

Sida's Support to UNDP in Sierra Leone

**Laurence Sewell
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Sida

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	2
Acronyms	3
Executive Summary	5
1. Introduction	8
1.1 Purpose of the Evaluation.....	8
1.2 Description of Methodology and Approach.....	8
2. Background to Support from Sida	10
2.1 Country Context for the Assistance.....	10
2.2 Role of UNDP.....	12
2.3 Understanding of the Context of Sida Support.....	13
2.4 Description of the Programmes.....	14
3. Findings of the Evaluation	16
3.1 Relevance – Appropriateness of Objectives and Design.....	16
3.2 Efficiency – Inputs.....	21
3.3 Effectiveness – Outputs & Outcomes (results).....	26
3.4 Impact & Sustainability.....	31
3.5 Coherence – Donor Harmonisation.....	32
4. Conclusions & Lessons Learned	32
4.1 Administration & Management.....	33
4.2 Efficiency.....	34
4.3 Effectiveness.....	35
4.4 Relevance.....	36
4.5 Donor Coherence.....	36
5. Recommendations	37
Annex I – Terms of Reference	39
Annex II – List of Persons Met	42
Annex III – List of Documents Consulted	43
Annex IV – Itinerary	45

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Acronyms

AfD	Arms for Development
AFRA	Department for Africa (Sida)
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CACD	Community Arms Collection and Destruction
CBO	Community-based Organisation
CMT	Change Management Team
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CO	Country Office (UNDP)
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DDP	District Development Plan
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DEPAC	Development Partners' Consultative meetings
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DISEC	District Security Committees
DPT	District Programming Teams
DFID	Department For International Development
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EoYR	End of Year Report
EU	European Union
GBP	Great Britain Pound (Pound Sterling)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoSL	Government of Sierra Leone
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbit
HIV/AIDS	Human immuno-deficiency virus; Acquired immune deficiency syndrome
IDP	Internally displaced people
ILO	International Labour Organisation
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
NDCA	National Drug Control Agency
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NGO	Non-governmental organisations
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEYS	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports
NDCA	National Drug Control Agency
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NRS	National Recovery Strategy
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONS	Office of National Security
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund

PCM	Project Cycle Management
PDU	Peace and Development Unit
PMC	Project Management Committee
PPRC	Political Party Registration Commission
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RBM	Results-based Management
RfD	Recovery for Development
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SCA	Strategic conflict analysis
SEK	Swedish Kronor
Sida	Swedish International Development Agency
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLANSA	Sierra Leone Action Network on Small Arms
SLIS	Sierra Leone Information System
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
TA	Technical assistance
TIF	Transitional Initiatives Fund
TLC	Triple Line Consulting
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Committee
TST	Transition Support Team
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNIPSIL	United Nations Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
YANATOL	Youth are not ashamed to learn
YEP	Youth Employment Programme (also known as YES)
YES	Youth Employment Scheme (also known as YEP)

Executive Summary

This report details the evaluation of Sida's funding to UNDP in Sierra Leone. The overall purpose of the evaluation is *'to support choice of path in the future collaboration between Sida and UNDP'*. The specific purpose is to provide Sida with an independent opinion on the efficiency of the UNDP programmes in Sierra Leone which have received support from Sida, the achieved results of UNDP, and the compliance with the agreements between Sida and UNDP. The evaluation was also designed to support the development of future collaboration between Sida and UNDP.

The evaluation covers the time period 2005 to 2007, during which Sida contributed to three specific programmes in Sierra Leone through the mechanism of its Trust Fund arrangements with UNDP: Arms for Development (AfD), Transition Initiatives Fund/ Transition Support Team (TST); and the Youth Employment Programme (YEP). AfD aimed to increase security and stability in communities across Sierra Leone through the collection of weapons and the associated (re)building of community infrastructure, as well as improving national-level security through supporting interventions to reduce the cross-border trade of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The Transition Support Teams (TST) and associated Transitional Initiatives Fund (TIF) were developed to support the process of government decentralisation in association with the 2004 Local Government Act. The Youth Employment Programme (YEP; also known as the Youth Employment Scheme or YES) was started in 2006 and grew out of an increasing recognition that youth unemployment and the continued marginalisation of youth represents a serious threat to the overall stability of Sierra Leone. The YEP was design to provide rapid employment opportunities and income-generation activities to young people through public works, private sector incentives, and self-employment programmes for marginalised youth. All three of these programmes are being implemented by the Peace and Development Unit (PDU) of the UNDP Country Office.

The evaluation was conducted by a two person team which visited Sierra Leone during the period 15th to 23rd July 2008. Consultations were held with UNDP and a range of stakeholders. The methodology employed by the evaluation adopts accepted good practice in keeping with DAC evaluation guidelines, and is consistent with the approaches set out in Sida's *Evaluation Manual* and its guiding principles and procedures (as outlined in *Sida at Work*, 2005). The work is based on documentary evidence, interviews with key stakeholders, fieldwork, objective analysis of findings and the preparation of a structured report.

The evaluation found that the three Sida-supported programmes were, at least in their initial conception, relevant to the post-conflict context and in keeping with the priorities outlined in Sierra Leone's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the UN's Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). However, the programmes suffered both from design flaws and a lack of revision over the project period which diminished their ability to remain relevant. AfD, for example, has been hampered by the low capacity and high rates of illiteracy among the community-level Project Management Committees which were supposed to take the lead in developing community projects to be funded by AfD following the certification of Chiefdoms as "weapons-free". The "weapons-free" certification has itself proved problematic as the process for declaring Chiefdoms weapons-free was not thoroughly designed or implemented and weapons are believed to remain within communities despite certification. The amount available for community projects was also insufficient as it relied on target communities donating material and labour – something which has declined over the programme period.

The report highlights structural, strategic and management issues which have impeded the delivery of assistance by UNDP. The progress and performance of the Sida support to UNDP programmes is extremely disappointing and has been marked by administrative and financial failures and a lack of

management efficiency. This has been exemplified by poor administration and reporting on programmes. The evaluation found that, while the UNDP/Sida agreements have all now expired, activities and expenditure are still being incurred. The evaluation was unable to obtain formal evidence that requests had been made by UNDP and approved by Sida to extend their validity in order to allow the continuation of expenditure.

The quality of programme documentation has been poor and there seems to have been little effort made to ensure consistency in the presentation of findings and results. Although project documents were prepared for each programme, these lack consistency in terms of layout and tend to also lack measurable targets and indicators. Subsequent changes to the programmes in terms of aims or content have not been reflected in amended project documents. Reporting on the implementation of the projects to Sida has also been weak. Annual reports on the programmes, as well as annual reports compiled by the Peace and Development Unit, are inconsistent in layout and content and there is a broad failure to focus on results or report on measurable indicators. Many of the achievements reported are cumulative rather than pertaining to a particular year which makes it difficult to see how the programmes have progressed and what results were being achieved.

UNDP in Sierra Leone has clearly had difficulties in maintaining robust financial management systems and proper accounting practice in relation to these programmes, and the use of the UNDP ATLAS system for budgeting and payments does not appear to have been operating in an efficient manner. Determining expenditures from the Sida contribution was a particularly difficult exercise as there does not appear to have been any precise reporting on expenditure, and no financial reports which would fulfil the conditions outlined in Article 11.2c of the Trust Fund Agreement were seen by the evaluation team. The evaluation was presented with a range of expenditure figures from different sources all of which were inconsistent. However, there appears overall to have been a very low rate of disbursement of the Sida contribution; the evaluation estimates that only 11% of the contribution totalling SEK 30m had been spent by the end of 2007 (this rises to 19.8% if expenditures to July 2008 are taken into account).

The low rates of disbursement and lack of monitoring and reporting across the three programmes pose difficulties in determining effectiveness. For example, although more than 6,000 weapons were collected through the AfD programme there is not an available estimate of the number of arms in circulation over the project period, so no comparisons can be made. The Transition Support Teams, particularly in the immediate period after the war, appear to have played an important role in supporting the process of decentralisation in Sierra Leone and ensuring that Local Councils were supported to develop District Development Plans. Unfortunately, evidence of these results is largely anecdotal and the scarcity of reporting and monitoring makes further judgements impossible. Similarly, the lack of monitoring of TIF projects makes an analysis of the contribution of those projects to Local Council or Chiefdom budgets unfeasible. The YEP appears to have suffered more severely from delays than the other initiatives supported by Sida and, to-date, there has been little expenditure against the YEP as a whole, and no Sida funds have been disbursed. A limited number of small-scale projects have had funding committed, but the results of these projects are unknown. Some capacity building support has been provided to the Secretariat for this programme, but most of this appears to be in the form of physical infrastructure and refurbishment rather than longer-term capacity-building and/or training for Ministry or other national staff.

The recent experience of other donors consulted by the evaluation showed that their assistance to UNDP has also suffered from a lack of transparency and proper accounting for funds, as well as limited progress in the achievement of results. Donors were particularly concerned to see the under-spend on their commitments to UNDP and there was broad consensus on the weaknesses displayed in the efficient and effective management of programmes by UNDP. There was also, however, a widespread acknowledgement that the low disbursement rates of UNDP are not representative of the large need

which still exists within Sierra Leone, particularly in terms of addressing poverty reduction, economic growth and social stability.

The evaluation is aware that the period under review has been a time of great change and challenge in Sierra Leone for all stakeholders. For UNDP, the period has offered particular challenges in moving from supporting post-war recovery to rehabilitation and sustainable development. However, evidence that UNDP has been able to respond to these challenges is highly debatable. The weaknesses and limitations highlighted by this evaluation are all the more concerning given that they have been acknowledged in previous UNDP reports and documents.

Strategic and management weaknesses are now being addressed by UNDP in recognition of the problems and under-performance of UNDP in Sierra Leone. During the evaluation a UN Change Management Team and a team from the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) were in-country and informed the evaluation of a drastic restructuring that is now being planned. This will include a 'clean up and regularisation' of programmes, and a transition phase in September–October 2008 to put new structures in place. The BCPR team has also been examining the new country context as well as the restructuring of the PDU which is to be reformulated as the Recovery for Development (RfD) Unit focusing on two strategic areas: (i) conflict prevention, and (ii) decentralisation and community development. This period of restructuring, as is recognised by UNDP, will be key to restoring donor confidence.

Summary of Recommendations

- 1 Sida should require UNDP to properly reconcile past expenditures under the various Trust Fund agreements. This may require Sida requesting a forensic audit from UNDP or an external independent auditors' report.
- 2 Sida needs to take a decision on the validity of the agreements now that they have expired. This includes a decision about whether to approve on-going expenditures that have been incurred in 2008.
- 3 Sida should request a report from the proposed UNDP recovery team on the progress of the planned changes, clean-up and regularisation that is being conducted, by the end October 2008.
- 4 Sida should formally request UNDP to provide a consolidated report on targets and milestones that have been both planned and achieved for each of the 3 programmes, so as to enable Sida to make a judgement of whether it wishes to continue supporting UNDP programmes in Sierra Leone.
- 5 If Sida is to extend the validity period and allow continuing expenditures from the existing allocation and also contemplate future support, it needs to ensure that the restructuring of the UNDP Country Office according to the plans of the Change Management Team is put in place. Sida should require certain benchmarks to be attained before further financing.
- 6 In formulating its future strategy for support to Government of Sierra Leone, Sida should consult with other donors, and especially those with an in-country office, on the need for harmonising approaches in working with UNDP, examining other potential modalities of support, and to ensure that future funding reflects the new priorities of the revised PRSP (expected in 2008) and UNDP's Country Programme Action Plan.
- 7 There remains a large unfulfilled need for donor support to GoSL and Sida is strongly encouraged to provide future funding to Sierra Leone, but also to ensure that it has the systems to effectively monitor its prospective support to the UNDP or other such modalities as may be chosen.

1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose of the Evaluation

This evaluation is an external assessment of Sida's funding to UNDP in Sierra Leone. Sida has contributed to specific programmes in Sierra Leone through the mechanism of its Trust Fund arrangements with UNDP. In accordance with the terms of reference (ToR), the overall purpose of the evaluation is:

'to support choice of path in the future collaboration between Sida and UNDP'.

The ToR highlight that the specific purpose of this evaluation is to provide Sida with an independent opinion on the efficiency of the UNDP programmes in Sierra Leone which have received support from Sida, the achieved results of UNDP, and the compliance with the agreements between Sida and UNDP. It is how these arrangements have worked, the results that have been achieved, and the management of the assistance by UNDP that is the subject of this evaluation. It is essentially about examining compliance and accountability in achieving objectives and what lessons can be learnt in relation to prospective future support by Sida. The evaluation covers the time period 2005 to 2007 and will support the development of future collaboration between Sida and UNDP.

Terms of reference (ToR) for the evaluation are found in Annex I. The client for this assignment is Sida's Department for Africa (AFRA).

The evaluation was conducted by a two person team¹. It was planned to commence the mission with a kick-off meeting and an initial briefing with the Peace & Development Unit (PDU) of the UNDP Country Office (CO) on 15th July 2008. Unfortunately, this meeting did not take place as key UNDP officials were not present for a variety of reasons. This meant considerable additional time was spent in arranging meetings and the programme of visits by the evaluators. Substantive interviews were held in Freetown during the period 15th to 23rd July, and a field visit was made to Makeni and Magburaka on 18th July. A debriefing and presentation of findings was made to UNDP on 23rd July². This report presents the results of this work.

The structure of the report is designed to reflect the approach set out in the ToR. It comprises this introductory section setting out the objectives of the evaluation and the methodology employed. The second section presents the context for the assistance and a brief outline of the description of the programmes. The third section covers the overall evaluation findings in relation to the funding by Sida and the various programmes' performance. Finally, a broad concluding section presents the overall conclusions based on the evaluation findings in the context of the agreements that Sida has made, and makes a number of recommendations to Sida in relation to the existing and potential future funding.

1.2 Description of Methodology and Approach

The methodology draws on the experience of the evaluators in conducting evaluation assignments for a range of international donors, adopts accepted good practice in evaluation in keeping with DAC evaluation guidelines (encompassing the key DAC principles for evaluation – relevance; efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability)³, and is consistent with the approaches set out in *Sida's Evaluation*

¹ Laurence G Sewell and Ceinwen P Giles of Triple Line Consulting Ltd.

² In addition, written comments to the draft report were submitted by UNDP on 19th August and were reviewed by the authors. These have been taken into account in finalising the report, but did not substantially alter the findings and conclusions.

³ OECD-DAC. 1991. *Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance*. OECD-DAC. Paris.

*Manual*⁴ and its guiding principles and procedures (as outlined in *Sida at Work*, 2005). Additionally, the team is also fully conversant with UNDP approaches as used in the UNDP ‘Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results’⁵. The work is based on documentary evidence, interviews with key stakeholders, fieldwork, objective analysis of findings and the preparation of a structured report.

Information for the compilation of evaluation findings has been principally derived from the following sources:

- Structured interviews with interlocutors, including officials and others concerned with, or affected by, the assistance. Meetings and interviews were held with key UNDP staff, government official and other interlocutors in Freetown, and in Bombali and Tonkolili districts; and
- Documentary evidence, including annual reports on the programmes and various financial data on expenditures (in the absence of certified financial statements). Additional programme/project reports, as well as UNDP published reports were reviewed, both in terms of gaining contextual understanding for the assistance and to examine specific interventions in greater detail.

This approach is an established evaluation methodology and aims to capture stakeholders’ views. It is iterative and flexible as a method of investigation, in that it allows for the further investigation and testing of findings obtained at earlier interviews. As such, it is a more effective analytical tool than a questionnaire-based approach as it permits interlocking themes and areas of concern to be investigated and analysed as the basis for deriving a synthesis of findings. Owing to the limitations of time and absence of discrete quantified indicators of achievement, the evaluation did not engage in any primary data collection nor carry out sample surveys.

Wherever possible the evaluation has triangulated its findings from different sources through an iterative process combining meetings and interviews, document review, the field visit, and analysis. It has maintained an active dialogue with relevant Sida staff in Stockholm throughout the process, contacts with the Embassy of Sweden in Dakar, and conducted a frank exchange of views with the UNDP Country Office in Freetown. Various contacts were made with representatives of the donor community in Sierra Leone, and a small donor round-table meeting was organised to elicit the views of other donors in regard to working with UNDP and issues on harmonisation.

A list of people interviewed in the course of the evaluation is shown in Annex II, and a list of documents consulted in Annex III. The itinerary of the evaluation is set out in Annex IV.

In particular, the evaluation team has examined the assistance from the perspective of a range of evaluation questions that were outlined in the ToR and elaborated more particularly in the Inception Report. These questions are addressed specifically in the conclusions to this report. This has considered both the context for the delivery of the assistance and the actual modalities in efficiently adhering to the requirements and obligations of the funding agreements. It has encompassed:

- *Relevance* of the programmes/projects implemented by UNDP in Sierra Leone and, in particular, whether they were in keeping with the development policies and priorities of the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL).
- *Efficiency* of UNDP modalities in disbursing the funds in a timely and cost effective manner and the overall administrative arrangements in delivering assistance.
- *Effectiveness* of UNDP’s programme delivery and an analysis of the success of UNDP’s different approaches (e.g. directly delivering programmes and projects versus building national development capacity and supporting both State and non-State actors to deliver them).

⁴ Looking Back, Moving Forward – Sida Evaluation Manual, 2007.

⁵ United Nations Development Programme, Evaluation Office, 2002.

- *Implications for donor harmonisation and the implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.* In particular, given that UNDP in Sierra Leone receives support from a large number of bilateral and multilateral development agencies, whether programmes/projects have been managed in a coordinated, transparent and accountable fashion.
- *Lessons Learned:* Going beyond the best practices which can be drawn out from UNDP's operation between 2005 and 2007, and considering what lessons can be learned at a strategic level in terms of the way in which Sida has supported UNDP Sierra Leone and what implications this may have for Sida's Strategy Framework with UNDP.

Unfortunately, gaining access to documentation and financial reports has not been easy as there was no systematic presentation to the evaluation team of the material that had been requested. Although requests had been made to both Sida and UNDP since early June, it became apparent that there were serious limitations in information retrieval from both sources. Indeed, some of the reports and key financial data were not made available to the team until the intervention by the UNDP Country Director during the last two days of the field mission⁶.

2. Background to Support from Sida

2.1 Country Context for the Assistance

A British colony from the 1800s, Sierra Leone in its modern form began as a settlement for freed slaves who had served with the British in the American War of Independence and later found themselves living in Canada, and England⁷. Sierra Leone experienced a steep decline in social and economic development after independence was declared in the 1961. Two decades of rule by the government of Siaka Stevens saw the erosion of the state's legitimacy, destruction of the education system, and steep economic decline which resulted in high levels of unemployment. The centralisation of power in Freetown, coupled with strong traditional authorities in the provinces, led to a situation in which many within the country – and particularly the young people who make up the majority of the population – were excluded from decision-making structures and suffered growing levels of poverty.

Sierra Leone's eleven year civil war, from 1991 to 2002, resulted in an estimated 70,000 casualties and the internal displacement of approximately half (2.6 million) of the population. As has been noted by many observers, the war was particularly brutal and was characterised by atrocities including systematic rape, child abduction, mass amputations, and the complete destruction of villages, particularly in the Eastern part of the country⁸. However, since the official end of the war in January 2002 significant progress has been made in a number of areas vital to the consolidation and maintenance of peace in the country. The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme has been formally completed and the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) has finished its work and produced a comprehensive report which includes wide ranging recommendations. A number of key structures have also been established; these include the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)

⁶ Some further financial data was presented with the comments to the draft report some four weeks after the conclusion of the mission. They are incorporated within the notes to the expenditure tables, (see 3.2.2 below) where relevant, but as with some other figures referred to in the notes, there was no substantiation on how these figures were derived.

⁷ Gberie, Lansana (2005) *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*. Hurst & Company, London, p. 17.

⁸ See for example: *Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries: Case Study Sierra Leone*. Mary Kaldor and James Vincent (2006); *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*. Lansana Gberie (2005); and *Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States*, International Crisis Group (2004).

and the Political Party Registration Commission (PPRC), while the National Electoral Commission (NEC) has been restructured⁹. Following successful elections in 2007 the country is moving out of a period of humanitarian relief and peace-keeping, and towards a phase more closely focused on social and economic development.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown between 6 and 7% in recent years, due largely to strong recovery in the agriculture, mining, construction and service sectors¹⁰. Nevertheless, support by international donors remains of great importance to Sierra Leone's national budget, for example, in 2005 aid disbursements totalled US\$304 million¹¹. Yet, despite some of the progress noted above, Sierra Leone currently ranks last on UNDP's Human Development Index¹²; an estimated 70% of the population lives below the poverty line, adult literacy rates are low¹³, and the maternal mortality ratio, at 1,800 per 100,000 live births, is the highest in the world¹⁴. Moreover, although the conflict in Sierra Leone has ended and human security has improved, many of the structural conditions that led to the conflict persist¹⁵. In their 2007 *Common Country Assessment*, the United Nations pointed to six broad threats still facing Sierra Leone:

- continuing challenges to internal security, including a dysfunctional justice system which lacks capacity in terms of logistics, mobility, basic infrastructure and training;
- serious challenges to the national dynamic of reconciliation, including confrontational politics and denial of political space for opponents;
- endemic corruption and a “lack of momentum for accountability”;
- insufficient respect for human rights and the rule of law;
- widespread economic disempowerment; and,
- a lack of national infrastructure for peace, including a “lack of capacity for mediation at all levels of government and society” which means that “even modest disputes can spiral into significant tensions or violence”.

The assessment also concluded that only one of the eight Millennium Development Goals (Goal 6 – combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases) was likely to be met¹⁶.

Of all the issues outlined above, unemployment, particularly among the youth, is considered one of the most pressing facing the country as it seeks to move forward. An estimated one third of the population is classified as youth¹⁷ but an estimated two thirds of youth are unemployed¹⁸. Poverty, coupled with

⁹ *Common Country Assessment in Preparation for the United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2010*. (2007). Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in Sierra Leone.

¹⁰ *Annual Progress Report on the PRSP* (2006). World Bank.

¹¹ *Common Country Assessment in Preparation for the United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2010*. (2007). Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in Sierra Leone.

¹² *2007/2008 Human Development Index*, UNDP (www.hdr.undp.org)

¹³ Literacy rates are estimated to be 30% for women and 47% for men (estimates 2000–2004). Population Reference Bureau (www.prb.org/datafinder).

¹⁴ Population Reference Bureau 2008 (see www.prb.org).

¹⁵ See for example: *Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict Affected Countries: Case Study Sierra Leone*, UNDP (2006); *Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States*, International Crisis Group (2004); *Consultations with Youth*, World Bank/ENCISS (2004).

¹⁶ Goals 1 (Eradicating extreme poverty); 4 (reduce child mortality), 5 (improve maternal health) and 8 (develop partnerships for development) were said to be difficult to meet while MDGs 2 (achieve universal primary education), 3 (promote gender equality) and 7 (ensure environmental sustainability) were said to be “likely to be met with special efforts” (see pages 27–43 of the Common Country Assessment).

¹⁷ Youth are classified as people aged between 15 and 35, See *Sierra Leone National Youth Policy*. (2003) Government of Sierra Leone.

¹⁸ *Common Country Assessment in Preparation for the United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2010*. (2007). Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in Sierra Leone.

marginalisation of youth from decision-making processes was considered a key driver of the conflict in Sierra Leone and it was young people who were most starkly affected by the conflict either as perpetrators or victims of violence. Long-term peace and sustainable development in Sierra Leone will therefore only be possible when those young people who were instrumental in the conflict are able to find a way out of poverty and find a meaningful place for themselves in society.

The UN's Common Country Assessment (2007, p.3) notes that:

“There is a growing mismatch between the rising expectations of the people, on the one hand, and the significant progress already made and realistically feasible progress in the immediate future, on the other hand. Expectations therefore may outpace what has been accomplished and what is possible.”

It will thus be especially important during the next phase of development for visible gains to be made.

2.2 Role of UNDP

The United Nations (UN) has a long history in Sierra Leone but its most recent work has its roots in the structures established during the civil war. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) – which replaced an earlier UN Observer Mission set up in 1998 – was established in October 1999 under the authority of the UN Security Council¹⁹. UNAMSIL, which oversaw the deployment of more than 17,000 peacekeepers at the height of hostilities, remained in place until the end of December 2005, at which point peacekeepers were withdrawn, responsibility for security was handed over to the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL), and the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was established²⁰. UNIOSIL was given a mandate to operate in the country until late 2007 although this was later extended to 30 September 2008; after this date it will be replaced by the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), initially for a period of one year²¹.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which operated in Sierra Leone prior to the war, was particularly affected by the conflict. Rebel attacks on Freetown in January 1999, for example, led to the forced evacuation of UNDP staff and destroyed most of the material resources of the organisation²². UNAMSIL and the UN Country Team (UNCT) played a key role in developing the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) which was the operational plan of the United Nations Peacebuilding and Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone. The original UNDAF was revised in 2006 to reflect greater coherence with Sierra Leone's Poverty Reduction Strategy paper (PRSP). Five outcomes were specified for the period 2006–2007:

- *Outcome 1:* Transparent, accountable and democratic governance advanced at national and local levels.
- *Outcome 2:* Increased production, availability, accessibility and utilisation of food, with improved employment opportunities for youth.
- *Outcome 3:* Improved health for all citizens, especially women of child-bearing age and children under five years of age.
- *Outcome 4:* Intensified response for HIV/AIDS prevention, care and support.

¹⁹ *Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries: Case Study Sierra Leone*. Mary Kaldor and James Vincent (2006).

²⁰ In 2001, UNAMSIL oversaw the deployment of more than 17,000 peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, making it the biggest peacekeeping operation in the world at that time. See *Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries: Case Study Sierra Leone*. Mary Kaldor and James Vincent (2006), p. 8.

²¹ *Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone*. United Nations Security Council, 29 April 2008, p. 12.

²² UNDP *Sierra Leone Country Programme Action Plan 2004–2007*. UNDP and GoSL 2004, p. 2.

- *Outcome 5:* Strengthened capacity of key national and local institutions for reconciliation, security, improved governance and respect for human rights.

Capacity building, gender equality and youth empowerment were noted to be key cross-cutting issues that should be taken into consideration across all UNDAF outcomes²³.

It is within the framework of both the original and the revised UNDAF that UNDP has formulated its priorities. The Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP; 2004–2007) outlines a framework for cooperation between the Government of Sierra Leone and UNDP and identifies three priority areas: (i) national recovery and peace building; (ii) governance and democratic development; and (iii) poverty reduction and human development. The Peace and Development Unit (PDU; formerly the National Recovery and Peacebuilding Unit) within UNDP is responsible for the implementation of ten initiatives²⁴, three of which have been supported by Sida (Arms for Development; Youth Employment Scheme; Transition Support Team/Transitional Initiatives Fund).

2.3 Understanding of the Context of Sida Support

Sweden has traditionally been a very strong supporter of the United Nations and recognises “the importance of the world organisation particularly for smaller nations whose well-being and security are considerably dependent on their relations with the rest of the world”²⁵. Sweden has also been a keen supporter of UN reforms, particularly those aimed at improving coordination mechanisms at the country level²⁶.

Approximately 30 percent of Sweden’s overseas aid is channelled through the multilateral agencies, mainly to the United Nations and the World Bank, and Sweden is one of the largest donors to UNDP (in 2000, Sida’s support accounted for 9.2% of UNDP’s core budget). An *Umbrella Trust Fund Agreement* between Sida and UNDP has been in place since 1st September 2000 and covers all financial contributions by Sida to UNDP non-core resources²⁷. It is through this Trust Fund that funding allocations have been made to UNDP in Sierra Leone.

Sierra Leone is a major partner country of Sida and is supported through the Division for Post-conflict Countries within the Department for Africa. Sida does not have any staff in Sierra Leone and development cooperation is administered by the Swedish Embassy in Dakar, Senegal. In addition to funding provided to UNDP in Sierra Leone, Sweden has also contributed 100m SEK to the UN Peace Building Commission (PBC), which has chosen Sierra Leone as one of its first project countries²⁸. Sierra Leone is among the countries with an increased focus from Sweden and the development of a new strategy for Sweden’s cooperation with Sierra Leone is currently under consideration²⁹.

²³ *United Nations Development Assistance Framework: Sierra Leone. Revised 2006–2007*. United Nations Country Team. July 2006, p. 3.

²⁴ This includes five major programmes: Transition Support Team (TST); Support to Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (SRRP); Arms for Development (AfD); Youth Employment Scheme (YES), Peacebuilding Programme. Five minor programmes are also supported: Sierra Leone Information Service; Environmental Programme; Housing and Informal Settlements; Support to Disaster Risk Management; Reintegration and Transition to Peacebuilding. See: *Draft Report of the Outcome Evaluation of the 2004–2007 Programme of the Former National Recovery and Peacebuilding Unit, now the Peace and Development Unit*. Florence During Kaïdaneh, James Vincent, and Isla Paterson (April 2008), p. 1.

²⁵ *Working in Partnership with UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF: A Swedish Strategy Framework for 2002–2005*, p. 15.

²⁶ Ibid and also personal communication Karin Lindgren and Susanna Nilsson, Sida.

²⁷ *Working in Partnership with UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF: A Swedish Strategy Framework for 2002–2005*, p. 16 and 36.

²⁸ See *What Does Sida do in Sierra Leone? and Why Does Sweden Provide Support to Sierra Leone?* Available at www.sida.org

²⁹ *Sida Country Report: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire*. Department for Africa, May 2008.

2.4 Description of the Programmes

Between 2005 and 2007, Sida provided funding to UNDP for three programmes under specific Administration Agreements: Arms for Development (AfD), Transition Initiatives Fund/Transition Support Team (TST); and the Youth Employment Programme (YEP), each of which contributes to the achievement of both the PRSP and the UNDAF outcomes. These programmes are being implemented by the Peace and Development Unit (PDU) of the UNDP Country Office.

2.4.1 Arms for Development (AfD)

AfD was launched by the Government of Sierra Leone and UNDP in January 2004 following an earlier Preparatory Assistance Phase in 2003. It grew out of two earlier initiatives: Community Arms Collection and Destruction (CACD) and CACD II, implemented by the Sierra Leone Police. The first CACD, which was launched in 2002, saw more than 9,000 weapons collected, was particularly aimed at removing weapons from the community and was tied to other programmes, such as the UNAMSIL Stop Gap programme which worked in the most volatile areas of Sierra Leone on reconstructing civil buildings with both civilians and ex-combatants³⁰.

AfD has three main areas of focus: (1) collection of weapons in exchange for development projects at the community-level (2) support to the review and implementation of arms, ammunition and explosives legislation (3) support interventions to reduce cross border trade of small arms and light weapons (SALW). As outlined in its 2005 Project Document, AfD was designed to operate within the existing national and international frameworks for peace-building and socio-economic recovery in Sierra Leone, including the 1999 Lome Peace Accord, the ECOWAS Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the National Recovery Strategy (NRS) for Sierra Leone, as well as Sierra Leone's PRSP, the UNDAF and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)³¹.

The partners in the project include the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), the District Councils, District Security Committees (DISECs), Office of National Security (ONS), the Sierra Leone Action Network on Small Arms (SLANSA) and the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). The main engine for policy and strategic decisions within the AfD was to be a Steering Committee chaired by the UNDP Project Coordinator for AfD, with a Secretariat based within the SLP. Representatives of Government, civil society, and the SLP were invited to join the Steering Committee.

2.4.2 Transition Support Team (TST) and Transitional Initiatives Fund (TIF)

Transition Support Team (TST)

In order to facilitate a smooth transition from emergency relief to development, an interagency team comprising the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), UNDP, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) conducted a review of the UN's "4R's (*Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Reintegration, and Reconstruction*)" approach in Sierra Leone in May 2003, in collaboration with other agencies including the World Bank, the EU and the World Food Programme. Two specific interventions were suggested and later approved by the UN Country Team (UNCT):

- 1 Initiation of an integrated approach which would make the 4Rs approach operational at the district level;
- 2 Creation of a Transition Support Team (TST), under the responsibility of the UN Resident Coordinator, with administrative support and guidance from the UNDP's Recovery and Peace-building Unit³².

³⁰ *Assessing and reviewing the impact of SALW projects on small arms availability and poverty: a case study of Sierra Leone UNDP Arms for Development Project*. Alison Lohead and Owen Greene, University of Bradford, April 2004, p.8.

³¹ *Arms for Development Project Document*. Government of Sierra Leone and UNDP, 2 February 2005, p.2.

³² Later, the Peace and Development Unit (PDU)

The 2005 joint funding proposal sets out a number of key focus areas for the TST, including the redesigning of humanitarian aid/development assistance coordination structures at the district level with a view to supporting local councils to develop District Development Plans (DDPs) with the participation of international and local NGOs, communities, and other relevant civil society groups. The formulation of District Development Plans has thus been a key area of focus for the TST and UN District Teams (UNDTs), with the TST developing “into advisers to the Councils, within the framework of the decentralisation process”³³.

In order to facilitate this work, offices were established in districts around the country. In November 2003, three offices were established (Kambia, Kono and Kailahun). A further seven offices were established in August 2004 within UNAMSIL premises (Kenema, Bombali, Koinadugu, Pujehun, Bo, Moyamba and Port Loko), bringing to 10 the number of field offices.

Transitional Initiatives Fund

The Transitional Initiatives Fund (TIF) was established in November 2004 under the UNCT to provide support to the Local Council for initiatives that cover gaps in the transitional process from emergency relief to development assistance, in line with the DDPs. The TIF *Funding Guidelines for the Local Councils* note that it was designed to enable Councils to effectively deliver services within the framework of their mandate as outlined in the 2004 Local Government Act, but emphasises the need for Councils to take a strategic approach to service delivery which not only improves conditions in their target areas but is also sustainable and can be co-funded from other sources³⁴. The Guidelines also note that Councils are free to develop initiatives under any of the service areas mandated to them in the Local Government Act (this includes, among others, primary health care, environmental sanitation, basic education, vocational education, agricultural extension, and water and sanitation).

TIF Funding Guidelines also outlined a two stage application procedure whereby a concept paper would be submitted to the TIF Management Committee, outlining the proposed project. Once approved, the Council would work with the UNDT and TST Field Officer to develop a detailed implementation plan which, once completed, would be reviewed by the TIF Management Committee prior to the disbursement of funds.

2.4.3 Youth Employment Programme (YEP)

UN support to the National Youth Employment Programme in Sierra Leone evolved out of an increasing recognition that youth unemployment and the continued marginalisation of youth represents a serious threat to the overall stability of the country. Conditions for young people within Sierra Leone are generally dire and characterised by deprivation and abject poverty; lack of access to sources of livelihoods; expansion of organised crime; high levels of unemployment; lack of educational opportunities; increased narcotics and alcohol abuse; the prevalence of a culture of violence; and feelings of disaffection, disempowerment and disconnection from political processes³⁵.

The National Youth Employment Programme was designed to provide rapid employment opportunities and income generation activities to young people through public works, private sector incentives, and self-employment programmes for marginalised youth. It also planned to increase youth participation in decision-making processes through the strengthening of capacity of key institutions such as the Ministry of Youth and Sports³⁶, youth groups and youth networks. Unlike AfD or the TST/TIF which were

³³ Ibid, p. 5. Note also that the passing of the Local Government Act in 2004 created the legislative framework for the (re) establishment of Local Councils following their abolition in 1972. Democratic elections were held for Local Councils in May 2004 as part of the GoSL's commitment to political decentralisation. This was seen as a way of addressing one of the root causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone.

³⁴ See *Transition Initiative Fund – Funding Guidelines for Local Councils*, p. 1 and 2.

³⁵ *UN Support to the National Youth Employment Programme in Sierra Leone*. (June 2006). Government of Sierra Leone and UNDP, p. 4.

³⁶ Now the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports (MEYS)

discrete UNDP programmes linked into other national development modalities, the National Youth Employment Programme was an initiative led by the Government of Sierra Leone which built on earlier national-level work including the adoption of a 2002 Youth Policy.

National partners include the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS), Youth Networks, and the National Drug Control Agency (NDCA). A Youth Employment Scheme (YES)³⁷ Secretariat was established within the MEYS to oversee activities implemented under this programme. YES Secretariat is headed by the Director of Youth from the MEYS and supported by national and international staff, including an M&E advisor and an external relations and resource mobilisation advisor³⁸. A Steering Committee (SC) was established to provide strategic guidance and discuss policy issues related to implementation. This Steering Committee includes representatives from Irish Aid, DFID, the EC and UN Country Team/UNDP, as well as MEYS, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Employment³⁹. Youth are also represented on the Steering Committee⁴⁰.

There are two key sources of funding for YES activities. One is the “Basket Fund”, into which Ireland, Sweden, Norway and Japan have deposited funds. The second is the Peace Building Fund (PBF) through which \$4 million has been allocated to support youth enterprise development.

3. Findings of the Evaluation

3.1 Relevance – Appropriateness of Objectives and Design

Relevance: The degree to which the objectives of a programme or project remain valid and pertinent as originally planned or as subsequently modified owing to changing circumstances within the immediate context and external environment of that programme or project.

The 2004–07 UNDAF prioritised four areas of focus in Sierra Leone: poverty reduction and reintegration; human rights and reconciliation; good governance, peace and security; and economic recovery. As noted in Section 2.2, the revised 2006–07 UNDAF placed a more specific emphasis on five outcomes devised to complement Sierra Leone’s first PRSP (2005–2007) which placed an emphasis on three pillars: good governance, security and peace-building; promoting pro-poor growth for food security and job creation; and promoting human development⁴¹. The three programmes were coherent with the priority areas of these documents.

3.1.1 Arms for Development

The 2005 project document defined the development objective as “*to build confidence, stability and security through capacity building of grassroots communities, civil society and national institutions supporting community recovery creating opportunities for the voluntary surrender of weapons*”. Five specific outcomes were identified for which indicators were specified:

³⁷ Note that the Youth Employment Programme is more commonly referred to as the Youth Employment Scheme (YES).

³⁸ The external relations and resource mobilisation advisor has been in place since 2007. The M&E advisor joined YES in 2008. Both are international staff.

³⁹ Interview with Elisa Glasgow and Anthony Koroma from YES.

⁴⁰ Youth representation is facilitated through the national youth committee structure. As there have not yet been national elections within the youth committee structure, the current representative comes from the Western Area youth committee.

⁴¹ *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – A National Programme for Food Security, Job Creation and Good Governance (2005–2007)*, Government of Sierra Leone, 2005; *United Nations Development Assistance Framework, Sierra Leone. Revised 2006–2007*. United Nations Country Team, July 2006.

- *Outcome 1:* Strengthened community recovery and community cohesion
- *Outcome 2:* Strengthened human security and conflict prevention mechanisms
- *Outcome 3:* Sustainable disarmament of the people of Sierra Leone
- *Outcome 4:* Reduction in the incidence and level of armed violence in communities
- *Outcome 5:* Stem circulation of SALW in the Mano River Union Basin.

The programme design was premised on the belief that the effective control of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a prerequisite for peace-building and sustainable development, and also that both the Government and communities need to play an active role in community security and socio-economic development. A key element in the project's design was thus an emphasis on community, rather than individual, incentives to disarm. Following the attainment of a Weapons-Free Certificate by a Chiefdom, AfD would provide funds of approximately 40,000 Leone (Le) to support the implementation of a community development project of the Chiefdom's choice⁴². The design, oversight, implementation and management of the community development project was to be done through a Project Management Committee (PMC) comprised of representatives of key stakeholder groups within the target Chiefdom (e.g. youth, women, elders, traditional authorities). It was noted that while it would be preferable to go through existing community-based organizations (CBOs), in practice it was unlikely to find existing organisations with the capacity to undertake the work, and that an emphasis would be placed (a) on training of the PMC on arms collection and democratisation, and community development and; (b) on the strengthening of the PMC into a CBO which would be registered and therefore be able to serve as a focal point for future community development initiatives⁴³. Following the selection of a project by the PMC (e.g. building a community centre or primary school), the PMC would be required to submit a project proposal which would be endorsed by Chiefdom authorities and approved by AfD community development staff.

The two other components of the project focus more on developing an enabling environment for the control of SALW. Supporting the design and implementation of the Arms and Ammunition Act was to be done with a focus on providing a legal framework for firearms licensing and would see a key role played by the SLP and that National Revenue Authority. Stemming the illicit trade of SALW would be done through a focus on border control and developing a National Commission on Small Arms.

While there do not appear to be firm figures on the number of SALW which were in circulation in Sierra Leone after the end of the war, there is no doubt they remained in circulation. In terms of the original design of the programme, there were many elements which were directly relevant to the immediate post-conflict context in which it was launched. In particular, the design of the AfD grew out of a desire to facilitate resettlement of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees while rebuilding social cohesion and improving security. Indeed, it sought to take an innovative approach to the collection of arms by tying it to community development. Moreover, by focusing on the provision of community, rather than individual, incentives AfD was designed to avoid encouraging the 'marketing' of small arms among individuals who might then see them as assets. It is also appropriate that focusing on a community-level reward ensured that victims of violence during the war would benefit, rather than providing incentives to ex-combatants who perpetrated violence. In the immediate aftermath of the war, this was particularly relevant as many victims of the war in Sierra Leone felt that they were being ignored, while ex-combatants were being financially rewarded.

⁴² Communities to be verified "weapons-free" by the SLP who would conduct a house-to-house search of 30% of the homes in the Chiefdom. If no weapons were found then the certificate would be issued. See *Assessing and reviewing the impact of SALW projects on small arms availability and poverty: a case study of Sierra Leone UNDP Arms for Development Project*. Alison Lohead and Owen Greene, University of Bradford, April 2004.

⁴³ *Arms for Development Project Document*. Government of Sierra Leone and UNDP, 2 February 2005, p.8 and Annex V.

In the initial phases of AfD, the project focused on Chiefdoms where there were believed to be large numbers of weapons in circulation (e.g. Chiefdoms in the Eastern province which was heavily involved in the war). The design then called for the project to be rolled out to adjacent Chiefdoms with the hope that word of success in the initial areas would facilitate collection and surrender of weapons.

This appears to have been a reasonable strategy, especially in the earliest phase of the AfD when gaining community support and building momentum for the initiative was of key importance.

There were, however, elements of the design that were overambitious. In particular:

- 1 The capacity of the PMCs was lower than expected which presented challenges in terms of initiating a democratic and transparent process through which projects could be developed. High rates of illiteracy also hampered the ability of PMCs to write project proposals which could be reviewed by the AfD management team.
- 2 As recognised by the 2006 evaluation of the AfD, it is not clear that the process for declaring Chiefdoms weapons-free was thoroughly done, and weapons are believed to remain within communities by most observers involved in the project⁴⁴. While there was an emphasis on the collection of arms, many other weapons of war (e.g. machetes) remained in the community and there was a lack of baseline data against which progress could be measured.
- 3 The community arms collection element of the project was based on an assumption that the Bill on Arms and Ammunition would be passed during the initial phases of the project, and would enable for community members to legally own guns which could be used for hunting and protection against wild animals. Many guns were surrendered with the belief that they would be returned within a relatively short period of time, once legislation was passed to legalise ownership. To date, the Bill has not been passed and this has negatively impacted on the relevance of the AfD as many people are now unwilling to surrender arms which they may need for hunting, as there is no clear timetable for their return. Despite lack of progress in passing the Bill, no attempt appears to have been made among the AfD management team to amend the project's design to better account for this constraint.
- 4 The amount available for community projects (40,000 Leones) was insufficient. The initial design appears to have relied on the assumption that the target communities would be willing to provide free labour and/or materials to support the implementation of the community development project, however, as time has passed this has become less common and communities have become less willing to donate to these projects⁴⁵. Inflation over the project period has also eroded the amount available for community projects. It is estimated that US\$30,000 is needed in order for a project to be viable, but there is insufficient budgetary allowance to meet this.
- 5 The timeframe outlined for the full AfD cycle in the project document is between 10 and 15 months. This was very ambitious, especially considering that it included the implementation of two capacity building modules for the PMCs as well as certification of weapons-free status by month five in the cycle. As was noted in a 2004 case study of AfD produced by the Centre for International Cooperation and Security, the "failure of many development projects is rooted in their short term inputs, not giving enough time to embed progress and make sure that the skills and experience are really there." The aim of developing fully functional and sustainable PMCs through two short-term capacity building modules does not appear to have been based upon an adequate understanding of the capacity building needs of the proposed PMC members.

⁴⁴ Group discussion with members of ONS and the SLP by the evaluators; see also March 2006 evaluation of AfD (title and author unknown).

⁴⁵ Discussion with Mohammed Kamara, AfD Project Manager.

6 It is not clear that adequate attention was paid during the design phase to ensuring that community development projects were relevant to the needs of all community members. While there is a noted ambition to ensure that PMCs include representatives of various stakeholder groups (e.g. youth, traditional authorities, women), the project's design did not go further in elaborating any specific mechanisms by which the needs of more marginalised groups – and particularly those of youth and women – could be incorporated into the various project stages.

3.1.2 Transition Support Team (TST) and Transitional Initiatives Fund (TIF)

The Local Government Act in 2004 created the legislative framework within Sierra Leone for the (re) establishment of Local Councils following their abolition in 1972. Democratic elections were held for Local Councils in May 2004 as part of the GoSL's commitment to political decentralisation. This was seen as a way of addressing one of the root causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone.

The TST was created to provide support to the Government's efforts to coordinate recovery and the transition process at the District level. The principal objectives of the TST are to:

- Identify needs and priorities and develop strategies, plans and projects for a smooth transition from humanitarian aid, especially in support of resettling populations.
- Support Government authorities in their efforts to take the lead in the recovery and transition process towards development
- Support enhanced data handling capacity and quality by the sector/line ministry groups linked to the Sierra Leone Information System (SLIS)⁴⁶.

Particularly in the early stages of TST, the focus on supporting Local Councils to identify needs and priorities, particularly in terms of developing coherent and integrated District Development Plans was highly relevant to the context. Supporting SLIS to collect information and map Districts met a need within the country to collect information which could be utilised for District and regional planning.

Utilising TIF funds as catalysts for revenue generation through the support to local initiatives was also highly relevant given the need for newly formed Local Councils, particularly in 2004, to generate income to support them as they tried to meet their mandated responsibilities within the Local Government Act. However, the project design did not, initially at least, take into account that collection of local revenue was also being done by Chiefdom authorities and that a split in revenue between the councils and the Chiefdom authorities would have to be negotiated.

Elements of the planning approach are highly ambitious. The TIF Guidelines require a written concept paper to be submitted by Local Councils who are asked to focus on their strategic priorities (rather than the implementation of a single activity). It is not clear that the Councils would have been able to produce a relatively complex written document in English unaided, nor that the TST had the required level of skills at the district level to support this work. The low capacity of the Local Councils, particularly those with newly elected members will continue to be a concern into the immediate future.

Across all elements of the TST/TIF there was a failure in the early design phases to specify targets and indicators of change. For example, while capacity building for Local Councils is said to be a key function of the TST, it is not clear that this was based on a specific analysis of capacity building needs at that level, nor that the activities subsequently developed were filling required capacity gaps.

⁴⁶ *Joint Funding Proposal from the UN Country Team in Sierra Leone for the Transition Support Team Phase III (2005–2007)*. UN Country Team. June 2006, p.5

3.1.3 Youth Employment Programme

The 2006 YEP Project Document⁴⁷ described five objectives for the programme:

- 1 Support the implementation of the National Youth Employment Programme to provide rapid employment opportunities and income generation activities to young people through public works, private sector incentives, and self-employment programmes for marginalised youth.
- 2 Strengthen and expand ongoing successful youth engagement and income generating activities through the UN agencies and partners.
- 3 Increase youth participation in decision-making processes through the strengthening of capacity of key institutions such as the Ministry of Youth and Sports⁴⁸, youth groups and youth networks.
- 4 Support mainstreaming of employment within development policies and programmes in order to mitigate the marginalisation of young people in Sierra Leone.
- 5 Support awareness campaigns on drug abuse and trafficking and HIV/AIDS.

It included a project results and resources framework. This specifies that the intended outcome of the programme is “*increased access to employment and income generation opportunities for poor people*”. As such, the programme is linked both to the PRSP (pillar two) and the UNDAF (outcome 3). The Project Document also includes a management and coordination framework which outlines the institutions involved in the YES, their role, and their reporting requirements. Of particular importance within this framework is the Secretariat which, sitting within MEYS, was mandated to coordinate programme activities, consolidate monitoring reports, and prepare annual and quarterly workplans.

There is broad agreement among all of the key players concerned with Sierra Leone’s transition from peace-keeping and relief to longer-term development that youth must be seen not only as a key target group for development activities, but also that concerted efforts need to be made to facilitate the inclusion of youth within decision-making processes at all levels. Thus, with its focus specifically on youth, the YEP was relevant to the specific needs of Sierra Leone and the strategic priorities of the GoSL. Of particular relevance was the focus on supporting a network through which young people could formally engage with stakeholders at district, provincial and national-levels.

With more than two-thirds of youth estimated to be unemployed, there is clearly a very real need to develop projects which support the creation of jobs throughout the country. However, the YEP’s initial design is not very clear about the means through which jobs would be created and skills developed and there was a tendency to focus on supply, rather than demand, driven interventions. A 2008 review of private sector development and youth employment in Sierra Leone noted that YEP and the projects-funded through it have tended to be developed separately from the private sector, with relatively little engagement with the business community. This is considered a key constraint in the project’s overall relevance to the context in which it is operating. The same review also notes that YEP has tended to focus on the creation of short-term employment opportunities which “cannot be considered as providing sustainable solutions to the challenge of youth (un)der-employment in Sierra Leone”⁴⁹.

Additionally, the original project design contains no clear focus on gender. There is a widely acknowledged tendency for “youth” to be interpreted as “male youth” and without an explicit strategy to incorporate young women, there is a risk that they will be overlooked and their particular needs not addressed.

⁴⁷ *UN Support to the National Youth Employment Programme in Sierra Leone*. (June 2006). Government of Sierra Leone and UNDP, p. 25

⁴⁸ Now the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports (MEYS)

⁴⁹ See *Private Sector and Youth Employment Mapping – Sierra Leone*, Justin Sykes, June 2008, p. 42.

3.2 Efficiency – Inputs

Input: A means mobilised for the conduct of programme or project activities, i.e. financial, human and physical resources.

Efficiency: The optimal transformation of inputs into outputs.

3.2.1 Administration of Sida trust funds

Assistance to UNDP is encompassed within the ‘UNDP/Sida Trust Fund for Assistance to UNDP Specific Activities’ established in September 2000. Specific administration agreements have been signed for contributions to the selected programmes in Sierra Leone. The evaluation has been particularly concerned with the administration of the funds (Article 6 of the Trust Fund) and the reporting on the programme contributions (Article 11). Gaining access to documentation has proved to be particularly onerous and time-consuming, as noted above.

Table 1 shows the date of these agreements and the contributions made.

Table 1: Programme contributions by Sida

Programme	Sida Contribution	Agreement signed	Period activities to be carried out	Contribution not available for disbursement from
Arms for Development	5,000,000 SEK (US\$ 652,000)	9 September 2005	1 September 2005 –31 August 2006	28 February 2007
Transitional Initiatives Fund (TIF)	10,000,000 SEK (US\$ 1.227million)	18 November 2005	1 December 2005 –31 December 2006	30 June 2007
Transition Support Team	3,000,000 SEK (US\$ 410,000)	3 November 2006	1 September 2006 –31 August 2007	28 February 2008
Youth Employment Programme	12,000,000 SEK (US\$ 1.650million)	3 November 2006	1 September 2006 –31 August 2007	28 February 2008

Whilst these agreements have all now expired, activities and expenditure are still being incurred. The evaluation was unable to obtain any formal evidence that requests have been made by UNDP and approved by Sida to extend their validity which would allow the continuation of budgetary expenditures of unspent sums⁵⁰.

It is also noted that the Trust Fund allows UNDP to charge up to 13% of the contribution for support costs (Article 7: cost recovery). This should provide adequate allowance for UNDP to put the necessary management practices and recruit the requisite staff to administer the Sida support during the period.

Table 2 shows the various prescribed documents and reports that the evaluation obtained in relation to these programmes

⁵⁰ The absence of any formal requests or approval was confirmed in an email of 24th July 2008 from Sida to the evaluation team.

Table 2: Project/Programme Documentation Received by the Evaluation

Type of Document	Transition Support Team (TST)	Transitional Initiatives Fund	Arms for Development	Youth Employment Programme
Project Document	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2005 End of Year Report (EoYR)	Yes	N/A*	No**	N/A
2006 EoYR	No	N/A	No**	No
2007 EoYR	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes
Annual Workplan & Budget 2005	Yes***		No**	N/A
Annual Workplan & Budget 2006	Yes***		No**	Yes
Annual Workplan & Budget 2007	Yes***		Yes	Yes
Annual Workplan & Budget 2008	Yes***		N/A	Yes

* End of Year Reports for TIF would be the same as the EoYR for the TST; no separate report has been produced as the TST is considered to be an activity of the TIF.

** According to UNDP staff, no annual report was prepared for 2005 or 2006 as Sida funding was not spent during these years.

*** These workplans were derived from entries on the ATLAS system and do not contain any narrative reporting.

In each case a project document has been prepared. These project documents are not written in a consistent fashion and layout, and subsequent amendments to the programmes (in aims and content) have not been reflected in amending the project document. No logical framework matrices are provided and there is an absence of measurable targets and indicators in the documents which would allow an objective evaluation of performance and achievements. These limitations carry through to the progress reports that have been compiled on the programmes.

Annual work plans are prepared in accordance with Article 11. 2a. As noted in the above table they were not prepared in every case (AfD only in 2007, and only ATLAS entries for TIF/TST) They follow a prescribed UNDP format, but they are not referred to in the subsequent progress reporting, making it difficult to ascertain the extent to which workplans are followed. These workplans have only limited narrative content and in most cases do not present expected results or targets for the year. It is not clear whether they have been sent to Sida in accordance with the Trust Fund agreement⁵¹.

There are a number of annual reports on each programme and in addition three collective reports (Status Report on Sida Funds, January 2007, Progress report as at 31 August 2007, and Progress report as at 30 April 2008) compiled by the Peace and Development Unit. The narrative reporting and layout of the progress reports are not strong. There is no consistent layout and content of the reports, a failure to focus on results, to report against any measurable indicators, or to relate to the original project document.

Reports are also confusing in that some reports pertaining to address Sida funds (the PDU reports) also contain commentary and results that were based on activities funded by other donors (e.g. Japan, Norway, Ireland). Also, some reports are a misnomer in that achievements are cumulative and do not

⁵¹ The evaluation mission was unable to obtain evidence of official communication with Sida by the Head of the PDU or the UNDP CO.

pertain specifically to that given year (e.g. AfD annual report 2007). It should be understood that Sida funds are pooled in these programmes with other donor funds and thus it is not always clear what specific activities Sida funds have contributed to and what other donor money has been used. This means, of course, that one cannot measure Sida contribution to achievements in an absolute sense, but only that Sida has contributed a certain percentage to achieving a particular outcome. None of the reports have been quality assured and they are not considered 'fit-for-purpose' in terms of Article 11, 2.b. No evidence was obtained that Sida had reviewed these reports nor provided any feedback on the content and quality.

Overall, this evaluation considers the quality of programme documentation has been poor; objectives, outcomes and the description of activities have not been consistently applied, and limited efforts seem to have been made to ensure consistent presentation of findings in accordance with normal UNDP practice.

3.2.2 Efficiency of expenditures

Determining expenditures from the Sida contribution has been a fraught exercise. No financial reports have been seen that would fulfil the conditionality of Article 11. 2c. There would appear to have been no precise and constant reporting on expenditure. Instead, the evaluation was presented with a variety of figures from different sources (including synoptic annual statements, financial tables, an 'office resource overview', and printouts from the UNDP ATLAS system) from which it has compiled details on expenditure. Table 3 presents the analysis of the budgets and expenditures shown to the evaluation team.

Table 3: Sida allocations and recorded expenditure by UNDP (2005–2008)

1. Arms for Development (AfD)

Date agreement signed	Period activities to be carried out ⁵²	SEK received	Approx US\$ equivalent ⁵³	2005 \$ spend	2006 \$ spend	2007 \$ spend*	2008 \$ spend
9 September 2005	1 September 2005 –31 August 2006	5,000,000	652,742	0	0	211,242.32	n/a

* From a financial report provided by AfD Programme Co-ordinator to the evaluation.

Note on AfD spending

- Note that the 2007 End of Year Report for AfD reports that the amount of Sida allocation spent was \$222,135.82.
- Another report (Office Resource Overview) reports that the total expenditure for 2007 was \$226,530.
- ATLAS printouts for 2007 fail to show confirmation of any of these figures.

2. Youth Employment Programme

Date agreement signed	Period activities to be carried out	SEK received	Approx US\$ equivalent	2006 \$ spend	2007 \$ spend*	2008 \$ spend
3 November 2006	1 September 2006 –31 August 2007	12,000,000	1,650,000	0	0	0

Note on YEP spending

- Funding for YEP was only received in early 2007 so no expenditures could be incurred in 2006.
- The End of Year Report for 2007 for UN Support to National Youth Employment and Empowerment reports only on allocations to the programme but contains no figures on expenditure.
- Discussions with programme staff indicate that, to-date, there has been no expenditure from the Youth Employment Basket Fund (into which Sida funds have been placed; other donors to the Basket Fund are Ireland, Norway and Japan)
- Discussions with other donors indicate confusion over YES/YEP expenditure and how expenditure is charged against either the Basket Fund or the Peace Building Fund (PBF – US\$ 4,000,000).

⁵² As outlined in the agreement between Sida and UNDP

⁵³ US\$ equivalent as reported in 31 January 2007 UNDP report on Sida funds

- While the Project Budget Balance provided to the evaluation team shows no expenditure of Sida funds, another report (Office Resource Overview) indicates that US\$ 478,977 from the Sida allocation was spend in 2007. UNDP also subsequently provided a table showing an expenditure of US\$ 612,871 in the period Jan–Jun 2008, but neither of these figures were verifiable.

3. Transitional Initiatives Fund (TIF)

Date agreement signed	Period activities to be carried out	SEK received	Approx US\$ equivalent	2006 \$ spend	2007 \$ spend*	2008 \$ spend*
18 November 2005	1 December 2005–31 December 2006	10 million	1,277,139	0	212,192.93	313.804.35

* From a financial report (Project Budget Balance, generated by ATLAS) provided to the evaluation.

4. Transitional Support Team (TST)

Date agreement signed	Period activities to be carried out	SEK received	Approx US\$ equivalent	2006 \$ spend	2007 \$ spend*	2008 \$ spend*
3 November 2006	1 September 2006–31 August 2007	3,000,000	410,000	0	81,397.89	86,162.19

* From a financial report (Project Budget Balance, generated by ATLAS) provided to the evaluation.

General note on spending for TST/TIF

- Project Budget Balance reports (generated in ATLAS) show support to the TST as Activity 6 under the TIF rather than a separate programme.

Notes on 2007 TST/TIF spending

- Project Budget Balance report for 2007 indicates that a total of US\$ 1,048,336.09 was spent to support the TIF/TST (funds provided by multiple donors, including Sida). Of this, a total of \$293,590.82 (28%) came from Sida. The same figure was included in the 2007 End of Year Report for the TST/TIF.
- A separate report provided to the evaluation team (Office Resource Overview) indicates that in 2007 \$1,289,798.00 was spent from Sida funds.

There is a large amount of confusion on financial reporting with a lack of consistent figures produced by the different programmes and the CO. This should necessarily be of concern to the Government of Sweden, as the rate of disbursement in each of the financial years has clearly not met expectations nor the plans set out in the agreements for each programme.

From the above figures, it is estimated that a total of US\$ 504,833 was spent from Sida over all programmes, representing 11.0% of the Sida contribution. Looking at expenditures made to July 2008 this total rises to US\$ 904,799 or 19.8% of the Sida contribution. Taking the period to end 2007 and the activity validity period of the agreements, 34% of the contribution to AfD has been disbursed, 0% of the YEP, 17% of the TIF and 20% of the TST. Such a low rate of disbursement obviously has implications in terms of what has been achieved.

UNDP in Sierra Leone has clearly had problems in maintaining robust financial management systems and proper accounting practice in relation to these programmes. The use of the UNDP ATLAS system for budgeting and payments as well as detailed cash-flow management does not appear to be operating in an efficient manner. The evaluation team learnt that there have been many problems in inputting data against proper budget coding, inappropriate allocation of expenditures to project codes and issues with making reversal of payments. This does not reflect well on the role of UNDP as custodian of donor funds.

Allocation of Sida funds seems to be made against specific activity budget lines in each programme, apportioned in an arbitrary fashion by UNDP given that funds are not hypothecated against particular components of the programmes. In the event expenditures are often recorded against different budget lines depending on what balance of other donor funding remains available to the programme (e.g. ATLAS printouts showed both nil returns against Sida specified items as well as negative balances where no budget provision had originally been made).

A significant amount of expenditure is incurred through the procurement of goods and services, for which the UNDP rules of public procurement and procedures are followed. However, adhering to the procurement procedures can generate lengthy delays where public procurement forms a large part of the activity, and in ensuring a sufficient number of compliant bids are obtained (a difficulty particularly when using contractors in rural areas). All this impedes efficient implementation of activities and has been one of the reasons for the slow progress.

3.2.3 Organisation and management

The Head of the Peace and Development Unit (PDU) is responsible for the 3 programmes being evaluated each headed by a Programme Co-ordinator. The PDU Head reports to the Deputy Resident Representative in charge of programmes in the Country Office. It is understood that the main respondent with Sida is the PDU Head.

Staffing resources of the PDU appear adequate to achieve its programmes, although as noted in the 2007 UNDP Annual Report there is a lack of capacity in a number of areas and a skill base which is focused heavily on operations, but less so on results and strategy. The following figures on staffing levels in the programmes were provided to the evaluation team:

	International staff	National staff*	Support staff
AfD	0	21	8
TST	0	13	17
YEP	0	1	0
YES Secretariat	3	2	0

* All staff are male except for 2 female in AfD

There were also a number of current vacancies. Additionally for the AfD programme field assistants have been employed in the past on local contracts in chiefdoms targeted for arms collection for the specific duration of the collection period.

The exercise of required skills in programme/project cycle management (PCM) and the UNDP results-based management approaches (RBM) is not being efficiently implemented by key management. There is a lack of administrative and organisational skills being displayed both in strategic planning and in programme management. This is exemplified by inadequate preparation of documentation, lack of attention to reporting and poor financial management. It has been reflected in the poor performance and paucity of achievements in implementation of the 3 programmes.

To an extent, this is a reflection of the need for changed modalities and skills as UNDP moves from emergency assistance in the aftermath of war recovery through rehabilitation to sustainable development. The period under review (2005–07) has been a period of change marked by the election of a new government and evolving national priorities, and whilst this is well recognised in UNDP it has been slow to respond to the structural and organisation changes necessary to equip UNDP to take on the new realities of partnership, institutional strengthening of public institutions and development.

The evaluation would be more sanguine about the ability of UNDP to respond to these changes had the limitations and weaknesses in approach and management been a newly recognised phenomenon. However, these difficulties have been acknowledged in many documents over the past few years and touches on issues which are strongly reflected in UNDP reports and other documents⁵⁴. It should also be realised that these issues are not unique to Sida funding. During a round table discussion with other donors present in the country, concerns about performance and accountability of UNDP were widely voiced.

However, these strategic and management weaknesses are being addressed by UNDP in recognition of the problems and under-performance of UNDP in the country. During the evaluation, a UN Change Management Team (CMT) and a Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) team were in-country. The evaluation was able to learn of the drastic restructuring changes being planned to shape the way forward. It will also include a 'clean-up and regularisation' of programmes and a transition phase in September–October 2008 to put the new structures (and prepare for staffing changes) in place. It was acknowledged that confidence needs to be restored with its donors through a reconciliation of current programmes and the status of agreements and finances, which will lay with a special recovery team to be brought in, before moving forward. In particular, the BCPR team has been examining the new country context and the necessary restructuring and strengthened capacities needed for the PDU which is to be reformulated as the Recovery for Development (RFD) Unit focusing on two future strategic areas: (i) conflict prevention, and (ii) decentralisation and community development. The intention is to work in a much more integrated fashion with other UN programmes. At the CO it will also include a stronger programme implementation unit and office for strategic oversight (including donor relations).

3.3 Effectiveness – Outputs & Outcomes (results)

Outputs: Tangible products (including services) of a programme or project that are necessary to achieve the objectives of a programme or project. Outputs relate to the completion (rather than the conduct) of activities and are the type of results over which managers have a high degree of influence.

Effectiveness: The extent to which a development outcome is achieved through interventions. The extent to which a programme or project achieves its planned results (goals, purposes and outputs) and contributes to outcomes.

3.3.1 Arms for Development

The project document for AfD does not contain clear targets for the two-year time frame initially outlined for the project (2004–2006). However, the 2004 Annual Progress Briefing for the project stated that “depending on much needed financial resources”, AfD aimed at rendering a total of 67 Chiefdoms weapons-free by the end of 2005, and complete all of the community development projects by the end of 2006. Table 4 provides details on targets outlined in the 2004 Briefing⁵⁵.

⁵⁴ For example: UNDP 2007 Annual Report raises concerns about reporting on the assistance and the necessary accountability that derives from monitoring and evaluation of programmes which appears to have been deficient. The report notes that: “donor support can only be assured by more diligent and regular reporting. This requirement may have had less urgency in the past... However... more emphasis on reporting and accountability should be expected” (Annual Report 2007, p. 33). Similarly, the 2007 Annual Report for the AfD indicates that the project requires “new management processes and techniques” as well as “robust arrangements for monitoring and evaluation” (AfD Annual Report 2007, p. 8).

⁵⁵ Note that it is not clear from the Briefing whether or not the figures in this table represent cumulative totals for the project, or targets for individual years. The Briefing states that it aimed to cover all 149 Chiefdoms in the country by the end of 2007, however it also somewhat confusingly states that the project aims to finish all community development projects by the end of 2006 but gives 77, rather than 149 or 120, as the target.

Table 4: Arms for Development Targets (from 2004 Briefing)

Activity/Year	2004	2005	2006
Chiefdoms sensitized on small arms issues	17	77	120
CBOs formed and trained	17	77	120
Chiefdoms declared arms-free	5	62	115
Community projects completed	17	27	77

Following the May 2006 evaluation, the target for the implementation of community development projects was increased to 145 although this was not clearly reflected in any project documents. No specific targets appear to have been set for 2007, but the 2007 EoYR indicates that a total of 15 community development projects had been completed, with a further 22 projects identified and initiated⁵⁶.

It is also important to note that an agreement was made in 2007 to abolish the ceiling of US\$14,000 for the community projects as it was clear that this “proved to be in most cases grossly inadequate for viable community projects”. This necessitated a tendering process for the upgrading of a number of completed as well as ongoing projects and appears to have further delayed progress.

In any case, current records indicate that by April 2008, a total of 6,112 weapons had been collected over the project period, although a breakdown of arms collected by year is not available. Records also show that by 20th May 2008 only 17 community projects have been completed. Also, it is understood that following the March 2006 evaluation of the AfD, the designation of “weapons-free Chiefdoms” was stopped as there was no clear means of verifying this status. The emphasis of the project was then shifted to the completion of community projects and increasing the number of communities sensitized on small arms issues. This, again, is not clearly reflected in any of the project documentation. Table 5 indicates that by mid-2008, the following outputs had been achieved. 72 community projects remain in various stages of procurement and/or implementation.

Table 5: Arms for Development Outputs (2004–2008)

Activity/Year	Outputs (cumulative to mid-2008)
Chiefdoms sensitized on small arms issues	91
CBOs formed and trained	28
Total number of Chiefdoms declared arms-free	59
Total number of community projects completed over lifetime of project	17
Total number of weapons collected over lifetime of project	6,112

The overall effectiveness of the AfD programme is difficult to assess given the weaknesses of clear reporting on targeting and achievements in any particular year, and lack of substantiated evidence available to the evaluation team. Lack of a baseline or any significant monitoring of activities or results further complicates the task. For example, while the AfD project collected more than 6,000 weapons between 2004 and 2008, it is not known how this compares to estimates of the number of weapons in circulation at the start of the project or, indeed within the specific Chiefdoms in which the project has been fully implemented. Taken together with the number of communities declared weapons-free, this may have contributed to a number of the original outcomes (for example, Outcomes 2 and 3) specified in the AfD project document.

⁵⁶ See *Arms for Development 2007 End of Year Report*, p. 2. UNDP.

Clearly, progress has been made in the sensitisation of communities on small arms issues that has been a key area of emphasis since mid-2006 in target Chiefdoms. However, M&E systems which would enable a judgment on the effectiveness of this work in changing perceptions and understanding of arms and weapons were not put into place.

Community projects were originally conceived as a way of linking development to disarmament and increased security within the communities, while increasing community cohesion. There was a core role for PMCs/CBOs in identifying, designing and implementing projects. Their capacity to undertake this work, however, was overestimated and some of the slow progress in the delivery of the projects to the community is due to weaknesses in the ability of the PMCs/CBOs to organise and deliver these projects. This work is now being contracted out to private companies which should improve the rate of delivery. However, coupled with the fact that weapons-free certificates are not longer being issued, it is unclear whether the project is now operating sufficiently within its original remit and whether this work will enable any further achievement of results related to improved community cohesion or security.

3.3.2 Transition Support Team and Transitional Initiatives Fund

The initial project document for the TST does not provide clear targets, outcomes or indicators. Five outputs for 2005 are, however, specified in a June 2005 work plan. The table below summarises these outputs and progress against them from the EoYR 2005. The work done by the TST during this time would have been implemented through the 10 offices operating at field level.

Table 6: 2005 TST/TIF Outputs

Output	Description	Progress (from 2005 EoYR)
Output 1	Formulation of District Development Plans 2006 supported (to be completed by December 2005)	No specific progress reported
Output 2	Suggestions formulated for further capacity building of local government institutions in view of development planning	No specific progress reported
Output 3	Plan of UN interventions 2005 presented to local councils in every district	Presentation of the workplans of UN agencies to the Local Councils (who had just completed their DDPs).
Output 4	Measures identified to improve coordination structure at district level	Creating coordination structures that would include UN agencies, INGOS and the Local Councils, though there is also a comment that these were not always successful due to other agencies failing to prioritise coordination efforts; establishment of District Programming Teams (DPT) which brought actors together to consolidate UNHCR interventions.
Output 5	Exit strategies formulated to support transition from UNHCR and UNAMSIL activities to projects/ activities managed by other UN agencies and/or local partners	Established UN integrated offices in the field as well as District Programming Teams in the districts where UNHCR was completing its programme.

The End of Year Report for 2005 also notes that TIF projects in three categories were approved, totalling US\$1.3 million⁵⁷. However, neither the number of projects approved, nor their specific costs are reported. There was no record of a 2006 End of Year Report for TST/TIF and no evidence presented regarding outputs for that year. The 2007 End of Year Report specifies three expected outcomes for the year:

- A number of projects identified, formulated and implemented by local councils, where the number is defined by the availability of funds.

⁵⁷ (1) Infrastructure (reconstruction of markets); (2) post-harvest processing (rice hullers); (3) health (waste management). Minutes from a TIF management committee meeting (9th September 2005) indicate that 37 proposals were received but it is not clear how many were approved.

- A number of coordination meetings (at least 12 per month), organised and conducted by District Councils.
- A number of activities identified and designed by the UN Agencies jointly at the district level through the UN District Teams, in cooperation with the local councils.

The report does not indicate how the project performed against these expected achievements (e.g. how many coordination meetings were held and what their results were). This report, with other documentation, indicates that over the course of the year, 47 proposals were received, 14 (nine markets and five lorry parks) of which were approved by the TIF management committee. By June 2008, five markets and one lorry park had been completed.

A database of development partners in each district was also compiled and a “comprehensive bidding process” had been completed for the implementation of one other project (Port Loko Teacher’s Electrification Project). Other activities, including the construction of a police station, public water and sanitation facilities in Kenema, and boarding facilities and electrification for a teacher training college in Port Loko were also approved. Of these, Sida funds have been used to support the construction of the police station and the water and sanitation facilities included within the community infrastructure component.

Once again, from the available documentation and evidence, it is very difficult to comment on the effectiveness of the TST and TIF to-date. Few activities are clearly reported on and, even where they are outlined in EoYR, the results are not specified. Anecdotal evidence (e.g. from discussions with Local Councils and UNDP staff) indicate that the TST has played an important role, especially in their early phase, in supporting the process of decentralisation and ensuring that Local Councils were operational and were supported to develop their District Development Plans. While there is no doubt some merit in these reports, there is no concrete evidence available to support them.

The overarching aim of the TIF projects was to act as a catalyst for the boosting of local revenue; the (re)building of markets and construction of lorry parks, for example, was done with a view to enabling local councils to generate income which could then be used both to sustain the projects and, where possible, support other council initiatives. One example indicated that a lorry park constructed in Barmoi could produce 162 million Le⁵⁸ in yearly revenue, 80% of which would go the Council (the remaining 20% would go to Chiefdom authorities)⁵⁹. Unfortunately, however, no monitoring system for approved TIF projects was put into place that allows for an analysis of the contribution of funded TIF projects to Local Council budgets. As with the TST, this makes it difficult to comment on the overall effectiveness, or indeed any wider strategic influences, of TIF projects to-date.

3.3.3 Youth Employment Programme

Specific targets outlined within the YEP project results and resources framework include:

- “Gainful” employment for more than 15,000 youth in agriculture-related activities;
- Training for 1,000 youth through a Youth Agriculture Farm Scheme;
- Involvement of 2,000 youth in environment/fuel wood projects;
- Creation of 5,000 jobs through enterprise development;
- Engagement of 4,800 youth in public works projects;
- Creation of 14 district youth committees.

⁵⁸ Approximately US\$56,000 or 336,000 SEK.

⁵⁹ PowerPoint presentation titled “Transition Initiative Fund MC”, provided to the evaluation team by the current project coordinator.

Other outputs listed in the project document are more vaguely worded, making it difficult to draw out specific targets (e.g. “improved environment for youth already engaged in small enterprises”; “awareness campaigns and support to cross-cutting issues”). The 2006 Annual Workplan, produced by the PDU, makes reference to only some of these targets (e.g. 15,000 youth engaged in income-generating activities). As no 2006 EoYR appears to have been written, it is not possible to assess outputs during that year. However, it was understood that no expenditure was incurred over that period.

No narrative workplan or detailed targets appear to have been developed for 2007, although a 2007 document showed five outputs were expected by the end of the year: (1) capacity of Youth Employment Secretariat strengthened; (2) rapid employment and income-generating initiatives created; (3) literacy and non-formal education for young men and women in Kambia, Kono and Bo⁶⁰; (4) Youth councils and executive committees formed nation-wide; (5) regional networks for information sharing and joint programming established. The 2007 EoYR, however, does not outline achievements against specific targets or, indeed, specifically the outputs listed above. Achievements listed for this year, in the EoYR, include the following:

- Support to the MEYS which included capacity building and work to enhance the operational capacity of the YES and the YES Secretariat through the provision of a generator and refurbishment of office space. No clear explanation is given, however, regarding what the “capacity building” entailed, or how it was designed to match expressed needs either within the MEYS or the YES Secretariat.
- Disbursal of just over \$59,000 to YANATOL, an organisation aiming to implement a range of formal and non-formal training projects⁶¹.
- Commitment to fund a Fuel Wood Project which would support 500 youth to minimise environmental degradation of the Western Area Peninsula forest through “youth-led environmental management, increasing sustainable fuel wood supplies, and promoting income generating initiatives”. A total of \$300,000 was committed to this project, apparently through Japanese support to the Basket Fund.
- Provision of \$24,000 to “Miracle Corners of the World”, a youth centre in Eastern Freetown which would support youth business and entrepreneurship classes for 500 direct beneficiaries, as well as an after school youth clubs programme.

No comment is made on awareness campaigns, public works projects or progress in relation to the establishment of district youth committees. While three of the projects are listed as “soon to commence”⁶², it was learned that two of them had subsequently been rejected for funding through the Basket Fund, while one (Sober Women’s Cement Factory) was supported through the Peace Building Fund⁶³.

A 2008 workplan indicates that many of the priorities for previous years remain in place, with a few adjustments. In particular, Output 2 in the 2008 workplan is focused on strengthening private sector enterprises to employ youth (though the activities are focused on public works and agriculture, in

⁶⁰ Note that this is the first time a reference to literacy and non-formal education appears in YEP/YES documentation.

⁶¹ YANATOL is an acronym for “Youth are not ashamed to learn”. It does not appear that this was supported through the Basket Fund.

⁶² (1) A \$150,000 project to empower youth through food production, processing and packaging to be implemented by Con and Cil Foods Ltd. (2) A \$150,000 project to support the Cassette Sellers Association and provide opportunities for self-employment for 1,000 youth. (3) Support to the Sober Women’s Cement Factor to develop brick production as a viable opportunity for self-employment (\$11,600).

⁶³ A June 2008 review funded by DFID indicates that a further two projects have received, or are about to receive support through the PBF: (1) \$25,000 to support urban micro-projects which will create sustainable livelihoods for 25 beneficiaries in Freetown; implemented by GTZ; (2) A \$600,000 grant to the Micro-Finance Investment and Technical Assistance Facility (MITAF) which will be used to “facilitate increased capacity among selected micro-finance institutions to deliver credit services to around 500 young people. See *Private Sector and Youth Employment Mapping – Sierra Leone* by Justin Sykes, June 2008, p.38.

addition to establishing informal enterprises). Output 3 of the workplan is focused on the establishment of 50 cooperative credit schemes. However, as noted in Section 3.2.2, the evaluation is unaware of any expenditure to mid-2008, particularly under the Basket Fund and Sida's contribution to it.

It became clear that the different agencies involved in the YES have competing priorities and that this has, to some degree at least, hampered agreement on the projects to be funded and the way in which the YES and the YES Secretariat should be monitored and supported. In particular, concerns were raised during the 2007 Presidential elections that projects funded through YES during this period could be viewed as supporting the political aims of the President at that time⁶⁴. Some recent progress has been made, however, in terms of developing strategies and approaches for future implementation and management of the scheme; for example, in early July 2008 an implementation plan outlining short-, medium- and long-term aims which will frame activities and how progress from this point forward could be monitored was developed. Also, a new call for project proposals was launched on 21st July 2008⁶⁵. To-date, however, as with other projects/programme to which Sida has allocated funding, the lack of expenditure, monitoring, and reporting on the YEP/YES makes it difficult – if not impossible – to judge effectiveness. Reports produced by UNDP on YES are confusing in that they repeat achievements from previous years, making it unclear when activities were implemented and when results might reasonably be expected. It seems certain, however, that given the lack of disbursement of Basket Funds – and within this, the Sida allocation – the YES has made very little progress towards its original targets.

Finally, the project document outlines that financial management responsibilities lie with UNDP, while the Steering Committee (of which UNDP is a part) and the Secretariat have responsibility for the coordination of programmes and approval of all reports. However, this structure has clearly not resolved the differences in opinion about the use of funds between the Steering Committee and UNDP and tensions have emerged. There is a clear need for fiduciary controls to be put into place and for donors to have confidence in the management of funding allocations.

3.4 Impact & Sustainability

Impact: The overall and long-term effect of an intervention. Impact is the longer-term or ultimate result attributable to a development intervention—in contrast to output and outcome, which reflect more immediate results from the intervention.

Sustainability: Durability of positive programme or project results after the termination of the technical cooperation channelled through that programme or project.

Impact and sustainability criteria were not specifically to be addressed as per the ToR. However, during the Inception period an exchange of correspondence with Sida (ref: email of 2nd July 2008) suggested that there may be value in examining any resulting impacts from Sida support on poverty reduction or youth employment. It will be evident from the foregoing that the evaluation is unable to attribute any specific impacts to Sida's support. The fact that only 11% of the Sida contribution had been disbursed by end 2007 indicates that very little is likely to have been achieved. The ability to attribute impact is also compromised by the absence of either measurable or qualitative indicators that would have allowed the evaluation to make some tentative judgements in this regard.

⁶⁴ However, this is not the view of all stakeholders, some of whom believe that the Steering Committee structure is robust enough to withstand political interference and pressure.

⁶⁵ This call for proposals indicates that funding for the projects will be drawn from both the Basket Fund and the PBF. Projects must be focused on three main areas: youth engagement in the agricultural sector; support to youth enterprise development; and support to skills and training development. See *YES Call for Proposals* 21 July 2008.

3.5 Coherence – Donor Harmonisation

It is evident that there has been a breakdown in donor harmonisation with the GoSL and amongst the donors, except at a sector level where informal contacts have been maintained bi-laterally. The Development Partners' Consultative meetings (DEPAC) used to meet quarterly chaired by the government and the UN ERSG. It last met in April 2007 prior to the elections. The first official forum with the new President did not take place until early July 2008. The new government has clearly been preoccupied with changes to the administration, and in-coming ministers have had little experience in matters of co-ordination. Any harmonisation is currently issues-based. There was no sense of what UNDP is doing internally to meet Paris declaration principles.

The experience of donor assistance to UNDP and working with UNDP has been broadly similar to the limitations outlined in this report on Sida funding. In management terms there was a broad consensus on: limited delivery on programmes, a lack of transparency, absence of management and reporting, poor financial accountability and lack of adequate M&E systems. Structurally, UNDP has worked as a sub-contractor in the post-war reconstruction phase, but has not had the technical assistance and skills to re-engineer itself to the changed realities of partnership (both with government and donors) and institutional capacity-building. Strategically, it had been weak in the policy arena and it was felt that UNDP has been too diffuse in its outreach, attempting to work in too many sectors.

In funding programmes through UNDP, donors did not want to see Sierra Leone losing commitments because of poor absorptive capacity and delivery, but without changes at UNDP were looking to close-off existing support as effectively as possible and unlikely to provide new funding (this relates to programme rather than core funding). A range of other disbursement instruments were being examined (e.g. Member States looking at mechanisms through the EU). There is a common wish to see the UNDP address its internal deficiencies, as is being proposed by the Change Management Team.

4. Conclusions & Lessons Learned

The evaluation is fully aware that the period under review (2005–2007) has been a time of change and challenge in Sierra Leone for all stakeholders, including both government and the donor community. There have been weaknesses in the enabling environment for the programmes evaluated (e.g. arms control legislation in AfD), and political changes following the elections in 2007 that have impeded the delivery of programmes. For UNDP, the period has offered particular challenges in moving from its mandate of supporting post-war recovery to rehabilitation and sustainable development. The evidence of the past few years is that the extent to which UNDP has been able to respond to these changes is highly debatable. This report has noted structural, strategic and management issues which have impeded the delivery of assistance by UNDP. The progress and performance of the Sida support to UNDP programmes is extremely disappointing and has been marked by administrative and financial failures and a lack of management efficiency.

The implementation of the specific administration agreements that were signed between Sida and UNDP for contributions to the selected programmes in Sierra Leone – Arms for Development (AfD), Transition Initiatives Fund/ Transition Support Team (TST); and the Youth Employment Programme (YEP) – has brought negligible tangible benefits. There has been little attempt to adhere to the conditions of the 'UNDP/Sida Trust Fund for Assistance to UNDP Specific Activities' under which the specific agreements have been signed. The evaluation found the absence of consistent reporting difficult to comprehend, and the plethora of different budgetary figures and financial tables produced by

UNDP confusing. These agreements have all now expired, but it was noted that activities and expenditure are still being incurred, without any formal request or approval to extend their validity.

Neither UNDP nor Sida would appear to have monitored the execution of the specific administration agreements in providing for narrative and financial reporting on the performance of Sida's financial contributions. There is no record that Sida has queried the lack of quality reporting or the absence of proper certified financial statements. Given that UNDP charges up to 13% of the contribution for support costs (Article 7: cost recovery) there would appear to be no reason why UNDP did not put appropriate staffing and the proper management practices into effect during the period.

Because there is no consistent and precise statement of annual expenditures, the evaluation can only estimate that from the total allocation of SEK 30 million to these three programmes, approximately SEK 3.03 million or 11.0% of the Sida contribution was utilised up until the end of 2007. Even more disappointing is the lack of tangible results that have been recorded, that could be attributed to this expenditure.

The conclusions of the evaluation can best be summarised by addressing directly the questions raised in the ToR.

4.1 Administration & Management

- *Has UNDP met the conditions outlined in the agreements?*

No. There has been a failure to adhere to the validity period of the agreements, inadequate reporting and an absence of proper financial accountability.

- *Is the institutional capacity and resources of UNDP in Sierra Leone sufficient to achieve the goals set out?*

UNDP was deemed to be sufficiently equipped to implement the programmes in terms of staffing and financial resources. A recent outcome evaluation of the PDU confirmed that it had the necessary resources for programme delivery. However, the required skills in programme/project cycle management (PCM) and the UNDP results-based management approaches (RBM) have not been exercised by key management. There has been a lack of administrative and organisational skills both in strategic planning and in programme management. There is little mitigation for this given that UNDP had the resources at its disposal, through the support costs levied against the Sida contribution, to address any perceived weaknesses in its internal institutional capacity.

- *Does UNDP have the absorption capacity of the existing level of support from Sida and, if so, would the organisations be able to absorb and even larger support programme?*

Not during the period under review, as demonstrated by the limited expenditure and performance in utilising the existing funds, and lack of accountability and transparency in reporting on what has been spent. Almost 90% of the Sida contribution remained unspent at the end of 2007 (even by mid 2008, 80% of the SEK 30 million remains unspent). Whilst it is recognised that it is better not to spend than spend unwisely, the large remaining balances show there would have been no purpose to further Sida contributions.

- *Which criteria are being used by UNDP to select projects/programme?*

There are two senses in which this question was addressed; (i) the criteria of how Sida money was allocated, and (ii) the presence of project selection criteria within the programmes.

There was no particular basis for allocating the Sida contribution to specific budget items in the programmes. It appears to have been an ad hoc process depending on what other donor contributions

were also received. Neither were the actual allocative decisions adhered to in booking expenditures. Many instances were noted, in examining the financial printouts, of expenditures being made to different budget lines. The whole procedure seems to have been largely arbitrary.

Within each programme, guidelines have been produced on which to base the selection of project proposals that are being submitted. However, in many cases these proposals themselves are weak and whilst there are various steering committees reviewing applicants, UNDP maintains a measure of control and decides on what is to be funded. It is noted that the guidelines produced have often given inadequate attention to the issues of gender inclusion, youth disaggregation and sufficient poverty focus.

4.2 Efficiency

- *Was the intervention economically worthwhile, given possible alternative uses of the available resources and results?*

As there has been little expenditure of the Sida contribution, and an absence of any significant results recorded, there is scant evidence to suggest that Sida's intervention has had any more than extremely limited economic benefit for the intended beneficiaries of the programmes.

Sweden of course is a strong supporter of the United Nations family and therefore its support to UNDP in the context of Sierra Leone can be justified, where it has no in-country presence. It is therefore all the more disappointing that the role of UNDP as a custodian and implementer of donor funds has been so inadequate. Given the paucity of progress and results, almost any other modalities (e.g. through direct NGO support, EU mechanisms) may have achieved more impact. However, the institutional framework is weak in the country and other actors also face difficulties in implementation. With hindsight, it can also be seen that there was inadequate preparation of the policy environment for decentralisation to be efficiently implemented and this has meant that performance of programmes such as TIF/TST and YEP have necessarily been curtailed.

- *Have the evaluated interventions been managed with reasonable regard for efficiency?*

Efficient management by UNDP has been absent. This is exemplified by inadequate preparation of documentation, lack of attention to reporting and poor financial management. It has been reflected in the poor performance and dearth of achievements in implementation of the three programmes.

- *What measures have been taken during planning and implementation to ensure that resources are efficiently used?*

To date, there has been no evidence that UNDP has addressed the concerns about performance and accountability that have been widely expressed in Sierra Leone (and as reiterated during the round-table donor discussion). Weaknesses in the efficiency of the programme units and CO have been recorded in the past, both in UNDP reports and other documents, so it is not a newly recognised phenomenon, but until now these management limitations have not been tackled.

Only at this point do remedial measures appear to be planned. As noted earlier in the report, a UN Change Management Team (CMT) and a Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) team are putting in place a recovery strategy over the coming months, involving both a restructuring of the CO, a 'clean-up and regularisation' of programmes, as well as a 'right-sizing' of staff to ensure better fit with current needs and priorities. It was reported that a reconciliation of current programmes and the status of agreements and finances will lay with a special recovery team to be brought in by the UN.

4.3 Effectiveness

- *Which actual results have Swedish support through UNDP contributed to?*

Very little of the support provided by Sweden to UNDP has been utilised to-date. Where funds have been drawn on, clear results are not always evident. While AfD did contribute to the collection of small arms and light weapons within target communities, it is not possible to record how effective this has been as there are no available estimates of the number of arms in circulation over the project period. A small number of community projects have been completed since 2004 and these are highly appreciated by the communities, particularly given the massive destruction wrought by the war. These gains are very small in comparison to the level of need however or, indeed, to the number of projects which remain outstanding.

The Transition Support Teams, particularly in the immediate period after the war appear to have played an important role in supporting the process of decentralisation in Sierra Leone and ensuring that Local Councils were supported to develop District Development Plans. Unfortunately, evidence of these results is largely anecdotal and the scarcity of reporting and monitoring makes further judgements impossible. Similarly, the lack of monitoring of TIF projects makes an analysis of the contribution of those projects to Local Council or Chiefdom budgets unfeasible.

The Youth Employment Programme appears to have suffered more severely from delays than the other initiatives supported by Sida. To-date, there has been little expenditure against the YEP as a whole, and no Sida funds have been disbursed. A very limited number of small-scale projects have had funding committed, but not all of this has been disbursed and the results to-date of these projects is unknown. It is noted that capacity building support has been provided to the YES Secretariat, but little detail is provided in the reports, and most of this appears to be in the form of physical infrastructure and refurbishment rather than longer-term capacity-building and/or training for YES Secretariat staff.

- *Which best practices can be drawn?*

It is disappointing for the evaluation to report that there is nothing that can be characterised as good practice from the limited expenditure, performance and results based on the Sida contribution. Neither can Sida be completely absolved of responsibility as there is no record that any feedback has been given to UNDP over the poor reporting and absence of supplying proper financial records.

- *What has been the added value of UNDP in the delivery of coordinated aid programmes/ projects?*

UNDP presence on the ground has been an important signal in the post-war recovery phase. Up until 2004/05 it was apparent that UNDP had strong local knowledge and a convincing reputation. Since then it seems to have lost its way and been unable to adapt organisationally to the changing circumstances in the country and the need for building strong partnerships and providing institutional support to capacity-building for national institutions. Thus, Sida's decision in 2005 to support the programme interventions through UNDP appears fully justified at that time. Subsequent performance and events have shown that confidence to have been misplaced.

- *What means of project/programme delivery were the most effective?*

Whilst there has been an absence of convincing programme delivery to date, there is a recognition that effective programmes require important components for promoting national capacity-building. A better aspirational model is that provided by the YES Secretariat within the YEP. This offers the prospect of national decision-making and greater local ownership over outcomes. This, however, requires broad agreement across all stakeholders to work through the systems and procedures established by the YES Secretariat, as well as agreement over how financial management systems will operate given that the Steering and Project Appraisal Committees are mandated to make decisions, whereas UNDP retains control over financial management and disbursement of project funds.

With regard to TST/TIF interventions, it is now recognised in today's environment that closer working relations need to be built with the Ministry of Local Government. This has not happened in the past where the direct execution (DEX) modalities meant that there was little appreciation of a role for central ministries. It is instructive to see the way the UNDP supported Kenema District Recovery Project (KDRP) is now operating, offering an area-based development approach with the adviser working closely with ministry officials.

4.4 Relevance

- *Were the programmes and projects implemented by UNDP in Sierra Leone in keeping with the development policies and priorities of the Government of Sierra Leone?*

Sierra Leone's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 2005–2007 has been the key guiding document on development priorities within the country over the period under review. Its three pillars (promoting good governance, security and peace; pro-poor sustainable growth for food security and job creation; and human development) have framed UN interventions in the country and this is reflected both in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (particularly the revised version for 2006–2007), and the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan 2004–2007, both of which highlighted the need for human development in conjunction with governance, democratic development, job creation and employment, and peace-building.

The programmes implemented by UNDP were in keeping with the particular policies and priorities of the GoSL at the time that they were designed. AfD, for example, was designed and initially started in the immediate aftermath of the war when addressing concerns about community-level security were vital to facilitating resettlement and rebuilding and relates to pillar 1 of the PRSP. The TST/TIF were also initially designed with a view to supporting a process of decentralisation of Government which was viewed as an important step to addressing one of the structural causes of the conflict and, later, to enabling Local Councils to better fulfil their mandate – also therefore relevant to pillar 1 of the PRSP. The focus on youth displayed in the YEP is also closely in keeping with priorities expressed in the PRSP, UNDAF and CPAP. However, as time has elapsed a number of issues in the design of the programmes have become apparent, but these have not been sufficiently reviewed and revised to ensure that they remain relevant. This is due to significant weaknesses in management and oversight, as well as a failure to implement monitoring systems which would have highlighted weaknesses as they emerged and allowed for a redesign of the programmes at various stages in their implementation.

4.5 Donor Coherence

- *What experiences do other donors have of working with UNDP?*

The recent experience of other donors consulted by the evaluation showed that their assistance to UNDP also suffered from the absence of transparent and proper accounting for funds, and limited progress in the achievements of expected results. There was broad consensus on the weaknesses displayed in efficient and effective management of programmes by UNDP. Overall there was disappointment in the performance of UNDP, and particularly the PDU, and the lack of leadership being offered by UNDP in working and liaising with GoSL.

Donors were concerned to see the under-spend on their commitments to UNDP, and looking to close-off existing support as effectively as possible unless significant improvements were made to operations by UNDP. There is a common wish to see the UNDP address its internal deficiencies, as is being proposed by the Change Management Team. There is also widespread acknowledgement that low disbursement rates of UNDP are not representative of a large need within Sierra Leone and that there is still a very significant need to address poverty reduction, economic growth and social stability within the country.

- *Were programmes/ projects managed in a coordinated, transparent and accountable fashion?*

Co-ordination and oversight arrangements of donor funds administered by UNDP have been poor. It is also the case that there has been little harmonisation between donors during the past eighteen months, in anything more than a few sector based informal contacts.

The Development Partners' Consultative meetings (DEPAC) has not functioned under the new government, and given the recent turmoil within UNDP, it has been more concerned with its internal issues than in providing a leadership role in co-ordinating and harmonising aid interventions.

5. Recommendations

- 1 Sida should require UNDP to properly reconcile past expenditures under the various Trust Fund agreements. This may require Sida requesting a forensic audit from UNDP or an external independent auditors' report.
- 2 Sida needs to take a decision on the validity of the agreements now that they have expired. This involves a decision about whether to approve on-going expenditures that have been incurred in 2008. The evaluation recommends enabling UNDP to fulfil its commitments to communities to complete current and planned activities elaborated in 2008 workplans for AfD and TST/TIF.
- 3 Sida should request a report from the proposed UNDP recovery team on the progress of the planned changes, clean-up and regularisation that is being conducted, by the end October 2008, if the existing balance of funds is to remain for disbursement.
- 4 Sida should formally request UNDP to provide a consolidated report on targets and milestones that have been both planned and achieved for each of the 3 programmes, so as to enable Sida to make a judgement of whether it wishes to continue supporting UNDP programmes in Sierra Leone.
- 5 If Sida does not obtain a response or is unconvinced of the measures being undertaken, it should take steps to recover outstanding balances of its funds under these agreements.
- 6 If Sida is to extend the validity period and allow continuing expenditures from the existing allocation and also contemplate future support, it needs to ensure that the restructuring of the UNDP Country Office according to the plans of the Change Management Team is put in place. Sida should require certain benchmarks to be attained before further financing. These would include:
 - Precise measures installed to demonstrate sound programme and fiduciary management. This should be in accordance with the results-based management approaches adopted by UNDP.
 - A proper ATLAS system operating under a qualified accountant and with properly trained financial officers and assistants
 - Monitoring frameworks defined and operating for the newly restructured units
 - Accurate structured reporting (appropriately peer reviewed and quality assured) completed at agreed intervals (e.g. quarterly, annually) for each of the programmes which clearly define outputs, results and achievements for the specific period.
- 7 In formulating its future strategy for support to GoSL, Sida should consult with other donors, and especially those with an in-country office on the need for:
 - Harmonising approaches in working with UNDP
 - Other potential modalities for support to Sierra Leone (e.g. EU mechanisms)

- Ensuring any future funding reflects the new priorities of the revised PRSP (due later in 2008) and the CPAP.
- 8 This evaluation has noted that it would have been beneficial if this Sida evaluation had been co-ordinated with other donors supporting these programmes and/or contributing to UNDP. A more comprehensive evaluation encompassing the different donors may be a more effective vehicle to demonstrate accountability both to UNDP and GoSL.
 - 9 There remains a large unfulfilled need for donor support to GoSL and Sida is strongly encouraged, based on the evidence of needs identified in the evaluation, to provide future funding to Sierra Leone, but also to ensure that it has the systems to effectively monitor its prospective support to the UNDP or other such modalities as may be chosen.

Annex I – Terms of Reference

1. Introduction

The process for a new strategy for Swedish development cooperation with Sierra Leone is getting started and a substantial part of the aid to Sierra Leone is channelled through UNDP. Sida now wish to evaluate the efficiency of the support to UNDP.

Sida's total allocation (2005–2008) to UNDP in Sierra Leone is about 35 MSEK. Sida contributions to specific programmes/projects are channelled through a Trust Fund. The Trust Fund supports the implementation of various programmes/projects initiated by UNDP.

The following programmes/projects implemented by UNDP in Sierra Leone have received support from Sida.

- *The Transitional Initiatives Fund*; the objectives of the project are to fund capacity building and sensitization in order to strengthen local authorities and community groups in the rebuilding of the country (10 MSEK 2005/2006)
- *Arms for development*; the objectives of the project are to collect illicit weapons through a voluntary surrender programme in exchange for development projects, support review and implementation of the arms, ammunitions and explosive legislation and interventions to reduce cross border trade of small arms and light weapons. (5 MSEK 2005/2006)
- *Transition Support Team*; the objectives of the project are to provide support to the government's efforts to coordinate and push forward the recovery and transition process at the district level. (3 MSEK 2006/2007)
- *Youth Employment Programme*; the objectives of the project are to provide rapid employment opportunities and income generating activities for Sports at the national and local levels that will facilitate the participation of young people in decision making process, to mainstream youth employment into all national policies and development initiatives. (12 MSEK 2006/2007)

In deciding for possible future support through UNDP in Sierra Leone, Sida will evaluate UNDP's performance in order to assess whether or not the organisation has reached the objectives as outlined in the Sida-UNDP agreements for the programmes.

2. Evaluation purpose

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to support choice of path in the future collaboration between Sida and UNDP.

The specific purpose of the evaluation is to provide Sida with an independent opinion on the efficiency of the programs and the achieved results of UNDP as well as the compliance of the agreements⁶⁶

The evaluation should cover the time period 2005–2007.

⁶⁶ See annexes

3. The Assignment

Questions to be asked in order to meet the purpose of the evaluation are following:

3.1 Administration

- a) Has UNDP met the conditions outlined in the agreements?
- b) Is the institutional capacity and resources of UNDP in Sierra Leone sufficient to achieve the goals set out?
- c) Does UNDP have the absorption capacity of the existing level of support from Sida and if so, would the organisation be able to absorb an even larger support?
- d) Which criteria are being used by UNDP to select projects/programmes?

3.2 Efficiency

- a) Was the intervention economically worthwhile, given possible alternative uses of the available resources and results?
- b) Has the evaluated interventions been managed with reasonable regard for efficiency? What measures have been taken during planning and implementation to ensure that resources are efficiently used?
- c) Which best practices can be drawn? Positive examples.
- d) Which actual results have the Swedish support through UNDP contributed to?

3.3 Other donors

- a) What experience do they have from working with UNDP?

4. Methodology, evaluation team, time schedule

4.1 Method

The evaluation should be carried out in adherence to Sida's Evaluation Manual 2nd revised edition 2007 and requires an overview of the objectives, purpose, plans and priorities of UNDP Sierra Leone. It should also involve a short overview of the implemented programmes and projects of the organisation in Sierra Leone.

The meetings and projects visited shall be selected in order to ensure a reliable and representative basis for the purpose of this evaluation and should take place in consultation with Sida.

The consultant is required to have a transparent discussion with Sida, on the type of sources used and to the extent by which the source could be considered biased.

The consultant can be defined both as one person and as a firm, which means that the proposal for call-off can include more than one person.

4.2 Time schedule

The selected Consultant is asked to begin the assignment by preparing an inception report elaborating on the basic design and plan for the evaluation. After approval by Sida the Consultant shall begin to carry out the evaluation as soon as possible. Before a draft inception report is submitted to Sida the concerned organisation should be given the opportunity to comment and correct any factual errors.

The consultant should start working as soon as the contract has been signed, not later than the end of May 2008. The consultant should conduct two weeks travel to Sierra Leone. Altogether the evaluation

should not take more than four weeks.⁶⁷ The final report should be delivered by the Consultant to Sida within two weeks after received comments.

4.3 Reporting

The draft report should be submitted in electronic form. The final report should be submitted electronically and in two hard copies. The report should be presented in Word format.

5. Specification of requirements

The proposed call-off shall be delivered to Sida no later than the 23rd of May and the consultant shall be able to sign the contract no later than the 30th of May

The call-off proposal should include:

- Proposed individual/s to implement the assignment;
- Brief information describing the proposed individual's suitability for the assignment, including confirmation that the minimum requirements listed below are fulfilled;
- State the total cost of the assignment, specified as fee per hour for each category of personnel, any reimbursable costs, any other costs and any discounts (all types of costs in SEK and exclusive of VAT);
- A proposal for time and working methods according to the Assignment;

Sida will, after evaluating the call-off proposals using the criteria specified below, decide upon which consultant is most suited for the assignment.

The consultant should have following experiences and knowledge:

- experience from conducting similar evaluations
- documented experience of international development cooperation
- experience from working in a post-conflict environment
- experience from working with following areas are beneficial:
 - poverty reduction
 - gender equality
 - human rights
 - democracy
 - anti-corruption
- fluent in English

Criteria for selecting the proper consultant:

- The proposed personnel's specialist competence
- The proposed personnel's experience from working in and with developing countries
- The suitability of the firm's method for doing the assignment in relation to the terms of reference
- The firm's ability to perform the assignment at the appropriate time
- The cost and time of the assignment

⁶⁷ As stated in Sida's Standard Conditions for short and long-term consulting services, 2002; "*Fees are remunerated on an hourly basis. For work performed on a weekly basis, one week shall be equivalent to 40 hours and for work performed on monthly basis, one month shall be equivalent to 160 hours, unless otherwise agreed between the parties.*" This means that 4 weeks are equal to 20 working days. Travel days can be excluded from these hours, where one travel day is equivalent to 8 hour, in each direction.

Annex II – List of Persons Met

Name	Position/Organisation
Sahid Abu Dingie	TST, UNDP, Bombali District, Makeni
Helen Appleton	Social Development Advisor, UK Department for International Development (DFID), Sierra Leone
Fatmata Barrie	Sierra Leone Police
Edward J Benya	USAID, Sierra Leone
Pious S Bockarie	Local Government Development Adviser and Project Team Leader, UNDP/Ministry of Local Government and Community Development
Elisa Cavacece Glasgow	External Relations & Resource Mobilisation Advisor, Youth Employment Secretariat/UNDP
Eric Duray-cesay	Chairman, Bombali District, Makeni
Martin M Farma	Chief Administrator, Bombali District, Makeni
Mahmud Fofana	AfD Community Development Assistant, UNDP, Bombali District, Makeni
George Hamilton	SRRP, UNDP, Bombali District, Makeni
Samuel Harbor	Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP
Nat John	Office for National Security (ONS)
Duramie Kamara	Deputy Director, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Rural Development and Local Government
Mohammed Kamara	Project Coordinator, Arms for Development/UNDP
Eriko Kobayashi	Resident Officer, JICA, Sierra Leone
A A R Koroma	Chairman, Tonkolili District, Magburaka
Anthony Koroma	Director of Youth, Youth Employment Secretariat
Paul Koulen	Head, Peace and Development Unit (PDU), UNDP
Thomas B. Lansana	Senior Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Local Government and Community Development
Aiah Lebie	Director of Local Government, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Local Government and Community Development
Mohammed Osman Marrah	D/Chair, DISEC, Bombali District, Makeni
Bernard Mokam	Country Director, UNDP
Toshihiro Nakamura	Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP
Samuel Nyambi	Resident Representative, UNDP
Grainne O'Neill	Country Programme Manager, Irish Aid
Anders Raaf	Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Project Coordinating Officer, UNDP
Laurence Reno	Roving Change Management & Operations Adviser, UN New York
Michael Samai	Acting Director, Local Government – Ministry of Internal Affairs, Local Government and Community Development
Mia Seppo	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP (New York)
Alpha Sesay	TIF/TST Project Coordinator, UNDP
Wahab Shah	Project Manager, Youth Employment Programme, UNDP
Raymond Shaukah	Office for National Security
Edward Sheku	Small Arms Bureau, Police Headquarters
Ibrahim Sillah	Community Development Associate Arms for Development/UNDP
Rebecca Stringer	Programme Manager, DFID, Sierra Leone
Mariatu Abionur Swaray	Office for National Security
Philomina I Turay	Small Arms Bureau, ONS
Keith Wright	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP (New York)

Annex III – List of Documents Consulted

No	Title	Author	Date
UNDP Documents			
1	Status Report on Sida Funds as at 31st January 2007	PDU	31st January 2007
2	Peace and Development Unit (PDU) – Progress Report as at 31st August 2007	PDU	31st August 2007
3	Peace and Development Unit (PDU) – Progress Report as at 30th April 2008	PDU	30th April 2008
4	UNDP Annual Report 2006	UNDP	2005
5	UNDP Annual Report 2006	UNDP	2006
6	UNDP Annual Report 2007	UNDP	2007
Arms for Development			
7	Arms for Development Annual Progress Briefing	UNDP	2004
8	Arms for Development – Updated Proposal	UNDP	February 2005
9	Annual Workplan – Arms for Development 2007	UNDP	2007
10	Arms for Development End of Year 2007 Progress Report	UNDP	2007
11	AfD Organogram	UNDP	2007
12	Arms for Development Assessment Report – Executive Summary	UNDP/BCPR	March 2006
13	Country Office Reactions to the Recommendations in the AfD Evaluation Report	UNDP	20th June 2006
Transition Support Team and Transitional Initiatives Fund			
14	4Rs/Transitional Project (2003–2004)	UNDP/GoSL	September 2003
15	Annual Workplan – 2005	UNDP	Date unknown
16	Addendum – Annual Work plan and Budget 4Rs/Transition Project (2005–2006)	UNDP	7 June 2005
17	End of Year Report – 2005, Transition Support Team	UNDP	2005
18	Annual Work plan 2006	UNDP	Date unknown
19	Annual Work plan 2006 (PowerPoint Presentation)	UNDP	Date unknown
20	Joint Funding Proposal for the Transition Support Team Phase III 2005–2007	UN Country Team	June 2006
21	Joint Funding Proposal from the UN Country Team in Sierra Leone for support to Transitional Initiatives Fund	UN	Date unknown
22	Annual workplan 2007	UNDP	Date unknown
23	Minutes of the United Nations District Team (UNDT) and United Nations Regional Team (UNRT) Meeting, May 16th 2007	UNDP	16th May 2007
24	End of Year Report – 2007 Transition Support Team	UNDP	2007
25	Transition Initiatives Fund – Funding Guidelines for the Local Councils	UNDP	Date unknown
Youth Employment Programme			
26	UN Support to the National Youth Employment Programme in Sierra Leone	UNDP, MoYS, UNCT	June 2006
27	Programme Document – Youth Employment Programme	GoSL/UNDP	June 2006
28	Annual workplan – Peace and Development Programme Youth Empowerment	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports	2006
29	End of Year Report 2007 – Youth Employment and Empowerment	UNDP	November 2007
30	Youth Employment Scheme – Call for Proposals	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports and UNDP	20th July 2008

No	Title	Author	Date
31	Annual work plan – Youth employment and empowerment annual workplan	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports	2008
32	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports – Youth Employment Scheme	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports	June 2008
Sida Documents Consulted			
33	Strategy for Multilateral Development Cooperation	Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden	30 March 2007
34	Sida Evaluation Manual	Sida	2007
35	Sida Country Report 2007 – Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire	Department for Africa, Sida	May 2008
36	UNDP/Sida Trust Fund for Assistance to UNDP	Sida	Date unknown
Other documents consulted			
37	Assessing and reviewing the impact of SALW projects on small arms availability and poverty: a case study of Sierra Leone UNDP "Arms for Development Project"	Alison Lohead, Owen Greene – Centre for International Cooperation and Security	April 2004
38	Country Programme Action Plan 2004–2007	UNDP/GoSL	Date unknown
39	Country Programme Action Plan 2008–2010	UNDP/GoSL	Date unknown
40	Draft country programme document for Sierra Leone (2008–2010)	UNDP/GoSL	Date unknown
41	Sierra Leone MDG Report 2005	Government of Sierra Leone	2005
42	Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) – OECD Issues Brief	Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD	2005
43	UNDAF Mid-term Review 2005	UNCT Sierra Leone	November 2005
44	Evaluation of UNDP assistance to conflict affected countries: Case study Sierra Leone	Mary Kaldor with James Vincent	2006
45	Resident Coordinator Annual Report	UNDG	2006
46	United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2006–2007 (Revised)	UN	July 2006
47	Reintegration & Transition to Peace-Building Project – Report of an Evaluation Mission	Meg Kinghorn, Ana Cristina Guimaraes	5–28 February 2007
48	United Nations Common Country Assessment in preparation for the United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2010	Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in Sierra Leone	January 2007
49	UNDP Strategic Plan 2008–2011: Accelerating global progress on human development	Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund	May 2008
50	Private Sector and Youth Employment Mapping – Sierra Leone	Justin Sykes	June 2008
51	Outcome Evaluation of the 2004–07 Programme of the former National Recovery & Peacebuilding Unit, now the Peace & Development Unit –Draft Report	Florence During-Kaindaneh, James Vincent, Isla Paterson	April 2008

Annex IV – Itinerary

Schedule for Evaluation

Date	Activity
14 July 2008	Arrival of consultants in Freetown
15 July 2008	1100: Kick off meeting with PDU (Murray Town office) 1400: Meeting with UNDP Country Office officials 1630: Meeting with Head PDU
16 July 2008	0900: Meeting with team from Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 1030: Meeting with Mohammed Kamara (AfD) 1200: Alpha Sesay (TIF/TST) 1430: Meeting with Head PDU, Paul Koulen
17 July 2008	0900: Document review at Murray Town office 1030: Ministry of Local Government 1400: Office for National Security 1630: DFID
18 July 2008	Laurence Sewell Field trip (Makeni, Magburaka) Ceinwen Giles 1000: Ministry of Youth/Youth Secretariat 1400: Meetings at PDU/UNDP
19 July 2008	Internal briefings and review
20 July 2008	
21 July 2008	0830: Wahab Shah (Programme Coordinator, YEP) 1000: Donor rountable (DFID, JICA, USAID, Irish Aid) 1130: Irish Aid 1200: Meeting with Samuel Harbor and Bernard Mokum (UNDP)
22 July 2008	0900: Work at UNDP office – reviewing documents, budgets, etc. 1430: Review meetings with Alpha Sessay of TIF/TST, & Mohammed Kamara (AfD)
23 July 2008	1100: Debriefing with Resident Representative, Deputy Resident Representative, Country Director, Representatives from the BCPR/Change Management Team for UNDP. 1400: Consultants work together to incorporate comments/feedback into findings to-date
24 July 2008	Departure
28–31 July 2008	Report preparation at home office

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Hans Peter Dejgaard, Hans Hessel-Andersen, Maria del Socorro Peñaloza, Emelia Arthur, Sunitha Bisani
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2008:39 Mid Term Review of Sida/Lake Victoria Initiative Support to Community-Based Strategies for the Management of the Environment and Resources of Lake Victoria (COSMER-LAV) 2005–2008

Irene Karani, Mike Wekesa
Sida

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Anders Olin, Lars Florin, Björn Bengtsson
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Thorsten Celandier, Anders Fahlén
Sida

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Denis Okello Atwaru
Sida

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John Carlsen, Jens Vad, Simon Peter Otoi
Sida

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Kimberly Inksater, Carlos Hugo Laruta, Jorge Enrique Torres
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Sida

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