

SYRIA (including Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey) Humanitarian Crises Analysis 2015

January 2015

Each year, Sida conducts a humanitarian allocation exercise in which a large part of its humanitarian budget is allocated to emergencies worldwide. This allocation takes place in the beginning of the year as to ensure predictability for humanitarian organisations and to allow for best possible operational planning. In an effort to truly adhere to the humanitarian principles Sida bases its allocation decisions on a number of objective indicators of which the most important are related to the number of affected people, vulnerability of affected people and level of funding in previous years. One of the indicators is also related to forgotten crises in order to ensure sufficient funding also to low profile crises. Besides this initial allocation, another part of the humanitarian budget is set aside as an emergency reserve for sudden onset emergencies and deteriorating humanitarian situations. This reserve allows Sida to quickly allocate funding to any humanitarian situation throughout the year, including additional funding to the Syria crises.

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

With no end in sight for the conflict in Syria soon entering its fifth year, and Iraq currently facing a complex and escalating crisis since January 2014, the protection and humanitarian crisis in the region is continuing to deteriorate and indeed increase in severity. The Islamic State (IS) advances in Syria and Iraq, which intensified towards the end of 2013, has effectively put an end to the Sykes-Picot agreement. Since 2013, IS has managed to take control of a territory encompassing large areas of eastern and northern Syria and western and northern Iraq, establishing its main stronghold in Ar Raqqa city in Syria. Although under pressure from the aerial military attacks by the alliance formed against it, IS continues to preserve and build its control over large parts of the two countries and may attempt to increase it further. As such, IS is likely to have a continued presence in the two countries for many years ahead. However, the drivers of continued conflict and political instability in Syria and Iraq goes much beyond the presence of IS, though its presence has added to the complex relationships between internal and regional actors. The crises in Syria and Iraq are indisputably linked together, however, the complex and distinct nature of each needs to be recognised, not least in regards to the role played by the respective governments.

The conflict in Syria has led to devastating humanitarian consequences within Syria itself, but has also resulted in vast humanitarian needs and increasing tension and instability in neighbouring countries. Inside Syria 12,2 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, of which 7,6 million are internally displaced. Over 3,2 million people have fled to the neighbouring countries of Lebanon (1,2 million registered refugees), Turkey (1,5 million registered refugees) Jordan (620,000), Iraq (228,000) and Egypt (138,000), but also to North African countries. The impact on host countries, municipalities, communities and individual households has been severe and has at times resulted increased political instability and inter-communal tension (most notably in Lebanon, northern Jordan and southern Turkey).

In Iraq, some 2.1 million people have been displaced from their place of origin due to the violence and insecurity prevailing in large areas of the country. In addition to the current conflict, the political situation in Iraq has been fragile since 2011 and fractures between key leadership groups have led to multiple governance issues. As the Iraqi conflict intensified during 2014, some 150,000 people left the country and sought refuge in the neighbouring countries. This is in addition to those Iraqi refugees who remain in the neighbouring countries since the previous crisis, including approximately 40,000 Iraqi refugees in Syria.

The humanitarian situation in the affected countries are spread across all sectors, with protection as an overarching objective of the humanitarian response in the region. The main vulnerable groups affected by the crises include children, women, the elderly, IDPs (Internally Displaced persons), refugees, migrants and third country asylum seekers, Palestinian refugees from Syria, and other minorities. The needs of host communities also need to be emphasised, having shown great generosity towards those in need. Resilience levels amongst those directly affected by conflict, refugees, IDPs and host communities alike are decreasing rapidly in many areas, and are further undermined by the inaccessibility, economic downturn, sanctions, drought and winter conditions. Anecdotal surveys show that the use of negative coping mechanisms is widespread and increasing, with growing evidence of child labour, increased levels of school drop out rates, early and forced marriage, sexual and gender based violence and other protection concerns.

1.2 Risks and threats

The main risk to people and communities within the region is the continuation and escalation of conflict and political instability. The lack of respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights Law (HRL) further emphasise the protection crisis but also has devastating consequences on the humanitarian response, not least in regards to humanitarian access.

As the political climate hardens inside Syria's neighbouring countries in regards to the refugee question, with Lebanon and Jordan strictly restricting the numbers of refugees being let into their countries, there is a risk that the policy of border closure continues and is further extended. This will have far-reaching protection consequences for the millions of IDPs inside Syria, and possibly Iraq, as well as refugees in the region.

Whilst humanitarian actors are responding to the crises in both Syria and Iraq, it is not foreseen that the security and political situation in the region will be improving significantly during the coming year. The risk of further displacement is likely to occur resulting in a larger number of IDPs and refugees if border policies allow for.

The resilience of peoples and communities risk deteriorating further, not least as a result of a continued economic downturn, competition for jobs, as well as the pressures on existing basic service delivery institutions. This may also affect the level of generosity and patience shown by host communities in future, and may add to inter-communal tension, with added direct overspill of the conflict in Syria in some cases. Tension between IDPs and refugees has also been noted in Iraq.

A generic risk in all countries with humanitarian needs is the risk of corruption. With general challenges in *all* societal pillars including law, order, stability and justice - the area of checks and balances also becomes fragile. Syria ranks on number 159 on Transparency International's Index for 2014. In Syria and Iraq, as with many conflict affected context, the issue is becoming extremely critical, and as such there is an urgent need to strengthen due diligence and monitoring mechanisms. As the black market economy grows in Syria and in the neighbouring countries, there is a significant risk of continued corruption, aid diversion and exploitation.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan

The following strategic objectives have been agreed within the WoS strategy and the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) for Syria in 2015:

- Promote protection of and access to affected people in accordance with IHL and IHRL including clear accountability of parties to the conflict and all relevant actors.
- Provide life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian assistance to people in need, prioritising the most vulnerable.
- Strengthen resilience, livelihoods and early recovery through communities and institutions.
- Strengthen harmonised coordination modalities through enhanced information management, communication and joint planning. Enhance the response capacity of all actors assisting people in need in Syria, including local actors and communities.

The following strategic objectives have been agreed on within the SRP for Iraq:

- Respond to the protection needs of civilians, including those displaced and otherwise affected by the conflict, with due regard to human rights and international humanitarian law;
- Provide life-saving assistance and ensure access to essential services for displaced and vulnerable individuals in a manner that supports the Government's responsibility as first responder; and,
- Improve the access of conflict affected people to livelihoods and durable solutions to enable them to restore their self-sufficiency and build resilience.

The following two objectives are identified in the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) document as guiding objectives for the response in 2015-2016:

- Refugee protection and humanitarian assistance will address the protection and assistance needs of refugees living in camps, in settlements and in local communities in all sectors, as well as the most vulnerable members of impacted communities.
- Resilience/Stabilisation-based development will address the resilience and stabilisation needs of impacted and vulnerable communities in all sectors; build the capacities of national and sub-national service delivery systems; strengthen the ability of governments to lead the crisis response; and provide the strategic, technical and policy support to advance national responses.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

Governments' capacity and willingness to respond to the crises varies widely over the region. In Syria, where the government is a party to the conflict, wide-ranging restrictions have been imposed on the humanitarian community,

however, line-ministries continue to deliver services in various degrees to parts of the country including to a limited extent in areas controlled by the opposition. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) continues to be the main implementor of humanitarian programming inside Syria. National and local NGOs were almost non-existent prior to the crisis, and there is therefore an urgent need to build their capacity.

In Iraq, the majority of national organisations are development orientated and lack humanitarian response capacity. The magnitude and duration of the emergency is beyond the government response capacity, and as such external assistance is required to complement the governments efforts.

In Syria's neighbouring countries the host governments have varied capacity, ranging from Turkey where the government remains in lead of the wider response both in terms of financial costs, but also arguably in regards to leadership and coordination; to Lebanon where the political situation has undermined the effectiveness of the response. Overall, the civil society is strong. However lacks experience in responding to complex humanitarian crises.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

Although being the first humanitarian crisis to be declared as Level 3 (i.e. most severe ranking possible), the international response to the Syria crisis, and subsequently also to the Iraq crisis, has been characterised by a lack of overall strategic leadership and coordination, on the regional as well as on country level. Disagreement over coordination structures and mandates, continues to impact negatively on the overall response. The main humanitarian donors, including Sweden, continue to advocate strongly for this to be resolved immediately in line with the Transformative Agenda.

The process of formulating the Comprehensive Response Strategy Framework (CRSF), aimed at ensuring an efficient and cost-effective response, has not had the desired and expected impact and has as such not provided needed guidance to humanitarian and development donors.

In past month, there has been a commitment from all to the Whole of Syria (WoS) approach. It entails a coordinated and needs-based approach to meeting the humanitarian needs in the whole country (and as such ensuring better coordination from the regular and cross line operations led from Damascus and cross border operations from Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan legitimised by Security Council resolutions 2139, 2165 and 2191). As such the HNO and SRP for Syria will for the first time reflect the needs and response capacity for the whole country. The move towards a WoS approach is certainly necessary and has been largely positive so far, however, the process is still in its infancy and should be viewed as a work in progress.

The scale of the humanitarian situation and its linkages to the crisis in Syria, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) declared the humanitarian crisis in Iraq as L3 in order to scale up the response. Approximately, 36 international humanitarian organisations (UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent and international NGOs) are all actively providing assistance in the various sectors across the country. Although the SRP targets all affected areas of Iraq, presence of agencies in the KRI region is high, whilst fewer operate in the south and centre regions. Most agencies were working in Iraq prior to the humanitarian crisis apart from OCHA which re-established itself in Iraq in June 2014.

The 3RP for 2015 and 2016, builds on the CRSF and the previous Refugee Response Plans (RRP), and is meant to enhance response effectiveness, increase cost efficiency of interventions and promote greater accountability and consistency in delivery by using one single planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation framework). It has two components, one for the refugee response (lead by UNHCR) and one for resilience (lead by UNDP). Though it is a regional plan, the country-level is at the centre and much dependent on the specific government's positions. As such the RC/HCs also has a central role in regards to leadership, coordination and advocacy. The planning process and expected formulation of each of the country plans have varied significantly in the countries. Concerns in regards to the needs-based nature of the response (including prioritisation and targeting), the coordination process itself, as well as the complementarity of the refugee and resilience components are continuously raised. Questions in regards to how the 3RP will be linked to the SRPs for Iraq and Syria remain.

The overall response in the region is improving in regards to capacity. However, the lack of humanitarian access, adherence to IHL and HRL, as well as the volatile security situation in Syria and Iraq in particular, significantly limits the response. In addition, the lack of hard data, needs assessments and analysis continues to be a major constraint.

The lack of funding continues to negatively affect the overall response. As such, difficult decisions are made in regards to coverage and response, which increases the need for better strategic and needs-based targeting and prioritisation on sector and inter-sector level. Furthermore, the lack of development and stabilisation funding to enhance resilience and respond to acute livelihoods and education needs in particular, also negatively impacts on the humanitarian response across the affected countries.

2.3 International and regional assistance

The main humanitarian donors to the region include the US, the UK, ECHO, Germany, Japan and Canada. Funding pledges are likely to be announced during the third pledging conference for the Syria crisis, Kuwait III. It is likely that humanitarian donors will continue a multi-sectoral approach for both Syria and the neighbouring countries, however, there is a risk that funding may start to level out during 2015. There continues to be an urgent need for development donors to increase their funding to meet the overall needs to what is quickly developing into a protracted crisis.

Regional donors, institutions and individuals are involved in the response. However, though efforts have been made to increase information sharing and coordination, little is known in regards to coverage and priorities.

3. SIDA'S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1. Sida's role

In 2014 Sida allocated a total amount of SEK 320 million to UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement and INGOs for the Syria crisis. Approximately 60% was allocated to Syria itself, while specific funding was also allocated to target acute needs in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Sida's humanitarian assistance to Iraq was SEK 170 million in 2014 (not including the Syrian refugee response).

Sida has largely provided unearmarked funding to UN agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA) and ICRC in order to ensure needed flexibility. Sida has built a strategic partnership with the Swedish Red Cross (SRC), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Norwegian Refugee Committee (NRC), and Save the Children (SC).

Sida's approach, characterised by being flexible, principled and needs-based, has proven to be both relevant and effective, and in line with overall donor priorities. Sida strategy has included strong emphasis on the need for improved coordination, targeting of acute needs and needs assessments, provision multi-sectoral assistance with a strong emphasis on protection, as well as adherence of IHL and HRL. Sida has furthermore emphasised the need for capacity building of local actors and gender mainstreaming.

3.2. Response Priorities 2015

Sida's priorities for the overall Syria crisis and Iraq crisis response in 2015 are as follows:

- Protection with emphasis on: 1) the need for adherence to IHL and HRL, as well as unimpeded humanitarian access within Syria and the region, and 2) the particular needs of IDPs, women, children, Palestinians, as well as other vulnerable groups
- Multi-sectoral needs based and principled humanitarian assistance, including preparedness and emergency response
- Improved coordination in line with WoS strategy and the CRSF
- Resilience and improved joint humanitarian/development analysis and response

Sida will continue to ensure that protection, gender and capacity building is mainstreamed throughout the programme.

Sida will continue to prioritise needs within Syria and Iraq, earmarking approximately 50-60% of the allocated funding to Syria itself. Specific funding will continue to be allocated to Lebanon and Jordan, however, other context (Turkey, Egypt) will be covered through unearmarked funding and the rapid response mechanism. Sida will continue to advocate for a comprehensive humanitarian response in each of the countries, meaning that all humanitarian needs should be responded to in a coordinated and efficient manner, also from the donor side.

For the Syria crisis, Sida has sought to develop linkages between the humanitarian assistance programme and the development programme within the Democracy and Human Rights sector. Should there be opportunities to extend the linkages with future development strategies through country or regional strategies, health, education, food security and livelihoods are possible areas where Sida's programme focus could be linked further in order to build the resilience of conflict-affected communities, IDPs, refugees and host communities alike.

Sida's development programme in Iraq is in the process of phasing out by July 2015. A new regional strategy for the MENA region, as well as a Syria crisis strategy are expected at the beginning of 2016.

3.3. Partners

Syria crisis initial allocation plan

Suggested initial allocation for Syria crisis- SEK 200 million

Organisation	Syria	Reg	Lebanon	Jordan	Turkey	Iraq	Egypt	Total amount (MSEK)
SRC	12 (relief, health, OD)							12
IRC			6 (protection)			6 (protection,)		12
NRC			11 (ICLA, shelter, ed, livelihoods)	8 (ICLA, shelter, ed, livelihoods)		8 (WASH)*		19
SCI			5 (education, CP)			7 (CP, education)*		5
Oxfam	5 (WASH, food security, NFI)							5
ERF Syria	5							5
HPF CB								
ERF Lebanon			5					5
ERF Jordan				5				5
OCHA	5							5
UNICEF	15	15			5			35
UNRWA	20							20
UNHCR		10	5 (cash)	5 (cash)				20
ICRC	5			5				10
ACAPS/SNAP		5						5
Other								37
Total	104	30	32	23	5	6	0	200

- To be covered by the budget for Iraq.

SYRIA

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

After nearly four years of conflict in Syria, there is still no end in sight. Since the breakdown of the Geneva II process, the international community has not been successful in finding new opportunities for a political process to be restarted. The warring parties have continued military capacity to stand their ground and cause considerable damage. However, no side has the ability to secure control over the whole country. As such, further instability, with possible further escalations of violence and loss of life is to be expected during the coming year (s). Over the past year, the regime has regained some of the momentum lost, at the same time as the opposition continues to be widely fragmented. The continued presence of the Islamic State (IS) in particular, but also other radical groups such as Jabat al Nusra, has further complicated the situation and weakened the influence and strength of moderate oppositional groups.

The humanitarian response has been mired by the ever deteriorating security situation, but also by the systematic obstructions by the Syrian authorities, as well as oppositional groups. There continues to be flagrant abuses of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights Law (HRL), including the indiscriminate attacks on densely populated civilian areas, targeting of medical personnel and infrastructure, and the use of sieges as a weapon of war. This has had a detrimental effects on access inside Syria, which led the international community to adopt security council resolutions 2139, 2165 and 2191 on humanitarian access. While this has legitimised and opened up new possibilities for both cross line and cross border access, the security situation has meant that these have had only limited impact so far.

The UN estimates that over 191,000 people (number of confirmed deaths) have died and almost one million people have been injured. The conflict has led to widespread suffering and humanitarian needs throughout all sectors with 12,2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, of which an estimated 5 million are children and 4,8 million are located in so-called – ‘hard to reach’ areas (of which 2.7 million are located in IS controlled areas, which are also being targeted by the Iraq and US government and their allies as part of the strategy to weaken IS in Iraq). Approximately 7,6 million people have been internally displaced, many several times over past years. Over 3 million people have fled across the borders to neighbouring countries. However, the governments of Jordan and Lebanon have during 2014 adopted stricter control of their borders making it increasingly difficult for Syrians to seek refuge abroad (please see chapeau as well as country specific HCAs for Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq). This means that almost half of Syria’s pre-crisis population has been displaced, making it the largest displacement crisis globally. Furthermore, Syria has been recognised as the largest protection crisis on the global stage, due to the escalating levels of violence and violations of IHL and HRL.

In addition to the needs described above, access to basic social services continues to deteriorate. The health system especially is at brink of collapse, as a result of a lack of staff and the damage to infrastructure. It is estimated that only 43% of hospitals are fully functional today, however, it is also difficult for those living in conflict-affected areas to access services even if they exist. Vaccination coverage has dropped significantly, with resulting outbreaks of polio, measles and pertussis. Equally, in the water sector, only half of those who had access to safe drinking water pre-crisis now do, as a result of damage to the infrastructure. In the education sector, 24% of the schools have been damaged and the Ministry for Education estimates that 52,000 teachers are no longer working. As a result, it is estimated that at least 2,1 million children in Syria are out of school or are not attending classes regularly. Some have been out of school for two to three years.

The vulnerability of the Syrian population has been further increased by the deep economic recession, caused by the fluctuating national currency, sanctions, sharp increases in the cost of food, fuel and medicines, and to some extent disruption of markets, as well as high levels of unemployment (54%). Furthermore, Syria was affected by a severe drought in 2014, which not only affected the availability of drinking water, but also severely affected agricultural production with a resulting 31% reduction in the cereal harvest in comparison to the previous year, which was already low due to the impact of the conflict.

The coping mechanisms and resilience of the IDPs and host communities are all but exhausted after four years of conflict. In addition to what has been described above, a sign of that is the widespread food insecurity, with a total of 9,8 million people being considered food insecure and of those 6,8 million are highly food insecure. The use of negative coping mechanisms such as drop out from school and child labour, reducing quantity of food consumed, residing in crowded or otherwise unsafe shelters (please note that 175,000 IDPs are also residing in informal IDP camps along the Turkish or Jordanian border), early marriage and domestic violence etc, is another clear sign. As such, it is not only the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance that is growing but also the depth of needs that need to be considered.

The humanitarian needs are widespread across Syria, however, the governorates of Dar'a, Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa and Rural Damascus are ranked as the top five governorates in terms of acute needs across sectors. The governorates of Deir-ez-Zor, Ar-Raqqa, Dar'a, Aleppo and Rural Damascus are most difficult to access. However, it should be noted that other governorates too have critical needs in various sectors.

In regards to vulnerability, the specific needs of IDPs and those hosting them have already been discussed. Furthermore, the Palestinian refugees in Syria are considered to be of particular concern, as 460,000 (representing 94% of the registered Palestinian population in Syria) are in need of humanitarian assistance as a result of the conflict, many of which reside in areas which continue to be in the middle of conflict zones. There are also approximately 40,000 Iraqi refugees in Syria still and 6,500 migrant workers. These groups are at particular risk because of the exposure to violence and conflict, but also because of lack of valid documentation making it difficult to access any services and leaving them at risk of harassment and detention.

Women and children are also among those most vulnerable, not least as a result of the lack of basic services, the breakdown of societal and community based protection mechanisms, and the widespread use of negative coping mechanisms. The conflict has directly resulted in increased levels of sexual and gender based violence, primarily targeting women and girls. Furthermore, forced recruitment and recruitment of minors is a continued protection concern. Additionally, 1,200 grave violations against children has been committed and documented, including 80 attacks on schools. A 23% increase in deaths of children has been documented since February 2014.

1.2 Risks and threat

As described above, the current level of fighting violence and human rights abuses are expected to continue or even escalate in the coming year, in the absence of a viable peace and reconciliation process. There has been a significant increase of 13% of people in need inside Syria since May 2014 from 10,8 million people in need of humanitarian assistance to 12,2. This trend is expected to continue in 2015. As discussed previously, the coping mechanisms and resilience of both IDPs and those communities hosting them, hard to reach areas and those areas directly affected by conflict or under siege, are continuously weakened. The onset of winter as well as the severe economic situation has further negatively affected those most vulnerable.

Syria will continue to be a protection crisis foremost. Of particular concern is the continuation of indiscriminate attacks (including barrel bombs) and continued targeting of civilian infrastructure such as schools and hospitals, the use of arbitrary and illegal arrests, detention and torture. Grave violations of IHL and HRL are expected to continue in 2015 by all parties to the conflict. The conflict has also resulted in high levels of criminality and banditry, which further increases the vulnerability of individuals, communities and markets. The lack of access to services further emphasizes the ongoing protection crisis.

Access constraints continue to be the largest hindrance for the humanitarian response inside Syria. The lack of access is largely connected to the extreme security situation in many parts of the country, but also to the systematic obstruction by the Syrian authorities and the growing number of opposition groups which also impose restrictions. IS controlled areas are particularly difficult to access for most actors, as are besieged areas. At the point of writing the government offensive in Aleppo (Handarat) is threatening to cut access to approximately 300,000 people. Cross border access continues to have limited impact. The threat to aid workers continues to be high. Efforts to engage in dialogue with all parties to the conflict will need to be sustained and strengthened.

Although efforts are made to strengthen needs assessment and analysis as part of the 'Whole of Syria' (WoS) strategy at sector level in particular, there are still significant gaps in data being one of the areas where sustained systematic obstructions has hindered the response. Along with the access restrictions described above, poor knowledge of needs has inevitably resulted in a less well targeted response. Efforts to better target the assistance and protection needs of IDPs in particular need to be emphasised.

Although the Syrian community itself has carried the largest burden of the response so far, the international community's response has been financially substantial. However, the SHARP appeal only received 45% funding in 2014 (USD 2,28 billion requested). The message shared by all humanitarian actors (including donors) is that more funding needs to be forthcoming in order to meet the needs, however, there is a fear that funding has already peaked. Efforts to reinforce analysis on costings, as well as find more cost-effective ways to programme are ongoing, but as needs are increasing and resilience levels shrinking the 2015 SRP for Syria appeals for a total budget of USD 2,9 billion.

The level of corruption in Syria is high and on the rise. Transparency International ranks Syria 168th out of 177 countries surveyed in 2013. Although the level of institutionalised corruption was high in Syria pre-crisis, the problem has soared as a result of the breakdown of governance institutions and structures, the growth of a war economy, as well as the

lack of capacity within oppositional groups, local administration and civil society. The role of media and civil society as watch dogs is weak. An emphasis on due diligence therefore continues to be emphasised by humanitarian actors and donors, and should be prioritised during 2015.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan

The following strategic objectives have been agreed within the WoS strategy and the forthcoming SRP for Syria in 2015:

- Promote protection of and access to affected people in accordance with IHL and IHRL including clear accountability of parties to the conflict and all relevant actors.
- Provide life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian assistance to people in need, prioritising the most vulnerable.
- Strengthen resilience, livelihoods and early recovery through communities and institutions.
- Strengthen harmonised coordination modalities through enhanced information management, communication and joint planning.
- Enhance the response capacity of all actors assisting people in need in Syria, including local actors and communities.

The WoS strategy is discussed in more detailed below. As discussed previously and below, there are significant gaps in access, data collection (including gender analysis) and coordination.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

The main burden of the humanitarian crisis in Syria is carried by the Syrian people themselves. Host communities have shown enormous generosity towards those displaced and as a result their own resources and resilience levels are decreasing. The Syrian government continues to be involved in all aspects of the response within areas of its control through ministries and line-ministries, including in regards to providing ongoing basic services. The MOFA and others are deeply involved in the response, as already discussed, in regards to granting or limiting access and permits to humanitarian actors.

In areas no longer controlled by the government, so-called local council have been set up, not least to sustain the provision of some basic services. As such, humanitarian actors have coordinated with these, however, it should be noted that in many areas their influence has drastically decreased since the arrival of more radical groups. The capacity of these also varies.

The Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) continues to be the main implementing partner, and as such, the largest and arguably the most important, humanitarian actor in-country. With 14 branches and 84 sub-branches and a network of 5,000 volunteers, it has wide-reaching access, including many, though not all, opposition controlled areas.

There are currently 101 national NGOs authorised by the government to work with the UN agencies and INGOs. The capacity of these are often weak, which is a great constraint for the wider response. In addition, there are a number of local and diaspora NGOs involved in cross border operations. Finally, there are a number of regional and faith based organisations involved in the wider response, however, little is known of their operations and coordination remains limited.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

As the humanitarian crisis has continued to escalate throughout Syria, the humanitarian community continued to scale up its response during 2014 through both regular, cross line and cross border operations in all 14 governorates. The UN led response alone reached 4.1 million people within the food security sector; 9 million people with health supplies; 3.8 million people with NFIs and 16 million people with WASH items. Furthermore, the UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement have expanded their presence by establishing hubs in Alepp, Qamlishi, Homs and Tartous.

The response has been significantly restricted by both the security situation but also by systematic obstructions by the Syrian government and other parties to the conflict. This has not only affected service delivery but also the collection of data. Coordination within and between between the different operational modalities used (regular/cross line vs cross border), has also been extremely problematic, leading to a less efficient response and targeting of needs. Only 14 NGOs are officially accredited to work in the country by the government, which is a considerable constraint to the scale-up of the operation. The low capacity of local NGOs is a further constraint. As many programmes are

implemented by remote control, the various international actors are working on strengthening their systems for remote monitoring and due diligence.

In recognition of the severe gaps in regards to coordination, the humanitarian community (including the donors; also Sweden), has agreed to commit to the so-called 'Whole of Syria' strategy. The WoS strategy is meant to reinforce the linkages between the overall response (regular, cross line and cross border) by working through the IASC sector/ cluster approach in order to increase efficiency and effectiveness of the response by: 1) developing a principled, predictable and systematic operational planning process; 2) ensuring greater coherence across the different operational modalities through improved coordination; and 3) strengthening the information-sharing and monitoring of the response. The experience so far has been positive, however, not without issues. The process has for the first time led to a joint Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and SRP for the whole country. Though much progress has been achieved so far, the process is in its infancy and should be considered a work in progress.

3. SIDA's HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1. Sida's role

Sida has not had a specific budget allocation for Syria itself as it has invested in forming a regional response to the whole crisis. As such, many contributions (in particular in relation to the UN agencies) have been unearmarked between the SHARP appeals and the Regional Refugee Response Plans (RRPs), and in regards to sectors. Contributions of which funds have been allocated to Syria are the following; OCHA (coordination) UNICEF (WASH, child protection, health, education), UNHCR (protection, shelter/NFIs); UNRWA (multi-sector but mainly cash distribution), ICRC (WASH, protection), SRC/IFRC/SARC (food security, NFIs, health), DRC (shelter, NFIs, protection). Sida has continued its strong emphasis on protection throughout the crisis, however, the response has been multi-sectoral in character. Emergency response has been emphasised not least by Sida being the second largest donor to the Regional ERF, as well as funding the two ERFs/HPFs recently set up for Syria. Sida's own rapid response mechanism with partner INGOs has also been drawn upon throughout the crisis, but only to limited extent.

Sida has emphasised the importance of regular and cross-line operations throughout the crisis.

3.2. Response Priorities 2015

Sida's priorities inside Syria in 2015 are as follows (please note that these are in line with overall priorities for the Syria crisis as outlined in the chapeau):

- Protection with emphasis on: 1) the need for adherence to IHL and HRL, as well as unimpeded humanitarian access within Syria, and 2) the particular needs of IDPs, women, children, Palestians, as well as other vulnerable groups
- Multi-sectoral needs based humanitarian assistance, with special emphasis on health
- Improved coordination in line with WoS strategy
- Preparedness and emergency response
- Resilience and improved joint humanitarian/development analysis and response

In regards to the latter point, it is Sida's intention to in 2015 further build on the existing synergies between the humanitarian assistance response and the development response (mainly in the sector of democracy and human rights, SEK 50 million in 2014).

JORDAN

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

According to the estimates of the government of Jordan, 1.4 million Syrians currently reside in Jordan (almost 750,000 Syrians are thought to have been living in Jordan prior to 2011). Jordan has adopted a strict border control policy since September 2014 reducing the number of Syrians who officially cross to Jordan by 80%. Jordan has also imposed new registration requirements for Syrian refugees since July 2014, and there is a trend towards reinforcing the encampment policy. Approximately 14,000 Palestinians from Syria (PRS) have managed to cross to Jordan and registered with UNRWA. Jordan closed its borders to PRS in January 2013. The number of Iraqis has been rapidly increasing in Jordan, reaching approximately 45,000 refugees since June 2014 with a sharp increase during the last quarter of the year. However, the total numbers of Iraqis in Jordan could be much higher since not all seek to register with UNHCR.

Geographically, the northern parts of Jordan continue to host the highest numbers of Syrian refugees. A new camp (Al-Azraq Camp, Zarqa governorate) opened in Jordan during spring 2014 and currently host 11,000 refugees while the second phase of the Emarati Jordanian Camp EJC was completed and inaugurated in November 2014 to host up to 10,000 refugees. Zaatari camp in Mafraq continue to host the largest number of Syrians in Jordan (82,000), however, 80% of the total number of Syrians in Jordan live outside the camps. The vulnerability of Syrians living among the host community is much higher than those living in camps due to the limited services available to them. It is therefore expected that a trend for those most vulnerable to move into camps will begin to emerge soon. Women and children continue to be among the most vulnerable groups while the elderly and persons with disability constitute up to 20% of the total refugee population according to a study by Handicap International. A national food security assessment was conducted by WFP and REACH showed that 74% of Syrian refugee households cited WFP vouchers as their main source of income and that 85% stated that they would not have sufficient access to food if WFP ceased assistance. 30% of refugee households do not have access to sufficient amounts of water for drinking, cooking or washing and 36% of refugees in Za'atari highlighted the need for WASH improvements as the top priority over other sectoral assistance.

The Jordan Response Plan and the 3RP were launched in December 2014, though the JRP was first launched at country level by MOPIIC on December 4th with a total budget of nearly 3 billion (1.8 billion for refugee and resilience response in 2015 in addition to 1 billion for budget support for the same year), targeting 700,000 refugees and 2,7 million Jordanians living in host communities.

1.2 Risks and threats

An overall deterioration of the situation of Syrian refugees in the region, particularly Jordan and Lebanon, can be expected. Jordanian borders will continue to be strictly managed with fewer Syrians and Iraqis getting through. Increased cases of detention and deportation, in addition to the enforcement of the encampment policy, is a possibility

Funding shortfalls will continue to affect the regional response to the Syrian crisis in light of other emerging global crises. The level of funding of the 3RP may not reach the same level as the RRP 6 (50% funded for Jordan), which could result in further reduction in the provision of food assistance and decreased access to health services.

Funding shortfalls together with tightened controls by the government in Jordan on refugees in general, restrictions on movement within the country, as well as limited livelihood opportunities, may push some refugees to return to Syria despite the prevailing security situation. Others will be forced to live in increasingly dire circumstances. There is a strong risk that the use of negative coping mechanisms, including survival sex, early marriage, and recruitment into armed groups will increase. Increased levels of tension between Syrian refugees and host communities is highly expected.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan

In terms of the specific objectives of the JRP that respond to the strategic objectives of the 3RP, the JRP 2015 will aim to:

- Meet the immediate needs of Syrian refugees both in and out of camps, as well as vulnerable Jordanians affected by the crisis.
- Support the government budget to cope with the additional financial obligations and income losses resulting from the Syria crisis.

- Rapidly scale-up critical government capacities to plan, programme, coordinate and implement a more resilience-oriented response, with the ability to manage and mitigate the impact of the Syria crisis in a timely, efficient, and effective manner.
- Strengthen the capacities and resilience of the health, education, justice, and water and sanitation service systems at local and national levels and mitigate the negative impact of high concentrations of refugees on service delivery sectors.
- Restore and reinforce municipal services and infrastructure degraded as a result of the sharp demand increases in critically affected sectors, in particular solid waste management, housing, environment, energy and transport.
- Rapidly expand employment and livelihood opportunities, and strengthen the coping capacities of vulnerable Jordanians who have been impacted by the crisis.
- Address social imbalances and strengthen social cohesion in Jordanian communities hosting large numbers of refugees.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

In general, the government of Jordan has been positive towards the UN and international community leading the response. However, in mid-2014 the government decided to take on complete leadership of the response with is targeted towards refugees and vulnerable host communities. The Jordanian government aims to emphasise the need to raise funds to address gaps in national capacities and service delivery in order to sustain the provision of services. Recently, the Ministry of Social Development has been brought in as a main actor in the response together MOPIC. Civil society organisations play a major role in the overall response and has increased its capacity over past years.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

The need for further strengthening of the international humanitarian response, in particular related to coordination, targeting and prioritisation still exist for the response in Jordan despite witnessed improvements throughout 2014. In particular, vulnerability identification and targeting has improved over the past year. UNHCR has previously been leading the overall response to the refugee crisis, however, under the leadership of the government within the 3RP process for Jordan, UNHCR will lead the response for the refugee pillar while UNDP will coordinate and support the resilience pillar. The INGO community has expanded its presence and capacity in Jordan since the beginning of the crisis.

The UN and some INGOs have been involved in cross border activities from Jordan, since the adoption of Resolution 2165. Coordination with the local authorities in this regard has been satisfactory, but overall impact has been limited due to access, security and funding constraints.

3. SIDAS HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1. Sidas role

Through unearmarked funding to UN agencies, Sida funding has been directed towards life-saving and protection interventions to UNICEF, (mainly WASH programmes) OCHA (coordination and emergency information management in addition to major allocation to the regional ERF fund), UNRWA (primarily protection and cash assistance to Palestinian refugees from Syria), and NRC (protection and legal assistance).

3.2. Response Priorities 2015

Sida's priorities for Jordan, in line with the overall priorities for the Syria and Iraq crises reponse, are as follows:

- Protection with emphasis on: 1) the need for adherence to IHL and HRL, as well as border access of civilians in need for protection in particular the most vulnerable groups
- Multi-sectoral needs based humanitarian assistance, with special emphasis on direct assistance through cash based schemes
- Improved coordination among actors and with the governments of Jordan leading the national response plan.
- Preparedness and emergency response
- Resilience and improved joint humanitarian/development analysis and response

LEBANON

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

According to the estimates of the government of Lebanon, the country host more than two million Syrian refugees, of which UNHCR have registered over 1,1 million refugees. The largest concentrations of refugees are in Bekaa, Beirut and Mount Lebanon, and Tripoli. Lebanon has generously welcomed Syrians since the onset of the crisis and Syrians now account for over 20% of Lebanon's total population (including the refugees). In the last quarter of 2014, there has been a dramatic shift in Lebanon's border policy, limiting the number of Syrians entering the country. The change in policy is a result of combination of issues related to absorption capacity, social tensions and armed conflict between Lebanese Army and Armed Groups from Syria (e.g. fighting in the Qalamoun area of Syria spilled over into the Lebanese border city of Aarsal which spurred heavy fighting between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and armed groups in August. Tripoli also saw some clashes during the month of October which were renewed in January 2015).

According to the preliminary findings of the vulnerability assessment in Lebanon for 2014, 75 per cent of interviewed households were found to be food insecure with an overall drop of 7% in food security in 2014 compared to 2013. Out of school children account for 66 % of the total number of Syrian children in country and at least 30% of the households do not have access to health services. Access to safe drinking water and sanitation has decreased with 5-27% between 2013 and 2014. In addition, it is estimated that 55% of the total Syrian population in Lebanon live in informal tented settlements, construction sites and unfinished houses, which is a major concern not least during the winter season. Approximately 43,000 of Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS) have crossed into Lebanon according to UNRWA. PRSs have been unable to enter Lebanon since May 2014, and are also thought to be highly vulnerable due to their uncertain status.

The Government of Lebanon (GoL) decided to take full leadership of the overall response during 2014, and by doing so also emphasised the need within host communities. The GoL has since launched the Lebanon Country Response Plan (LCRP 2015), which amounts to USD 2.1 billion, which also is included in the Regional refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). The total number of beneficiaries directly targeted by the LCRP is 1.5 million Syrians and nearly 2 million Lebanese people living in host communities.

1.2 Risks and threats

With funding shortfall expected to extend to 2015, in addition to an expected deterioration of the situation in terms of protection, access and availability of services, and large gaps in service provision, it is expected that the level of needs and vulnerability will continue to grow and deepen across Lebanon. In December 2014, WFP announced a major cutdown in food assistance, which if followed through fully, will have had a severe implication on the health indicators, livelihoods and coping mechanisms for refugees across the region. There is a possibility of an increase in the number of returns, as well as a risk of increased use of negative coping mechanisms, such as a major increase in child labour, exploitation, school dropouts, prostitution/ survival sex, and recruitment into armed groups.

The level of support to local structures and institutions have been inadequate, with resulting gaps in service delivery and assistance to refugees. There is a strong risk that this will cause further tension between refugees and host communities (including relations between PRS and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon), with long term consequences in terms of social cohesion. It is therefore crucial to strengthen coordination, maintain or increase funding levels, as well as secure long-term stabilisation and development funding and increase efforts to address capacity building at municipal level.

There continues to be a strong need to continue efforts to increase targeting of the most vulnerable people and urgent needs, as well as ensure overall cost-effectiveness.. However, as it is a context where most basic service delivery is privatised, public service provision lack the needed absorption capacity. .

The lack of preparedness, coupled with funding shortfalls, has led to a limited and delayed winterisation response by humanitarian agencies over the past years (including 2014). This particularly affects refugees living in sub-standard shelters, the majority of whom reside in informal settlements in Lebanon. In addition, many areas hosting refugees are subject to flooding and freezing temperatures, further deepening the vulnerability of refugees.

It is expected that Lebanon will continue to tighten control over the borders to stop any influx of refugees and also apply a stricter measures over Syrians residing in Lebanon.. This may increase protection needs further.

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan

The specific objectives of the LCRP that respond to the objectives of the 3RP, the LCRP for 2015 is designed to:

- Ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for the most vulnerable among the displaced from Syria and poorest Lebanese.
- Strengthen the capacity of national and local service delivery systems to expand access to and quality of basic public services.
- Reinforce Lebanon's economic, social, environmental, and institutional stability – emphasizing opportunities for vulnerable youth to counter the risk of radicalization.

2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

As described above, there has been a move towards a response centered more around the need to build resilience within host communities, as well as address humanitarian needs within refugee and host communities alike. The national plan also aims to address capacity building needs of public social services at local level. There is no doubt that the influx of such a large group of refugees has caused significant strain on public service delivery infrastructure, in particular in those areas with the highest concentration of refugees (which also corresponds to the municipalities with the highest number of poor Lebanese).

The capacity of civil society organisations in Lebanon is fairly strong, having been involved in humanitarian responses prior to the current crisis. As an example, the Lebanese Red Cross (LRC) is a strong actor which recently has revised its internal structure to be able to better engage directly in the response.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

There is a need to further strengthen the international humanitarian response, in particular related to coordination, targeting and prioritisation in Lebanon, despite significant improvements throughout 2014. The development of joint vulnerability criteria is a strong improvement to previous years.

The INGO community scaled up considerably in 2013, both in terms of presence and operational capacity.

3. SIDA'S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1. Sida's role

Sida has consistently prioritised life-saving and protection related interventions targeting the most vulnerable among the refugees including children and women. Sida has developed strategic partnerships with IRC, NRC and Save the Children in Lebanon focusing on protection, legal assistance, GBV and psychosocial support as well as shelter and education. Needs are expected to be largely similar in 2015, and as such a continued multi-sector approach with a strong emphasis on protection is advisable. Sida has also allocated unearmarked contributions to: 1) UNICEF with a focus on WASH and education; 2) OCHA for coordination and emergency information management in addition to a major allocation to the regional ERF and the recently launched ERF for Lebanon; 3) UNRWA through a regional allocation for the Syria crisis response with a primary focus on protection and cash assistance support for PRS.

3.2. Response Priorities 2015

Sida's priorities for Lebanon, in line with the overall priorities for the Syria and Iraq crises response, are as follows:

- Protection with emphasis on: 1) the need for adherence to IHL and HRL, as well as border access of civilians in need for protection in particular the most vulnerable groups
- Multi-sectoral needs based humanitarian assistance, with special emphasis on direct assistance through cash based schemes
- Improved coordination among actors and with the governments of Lebanon leading the national response plans.
- Preparedness and emergency response
- Resilience and improved joint humanitarian/ development analysis and response

TURKEY

1. CRISIS OVERVIEW

In April 2011 the first refugees from Syria arrived in Turkey which the same year declared an “open door” policy and in a prime ministerial circular officially granted Syrian and state-less people from Syria unlimited access to the country. The total number of refugees from Syria in Turkey is today estimated at 1.6 million (AFAD October 2014) of which approximately 200,000 live in government-administered camps (UNHCR Nov 2014). The UN estimates that 2.5 million refugees will be residing in Turkey at the end of 2015, with 300.000 living in camps. The urban refugees were initially concentrated to the southern and southeastern border areas but have increasingly spread across the country, most notably to Istanbul. UNHCR estimates that around 10.000 Palestinians from Syria (PRS) have arrived to Turkey of which around 3.500 remain.

Until 2014 Turkey was hosting approximately 40.000 Iraqi refugees/asylum seekers. With the advancement of the Islamic State (IS), approximately 200.000, mainly Kurdish, refugees arrived mostly remaining in the eastern and southeastern predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey. There are additionally around 35.000 refugees/asylum seekers from other countrys, notably Afghanistan.

Turkey has ratified the Refugee Convention with a limitation to covering only persons escaping from Council of Europe member states. All people from Syria have been declared to fall under a temporary protection regime while persons from Iraq, Afghanistan etc are domestically treated as “conditional refugees”, essentially granted the same rights as other refugees. A number of legal changes occurred in 2014. A new migration law and regulation entered into force granting a clear legal status of temporary protection to Syrians while a Ministry of Education circular clarified their rights to education. However, access to labour market remains unclear.

The refugee influx has increasingly burdened host communities, mostly situated in the already poverty-stricken south and southeast of the country, with overstretched public services, increased rents and living costs, increased competition over jobs and fallen salaries within the informal sector. Tensions have followed as a consequence and led to outright clashes between refugees and local populations across Turkey during the summer of 2014. IS expansion in Kobane/Ayn al-Arab of September-October 2014 likewise had spillover effects.

Given the current political and military deadlock in Syria, the flow of refugees cannot but be expected to continue, and possibly further emphasised by the change in border policy in Jordan and Lebanon. Turkey’s initially declared “open-border policy” towards Syria officially remains in place, though certain restrictions have been imposed. In practice a complete closure of the long, porous and mountainous border would be next to impossible.

UNHCR announced the 3RP, including the Turkey Response Plan, in December 2014. It includes a resilience and refugee response element of USD 461 million and USD 163 million respectively.

1.1. Geographical areas and affected population

A comprehensive needs assessment of the refugees in Turkey has still not been undertaken and only fragmented and anecdotal information on the geographical distribution of refugees exists. Information on needs, gaps and vulnerabilities is likewise unavailable. Assistance is provided by Turkish local and central authorities, the Turkish Red Crescent, international and national NGOs. A consolidated picture of the response is lacking.

Syrian refugees formally have access to free health care. In reality however, only primary health is accessible without payment and costs of transportation, translation and medication have to be covered by the refugees. The capacity of many health facilities in areas with high concentration of refugees are also overstretched.

The need within protection, especially of women and children, livelihoods, education and housing are all thought to be extensive. Urban refugees, and of these in particular children, are to be considered the most vulnerable.

1.2 Risks and threats

Soon entering the fifth year of conflict, the unmet livelihood needs among the Syrian refugees in Turkey can be expected to increase as accumulated resources gradually are depleted and negative coping mechanisms increase.

As destitution among the refugees and the burden on host communities increase, the existing tensions could possibly further increase and again escalate into acts of violence similar to what was seen in 2014.

The Turkey chapter of the RRP has hitherto been the most heavily underfunded which remains a serious risk to the humanitarian response. The EC, however, has declared that considerable EU funds will be directed and redirected to the humanitarian response including supporting resilience focused programmes amongst host communities.

The continued unwillingness of the GoT to conduct or allow space for proper needs assessments and to limit the operations of INGOs remains a risk hampering the humanitarian response.

2. TURKEY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES

2.1 National and local capacities and constraints

The government in Turkey has taken full leadership for the humanitarian response in the country with UN agencies having only an additional role in providing authorities with technical expertise and assistance.

By the arrival of the first refugees in 2011 Turkey's emergency response authority AFAD, with no previous experience of dealing with refugees in the country, was tasked to respond to the influx. In April 2014 the migration management body DGMM was established, formally acquiring the overall responsibility, including registration, for Syrian refugees residing outside of camps.

Turkey has showed itself remarkably generous having spent USD 4.5 billion (AFAD Nov 2014) on the response.

Turkish authorities are responsible for the registration of refugees to which UNHCR has contributed with expertise and mobile registration centres.

While the AFAD-administered camps exceed SPHERE standards in most respects, almost 90% of Syrian refugees reside in urban settings. The Turkish Red Crescent is a major actor both inside the camps and in urban settings.

The situation for INGOs operating in Turkey has improved during the last year even though many hurdles remain. Around 20 INGOs are now registered and many report increased willingness by Turkish authorities to allow operational space.

Several Turkish NGOs operate, in many cases as implementing partners to the UN and INGOs. Many of these have previous experience from humanitarian operation abroad while others have redirected into the field with the coming of the Syria crisis and may lack certain capacities.

2.2 International operational capacities and constraints

Turkey does not have a designated Humanitarian Coordinator and the GoT holds a central role for the humanitarian coordination. The cluster system has not been activated in Turkey and the coordination of assistance outside of the camps for long lacked any formal structure. However, working groups for most sectors, and inter-agency coordination fora have now been established.

UNHCR has taken a lead on the development of the 3RP.

3. SIDA'S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

3.1. Sida's role

Sida has not had a specific allocation for Turkey itself. Un-earmarked contributions to the RRP, of which funds have been allocated to Turkey are the following; UNICEF (WASH, child protection, health, education), UNHCR (protection, shelter/NFIs); DRC (shelter, NFIs, protection). However these agencies have largely deprioritised Turkey and the bulk of Sida contributions have been utilised elsewhere in the region.

Sida's own rapid response mechanism with partner INGOs has been utilised once for Save the Children.

3.2. Response Priorities 2015

The UN, in the 3RP, identifies the following priorities for Turkey:

- continued access to territory and protection under legal framework
- Support needy populations to meet needs for basic and domestic items
 - education

- health
- livelihoods
- Resilience response:
 - Support to national institutions to provide assistance/support to most vulnerable refugees
 - Support GoT and municipalities in community sanitary facilities, latrines waste management systems in camps and urban areas
 - support national and provincial entities in education sector response
 - support to national institutions in providing health care and assistance to the most vulnerable refugees in host communities exploring ways to enhance food security systems, possibly increasing livelihoods among refugees and host communities
 - Establish new socio-economic facilities to boost employment

Sida has a development budget of SEK 80 million per year and, with the overall aim of supporting Turkey's EU accession, focuses on human rights, gender equality, justice sector and public administration reform, and civil society development.

Several of the Sida funded development programmes have synergies with the humanitarian response. Sida supports the newly established DGMM in cooperation with the Swedish Migration Board with part of the embassy's Migration Expert allocated to engage in capacity building of the institution. Sida will during 2015 enter into agreement with the World Bank to conduct a needs assessment aimed at strengthening host communities in the south and southeast of Turkey, potentially forming the base for development programmes co-financed with other donors. Finally, the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey since long supported by Sida is partly redirecting its torture rehabilitation and documentation programme into covering Iraqi and Syrian refugees.

SOURCES

ECHO: Humanitarian Implementation Plan 2015
 OCHA: Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), 2015
 OCHA: Strategic Response Plan (SRP), 2015