside it. The internal criteria were based on administrative considerations rather than considerations about how Sida could provide the most effected assistance to the affected population. So, they ruled out sectors that Sida had not funded in Indonesia before. While it is reasonable for Sida to focus on sectors in which it has experience and expertise, it meant that Sida missed the opportunity to support agriculture, which went largely un-funded (except for a CERF allocation) even though farmers were amongst the most seriously affected by the earthquake.

## **Indonesia needs stronger and more inclusive humanitarian coordination mechanisms**

The government's lack of capacity for taking a lead on humanitarian coordination, particularly at provincial level, is a major challenge to ensuring effective humanitarian assistance. The international community's piecemeal efforts to improve this capacity have yet to show an impact.

In the case of the West Sumatera earthquake, the international community compensated for the government's lack of capacity by activating the Cluster approach. This seems to have worked well for international organisations in the initial emergency response stage though it failed to include local NGOs adequately and the private sector at all, even though both sets of actors played a very important role in the earthquake response. In the later stages of the emergency, the Cluster system worked less well in identifying overlaps and ensuring more harmonised approaches to avoid creating tensions within communities, particularly in shelter.

## **UNOCHA has played an important role in supporting local actors**

UNOCHA supports the GoI in a number of ways, ranging from help with running the Recovery Network to working closely with BNPB and supporting a range of technical working groups on DRR. As already noted, UNOCHA has also supported local (particularly Islamic) NGOs through the HRF. If UNOCHA headquarters closes the Indonesia office due to a lack of resources, the government and other local actors will lose its valuable support.

## **Field level studies are helpful and deserve donor support**

Aid agencies in Indonesia have made some efforts to analyse their experiences of responding to disasters in Indonesia and identify best practice. When NGOs have adopted different approaches in a particular sector or activity, attempts to examine what works best can provide valuable lessons. Members of the Emergency Capacity Building project also undertook a joint evaluation of their response to the West Java and West Sumatera earthquakes. Such field level studies are useful because they are far more likely to be used so they deserve donor support.

## **Need for greater donor coordination**

Although there are no formal mechanisms to coordinate the different donor and international aid agency initiatives to strengthen government capacity and support DPRR, donors have not found this to be a problem and did not feel that there was any overlap between the initiatives. However, from the BNPB perspective, the government is 'bombarded' by piecemeal efforts. Therefore, it would be helpful if donors established a coordination mechanism to reduce the burden on government agencies and ensure that their various initiatives are mutually supportive.

# **6. Recommendations**

The report presented recommendations at the end of sections to demonstrate that they are clearly based on evaluation findings. To make it easier for Sida and other actors to implement these recommendations, this section draws them all together, organising them according to the organisation(s) towards which they are directed. Most of the recommendations are addressed to Sida but, since the MFA is responsible for Sweden's global advocacy on humanitarian issues and engagement in interna-

tional fora, Sida will need to support the MFA in ensuring that its field-level experience informs the MFA's work in these global fora. In these cases, the recommendations are addressed to Sweden rather than Sida alone.

## **Sida and the MFA**

- Sweden should monitor the timeliness of the implementation of projects that it funds (including through pooled funds such as Emergency Response Funds (ERFs)/HRFs and the CERF).
- At a global level, Sida needs to develop or adopt a severity of crisis model to guide the determination of geographical funding envelopes, so as to ensure that its funding for each emergency is truly in proportion to the severity of needs. It should also ensure that criteria used to allocate funding within a specific crisis are used consistently.
- Sweden should encourage Clusters globally to raise awareness of the Cluster concept amongst all relevant stakeholders. This would enable all actors, including the private sector, to participate in Clusters when a disaster occurs. In the event of a natural disaster, Clusters should also align with both the host government's administrative structure as well as the disaster response coordination body (such as the national platform), which should include the private sector, academia, media and other civil society members.
- To increase direct funding from the HRF to local NGOs, Sida should support UNOCHA in undertaking a capacity assessment of Indonesian NGOs that have received HRF funding or are likely recipients to identify specific areas where they need support and then perhaps commission a suitable INGO to provide this support.
- Sida should emphasise its focus on local capacity strengthening (in whichever form is the most appropriate) in its partner agreements and to pooled fund administrators. This should encourage multilateral partners in particular to work more closely with local organisations.
- Sida could consider providing additional funding to the HRF to continue its engagement with preachers as one way of communicating key messages on disaster management and DRR to local communities.
- Sida's policy of focusing on DRR at global and regional levels has not had any visible impact on reducing disaster risk for vulnerable communities in Indonesia. It is important for Sida to ensure that DRR, particularly disaster preparedness, is mainstreamed in its funding decisions and that all partners include a preparedness/risk reduction focus in their humanitarian response programmes.
- The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) suggested that Sida should consider seconding a staff member to his office to advocate with the government and UN system on disaster preparedness. He believed that this would give the staff member access to UN contacts and greater influence with the UN system as well as the government.
- Sweden should work with like-minded donors to ensure that the CERF can finance prevention activities. This would enhance its effectiveness and contribute to its life-saving objective.
- Given that Indonesia is the second most at-risk country to natural hazards, DPRR is vital for effective assistance to the country. Sida should mainstream DPRR into its humanitarian programming.
- As Sida does not have a country presence, it should consider funding already established programmes. Options include funding the Safer Communities through Disaster Risk Reduction (SCDRR) programme or Oxfam's Preparedness and response, Reducing risk, Influencing policy: a Model for Emergencies (PRIME) programme.

- It would be helpful for Sida to communicate its goals and approaches to partners in more detail so that mechanisms like the Humanitarian Response Fund retain the flexibility and support for recovery and longer-term approaches that Sida provides through its bilateral funding.
- Sida could make a greater effort to support the recovery elements of projects that it is supporting with bilateral funding.
- Once the government's MDTF for reconstruction and rehabilitation is operational, Sida could consider funding it, if it is disbursing in a timely way.
- UNOCHA Indonesia is playing an important role in strengthening the humanitarian system so Sida should consider funding it directly to ensure that it can continue its work on DRR and support to BNPB even if there is no major emergency in the country.
- Since the Indonesian army often provides emergency assistance in the aftermath of natural disasters, Sida could consider supporting actors such as the Red Cross Movement to provide it with training on humanitarian principles, gender and other relevant cross-cutting issues. Sida could also consider strengthening the capacity of UNOCHA's Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord).
- Sida could consider working with appropriate partners to promote international standards and humanitarian principles amongst the private sector at a global level.
- Sida should make project visits and/or commission beneficiary surveys to ensure that its partners consult affected communities and involve them in all stages of their programmes, including monitoring and evaluation. It should also support Plan in sharing its innovative approach to involving beneficiaries in monitoring.
- Sida should periodically attend DPRR events to co-ordinate its DPRR support with other actors. This could be a Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) meeting or the annual Convergence Group workshop.

## **UNOCHA**

- NGOs have experienced delays with the HRF largely due to administration issues in Geneva. UNOCHA is establishing an administrative unit specifically for ERFs/HRFs and should ensure that this speeds up disbursements. This unit should systematically inform UNOCHA field offices when it has disbursed funds to NGOs so that they can monitor the timeliness of implementation.
- To ensure that the HRF remains a flexible mechanism and supports the most appropriate forms of response, it would be helpful if it did not set specific percentages on the amount of funding that can be used to support prevention, response and recovery. This will enable NGOs to take a holistic approach and include elements of preparedness and recovery into their emergency response programmes.
- Although the CERF remains accessible only to UN agencies, allowing non-UN agencies to become members of the HCT and participate in the decision making process is good practice and one that should be followed in countries where this does not happen currently.
- UNOCHA should ensure that its administrative requirements for ERFs/HRFs (e.g., requiring proposals in English) do not become barriers that prevent local NGOs from accessing funds.
- Field level research promotes better operational decision making and guides longer term planning. To ensure that the HRF supports the most effective humanitarian response, UNOCHA should

commission a review of the different approaches to temporary shelter that it supported and identify what worked best. It could build on the Cordaid review.

- UNOCHA should update the Review Board regularly on the progress of HRF-funded projects and make final reports available to Board members.

### **International humanitarian community**

- NGOs (both international and Indonesian) commonly complain that participating in UN Appeals does not result in funding. If donors and UN agencies expect NGOs to continue to invest in participating in these Appeals, they should ensure that NGOs see participation translate into funding.
- In future, Clusters should provide translation facilities to enable local NGOs, the private sector and government representatives to participate fully in meetings (as is the case with the monthly coordination meetings in Padang) or run meetings in Bahasa Indonesia.
- The international community should strengthen the capacity of local government bodies in Indonesia to take a lead in coordinating emergency response activities.
- It would be helpful if donors and international aid agencies coordinated their efforts to strengthen government capacity, which would reduce the burden on the government and ensure that the efforts were complementary.
- International aid agencies urgently need to strengthen the operation of the Working Groups in the Recovery Network on data collection and coordination of members' activities.
- Donors and international aid agencies should make the case for the need for coordination to local government agencies and strengthen their capacity to lead it, either directly or by strengthening BNPB's Technical Support Team (Tim Pendukung Teknis (TPT)).

### **HRF Review Board**

- When considering proposals, the HRF Review Board should ensure that they are promoting coordinated approaches, e.g., ensuring that NGOs provide the same size of cash grant.

### **Donors**

- AusAID's plan to deliver disaster management training through provincial universities to build up a critical mass of trained government officials is a promising way to tackle the challenge of staff turnover in government agencies. Other donors should consider supporting this initiative.
- The ECB joint evaluation is an example of good practice that should be replicated in future emergencies in Indonesia as well as globally. The lessons from the evaluation are also applicable broadly so Sida and other donors should support the dissemination of these lessons.
- It would be helpful if donors established a coordination mechanism to reduce the government's perception of being 'bombarded' by piecemeal assistance and to ensure complementarity of their capacity strengthening and DPRR efforts. One option is for donors to join the SCDRR Steering Committee meetings.

## Annex A: Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF) Overview

UNOCHA established the Indonesia Emergency Response Fund (ERF) in 2001 as a country level pooled funding mechanism for NGOs<sup>24</sup>. The table below shows donor contributions to the ERF. Since 2008, Sida has been the sole donor to it.

**Table 2: Donor Contributions to ERF/HRF from 2001–2010**

Donor	Funding (\$)	Project Period	# of Projects
UK Department for International Development	2,863,900	2002–2006	42
AusAID	999,000	2003–2006	14
The Kingdom Foundation, Saudi Arabia	266,576	2007	5
OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)	499,975	2007–2008	8
Sida	1,115,375	2007–2008	15
Sida	1,876,460	2009–2010	21
Sida	2,070,150	2010	19
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>9,691,436</b>		<b>124</b>

The fund's objective is to finance humanitarian activities that:

- Meet short-term emergency needs and re-establish basic living conditions
- Prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of emergency situations
- Lay the groundwork for supporting durable solutions by meeting initial recovery or transition needs.

ERF funding is not intended for responding to chronic social problems and long-term development needs. As described in section 2.1, UNOCHA and the Review Board have agreed to change the fund's name from *Emergency* to *Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF)*.

From 2002–2004, the HRF was used mainly to respond to humanitarian needs in post-conflict areas of Indonesia, such as: Aceh, Maluku, North Maluku, Central Sulawesi and West Kalimantan provinces. Since 2005, with an improvement in the post-conflict areas and an increase in natural disasters, the HRF has focused primarily on responding to natural disasters. So, the DFID and AusAID contributions were used mainly for responding to post-conflict needs while OFID and the Saudi Kingdom Foundation earmarked their contributions to the tsunami and the earthquake affected areas of the Java coast in 2006 and the Jakarta floods in 2007 respectively.

The Review Board comprises UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, WHO and FAO (with FAO as a recent member to represent the agriculture Cluster). UNOCHA has also invited IFRC to join so that the Board represents the full range of Clusters. The Board meets every 3 months.

To ensure that the HRF processes applications quickly, UNOCHA circulates proposals submitted to the HRF by email to get Board approval. UNOCHA undertakes a preliminary screening of proposals to ensure that they comply with HRF criteria and guidelines. It then sends its assessment and recommendation to Board members who can approve or reject the proposal or request changes. Board members give UNOCHA's assessment priority when making their decision, also examining the proposal and budget. Board members may also liaise with UNOCHA in the field about proposed projects. However, Review Board members suggested that it would be helpful if UNOCHA developed a checklist of criteria that they should take into consideration when assessing proposals.

The table below lists the projects that the HRF funded in 2009–2010, most of them responding to the West Java and West Sumatera earthquakes. It is based on data supplied by UNOCHA updated in June 2010.

<sup>24</sup> The description of the fund in this section is based on the revised HRF guidelines and on UNOCHA's 2009–2010 donor report to Sida.

Table 3: HRF Funded Projects: 2009–2010

NGO	Project Title	Location	Duration	Objective	Budget/ Disbursement
<b>OXFAM/ROA</b>	T-Shelter for earthquake affected communities	2 villages in Buol District, Central Sulawesi Province	1 Feb – 31 May 09	To provide earthquake-resistant T-shelter and raise public awareness on disaster preparedness	85,960 83,560
<b>Church World Service (CWS)</b>	Emergency Assistance for Earthquake Affected People	46 villages in 9 sub-districts in Talaud District, North Sulawesi	15 March – 10 July 09	To provide shelter and tool kits and to raise community awareness on disaster preparedness	66,659 63,599
<b>PLAN Int'l</b>	Surakarta Floods Response	3 villages in Serengan, Pasar Kliwon and Jebres sub-districts of Surakarta District, West Java	15 March – 15 Sept 09	To provide durable tents and conduct disaster preparedness/ education activities	95,383 95,382
<b>Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)</b>	Bengawan Solo Floods Response in E. Java	24 villages in 3 sub-districts in Tuban, Lamongan and Bojonegoro districts, East Java Province	1 April – 6 July 09	To provide additional nutritional intake and health services for children, mosquito spraying/ fogging/abate, and health promotion	85,037 82,053
<b>HOPE</b>	Manokwari Psychosocial and Disaster Education Intervention	5 sub-districts in Manokwari District, Papua Province	11 May – 11 Nov 09	Provide trauma counselling and conducting disaster education session for children, building local capacities by arranging trainings and workshops.	93,360 81,104
<b>HOPE</b>	West Java Earthquake Disaster Relief	24 hamlets, Margamulya Village, Pangalengan Sub-district, Bandung District	10 Sep – 10 Oct 09	To provide shelter kits and family kits	68,858 61,000
<b>PLAN Int'l</b>	Southern Java Earthquake Response	21 villages in Cisompet, Cibalong, Cikelet and Pendey sub-districts, Garut District	10 Sep – 10 Jan 2010	To provide shelter kits, and family kits, and to provide psychosocial healing for children through establishments of Child Friendly Spaces	79,718 79,718
<b>Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (ASB)</b>	West Java Earthquake Emergency Shelter Response	24 villages in Cihaurbeuti, Mangunjawa, Kawali, Cipaku, Cisaga and Purwadadi sub-districts, Ciamis District	10 Sep – 10 Oct 09	To provide shelter kits and family kits	79,624 76,226
<b>Islamic Relief Indonesia (IRI)</b>	WASH Response to Drought in Pandeglang District, Banten Province	16 villages in 5 sub-districts in Pandeglang District, Banten Province	17 Sep 09 – 17 April 2010	To provide safe drinking-water facilities, increase community awareness, build capacity on WASH facilities, and WASH promotion	99,837 83,692
<b>ADRA</b>	Emergency Shelter Response in Tasikmalaya	Eight villages in Cisayong and Sodong Hilir sub-districts, Tasikmalaya District	17 Sept – 17 Oct 09	To provide shelter and family kits	58,000 58,000
<b>OXFAM</b>	West Java Earthquake Response	153 villages, 32 sub-districts in Ciamis, Tasikmalaya, Garut and Cianjur	17 Sept – 30 Nov 09	To provide tarpaulin	78,776 78,158

NGO	Project Title	Location	Duration	Objective	Budget/ Disbursement
<b>Mercy Corps</b>	West Java Earthquake Response	Mandalakasih Village, Pamengpeuk Sub-district, Garut District	17 Sept – 30 Oct 09	To provide 18 T-shelters, 5 communal latrines, 9 private latrines & conduct community training on build back safer	47,000 44,779
<b>PLAN Int'l</b>	West Sumatera Earthquake Response	21 villages in North Pariaman Sub-district, Pariaman City	15 Oct – 15 Dec 09	To provide family shelter kits and hygiene kits	97,905 90,580
<b>HOPE</b>	West Sumatera Earthquake Relief	4 villages in Sungai Limau and Ulakan Tapakis sub-districts, Padang Pariaman District	15 Oct – 15 Dec 09	To provide tarpaulins and blankets, and safe-living in displacement promotion	100,000 95,350
<b>ASB</b>	West Sumatera Earthquake Emergency Shelter Response	3 villages in Enam Lingkung Sub-district, Padang Pariaman District	15 Oct – 15 Dec 09	To provide family shelter kits and communal cleaning kits	100,000 87,248
<b>Mercy Corps</b>	West Sumatera earthquake Response	4 villages in 3 sub-districts in Pesisir Selatan and Padang Pariaman districts	15 Oct 09 – 15 Jan 2010	To provide family hygiene kits, water harvesting kits and construction kits	99,015 77,378
<b>OXFAM</b>	West Sumatera Earthquake Response	5 villages in 5 sub-district, Padang Pariaman District	15 Oct – 15 Dec 09	To provide tarpaulins	99,107 94,388
<b>Muslim Aid</b>	Immediate Shelter Needs for Padang Sago, Padang Pariaman	3 villages in Padang Sago Sub-district, Padang Pariaman District	15 Oct – 15 Dec 09	To provide shelter kits, cooking kits and cleaning kits	99,743 98,959
<b>Church World Service (CWS)</b>	Emergency Assistance for Earthquake Affected People in Padang Pariaman	2 villages in Sungai Limau and Sungai Geringging sub-districts, Padang Pariaman District	15 Oct – 15 Dec 09	To provide family shelter kits and communal cleaning kits	99,841 99,841
<b>Islamic Relief Indonesia (IRI)</b>	Emergency Rehabilitation of Water Supply and Wells	17 villages in Padang Sago, VII Koto and Patamanan sub-districts, Padang Pariaman District	1 Nov – 31 Dec 09	To provide WASH facilities, and conduct WASH promotion	69,893 66,221
<b>Nahdliathul Ulama (NU)</b>	Emergency Assistance for Earthquake Affected Community in W. Sumatera	3 villages in Enam Lingkung, VII Koto Sungai Sarik and Padang Sago sub-district in Padang Pariaman District	1 Nov 09 – 31 Jan 2010	To provide WASH facilities, conduct DRR training for Muslim preachers, and rebuild mosques	69,104 66,582
<b>PLAN</b>	Child Friendly T-Shelter Construction	Pariaman Utara Sub-district, Pariaman City	10 Jan – 10 May 2010	To provide cash grant (\$250/HH) for t-shelter & conduct training on youth participatory M&E	99,000 99,000
<b>Save the Children</b>	T-shelter Project	Korong Aur Malintang, Pariaman Utara, Pariaman City	10 Jan – 10 April 2010	To provide cash grant (\$275/HH) for t-shelter & provide technical assistance on safe t-shelter construction	99,744 99,744

N60	Project Title	Location	Duration	Objective	Budget/ Disbursement
<b>Save the Children</b>	T-shelter Project	Korong Batu Basa, Pariaman Utara, Pariaman City	10 Jan – 10 April 2010	To provide cash grant (\$275/HH) for t-shelter & provide technical assistance on safe t-shelter construction	99,744 99,744
<b>Catholic Relief Service (CRS)</b>	W. Sumatera Earthquake response, T-shelter Programme	Malalak Selatan, Malalak Sub-district, Agam District	10 Jan – 10 March 2010	To provide cash grant (\$270/HH) for t-shelter & provide technical assistance on safe t-shelter construction	100,000 100,000
<b>Catholic Relief Service (CRS)</b>	W. Sumatera Earthquake response, T-shelter Programme	Malalak Barat, Malalak Sub-district, Agam District	10 Jan – 10 March 2010	To provide cash grant (\$270/HH) for t-shelter & provide technical assistance on safe t-shelter construction	100,000 100,000
<b>Muslim Aid</b>	Transitional Shelter Project	Padang Sago Sub-district, Padang Pariaman	10 Jan – 10 Jun 2010	To provide pre-fabricated t-shelter, and conduct community training on safe house construction	100,000 100,000
<b>Church World Service (CWS)</b>	T-shelter Assistance for Earthquake-affected People in Padang Pariaman District	Koto Bongko, Sn Geringging, Padang Pariaman District	10 Jan – 10 May 2010	To provide building materials for t-shelter and conduct community training on safe t-shelter construction	100,000 100,000
<b>Islamic Relief</b>	T-shelter and WASH construction for W Sumatra Earthquake Response	Batu Kalang, Padang Sago Sub-district, Padang pariaman District	10 Jan – 10 may 2010	To provide building material, build communal WASH facilities, conduct community training on safe t-shelter and hygiene	100,000 100,000
<b>Relief International</b>	Ind Rapid Assistance for t-shelter in Padang Pariaman	Ulakan Tapakis, Padang Pariaman District	10 Jan – 10 May 2010	To provide cash grant (\$200/HH) for t-shelter & conduct community training on safe t-shelter & house construction	94,320 94,320
<b>International Relief and Development (IRD)</b>	Emergency WASH in Padang Pariaman District	Patamuan, Padang Pariaman District	10 Jan – 10 April 2010	To provide community & school latrines, repair/install water pipeline, & repair water irrigation channelling	99,841 99,841
<b>CORDAID / AMAN</b>	Padang Earthquake Recovery Programme 2010	Sungai Limau and Pilubang Sub-district, Padang Pariaman	1 Feb – 31 July 2010	Part of programme co-funded by Cordaid. To increase coping capacities of affected communities by meeting immediate shelter needs, facilitating alternatives for drinking water and empowering women to take a key role in recovery and rehabilitation. ERF funds used to assist families in the construction of T-shelters by providing materials (to complement community contributions of materials) and carpenters. Value of assistance per HH: approx. IDR 2.5 million.	100,000 100,000

NGO	Project Title	Location	Duration	Objective	Budget/ Disbursement
<b>CORDAID / Pusat Studi Pembangunan Perdamaian (PSP)</b>	Padang Earthquake Recovery Programme 2010	Enam Lingkung Sub-district, Padang Pariaman District	1 Feb – 31 July 2010	Part of programme co-funded by Cordaid. ERF funds used to assist with the purchase of materials. PSP provided materials (plywood & cement), technical supervision, and small funds (approx. IDR 1.7 million per HH) to households to mobilize carpenters.	100,000 100,000
<b>CORDAID / Bina Swadaya</b>	Padang Earthquake Recovery Programme 2010	VII Koto Padang Sago Sub-district, Padang Pariaman District	1 Feb – 31 July 2010	Part of programme co-funded by Cordaid. Assist families in the construction of transitional shelters by providing materials, technical assistance, and small funds (approx. IDR 3.3 million per HH) to mobilize carpenters.	100,000 100,000
<b>Habitat for Humanity</b>	West Sumatera Disaster Response Project	V Koto Timur, Padang Pariaman District	20 Jan – 30 June 2010	To co-fund (35% of unit cost or \$532) house repair, and to conduct community training on building back safer	100,000 100,000
<b>Aceh's People Forum (APF)</b>	Temporary Classrooms Rehabilitation Project	Padang Pariaman District	25 March – 25 Aug 2010	Provide 33 temporary classrooms in 13 government-run elementary schools	99,295 99,295
<b>Save the Children</b>	Education Rehabilitation in West Sumatera	Agam and Padang Pariaman districts	25 March – 25 Sept 2010	Provide temporary classrooms and learning materials in 25 government-run schools, and conduct training for school committee and children on Safe School components	99,884 99,884
<b>World Relief</b>	West Sumatera Earthquake Transitional Shelter Program	Padang City	25 March – 25 Aug 2010	To provide cash grant (\$320/HH) for the support of T-shelter construction and conduct community training on building back safer	99,999 99,999
<b>PADMA</b>	Providing T-shelters for Low Income Beneficiary using Recycled – Salvaged Materials	Nagari Sungai Asam, VI Lingkung Sub-district, Padang Pariaman District	25 March – 25 Aug 2010	Provide building materials for the support of T-shelter constructions, and to conduct community workshop (for women and elderly) on monitoring construction process	99,459 99,459
<b>Yayasan Ananda Marga Indonesia (AMURT)</b>	Construction of Temporary Kindergartens Schools	Padang Pariaman and Kota Pariaman	25 March – 25 Sept 2010	Provide 12 temporary kindergarten schools, complemented with toilets and teaching materials	100,000 100,000

In addition to the project budgets listed in Table 3 above, in 2009, UNOCHA spent USD 60,214 on auditing 16 projects. As noted in section 2.1, at the suggestion of UNOCHA's administrative office in Geneva, UNOCHA Indonesia changed from allowing NGOs to charge for audits within their project budgets to commissioning its own auditor. For the 19 projects that the HRF funded in 2010, UNOCHA expects an audit cost of USD 76,514. In the interests of demonstrating value-for-money, it would be useful if UNOCHA Indonesia provided Sida with a comparison of the audit costs that NGOs paid directly with what UNOCHA is paying.

As noted in the main report, the HRF has operated well and is much appreciated by NGOs. However, UNOCHA Indonesia has faced administrative challenges with managing the fund. One has been the lack of administrative (as opposed to project management) guidelines from UNOCHA headquarters. For example, it is not clear how NGOs can use the contingency reserve line of the budget (originally, they were supposed to use it to cover project inputs but now they appear to be expected to use it to cover exchange rate fluctuations). The format for the MOU with NGOs also keeps changing.

Some of the administrative challenges are due to Sida's requirements. For example, Sida has asked for a financial statement showing that UNOCHA has spent all the money in its bank account before providing additional funds. However, this is a challenge because UNOCHA disburses 20 % of the grant amount at the end of the project, once the NGO has provided financial and narrative reporting. This means that it has some money remaining in its account even though this is already allocated to projects.

## Annex B: Methodology

This report is based on a field visit to Indonesia from 26<sup>th</sup> July – 6<sup>th</sup> August 2010. The team undertook key informant interviews with the Humanitarian Coordinator, aid agencies and 5 donors in Jakarta. Some interviews were with individual organisations and some were group consultations, e.g., with 6 CERF recipient agencies, the HRF Review Board and 11 HRF recipient NGOs. The team travelled to West Sumatera from 28<sup>th</sup> July – 1<sup>st</sup> August to visit Sida and HRF-funded projects and to consult aid agencies (including a group of HRF recipient NGOs in Padang), government representatives and crisis-affected communities. Team members also attended a coordination meeting chaired by TPT in Padang. On 4<sup>th</sup> August, the team visited an HRF-funded project in Pandeglang. The team supplemented information gathered during the field visit with a document review. The table below lists those consulted for this case study.

Name	Surname	Job title/ Organisation
Radiyan		AMURT
Muhibbuddin		Aceh People's Forum
Jiyono		Education Specialist, UNICEF
Rizalzi		Senior Officer, WASH, Islamic Relief
Munson		Project Coordinator, ADRA
Asnul		BAPPEDA Kota Pariaman
Syahrul		BAPPEDA Kota Padang
Setiabudhi		UNDP RISE Project
Kusnadi		UNDP RISE Project
Sentosa Budi	Alluhri	UNDP RISE Project
Avianto	Amri	Disaster Management Specialist/Emergency Operations Manager, PLAN Indonesia, Jakarta
Dewi	Amsari	Community Organiser, Habitat for Humanity Indonesia
Rosilawati	Anggraini	Humanitarian Officer, UNFPA
Ludi	Anwar	KP2T Pemko Padang
El-Mostafa	Benlamlih	UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC), Indonesia
Pria Santri	Beringin	Save the Children
Erynn	Carter	Director, West Sumatera, Mercy Corps
Astrid	Dionisio	Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF
Nanang	Dirja	Programme Coordinator, Islamic Relief, Banten
Riki	Falantino	BAPPEDA Kota Pariaman
Irawati M.	Hapasari	Programme Officer, UNDP
Andreas	Hapsoro	Project Coordinator, Habitat for Humanity, Padang Pariaman
Medi	Herlianto	Deputy National Project Director, DR4, UNDP/BNPB, Jakarta
Gerard	Howe	Deputy Head Programmes, Senior Social Development Adviser, DFID, Jakarta
Gustya	Indriani	Deputy Programme Manager, DFID, Jakarta
Denny	Koswara	Programme Development, International Relief and Development
Lindalisa K	Kulenga	Programme Development & Funding Coordinator, Oxfam
Tony	Kurnia	IT/PR Officer, ADRA
Dr Vijay Nath	Kyaw Win	Medical Officer, WHO
Vanda	Lengkong	DRR Project Manager, PLAN Indonesia, Jakarta

Name	Surname	Job title/ Organisation
Ignacio	Leon-Garcia	Head of Office, UNOCHA Indonesia
Rajeshwar	Mandal	AMURT
Esther	Manuhutu	Habitat for Humanity, Indonesia
Yahdi	Mayasa	Hygiene Promotion Officer, Islamic Relief
Nike	Medah	Programme Officer, Church World Service, Indonesia
Akbar	Meirio	UNDP RISE Project
Ikhsan	Mentong	Church World Service, Indonesia
Titi	Moektijasih	Humanitarian Affairs Advisor, UNOCHA Indonesia
Lu'lu	Muhammad	National Project Manager, UNDP, Jakarta
Mirna	Mutiara	Programme Development Coordinator, Church World Service, Indonesia
Yuventus	Newin	PADMA Indonesia
Ali	Noor	Country Director, Islamic Relief
Laksmita	Noviera	Humanitarian Affairs Analyst, UNOCHA, Jakarta
Yusak	Oppusunggu	Program Specialist, USAID, Indonesia
Jeong	Park	Disaster Management Advisor, AusAID, Jakarta
Didiek	Purwandanu	UNDP RISE Project
Mindaraga/Iwan	Rahardja	Emergency Response Officer, UNOCHA Indonesia
Nova	Ratnanto	District Coordination and Liaison Officer, Early Recovery Network, Office of the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator (UN RC/HC), Padang
Nugroho	Retno	BAPPEDA Prov. Sumbar
Linda	Rupidara	Programme Officer, ECHO, Jakarta
Ariza Mayang	Sari	UNDP RISE Project
Dino	Satria	Church World Service Indonesia
Hary	Satria	PDAM Kota Padang
Khen	Shimizu	Operations Coordinator, FAO
Imelda	Sihombing	Senior Administrative Manager, International Relief and Development
Kristanto	Sinandang	Head, Conflict Prevention and Recovery Unit, UNDP
Annika	Siwertz	Counsellor, Embassy of Sweden, Jakarta
Hester	Smidt	Cordaid
Lina	Sofiani	Emergency Specialist, UNICEF, Jakarta
Benni	Sormin	Assistant Representative, FAO
Unggul	Sudrajat	UNDP RISE Project
Nono	Sumarsono	Program Support Manager, Plan Indonesia, Jakarta
Muji	Susilawati	KP2T Pemko Padang
Afriando	Tarigan	UNDP RISE Project
Awiny	Tjendra	Finance Officer, Hope Worldwide Indonesia
Yovianus	Toni	Programme Manager, PADMA Indonesia
Lilik	Trimaya	Emergency Response Coordinator, Oxfam
Budhi	Ulaen	Programme Officer, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit, UNDP Indonesia, Jakarta
Ervin	Walenta	PADMA Indonesia
Donald	Warouw	Programme Manager, Hope Worldwide Indonesia

Name	Surname	Job title/ Organisation
M Josephine	Widiastuti	M&E Officer, Catholic Relief Services
Suci Melati	Wulandari	Emergency Programme Officer, WHO
Fran Rizal	Yeni	Padang Coordinator, Islamic Relief
Mona	Yolanda	Programme Manager, KOGAMI

In addition to various consultations, the team members (together with UNOCHA), participated in a live hour-long radio interview on 31<sup>st</sup> July on Siaga FM, a radio station based in Padang and specialising in discussions of disaster management and risk reduction. The aim was to inform local communities in West Sumatera about the Sida evaluation and its findings.

The table below lists the projects that the team visited. During these visits, the team conducted 7 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with crisis-affected communities (5 in West Sumatera and 2 in Pandeglang). The team used the ‘spokes’ technique (a participatory learning approaches tool) with the HRF recipient NGOs in Jakarta and two community groups.<sup>25</sup>

Projects/sites visited	Objectives	Implementer	Interviews/FGDs
Recovery Initiatives for Sumatera Earthquake (RISE): visits to Padang former bus terminal, KOGAMI implemented manual demolition project and one school demolition site (bilateral funding)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technical assistance</li> <li>• Rubble clearance &amp; demolition (RCD)</li> <li>• Support communities to build back better</li> <li>• Livelihoods (not started at time of visit)</li> <li>• Coordination (Recovery Network)</li> </ul>	UNDP	3 individuals at bus terminal (RDC project leader at PWD & 2 cafe owners) Beneficiaries of KOGAMI project (1 family) School principal and teachers
Child-friendly temporary shelter project (HRF-funded)	To provide cash grant (\$250/HH) to 270 families for temporary shelter (T-shelter) & conduct training on youth participatory M&E (30 youths)	Plan Indonesia	FGD with around 15 women in Cubadak Air Utara village FGD with 5 girls & 7 boys trained in film-making/monitoring
Education rehabilitation project in Agam & Padang Pariaman (HRF-funded)	Provide temporary classrooms and learning materials in 25 government-run schools, and conduct training for school committee and children on Safe School components	Save the Children	Principal of school in Padang Pariaman given 6 temporary classrooms
T-shelter project in Sungai Limau and Pilubang Sub-district, Padang Pariaman (HRF funded)	Project co-funded by Cordaid and ERF. Aim: to decrease the vulnerabilities of earthquake affected communities by facilitating the construction of T-shelter, restore livelihoods and facilitate strategies to mitigate and prevent risks. ERF funds used to assist families in the construction of T shelters by providing materials, technical assistance, and small funds (approx. IDR 3.3 million per HH) to mobilize carpenters.	Cordaid/Bina Swadaya	FGD with 20 women who were beneficiaries of Save the Children, Bina Swadaya, Muslim Aid and Islamic Relief projects visited

<sup>25</sup> The Spokes tool was developed by CR2 Social Development

Projects/sites visited	Objectives	Implementer	Interviews/FGDs
T-shelter project in Padang Sago Sub-district, Padang Pariaman (HRF funded)	To provide pre-fabricated T-shelter, and conduct community training on safe house construction	Muslim Aid	Visited home of one participant in FGD with women (see above)
T-shelter and WASH construction project in Batu Kalang, Padang Sago Sub-district, Padang pariaman (HRF funded)	To provide building material, build communal WASH facilities, conduct community training on safe T-shelter and hygiene	Islamic Relief	Joint FGD (see above) supplemented by site visit to communal well & latrines built at a mosque
WASH Response to Drought in 16 villages in 5 sub-districts, Pandeglang District, Banten Province (HRF funded)	To provide safe drinking-water facilities, increase community awareness, build capacity on WASH facilities, and WASH promotion	Islamic Relief	One FGD with 37 women and one short FGD on WASH training with over 30 children in Pasir Awi village. Plus, interviews with members of 2 water committees, group of 4 women and one young female activist promoting hygiene
T-shelter for low income beneficiaries using recycled salvaged materials in Nagari Sungai Asam, VI Lingkungan Sub-district, Padang Pariaman District	Provide building materials for the support of T-shelter constructions, and to conduct community workshop (for women and elderly) on monitoring construction process.	PADMA	Two FGDs, one with approximately 15 women and one with approximately 20 men. Spokes tool used with male group (see Table 1 in Section 4).
Temporary Classrooms Rehabilitation Project in Padang Pariaman District	Provide 33 temporary classrooms in 13 government-run elementary schools.	Aceh's People Forum (APF)	Head teachers from some of the schools participated in the male FGD (see PADMA project above).
T-shelter construction in Enam Lingkungan Sub-district, Padang Pariaman District	Project co-funded by Cordaid and ERF. Aim: to decrease the vulnerabilities of earthquake affected communities by facilitating the construction of t-shelter and improving access to water." ERF funds used to assist with the purchase of materials. PSPP provided materials (plywood & cement), technical supervision, and small funds (approx. IDR 1.7 million per HH) to households to mobilize carpenters.	CORDAID / Pusat Studi Pembangunan Perumahan (PSPP)	Interviews with PSPP staff and visits to T-shelters
T-shelter construction in V Koto Timur, Padang Pariaman District	To co-fund house repair (35% of unit cost or \$532), and to conduct community training on building back safer.	Habitat for Humanity	Interview with project staff
Construction of Temporary Kindergarten Schools in Padang Pariaman and Kota Pariaman	Provide 12 temporary kindergarten schools, complemented with toilets and teaching materials.	Yayasan Ananda Marga Indonesia (AMURT)	Interview with project staff and visit to kindergarten

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## Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance

This case study was prepared as part of the evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance (2010:4). It focuses on assessing Sida's funding and work in Indonesia and attempts to learn lessons from this to inform the future humanitarian strategy and programming.

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