This study of mainland Tanzania shows that power is centralised and significantly influenced by development partners. Power is also dispersed among patronage-oriented individuals who fail to coordinate or act in a strategic manner in order to realise the common objectives stated in strategic development documents and declarations.

The study proposes how analysis and monitoring of power could be conducted in more systematic ways. It offers a set of proposals for local actors and development partners that would help bring a more equal character to their relationships. There are ways in which civil society and state institutions could enter into a competitive and constructive relationship under the auspices of national ownership of the development process. The conclusion discusses how power analyses can be used by development partners and partner institutions alike.
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Power and Policy Slippage in Tanzania – Discussing National Ownership of Development

GÖRAN HYDÉN AND MAX MMUYA
The elaboration of a new Cooperation Strategy for Swedish Development Cooperation with Tanzania in 2005, and the implementation of that strategy in its first years, generated these power studies carried out between 2005 and 2007.

Generally power analysis can bring the social and political realities in which growth and poverty reduction policies are enacted and implemented into focus, and throw light on a number of issues that are not included if the study is of formal institutions only. Power analysis should, however, also make us pay increased attention to how we, as donors, are a part of the power game in Tanzania. As Göran Hydén concludes in his report:

“A power analysis would serve as the mirror in which donors could see their own strengths and weaknesses, as well as those that hamper partner institutions. It should serve as a method of self-reflection as much as a critical examination of specific partner countries and their development policy performance.”

This purpose was the primary reason for the Embassy of Sweden in Dar Es Salaam choosing the method and approach used in the power studies presented in this volume.

One important implication arising from the power analysis concerning the outline of the cooperation strategy was recognition of the importance of strengthening national ownership and government leadership of the development process. The move to General Budget Support for Poverty Reduction as the main channel of ODA to the Tanzanian state is the method that we as donors use to attempt to change and to enable stronger government ownership in the intervention logic of the new cooperation strategy.

Although Tanzania is formally a multiparty democracy, the ruling ccm party dominates society so much that some observers speak of a de facto one-party state. This total dominance of one party blurs the delimitations between party and state, and entails unclear separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government. Key focus areas in the Cooperation Strategy are thus openness and transparency, accountability, power sharing and the rule of law.

Even if social movements and interest groups have grown in strength, they are still weak and cannot provide sufficient counterbalances to executive/state power. Stronger constitutional rules, a pluralistic and independent media and a vigorous civil society, if strengthened, could serve to counteract the Executive’s controlling mode of power and provide checks
and balances to executive power as well as promote democratic political culture and political participation and equality. One important measure was also to develop and adopt guidelines for the Embassy strategic support to civil society in Tanzania.

With these points of departure we wished to embark on an analysis of power in Tanzania.

Firstly, because the experience of development cooperation in the previous period led us to the conclusion that, whereas reform of economic institutions is progressing and donor relations are improving, reform of Tanzania’s political system and institutions has been slow over the last decade.

Secondly, because lack of implementation of policy reform processes is very common and often explained merely by “lack of political will”. This applied specially to two reform areas we consider crucial for the relevance and effectiveness of poverty reduction in Tanzania: the decentralization of authority to district level in order to make services work for the poor, and improved access to justice enabling the legal empowerment of the poor.

Thirdly, because the shift in funding modalities from project funding to programme based approaches, including budget support, entails a new and different set of challenges both to donors and the Government. It also means – using the terminology of Max Mmuya – that we as donors change the grid of power within the state by making the Ministry of Finance the main “docking site” of development assistance.

The new aid environment entails the necessity to strengthen support to accountability measures combined with an effort to monitor power relations in their broader societal context and conduct a dialogue based on power monitoring in order to complement traditional political/governance reporting for follow up on democratic governance.

A series of studies on power that formed the basis of our effort has been collected in this volume. It began in 2005 with an analysis of power by Göran Hydén, providing the historical context of change of power in Tanzania. A second study on the Paris Agenda in Tanzania in 2007 further provided reflection on how development partners’ assumptions are based on an understanding of power that is not shared by their Tanzanian counterparts, leading to disappointment when the results expected are not achieved.

The first power monitoring report, produced by Max Mmuya, was finalised in April 2007. Findings in the report and a follow-up study in 2009 will constitute an evidence base on which to conduct power discussions and will become an integral part of the implementation of the Swedish cooperation strategy.
The monitoring study focuses on the perceptions of power of well-informed citizens and educated Tanzanians. These perceptions of power are important since they ultimately influence the choices available for action. During the previous year, a series of political events, including the resignation of the Prime Minister, seems to have shifted the power balance somewhat. The roles of Parliament and media have been strengthened. Strong voices in Parliament, both from opposition and from within the ruling party CCM, have asserted that the Parliament will no longer be content to “rubber stamp” government policy proposals. Media have provided serious scrutiny of alleged corruption cases, and thus challenged the Government, forcing it to react to public debate.

Ordinary citizens are those found outside of the triangle of the power dynamics between the state, development partners and non-state actors. They are affected by decisions, but may also in many cases be found out of reach of policy decisions. Tanzanian citizens’ confidence in multiparty democracy has declined over the last ten years. Still, citizens are perceived as having a role by engaging in dialogue with Government and by questioning specific policies publicly, according to almost 30 per cent of the respondents in the power monitoring study. This is further emphasised in the recently published report “Views of the People” where 53 per cent of respondents found that “People like me make a difference by publicly expressing our view on local issues that affect us” (study by REPOA published by Ministry of Planning Economy and Empowerment, 2008). This is an encouraging sign of citizens’ perceptions of their power to influence.

The sequel power monitoring study in 2009 may be able to determine whether the recent political changes are significant and sustainable enough to be visible in the monitoring of power.

To date, Sida has supported around twelve different power studies in different countries using very different approaches. One major challenge of power analyses, which has been noted by the OECD-DAC Governance Network, remains what to do with the findings? This is a greater challenge than their design. Findings tend to point to recommendations that are not always welcome in results-oriented donor agencies. This study also concludes with a proposal for changes in development cooperation practice. While we as donors need to reflect on the findings of this study, it is not an issue that should be limited to development partners only. An open public debate on the complex nature of development cooperation is important in order to foster continuous reflection on the challenges of poverty reduction.

Ambassador Staffan Herrström
November 2008
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and cooperation
Prompted by the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness there is a growing awareness and recognition among donors – or development partners as the new term reads – that foreign aid is not only a technical or administrative, but also a highly political, venture. They are – finally – ready to accept that designing and implementing projects without understanding the social and political realities in which they are expected to function is a waste of taxpayer-funded resources. There is also a growing realisation in these circles that pushing a “good governance” agenda from the outside without much grounding in political circles in recipient countries produces few, if any, results.

Development partners have consequently adopted a new strategy which assumes that a combination of the harmonisation of their own efforts with a more pronounced national ownership of their support by recipient country governments can lead to greater aid effectiveness. Underlying this approach is the belief that recipient governments can be trusted to live up to their commitments if afforded greater autonomy and respect and that it is possible, therefore, to act on the principle of mutual accountability.

Although not all member countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have begun to implement this new strategy, and some countries have moved faster than others, there is little doubt that the Paris Declaration is being taken seriously among development partners and partner governments in the South. Sweden, through Sida, and the United Kingdom, through its Department for International Development (DFID), are in the forefront of exploring the full implications of this shift to a more political approach. In the case of Sida, it has commissioned a series of studies aimed at analysing the political situation in countries where they have ongoing programmes. Although they differ in approach and method, they have generally been referred to as types of “power analyses”. This volume reports on a series of studies that were conducted between 2005 and 2007 in Tanzania. They differ from other power studies by Sida in that they form a sequence that not only reports on substantive issues but also draws the methodological lessons and thus discusses at some length how such studies may be improved and made more systematic.

Tanzania has featured very prominently in Swedish aid ever since it began in the mid-1960s. It is also natural, therefore, that it is included in Sida’s series of power studies. As in other countries where they have been
conducted, the fundamental question that has driven this study has been why there is such a large gap between policy and practice – why policies supported by aid funding do not gain “political traction”?

This volume attempts to answer this question by examining the power concept itself and the fact that development partners and partner governments in Africa tend to view and exercise power differently. The countries’ socio-economic and political contexts are not the same and therefore it is no surprise that political actors approach power from varying angles. As further discussed in Chapter 1, these differences tend to crystallise around three issues: (1) whether power rests on consensus and the ability to produce truly public goods or its use is inevitably associated with conflict and therefore coercion; (2) whether power is verifiable only in situations where it is empirically manifest or it exists also in latent forms, e.g. by locking certain issues out of the political agenda; and (3) whether power is vested in offices and thus constrained by rules and roles or if instead power is vested in relations among people and thus subject to more discretionary use. These differences are not merely academic but have a direct bearing on how development partners relate to actors in African partner countries. Do they dismiss the way their partners regard power or do they accept it as a fresh starting-point for dialogue and policy discussions? In the spirit of the Paris Declaration these are highly relevant issues for diplomats and development cooperation workers alike.

Tanzania is an interesting case study because, politically, the country has been governed by the same ruling party – Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) – ever since political independence was granted in 1961, yet its policies have shifted from socialist over the first twenty-five years and since then to becoming increasingly market-based. Chapter 2 traces these shifts through the four presidents who have ruled the country since 1961 and examines, with special reference to development assistance, how power in Tanzania produces outcomes that differ from strategic documents with reference to such key areas as resource allocation, decentralisation and the administration of justice. It indicates that power is centralised but at the same time dispersed among powerful individuals who fail to coordinate and act in a strategic manner with a view to realising common policy objectives. There is a lack of the “system” that development partners are used to from their own countries and build into their planning of particular aid projects. With growing direct budget support to Tanzania, and thus greater national ownership, building such a “system” becomes paramount; however the question that they face is how far power relations and structures that are so different permit, or can be transformed into, what is necessary to achieve it.
In response to the interest that this power analysis of Tanzania initially received among development partners but gradually also among Tanzanians, especially in civil society organisations, the Swedish Embassy in Dar es Salaam commissioned the next step in this sequence, a study of how power can be studied and monitored more systematically.

Chapter 3 is a revised version of the report that was prepared in 2006 on how to go about it. The first part identifies five arenas or nexuses that are of special relevance for a more extensive and systematic study of power: (1) donor-government relations with a view to assessing how far the country is on the reform track; (2) formal-informal institutions with the purpose of assessing how policy implementation may be improved; (3) use of power in order to assess the prospect of promoting a democratic culture; (4) control of power with a view to enhancing accountability and transparency; and (5) state-civil society relations in order to assess what can be done to foster popular participation. These five issues would allow for an assessment and analysis at different points in the policy process, both upstream and downstream.

The second part focuses on how subjective perceptions of power may be designed for comparative purposes. It presents a conceptual framework that recognises that power is at the same time an independent and a dependent variable. It does create the conditions in which a person acts; however power is also an instrument to achieve change in these same conditions. Power, thus, both constrains and facilitates. The research instrument asks questions concerning how people regard the power used with reference to four issues: How power is constituted, distributed, exercised and controlled at four different points in the policy process: (1) agenda setting, (2) policy formulation, (3) policy implementation, and (4) policy effects.

After a discussion on exactly which questions were to be derived from this matrix, it was decided to conduct a survey of well-informed individuals drawn from ten different walks of life in Dar es Salaam and also engage in focus group discussions with other groups of Tanzanians. The findings from this study, which was carried out in the latter part of 2006, are reported and discussed in Chapter 4. Many of the answers confirm the points that were included in the initial 2005 study, however this power-monitoring exercise also provided more systematic empirical proof to back up the observations made earlier. It showed, among many things, that Tanzanians believe that power rests with the development partners, that government listens more to donors than civil society, that civil society is rather “unloved”, and that power is exercised by ministers and party leaders in a highly discretionary manner. A comparison between the situ-
The following two chapters examine the implications of the power monitoring study and are revised versions of papers that were produced in 2007. Chapter 5 focuses on the implications for Tanzanian stakeholders. It asks whether Tanzania is reaching a tipping point where the critical views expressed in the monitoring study are culminating in a more public articulation of the disaffection and disappointment that a series of financial scandals disclosed in 2007 had helped to crystallise. It certainly makes the point that with growing urbanisation and globalisation, the task of governing the country is becoming more complicated and some of the things that political leaders could get away with in the past are no longer going to be accepted by the public. This chapter asks whether Tanzanian politicians are really ready for this challenge, given that they remain very much in the hands of the donors and fail to become involved with civil society. It concludes by offering the idea of a “confluence site”, a symbolic notion of how donors, government and civil society might come together in a more constructive and equal relationship.

Chapter 6 looks at the implications for development partners and emphasises the importance of a more self-critical look at how they engage partner institutions in Tanzania. It is clear that direct budget support – one of the hallmarks of the Paris Declaration – enhances the power of partner governments at the expense of other institutions in society. Instead of enabling civil society to play a greater role it loads the odds against it. Treating civil society as a “sector” that is administratively separate from aid given to government reinforces this situation. It argues that the development partners must cease acting as referees and instead become players who engage their partners in a constructive manner that enhances local demand for development, strengthens governance and allows for meaningful competition for resources between government and civil society actors.

Chapter 7 includes a formula for how the notion of a confluence site, in which donors, government and civil society participate as equal partners, may be realized. It is based on the recommendations of an expert consultation, attended by African government ministers, parliamentarians, civil society actors, donor representatives and academics that was held several years ago in Kampala, Uganda and whose time has finally arrived.

The concluding chapter addresses the question of how to apply the findings of power studies, an issue that is still under consideration in agencies interested in adopting the Paris Declaration. It argues that power
analysis and monitoring can be applied to improve aid effectiveness by action at three levels – international, national, and agency – and with reference to three important functions: collaboration, reporting and capacity-building. With reference to a matrix created using these levels and functions as parameters, a series of specific recommendations are presented, based on the findings in the volume.
Introduction

Why conduct a power analysis?

There is growing recognition in African countries and in the international donor community that politics is not only part of the solution but also a part of the problem when it comes to bringing about policy and governance reforms. Evaluation reports in recent years have increasingly come to identify “lack of political will” or “lack of right policies” as the determining factor when trying to explain why development ambitions fall short of promise. In dealing with this challenge donors have focused on trying to get politics right, i.e. aligning them more closely to their own type of political system. Two decades of governance reform with the World Governance Indicators project (e.g. Kaufmann and Kraay 2007) as the most ambitious assessment effort is testimony to this concern. There has been much less attention paid to the local conditions in which such realignment is expected to take place. Local institutions have typically been treated as obstacles that need to be neutralised or removed. Little acknowledgement has been given to the possibility that these same institutions have a dynamic of their own; that economic and political reforms are unsustainable without a much deeper understanding of how reforms may acquire political traction in the context of existing local institutions in Africa.

A power analysis offers a way of closing this gap in understanding among donor agencies. It is rather surprising that it has taken almost half a century of development assistance and cooperation to “discover” power as a variable. Donors have looked to other factors as determinants of development. Because of the tendency to move flock-wise, each agency has been inclined to follow the other. Over the last few years the British Department for International Development (dfid) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) should be commended for having taken the lead in calling for a better understanding of power. It is now becoming an integral part of the analysis carried out by agency staff before adopting a new country strategy. This volume reports on a series of power analysis and monitoring projects carried out between 2005 and 2007 in Tanzania funded by the Swedish Embassy in Dar es Salaam.

While power analyses are new to development cooperation, they have been conducted in other countries, developing as well as developed, either by individual scholars or public commissions (Dahl-Ostergaard et al...
These studies demonstrate the different roles such studies have. In developed countries, they tend to confirm existing power structures; in developing countries they tend to uncover such structures. For example, Damgaard (2003) offers an analysis of power and accountability in Denmark that draws on how formal institutions shape the political landscape. In Norway and Sweden, government called on public commissions to review the subject (nou 2003; sou 1990). Their final reports are a combination of mapping and analysis. While raising several relevant issues, they read rather like a vehicle inspection report. Against the background of growing individualisation and globalisation each item is ticked off and the overall conclusion is that the vehicle operates all right but with increasing strain. There are no real surprises. Any attempt at analysing power in Africa is more like a venture into the unknown. Much of what Africa is all about has been “discovered” by outsiders, but the secrets of power remains an enigma. Policy analysts have long been reluctant even to try. Yet, it is increasingly clear that these analyses hold many of the answers to the continent’s predicament. How power is perceived, how it is exercised, and with what consequences are issues crying out for an answer.

Power analysis may not be the “Holy Grail” of explaining development success or failure, but it is a necessary complement to other types of analysis as it places policy in its rightful political context. A focus on power is particularly relevant in countries like Tanzania where it is more inherent in informal than in formal institutions. An examination of the latter leaves power analyses without much value as they must be able to probe beyond the formal and objective performance indicators that show up in conventional evaluations. This becomes especially important at a time when donors have been turning to programme support such as general budget support and abandoning the field presence that project aid offered.

The approach to power applied in this study

There are many different ways of looking at power. For the task at hand in Tanzania it was agreed that the analysis of power would focus on the triangular relations between state, society and donors. In all, the various studies attempted to achieve four objectives: (1) to make clear that political power is both an independent and dependent variable, i.e. it shapes society at the same time as it is shaped by social forces (2) to demonstrate the differences in perception of power between development partners, on the one hand, and African government officials on the other; (3) to sensitise the former to what they can do in order to become more effective in their
aid relations with African governments; and (4) to find out how Tanzanians perceive power in their own country.

The approach to how power is used in power studies funded by Sida varies (see e.g. Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003; Lewis and Hossain, 2005 and 2008; Large and Jok, 2007). Together the different studies have brought together a wealth of information about how power shapes policy in different countries.

The series of studies in Tanzania that this volume is based on were less concerned with mapping power than with showing how it works. They were less concerned with social power as manifest in e.g. gender relations, than with political power as evident in discretionary decision making with implications for public goods. Thus, although a gender perspective is an important programmatic concern to Sida, in this study it does not feature other than indirectly. This does not mean that the importance of economic or social power is overlooked. It also features in this volume, but less directly so than in studies which primarily focus on how economic resources afford some groups advantage over others or on how patriarchy defines gender relations. These are important issues and are worthy of study in their own right but any study of power has to be delineated in order to be manageable.

Thus, one principal focus is on showing how priorities in various sectors adopted in international declarations such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are challenged or subverted by political actors in Tanzania as they respond to opportunities in the global and national arenas. For instance, donor support for educational purposes is often held up as funding and materials pass down through the government bureaucracy and officers at various levels decide to release the materials only after having received a “kick-back” (a bribe), however small (Sundet 2004).

In this volume, the way power is defined and used is first and foremost shown as how power affects policy.

**Mainland Tanzania**

A final qualification that must be mentioned here is that the studies cover mainland Tanzania only. They refer to Zanzibar only indirectly, the reason being that the mainland and the islands of Zanzibar are historically, and in many other respects, quite different. Although they formally constitute a political union, they are for many purposes two distinct entities. For instance, Zanzibar has its own constitution, including a President, government and parliament that have sovereign decision-making rights on the islands. In more recent years the Zanzibaris have decided to adopt
their own flag and national anthem. What is said about Tanzania in the following pages, therefore, should be regarded as applying to the mainland, what was once called Tanganyika.

**Tanzania in brief**

Tanzania – an abbreviation of Tanganyika and Zanzibar – together with neighbouring Kenya and Uganda make up what is usually referred to as East Africa. Tanzania is the largest of the three countries. In territorial terms, Tanzania’s total area is 947,987 square kilometres compared to Kenya’s 582,650 and Uganda’s 236,040. When Tanganyika became independent in 1961, its population was approximately the same as that of Sweden today. In the past five decades, however, the population has increased more than fourfold from a mere 9 million people in 1961 to a current total of 40,213,162. The majority of Tanzanians still live in rural areas, however urban migration, as in other African countries, has increased over the past two decades.

Tanzania is rich in natural resources. In addition to large tracts of wildlife reserves and parks such as Serengeti and Ngorongoro Crater, it has natural gas deposits, gold, diamonds and gemstones, notably the famous Tanzanite the blue gem that is found only in Tanzanian rock formations. Its agricultural sector relies largely on the production of cash crops such as coffee, tea, tobacco, sisal, sugar and cotton and food crops such as maize, rice and green bananas. Agriculture is still a large sector accounting for 42% of GDP, 83% of exports and employing 80% of the workforce. In recent years however, mineral extraction and tourism are the sectors that have been growing most rapidly.

Tanzania’s economic performance since independence looks like a roller-coaster. It enjoyed significant economic growth in the 1960s and early 1970s but it was stymied by socialist policies and the war with Uganda in the late 1970s. Its macro-economic indicators took a downward turn. The 1980s were the hard years in economic terms. Recovery began in the first part of the 1990s and has continued in a steady manner ever since.

Compared with most other African countries, political development since independence has been largely peaceful, although the first few years were turbulent. A military mutiny in 1964 followed by a revolution on the islands of Zanzibar put their imprint on the country’s future. The mutiny

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and previous actions aimed at power consolidation\(^2\) prompted an amend-
ment in 1965 to constitutionalise a one-party state (which was politically
easy as the ruling party had won all the seats in parliament in the last elec-
tion before independence). The revolution in Zanzibar was the main fac-
tor behind the decision to create the United Republic of Tanzania made 
up of mainland Tanganyika and the Zanzibar islands of Unguja and 
Pemba. The two ruling parties merged in 1977 to form Chama cha Map-
induzi (ccm) which remains in power to this day. Tanzania returned to 
multi-party politics in 1992. In the first three elections under this new 
dispensation, ccm has won the presidency; (61.8\% in 1995, 71.7\% in 
2000 and 80.3\% in 2005) and has increased its majority in parliament 
from 80\% of elective seats in 1995 to 87\% in 2000 and 89\% in 2005\(^3\). 
Presently 30\%\(^4\) of the parliament consists of women, although the majority 
of them are elected on a quota of special seats.

For the benefit of the reader, it should be emphasised here that these 
figures apply to the mainland. The situation in Zanzibar is different. While 
it also returned to multi-party politics in 1992, its political evolution has 
since been characterised by conflict and stalemate between the ruling 
ccm and the main opposition party, Civic United Front (cuf), which has 
managed to win almost half the votes on the islands in the three elections held 

\section*{The organisation of this study}

Power analysis and monitoring evolved gradually in Tanzania under the 
auspices of the Swedish Embassy. It was not planned as a major, comprehen-
sive project from the very beginning. The first attempt, while involving 
interviews with local stakeholders, was largely a desk study aimed at map-
ing the terrain and identifying issues that were of special interest to de-
velopment partners. It was produced in 2005 and shared widely with 
Tanzanians and representatives of development partner embassies in Dar 
es Salaam (Hyden 2005). It coincided with two other political economy 
studies, one commissioned by the World Bank (Mukandala et al 2005) the 
other by dfid (Lawson et al. 2005). It highlights many of the factors that 
generate policy outcomes which differ greatly from those intended. In this

\(^2\) These actions included the abolition of chieftains 1962 and the replacement of the chiefs with centrally appointed and transferable local level administrators.

\(^3\) Source: The election results are obtainable from Reports of the National Election Commission (Nec) for each election year.

The initial paper has been divided into two separate chapters, the first focusing on the power concept and how it is interpreted and used differently and the second discussing how power relations in Tanzania have changed since independence and what the implications are for development assistance.

Given the widespread interest in power studies of this kind and the decision by the Swedish Embassy to continue its interest in such analyses, the third chapter outlines methodology for monitoring power that was produced the following year (Hyden 2006a) and led to the survey that is reported and discussed in the fourth chapter (Mmuya 2007). This methodology emphasises the importance of tracking subjective perceptions of power over time. Thus, the initial study will be followed by another using the same questions in 2009, one year before the next general election. A slightly edited version of the full questionnaire used is included as an Annex in this volume.

The next three chapters draw the implications of power analysis and monitoring for Tanzanian stakeholders and development partners. Chapter 5 deals with the implications for Tanzanians and what could be done to address some of the unequal power relationships in the country between donors, state and civil society. The sixth chapter discusses the consequences for development partners, both in terms of what they can do to make better use of power studies in development policy analysis and what they may be willing to consider in their relations with Tanzanian counterpart institutions. In the seventh chapter, a special formula that is based on the concluding implications for Tanzanians is offered as a challenge in order to strengthen mutual responsibility and accountability among Tanzanians and development partners. Chapter 8 serves as conclusion and addresses the question of how power studies like those presented in this volume can be used by development partners and stakeholders in partner countries.
Different definitions and uses of power

There is no general agreement about the proper definition and analysis of power although there is a widely-held notion that it has something to do with causing things to happen or getting people to do what they otherwise would not have done. This usage is in line with seminal contributions in the literature by prominent scholars such as Max Weber (Gerth and Wright Mills 1946; Weber 1978) and Bertrand Russell (1938) who equate the use of power with the production of intended effects. How power is exercised and with what effects, however, differ tremendously.

1.1 Analysing how power affects policy outcomes in African countries

There are at least three issues that are relevant to an analysis of how power affects policy outcomes in African countries: (a) how far and in what ways does power manifest itself in consensus or conflict: is the concept best conceived as “power to get things done” or “power over people”? (b) how far is power manifest or latent: is it only observable in who prevails in a decision-making context or does it exist in less immediately evident terms, e.g. as control over the political agenda? and (c) how does power operate in partner countries: how far is compliance feasible if power rests not only in the formal authority of office but also in relationships among people?

1.1.1 The consensual vs. conflict approaches

This refers to a classic divide in the literature between those who view power in a constructive fashion as a means to achieving collective ends on the one hand, and those who regard power as manifesting itself in conflicts of interest on the other. Both have a dual origin: the former in moral philosophy and sociological functionalism; the latter in behavioralism and political economy.
The consensual tradition is strongly associated with modern philosophers such as Hannah Arendt. According to this tradition, the republic is based on the rule of law which, in turn, rests on ‘the power of the people’. Power springs up wherever people get together to act in concert. As Arendt (1958:51) argues [power] “far from being the means to an end, is actually the very condition enabling a group of people to think and act in terms of the means-end category”. In this perspective being ‘in power’ means that this person has been empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. Once the group dissolves, the person in power automatically loses it. To translate this into real life situations: because political institutions are manifestations of living people power, they decay as soon as it ceases to uphold them. Violence is the opposite of power. It is purely instrumental and appears where power is in jeopardy.

The functionalist position is most closely associated with Talcott Parsons. He ties power to authority, consensus and the pursuit of collective goals. Thus, although he comes from a very different direction, his argument is parallel to that of Arendt. Like her, he disassociates power from conflict of interest and coercion or force (Parsons 1957). Power depends, in his view, on the institutionalisation of authority, i.e. legitimate power, which is used to mobilise commitments or obligations for effective collective action. By contrast, the threat of coercive measures or compulsion without legitimisation or justification should not be called the use of power.

The problem with the consensual approach is that it excludes, by definitional fiat, the phenomena of coercion, exploitation and manipulation. Therefore it provides a very one-sided version of the concept. In Arendt’s interpretation power is a residual property of community; in Parsons’ view it is a property of the system. The alternative, i.e. that collective goals may be the negotiated outcome of conflicts between parties holding different degrees of power is never considered.

This issue is relevant to what is happening within the international development community. It has tended to take authority, consensus and the pursuit of collective goals as givens. It has acted on the premise that there is a “negotiated order” between equal partners. The challenge, therefore, has been to mobilise commitments by cashing in on norms that every actor is believed to embrace. This is illustrated in how the development partners expect an automatically positive response to their calls for ‘good governance’, including fighting corruption or adherence to the Millennium Development Goals. They hold on to the assumption that there is a global agreement about what should be done and how. The prevailing notion among development partners expresses itself in the idea of ‘power
Power in their view indicates a capacity or ability, not a relationship. The conflictual approach to power emphasises the latter. In the view, for example, of Harold Lasswell (1958) politics is about ‘who gets what, when and how’, an indication that the distribution and conflict of power matters. The behaviourist interpretation of power tends toward a pluralist and empiricist approach, while the political economy version privileges a more radical interpretation in which structures matter.

Robert Dahl (1961) has produced one of the best known behaviourist studies of power. Its main purpose was to examine who, in an empirically observable decision-making context, has the power to decide. Thus, his method aimed at determining which participants had initiated options that were finally adopted, had vetoed alternatives initiated by others or had proposed alternatives that were turned down for each decision. Dahl and other behaviourists agree that identifying who prevails in decision making constitutes the best way to determine which individuals or groups have ‘more’ power in social life, because direct conflict between actors presents a situation most closely approximating an experimental test of their capacities to affect outcomes. These conflicts are not between ‘objective’ interests but between subjective preferences that are also understood as being policy preferences.

Political economy studies accept that the distribution of power is unequal and that a power elite always prevails. They are not only interested in power as influence but also examine how intra-class disagreements and conflicts of interest cause skewed outcomes. They dig deeper trying to explain policy outcomes in terms of the constitution and distribution of power in society. Because access to economic resources is differentiated, some people possess an automatic advantage when it comes to competing in the political arena. The latter is never a level playing-field (Wright Mills 1968). These studies, therefore, are more pronounced than the pluralist perspective in their emphasis on “power over”. This view of power is also reflected in writings on social movements, in which challenging social inequalities features quite prominently (Tarrow 1998).

The conflict approach exposes power in a way that becomes potentially controversial in a development partnership relation. It tends to threaten the relationship by suggesting that the outcome favours one party over the other. Whether seen in behaviourist or political economy terms the conflict approach points to the inevitability that some actors have more power than others. The difference between the two is that the structuralist political economy perspective is more pessimistic about the prospects for change in existing power relations. When interacting with development partners, many African government leaders are tempted to adopt such a view.
1.1.2 Manifest vs. latent power

Power is manifest if it is empirically observable. As suggested above, the behaviourist approach to power aimed at measuring power by assessing how A may get B to do what he (or she) otherwise would not have done. Who initiates, decides or vetoes what is the focus of such studies? Due to the fact that these studies are both laborious and time-consuming and yield data that are confined to particular micro-contexts, they have been largely abandoned by the political science community. Yet, the idea that it is possible to see how one actor gets another to behave in accordance with her/his own preferences is attractive, especially in a positivist perspective. The latter includes many analysts in the international development community who believe that power is inherent in formal institutions and thus something manifest in legal and constitutional documents.

Power, however, may also be latent. This issue takes on special importance in the analysis of the objective of donor harmonisation. There are two approaches to the study of latent power: one is post-modernist, the other institutionalist or structuralist. Michel Foucault is a representative of the former. The notion that power is latent is particularly clear in his study of the relationship between knowledge and power. Power is latent because it works through people rather than on them (Foucault 2000). Certain ideas or belief systems gain power as they become more widely disseminated to people and are treated as common knowledge. These hegemonic systems of knowledge produce their own figures of authority, e.g. doctors in hospitals or priests in churches, who serve as gatekeepers in deciding what is right or wrong, normal or deviant. Within a particular belief system, certain views, thoughts or actions are ruled out by prevailing values. Unlike writers such as Gramsci (1971), who treat power as working on people and therefore operate with an oppositional power-resistance framework of analysis, Foucault treats power in less clear-cut terms. Like Gramsci, he assumes that other discourses can contest hegemonic belief systems but he does not attribute change to agencies in the form of organised resistance but rather to the gradual permeation of new ideas that occurs as the result of independent action by a number of diverse authority figures. In this respect, it is much more difficult to trace the way power works visually.

There are two versions of institutional and structural interpretations of power that are relevant here. One important institutionalist critique of the behaviourist approach is offered by Bachrach and Baratz (1962). They refer to power as having two “faces” in the sense that in addition to

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5 “Institutionalist” here refers to norms inherent in rules that serve as guides for human choice and behaviour; “structuralist” refers to social forces, e.g. class or ethnicity that operate at a more basic level of societal change.
being embodied and reflective in concrete decisions – the behaviourist position – it is evident in the “mobilisation of bias”. The latter implies that some issues are organised into politics while others are left out. More specifically, a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures that may be called “rules of the game” operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain individuals and groups at the expense of others. There is always a group – often an elite minority – that sets the agenda. In order to understand how power operates, therefore, it is necessary to study both decisions and non-decisions.

The second position, represented by Lukes (1974), is more structuralist in that potential issues are kept out of politics not only because of decisions by particular individuals or institutional practices but also because the real interests of those who are excluded from power may never be articulated in the first place. Social forces or structures prevent some from being able to express their own views to challenge the status quo. As he asks, “is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial?” (Lukes 1974:24).

The perception of power as manifest or latent is extremely relevant to the global agenda of poverty reduction. Power is not only manifested in decision-making situations where donors meet with representatives of partner governments, nor is it evident only in how government officials behave toward civil society or media representatives in the public realm. Equally significant are the ways certain policy preferences are mobilised at the expense of others. The global agenda of the development partners expresses preferences that limit, if not preclude, initiatives that build on the African “grain”. For instance, harmonising aid is not merely an administrative matter. It is highly political in the sense that the more harmonisation there is, the more limited the scope for alternatives. This becomes an issue especially when implementing this agenda in Africa as it is often the latent power inherent in informal institutions that matters most at this stage in the policy process.

1.1.3 Institutional vs. personal power
The bulk of political science literature on politics in the OECD countries focuses on formal institutions because they are stable, predictable and offers opportunities for comparison. Whether it is the executive or various
aspects of political society such as political parties, elections or the legislature, the scholarly assumption is that these institutions are responsible for explaining policy outcomes. Much of this is also reflected in official declarations about the constitution and other features of politics in these countries. It is no surprise, therefore, that development partners tend to perceive power as vested in formal institutions. Power is delineated and circumscribed by rules that limit the extent to which a particular person can use her/his position. Formal institutions operate with an objective and roles and rules are designed accordingly. There is little scope for discretionary use of power; hence few, if any, surprises as the power studies of the Scandinavian countries mentioned above confirm. The assumption that formal institutions are decisive is also reflected in much of the political reporting by development partners from countries in Africa.

Formal institutions do exist in African countries but have received much less attention in the literature on African politics than informal institutions have. The latter are described in different ways as clientelism, self-help, kinship and other customary norms that have their roots in African society (Lemarchand 1972, Chabal and Daloz 1999, Trager 2001 and Sangmpam 2007). They have such features in common as involving face-to-face interaction, being unwritten and typically self-enforcing, i.e. no third party is called upon to resolve a dispute. These informal institutions do not operate in a vacuum. Their locus is often public agencies where they compete with formal institutions. Because they are discretionary, they typically exert an unexpected effect on performance. Policies are diverted to other uses, promotions based on favours, performance slack, and so on.

Informal institutions, however, are not necessarily subversive. They have a dynamic that is different from prescribed formal rules but they enjoy a local legitimacy because they “deliver”. For instance, clientelism may at first glance look malignant. After all, it is personalised power over others. It is not transparent. It lacks a public rationale. For these and other reasons, clientelism or neo-patrimonialism is generally brushed aside as incompatible with good governance. Such dismissal of the institution, however, may be too simplistic. Clientelist relations are based on the principle of reciprocity. As a result, there is an element of accountability built into the institution. There is a cost attached to both parties – patron as well as client – if they do not live up to the original promise of the exchange. Informal institutions in Africa are not primarily the creations of evil or autocratic minds. They are more often the natural product of the fragmentary nature of the economic system and the lack of social differentiation – and stratification – that has given rise to formal institutions in
other regions of the world. They constitute the “grain” from which local progress can be made, as the case of Botswana illustrates. The national elite in that country, which is deeply rooted in the traditional life of their respective home villages, have employed their personal ties and reciprocities to unify themselves into a governing class, build cross-ethnic coalitions and maintain strong ties with different segments of society (Rotberg 2004). Botswana is a success story because it has allowed governance and development to evolve from within, without the international community “breathing down its neck”. The emphasis in the Paris Declaration on greater local ownership of foreign aid offers the prospect of allowing a similar process to occur in other African countries. The problem, however, is that the Declaration adopts performance measures that are not set by local actors but reflect a global consensus of what is viewed as “good” governance. The challenge for development partners, therefore, is to acknowledge that both governance and development are highly political activities in which power decides the identity of the winners and losers.

The state apparatus in African countries such as Tanzania may be weak in terms of official capacity and soft in terms of adherence to formal rules but nothing is static (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Government departments keep changing, civil society organisations continue growing not merely because of capacity-building or other inputs from the outside but because they are involved in unpredictable, but sometimes productive, political processes. It is this ability to “read” these processes in terms of constraints and opportunities – something local actors need to know quite well in order to be successful – that development partners must also become more expert in. Formal institutional power is not irrelevant in Tanzania, but it works differently from how it does in OECD countries because it is significantly influenced by the informal institutions that spring from a situation where power is mainly manifest in relationships between persons as individuals and not as office bearers. The exercise of power and authority in African countries results in hybrid institutions that are constructed of varying measures of both formality and informality. Consequently, understanding how power works in Africa is a great challenge. For the development partners it is indeed a venture into unknown territory. Their own perception of power and how it works rarely holds.

1.2 Differing power concepts among partners and governments

As suggested above, development partners and African governments come from very different directions when it comes to understanding power and its uses. While they may have some values in common, they do typically
manifest divergent tendencies when it comes to conceiving and exercising power. The differences that are relevant to this volume are summarised below:

Table 1 Tendencies towards differing power concepts among development partners and African governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Conflictual/Consensual</th>
<th>Manifest/Latent</th>
<th>Institutional/Personal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development Partners</strong></td>
<td>Power is constructive (Power to)</td>
<td>Power is used to prioritise some issues over others</td>
<td>Power stems from formal institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>African Governments</strong></td>
<td>Power is controlling (Power over)</td>
<td>Power is seen as limiting initiatives by local actors</td>
<td>Power is vested in relationships between individuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Like the vast majority of African countries, Tanzania – or Tanganyika as it still was for a couple of years after independence – has become what it is today very much thanks to how it responded to its colonial legacy. It was one among a number of newly independent African countries that wanted to distance themselves as much as possible from this legacy. Perhaps no other country has succeeded in this pursuit better than Tanzania. The Government decided to use the Swahili language as lingua franca to overcome ethnic and cultural differences. It adopted a set of socialist policies in order to achieve economic integration and equality. These economic policies eventually became an albatross around the country’s neck which has taken many years to remove. President Mwinyi (1985–95) laid the foundation for their dissolution, but it was only under the third president – Benjamin Mkapa (1995–2005) – that the new economic order was institutionalised more fully. The relative success that Tanzania has recorded in the economic sphere in recent years is well known and rightly heralded as impressive. With the exception of having maintained peace on the mainland throughout the period since independence, its political record has received less praise. This reflects the fact that power relations in Tanzania remain controversial from a democratic, as well as developmental, point-of-view. How they have changed over time since independence is the subject of the remainder of this section.

2.1 The Nyerere period

No single person has had as much influence on the destiny of Tanzania as Julius Nyerere, the country’s first President (1961 to 1985). As the rightful “Father of the Nation”, he placed his imprint on policy and development from very early on. Gradually, Tanzania increasingly became a mirror
image of Nyerere’s own personality. Tanzania turned its back on foreign ideas; foreign experts were accepted, but only as an associated cost of foreign aid. Neither they nor their local counterpart experts had the President’s ear or that of his fellow political leaders in the ruling party. Expertise was disregarded; populism embraced. For example, World Bank-funded village settlements were discarded in favour of *ujamaa* villages, established with little or no attention to cost and feasibility (von Freyhold 1977). This was repeated over and over again in the context of “campaigns” such as *Kilimo cha kufa na kupona*, *Operation Vijana*, or *Mwongozo*, each aimed at pushing a socialist agenda in different sectors – agriculture, culture, and business – with no attention paid to how the goals were achieved or at what cost (Coulson 1982). Generous foreign aid, given in most instances without any questions asked, reinforced his ambitions. Nyerere’s strong belief in his principles of African socialism became a hallmark of both politics and development in Tanzania, especially during the 1970s. When faced with failure, Nyerere and the political system he had created were reluctant to make the necessary adjustments. The costs to individual Tanzanians grew rapidly in the first half of the 1980s, as Nyerere and *ccm* refused to change policies on terms proposed by the international community. Only after long and painful negotiations with, and persuasion by, his “Scandinavian friends” did he eventually give in and finally called it quits in 1985 (Hyden and Karlström 1993).

By that time, state control of the economy was almost total, however official instruments of power had lost their ability to steer the country in a positive direction. There were severe shortages of even the most basic commodities. Agricultural producers lacked incentives to market their produce. They voted with their feet rather than their voices, denying the state its potential revenue from the sale of their produce. The state had failed to capture the majority of economic actors to serve its end. Even urban-based residents acted with no regard for formal rules by beginning to steal from public corporations and engaging in bribery to obtain the few commodities that the market could offer. The beginnings of corruption in Tanzania, as well as other manifestations of informal practices, date back to the “hard times” in the early 1980s. The perforation of the state machinery by personal and informal initiatives had begun in earnest (Barkan 1994; Bienen and Herbst 1996).

From a power perspective, the Nyerere period led to a high degree of concentration of power at the centre. Economic, social and political power rested in the hands of a small political elite consisting more of party officials than government officers. Leadership was largely male but the few women, such Bibi Titi Mohamed, Lucy Lameck, Tabitha Siwale
and Gertrude Mongella who held positions of power, were quite influential and respected. Public power was privatised in the sense of ending up in the hands of officials belonging to CCM – as a political party and a private organisation. The result was no public transparency or public accountability. Socialism was the ideology that held it together especially during the 1970s. There was policy slippage, not the least in building UJAMAA villages and promoting rural development, but it was less due to corruption, nepotism or such similar informal factors than to the lack of a functioning and reliable “system”. Because Nyerere wanted “to run while others walk”, any question asked about what was being attempted by the ruling party was regarded as “treason”. Most leaders in the party hierarchy remained silent; those who raised questions were removed (Hyden 2006b). This power structure, however, began to collapse in the early 1980s as, out of frustration, people decided to take matters into their own hands. Some of the more frustrated planned a coup (but ended up only hijacking an Air Tanzania plane to London). Others turned to informal means of helping themselves to satisfy their most immediate needs. The silent majority, especially in the rural areas, reverted to subsistence living. Power was no longer a functional factor for development. At the top, its face was only intimidating; at the bottom of the power pyramid, despite decentralisation to heavy-handed officials at region and district level, people used their lack of dependence on the system to deny officials the ability to control them.

2.2 The Mwinyi period

It fell upon the second President, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, to carry out the necessary economic reforms that Nyerere had refused to allow or had not wished to be associated with. His government was now in a weak bargaining position and he had to strike an agreement with the International Monetary Fund that forced a radical shift to market economics. In the latter part of the 1980s, he and his party colleagues adopted the Zanzibar Declaration which allowed political leaders to accumulate personal wealth, an opportunity that they had been denied by the Arusha Declaration of twenty years earlier. Although there were a few exceptions, it is quite remarkable how little private wealth accumulation there had been in Tanzania until the 1980s when it began, initially illegally and after the Zanzibar Declaration, legally. The important consequence of the relatively strict discipline of the party leadership during the Nyerere days is that no indigenous middle-class with economic power really developed in Tanzania as it had, for instance, in neighbouring Kenya. The lack of such a class with
a corporate interest in strengthening its own position became apparent during the Mwinyi period. The President himself was not strong-willed as his predecessor had been and took the greatest pleasure in being able to approve requests for favours that came his way, hence his reputation among Tanzanians as President Ruksa. The market reforms that began to “kick in” more effectively in the second half of Mwinyi’s time in power provided new opportunities for more entrepreneurially minded Tanzanians, not the least those belonging to the Chagga ethnic group (whose members, like those of the Asian minority, tend to support rather than undermine each other – this, according to popular belief in Tanzania, being the more common pattern within other ethnic groups). The vast majority of these new economic actors, however, remained in the informal sector. As such, they did not really augment the local revenue base. Their operations took place outside the “system”. CCM was losing its grip on the economy, and state power was not pursued in a consistent or coherent manner. Discipline continued to deteriorate in public offices. For example, Tanzania had begun to increasingly rely on loans from international finance institutions while public finance management was in shambles. The country’s reputation was on the decline among international creditors. Furthermore, little was done to enhance transparency or public accountability. If Tanzania was slowly beginning to turn around, it was as much in spite of as thanks to state policy and action. Not much changed on the gender side of politics. A few more women entered positions of leadership in government, but despite the efforts by the international community to increase the number of women leaders, no significant progress was made during this period.

The return to multi-party politics in 1992 was initially perceived as a challenge by CCM, but once it realised that the opposition parties were led by groups of disgruntled and opportunistic individuals, many of whom had previously held leading positions in the ruling party, this fear soon abated. By the time the first multi-party election was held in 1995, CCM’s hegemony was confirmed although its candidate, Ben Mkapa, was a surprise to many as he had held no prominent position in the ruling party. CCM in 1995, however, was quite a different organisation than it had been ten, let alone twenty, years previously. Its attraction lay in control of public resource allocation. Political leaders preferred it, not for ideological reasons, but because it provided access to material goods and valuable services (Bayart 1993; Schatzberg 2002). At the same time, officially CCM had given up its control of the economy. It accepted an almost total retreat from direct involvement in the economy, although for revenue purposes it retained – and created anew – its own economic ventures. By and large,
However, by 1995 the economy was liberalised and it had begun to function much like markets elsewhere in the world. From a power perspective, the heavy-handedness of the first period remained. Citizens continued to look at political power as something negative. Its face was not pretty, its use arbitrary and often whimsical. This new freedom was much appreciated, but neither Mwinyi nor anyone else tried to link it to responsibility for other people or for public institutions. An open frontier climate emerged. The separation of state from market finally gave a group of indigenous Tanzanians a chance to evolve into independently wealthy individuals with the possibility of shaping the country’s destiny in a new direction. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Mwinyi years, however, was the institutionalisation of a range of informal practices. Political clientelism intensified, especially with the arrival of competitive politics. The habit among ordinary people of seeking favours, rather than engaging in productive activities of their own, reinforced this informal institution. It also paved the way for corruption, which grew with the decrease in value of public sector wages and salaries that followed in the wake of the continuing devaluation of the local currency. In short, by the end of the Mwinyi period, political stability relied more on informal personal networks than on functioning formal institutions, whether state or market. The attempt by a group of 55 CCM members of parliament to create a separate government for mainland Tanganyika in 1993 is an example of the political rivalries within ruling circles at the time. Tanzania remained a rather rudderless vessel and it fell upon Nyerere as Father of the Nation to make authoritative interventions to stabilise the situation.

2.3 The Mkapa period

If the Nyerere years were a blind race toward a false paradise and the Mwinyi period a chaotic free-for-all dance in the rediscovered marketplace, the next ten years under the country’s third President were an attempt at a more disciplined march toward specific policy goals. Discipline in the ranks still left a lot to be desired, but despite these weaknesses Tanzania was slowly becoming integrated into the global economy with all the costs and benefits associated with such a move. This process began at the apex of the system with reforms of public finance and administration. It trickled into the economy as a whole in the form of a relatively stable currency, an acceptable level of inflation and a stronger emphasis on pushing development funds to district and local levels as part of a new National Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (MKUKUTA) (Fjeldstad et al
The majority of Tanzanians, however, are still to experience the full benefits of these reforms. It is no surprise, therefore, that the public continues to lament the cost of living and other shortcomings not the least corruption, poor service delivery and infrastructural maintenance that continue to adversely affect the image of the ongoing reform programmes. The local media continue to be full of such complaints to this day.

Despite the significant changes that President Mkapa was responsible for introducing, much of the old legacies remain. They help explain the public complaints and slippage that continue to affect policy implementation. With no serious and credible competition from the political opposition, CCM enjoys the monopoly of power (see Box 1 below). It tends to take its position for granted. From a power point of view, however, CCM as an organisation is problematic not because it has too much power but because it has too little, at least as it affects the country’s development. With the economic reforms that were introduced, the party as a formal organisation increasingly lost its ability to steer and control the country’s destiny. It lost its image as a guardian of the poor. Political leaders became increasingly interested in accumulating wealth for private enrichment as well as bolstering their chances of re-election. In this new dispensation, party discipline inevitably began to decline. This became especially apparent after the death of former President Nyerere in 1999. Personalised networks were strengthened. Being an insider with access to state patronage overshadowed considerations of a principled nature. There have been speculations that CCM might split but such a scenario, as happened in neighbouring Kenya, Malawi and Zambia, has so far not proved an immediate threat given CCM’s relative success in adjusting to changing circumstances without losing its claim to being the best guardian of national interests.

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**Box 1. Costs and benefits of a stronger political opposition**

A break-up of CCM might be a plus from a governance perspective, but a minus from the policy reform perspective! For example, increased political competition may enhance party discipline but may also mean that policies will be contested to a greater degree. Current policies, therefore, stand a greater risk of being overhauled or significantly modified in a political context where a functioning multi-party system is emerging. Conversely, with CCM in power without any real challenges from the opposition, the downside is the lack of discipline and the prevalence of informal, personalised networks as the principal basis of its hegemony. Such networks are unpredictable and a primary cause of policy slippage, yet they do tend to work in favour of stability at the macro level as they do not call the overall policy framework into question. In short, Tanzania is caught between a rock
and a hard place. From a development policy perspective, there are costs associated with either scenario, but they may be higher in a competitive multi-party context than they are in the dominant party system that Tanzania currently enjoys. The path to policy reform is not always the same as that to governance reform because, in Tanzania, political decisions are typically not driven by the type of calculations assumed by economists.

Perhaps the most significant change in the Tanzanian power map during the Mkapa years was the extent to which the international community, through international finance institutions and donor agencies, managed to get a hold on Tanzania’s destiny. Because the Tanzanian Government during Mkapa’s time in power was anxious to restore international credibility, it found itself with few options other than to comply with these organisations in their role as agenda setters. This was reinforced toward the end of his presidency when the donor community began to consider direct budget support as a mechanism for improving their aid. In spite of their wish to move upstream in the policy process and abandon project support downstream, their collective arm stretched quite far into the implementation machinery via direct or indirect means. The irony, therefore, is that as development partners began to abandon project aid and instead talked about Tanzanians owning the processes, they increased their power by insisting that Tanzanians adhere to their global agenda and live up to their performance standards. Consequently, from a power point of view development partners attempted to mobilise a policy bias in favour of what they regard as universally valid objectives.

This is not to imply that President Mkapa did not appreciate the importance of strong government institutions. To a greater degree than his predecessors he paid attention to strengthening the capacity of government institutions. He set in motion several large-scale reform programmes, not the least the one focusing on the public service. His outlook was more that of a “technocrat” than a “party populist”. Unlike his predecessors who moved senior civil servants around at will President Mkapa, with only a few exceptions, retained them throughout his time as head of state in the positions to which they had been appointed. He promoted many women to senior positions in government and encouraged a reform that allowed greater female representation in parliament through election of women to special seats. His effort to reform government, however, was never deemed a success for two reasons. One was the universal standards against which it was assessed by development partners. The other was the lack of commitment on the part of those in charge of the reform programme in individual ministries. While the President had an excellent management team leading the effort from his office, it did not quite suc-
It is fair to conclude that never before had the donors and the Government of Tanzania been closer in their adherence to a common set of policy objectives; however this was never fully appreciated by the development partners who failed to assess Tanzania on its own power terms. They were too ready to emphasise the great distance that Tanzania still had to go in order to be a global success rather than to show appreciation of the distance it had covered since the 1980s. They were too ready to focus on the abuse of official power rather than recognising the creative use of informal power to get things done.

2.4 The Kikwete period

Jakaya Kikwete was elected as Tanzania’s fourth President in late 2005. This volume is being prepared at a point when he is only halfway into his first period. It is difficult to make any definite statements about where Tanzania will head in the next few years. A set of comments about what has happened since he took power, however, may still be possible.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the structural conditions in Tanzania are changing and beginning to pose a challenge to how the country is governed. As the economy is allowed to grow in significance and more people are moving into urban centres, conventional ways of governing the country are becoming increasingly inadequate. Given the legacy of equality preached during the Nyerere years, Tanzanians have a “baseline” notion of what is fair which may not exist in countries that never experienced an extended socialist period. Individual enrichment among political leaders is becoming not only increasingly evident but also more and more openly criticised. Although Tanzanians find engaging in collective action to be difficult – most efforts failing to get off the ground or fizzling out quite early – the poorer segments of the population are becoming increasingly agitated especially since much of the enrichment has been associated with scams involving the misuse of public funds. In the minds of many, Tanzania has become a country of mafisadi, i.e. individuals who engage in acts of malfeasance. The print media have also become an important player in prying open official matters that were previously hard to probe.

There is growing frustration among many Tanzanians, especially in the urban areas, that the government is not doing enough to punish those involved in these scams. To be sure, President Kikwete has acted to remove some ministers, including his former Prime Minister, but none of
them have been prosecuted. Instead, they have been allowed to return to their home constituencies where the local party bosses have organised events welcoming them back as heroes. Because they are “local sons” and have brought tangible benefits to their districts, people there do not see that they have done anything wrong. While they appear corrupt to those who have not benefited from their actions, their local constituents view them as successful patrons. Clientelism remains entrenched in Tanzania as it does in so many other African countries (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). The rule of law and adherence to formal institutions is still trumped quite often there as elsewhere. It is obvious that corruption scandals are regarded as increasingly costly to the party but it prefers to deal with these issues internally rather than through the courts. At the meeting of its National Executive Committee on June 15, 2008 it was agreed that those involved in corruption scandals would be held responsible for their actions according to the Party’s constitution (The Citizen, 16 June, 2008).

The number of women in parliament was again increased as a result of the 2005 election. Approximately one third of all members are now female and there is a promise of an increase to 50% at the next election. This rapid increase and the promise of an even greater number of women has been possible in Tanzania because women can be elected on a special slate. Only a small number of these women have actually won a regular constituency seat. This increase in women legislators means that new perspectives are being brought to bear on several issues. Some of these women are quite outspoken and a few have challenged government on such sensitive issues as corruption. Yet, none of them has yet shown the clout that some of the previous women leaders had due to the fact that they had been forced to compete with strong men in order to win their respect and power, a matter that was acknowledged by the Tanzanian Women’s Parliamentary Group at its meeting in Dodoma on April 26, 2008. The increased presence of women seems to have broadened the debate on key social and economic issues, but it remains to be seen what difference it really makes to the issue of who wields power in Tanzania.

As the country’s economy is becoming increasingly diversified, more and more foreign investors are establishing their businesses, however the majority of urban residents remains without a job or forced to rely on informal sector incomes so it is no surprise that the political climate is becoming more confrontational. This is reinforced by the unwillingness of ccm to constructively pursue a solution to the political stalemate between itself and cuf in Zanzibar. So far patience and reason has prevailed, but there are local seasoned observers of politics in the country, such as Professor Issa Shivji, a respected opinion-maker (Mtanzania May 22, 2008).
who publicly express fears for the possibility of preserving the country’s political tranquillity in the years to come. For instance, a protest march by cuud elders on the island of Pemba in which a threat of secession was made in a speech led to the detention of the elders as if secession was already being actively pursued. The “face” of power that Tanzanians typically encounter tends to be harsh and intended to intimidate.

Figure 1 The face of power in Tanzania

This new situation also has implications for development partners. They are no longer as dominant as they used to be although the country’s level of aid dependence remains high – approximately 42% of the annual budget in 2007⁶. They continue to insist on the global reform agenda and try to push Tanzania in the directions of “good governance” and “poverty reduction”. With increased direct budget support, it is not clear whether they are effective in achieving this objective since their levers are weaker than in the days when individual project and programme aid prevailed. It is clear, however, that with direct budget support and a role greater in policy formulation than policy implementation, it is necessary

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⁶ Budget projections for fiscal year 2008/09 suggest that Tanzania will reduce its dependence ratio to 30 per cent, as stated in local newspapers on June 2, 2008.
to enhance expertise on how politics works in the country. The next section will pay particular attention to some areas that are of special interest and importance to development partners.

2.5 A Power perspective on development assistance

If divergence between policy promise and practice continues to be significant at the apex of the political system, it appears even greater if viewed from the bottom up. There is little, if any, loyalty to public institutions and many individuals, inside as well as outside government, continue to engage in fraudulent behaviour. As President Mkapa said in his last weekly radio address in January 2005, commenting on the infamous reference to Tanzania as “Bongoland”, people use their creativity to fool others and steal from their employers rather than to help develop the country (*The Citizen*, January 30, 2005). The civic type of social capital is very limited in Tanzania as social, as well as political, trust is low. It is everyone for themselves; social capital is consequently short-lived and primarily opportunistic. What are regarded as shortcomings at government level do also exist in Tanzanian society. The reality for most people is that day-to-day living is not only difficult, but also brutish characterised as it is by a lack of personal security, a shortage of means to make a decent living and often a fear of authorities. It is this kind of reality that official development assistance in the name of poverty alleviation is committed to addressing and improving.

This is no mean task and one that is easily prone to generating disappointment. This chapter is unable to address all these challenges but includes discussion of three issues of concern to development partners and Tanzanian authorities alike: (a) how does power bear on resource allocation? (b) how does it shape the administration of justice? and (c) how does it affect the use of donor funding?

2.5.1 The impact of power on resource allocation

Poverty reduction in a country like Tanzania is a process that is not easily subsumed under a single strategy. Development partners believe that this effort should be organised under such a national strategy. Although the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (*MKUKUTA*) is a part of official government policy, poverty reduction, to most Tanzanians including those in government, is perceived in broader and more diverse terms than merely policy. Government leaders are rhetorically committed to the strategy because it generates the necessary funds for pursuing more broad-based development, but practice suggests otherwise (Gould 2005).
Coordinating, planning and strategising is virtually absent at central government level largely because power is not exercised in a legal-rational fashion but more in terms of controlling subordinates. Power is not vested in the formal bureaucratic institutions but in the individuals who occupy them. It is fair to say that a person who occupies a government office anywhere brings personal qualities to her or his job, but the notion that the person matters more than the office rules and roles has been identified as an especially prominent feature of African government operations (Montgomery 1987). This personalisation of power means that government departments as agencies are generally quite weak and ineffective. Things happen not because people follow “official channels” but as a result of personal connections linking seniors with juniors or outside clients. Thus, individuals serving in these institutions may have power, but they use it at their personal discretion rather than as part of a team. The Minister of Finance has power because so much of development partner funding passes through his office. Other ministers and politicians, however, typically place their loyalties at local level, in most cases within a single electoral district but in the case of the more powerful actors in larger geographical areas. For instance, a measure of political success is being able to extend one’s power base from a local electoral district to an administrative region and beyond. In order to achieve such extended power, it is necessary to take charge of specific policies and turn them into projects or patronage goods that demonstrate the leader’s ability to deliver. Vertical accountability is by no means absent in Tanzania but it is exercised informally within a framework of formal institutions that are more or less accepted. Leaders create their own modes of operation that are in tune with local values and norms because that is the best way of being appreciated, i.e. re-elected.

In the eyes of the development partners, this informality is a weakness which they have addressed through a series of reforms of government at large or particular sectors, e.g. legal & constitutional affairs and local government. Public sector reforms have aimed at making officers in government more conscious of their role as public servants. Disciplinary action has been taken against certain categories of officers who have abused their roles. These interventions, however, have yet to set enough of an example for others to adopt more role-oriented behaviour in office. Discipline in public office remains low. Staff members spend as much time chatting or doing their own things as devoting themselves seriously to what they are expected to do for their employer in the public interest. Citizen charters that have been adopted in some agencies and departments are a step in the right direction, but service delivery remains far
from what it should – and could – be. For clients wishing to obtain service, personal visits to relevant officers are a must in order to get something done within an acceptable, though often quite long, timeframe. The fact that bribes are paid in these circumstances should come as no surprise.

Reducing the size of central government and creating independent executive agencies, therefore, makes sense. Executive agencies make political patronage more complicated but there is enough anecdotal evidence to suggest that they are not completely immune to political interference. In the past few years, the Bank of Tanzania as well as the University of Dar es Salaam have been subject to such interference at great cost in terms of the prestige and legitimacy of these entities.

Another major question for development partners, given their belief that decentralisation will accelerate poverty reduction in rural areas, is what happens with that policy. The enthusiasm that existed for decentralisation of authority to district level some ten years ago appears to have dissipated, as the recent Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support in Tanzania 1995–2004 (idd and Associates 2006) also notes. The idea of political decentralisation and local empowerment seems to have given way to a push for fiscal decentralisation driven by the Ministry of Finance with the full support of the President. Taking advantage of the “system enclave” that has been built around this Ministry with donor support, money is allocated as block grants to local government authorities and village governments as part of the strategy of promoting more effective service delivery in rural areas. This extension of donor fund allocation to local government bodies is generally embraced by development partners because it is regarded as reducing what they perceive as an over-centralisation of power. It is part of their strategy to shift power relations in favour of the poor. Given previous experience with devolution of power in Tanzania, it still remains to be seen how far this exercise in participatory democracy will go. As suggested in Box 2, there is also the issue of how easily reconcilable the fiscal and political aspects of decentralisation are.

2.5.1.1 The decentralisation dilemma
From a power point of view, this drive is problematic. In addition to whether there is sufficient capacity to absorb these additional funds – a primary concern of the financiers – there is the question of who gets to make the allocative decisions. Executive Directors in the district councils are appointed centrally. Their loyalty, therefore, lies further up the hierarchy. To the extent that they manifest independence in the exercise of their power, they are likely to run into conflict with the locally elected councillors. The latter have a mandate to ensure services and resources for their
respective wards. They are not primarily interested in efficient use of these funds, or in the idea that they must be allocated according to a set of criteria determined by central government or donors. Like their counterparts in the National Assembly, these councillors do not act in a corporate fashion representing a particular economic interest, but primarily regard themselves as representatives and patrons of local communities. What matters to them is not the principle according to which these resources are allocated but the tangible resource itself. Whether the resource reaches the beneficiaries in ways that are questionable, perhaps even illegal, carries little significance to people who are poor and in need. In exercising their control over elected representatives, they are not interested in how they obtain a particular good or resource, just the fact that they can deliver it. Wherever power cuts social and political relationships vertically rather than horizontally (as in societies that are stratified along the lines of social class and divergent corporate economic interest), accountability develops along different lines than those identified in models based on Western systems of democracy.

### Box 2. The decentralisation dilemma facing donors

What matters most to the donors: efficient use of their block grants or the empowerment of people at local level? Reconciling these two objectives is likely to be more difficult at the local government level than at the centre. Allowing local district councils to graduate from central control once they meet certain stipulated conditions for doing so may be one way of dealing with the issue. This is no guarantee, however, that they will continue to succeed in managing funds once they are more independent. Nor is it a given that such a formula is politically acceptable across the board as it is likely to give a head start to local areas that are already developed and consequently runs against a deeply embedded principle in Tanzania that poor districts should be given an equal chance – or actually receive more benefits than those already well endowed. It is also bound to involve an extensive capacity-building programme that will take time to complete. There will be plenty of room for problems in the use of these funds as well as political tensions arising between central and local authorities and between professional staff and politically elected leaders. How the left donor hand will know what the right one is doing is likely to be a challenge in the years to come.

The creation of special Constituency Development Funds in recent years may be one way of creating more space for local decision making, however as long as these funds are going to be significantly, if not exclusively, controlled by elected MPs they are likely to reinforce clientelist relationships in politics rather than building local forms of governance along the lines of Western democracy.
2.5.2 The administration of justice

Looking at the justice sector in Tanzania from a poverty perspective, the picture is quite a grim one. The majority of the population has limited access to justice and does not enjoy a genuine feeling of safety and security. Many face corrupt and unethical officials within the legal system. In short, the public trust in the legal system is quite low (United Republic of Tanzania 2004). This state of affairs reflects the inability of legal sector institutions in the country to fulfil their stated mandates and obligations in providing justice and upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights. The need for reform has been identified over and over again since the early 1990s when the Financial and Legal Management Upgrading Project (filmup) was created. It was followed by the Nyalali Report 1991 (United Republic of Tanzania 1991), the Warioba Report on corruption 1996 (United Republic of Tanzania 1996), the Medium Term Strategy and Action Plan of 1999, and subsequently the much delayed “Quick Start Project”, supported by a consortium of donors including all the Nordic countries (United Republic of Tanzania 2002). An extension of the Medium-Term Strategy for the Legal Sector was approved in 2004.

All these initiatives reflect concern in local and international legal circles – as well as among donors – for the importance of legal reform as part of the “good governance” packet. They also reflect, however, the political problems associated with putting these reforms into practice. These can be found at two levels: (a) how justice is perceived locally and (b) in the relationship between government and donors.

The problems facing the legal sector in Tanzania begin in society. The Western notion of justice and how law should be dispensed and administered is only shared and fully understood by a relatively small number of Tanzanians. Improving respect for human rights and the rule of law, therefore, is not easily fixed by focusing on realigning relations among formal institutions at state level only. Such efforts should be pursued but they are likely to only touch on the surface of the problem. They may help keep the elite in check more effectively. This is not insignificant but the extent to which these institutional realignments will really benefit ordinary citizens, however, is meagre. The local understanding of justice, while evolving, continues to be different from the universal principles of human rights that development partners wish to see implemented as part of their good governance agenda.

The problem in Tanzania, like in many other African countries, is that people are caught between a disintegrating moral order and a legal order which is still at best poorly understood by the public. The moral sanctions that used to hold individuals in check and make life easy and predictable
have broken down. The economy of affection, i.e. social support and development networks, is characterised by greater moral hazards than before (Hyden 2006b). Most Tanzanians are rhetorically ready to condemn corruption in courts or other institutions but they are more genuinely concerned with what they perceive as breaches of what might be called positive morality. The self-binding commitment to local moral codes that was once very strong is gone and has not been replaced by a similar commitment to abstract and formal rules or laws. The latter do not form part of the day-to-day discourse on the difficulties people face today. The foremost reason is that the notion of justice that prevails in Tanzania is not the one that Western perceptions of good governance call for.

Following John Rawls, whose influence in Western societies is hard to dispute when it comes to defining justice, the latter is based not merely on its content but also the terms for how, through reasoning, agreement can be reached. This definition of justice as impartiality presupposes (1) principles and rules that are capable of forming the basis of free agreement among people on reasonable terms, and (2) a personal behaviour that is not motivated by private considerations. The important thing about this treatment of justice is that the dispassionate impartiality, that is the stock-in-trade of the ideal judge or bureaucrat, is not confined to the public sphere only. The same morality also permeates the private realm. For example, this standard of impartiality is typically applied by parents in respect to their children, even in the way people choose friends. They do not want their choice to betray an unpleasant taste for social climbing or, even worse, express racial or ethnic prejudices. It is the rationale for the extension of this Western notion of justice to an increasing array of issues e.g. how women and children are treated and sexual minorities respected. It constitutes the foundation on which activist NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch rationalise their critique of aberrant practices of human rights. This liberal notion of justice is also the basis of the exercise of a softer version of power (Barry 1995).

The prevailing notion of justice in Tanzania is different and is based on the principle of reciprocity. It stems from the customary forms of justice that already existed in pre-colonial society and which have survived in parts to this day to the point where they also colour the way formal state institutions behave and perform. Justice as reciprocity may be defined as the right of one actor – individual, group, community or state – to pursue its ideal interest in competition with others based on a common understanding of the moral limits of these pursuits. When Tanzanians lived and worked in local communities before colonialism or under colonial tutelage, these limits were well known, the common good easy to defend and
pursue. With social change in the countryside since independence, these parochial boundaries have weakened and what is right and wrong has become much fuzzier in the peoples’ minds. Urbanisation, and more recently globalisation, has exacerbated this trend.

In an economy where investment in personal relationships is more important than strict adherence to abstract rules, effective maintenance of these relations by mutual agreement on what holds them together is of paramount importance. For ordinary Tanzanians, it is the crisis at this level rather than the state that is most worrisome. This moral crisis increases uncertainty, augments transaction costs and invites arbitrary uses of power. Increased instances of popular justice and harsher measures being taken by the police and security forces to deal with criminal or illicit forms of behaviour are responses to this breakdown in morality. The use of hard state power in Tanzania, then, is not so much because of lack of checks and balances at state level as it is the result of a moral crisis at society level. The frequently harsh application of state power is an elementary attempt to restore a social order that reflects more the past than the future. It would be wrong, however, to regard these heavy-handed interventions as the last gasp of an old order. When it comes to perceiving modern institutions such as elections, it is instructive that the President and his colleagues in CCM typically refer to the latter not in terms of the legal notion of “free and fair” but rather the moral perception of “peaceful and orderly”. The latter two notions enjoy are better understood among ordinary Tanzanians than the former. The gradual dissolution of customary forms of morality may eventually make Tanzanians more receptive to a Western notion of justice and the formal institutions associated with it, but such a transformation is likely to take time and cannot be engineered from the top only.

The second problem – the divergent opinions between government and donors on legal reform – must be viewed against the background of what has been discussed above. It would be too cynical to suggest that the Tanzanians are just going through the motions in order to receive funding, because they know that donors consider the legal sector to be critical to good governance. There are, after all, many Tanzanian lawyers and others in government, as well as in society, who care about modernising and streamlining the legal system. It was allowed to decline in earlier years, because laws did not really matter to the country’s rulers. What mattered was the outcome of a given policy or intervention regardless of how it was carried out. The government often rode roughshod over its citizens. This tendency remains, albeit somewhat modified because government leaders realise that there are increasing costs attached to too ar-
arbitrary a use of power. Thus, although the approach to governance may be slowly changing, there is no critical mass in government, let alone CCM, that considers legal reform a high priority in the current growth and poverty reduction context.

2.5.3 Donor funding – the implications of budget support

This raises the more general question of what the shift to direct budget support in the donor community means from a power perspective. Donors agree that it is more administratively convenient, although the turn away from projects also shifts the rationale for their presence in Tanzania. Government likes it too because it provides greater control of how external funds are allocated. By not being tied to specific projects, the money becomes more fungible. The rationale for this new approach stems largely from the Paris Declaration which emphasises, among other things, that recipients of aid must be given greater control over the use of these funds.

Tanzania has been selected as one of the African countries where this new approach should be tried out because donors believe that the prospects for efficient and responsible use by government are on the whole greater there than in many other African countries. Because both parties have a vested interest, albeit for different reasons, in continuing budget support, it has been increasing since 2005. From a power perspective, this has definite implications, two of which are worth discussing here: (1) what happens if Tanzania fails to live up to its promises? and (2) what are the implications of placing all the available eggs in the state basket?

Although the confluence of political, economic and administrative factors make direct budget support the preferred donor practice in countries where government demonstrates at least a minimum of commitment to the principles of good governance, donors are faced with the issue of how much deviation from these principles they are able to accept. There is, on the one hand, a set of performance standards that are applied for assessing progress on an annual basis. This managerial approach to the problem, however, is challenged by political considerations. Negotiations at the political level often allow the partner government to “buy time” to implement reforms. This means more money and often an attenuation of the commitment. By allowing such compromises in the original approach, however, donors ultimately face the problem that support in their home countries for what they are doing may run out. Direct budget support is not necessarily broadly supported in these countries. Failures to demonstrate results in partner countries, therefore, may be used by those opposed to such budget support to gain the upper hand and put an end to it. The effect is that governments are allowed to make mistakes or fail to live
up to the whole package of principles to which they have committed themselves. As indicated above, there are many factors in these countries that suggest that such behaviour may become institutionalised, because if governments have gotten away with it once, there is a temptation to rationalise it again. By being able to ride a wave of goodwill among development partners, despite several corruption scandals in 2007, Tanzania is unlikely to risk losing direct budget support any time soon, however questions are being asked in development partner circles concerning how much of their aid should be in the form of direct budget support, given the events in the past couple of years.

Shifting away from direct budget support, or terminating it altogether, is however a more complicated and sensitive issue than closing down individual programmes and projects. Doing so with the latter may be controversial to some actors, but the repercussions can be contained relatively easy. This is not necessarily the case with this form of budget support which constitutes not only untied funding but also a transfer of funds under an agreement of trust. The political and economic fallout of ceasing such support, therefore, is bound to be quite significant or in fact potentially disastrous for the country that falls out with donors. This is where donor power really shows. The enormous costs that may be incurred if direct budget support comes to an end are likely to serve as potential brakes on African partners. There is no guarantee, however, that they respond as donors expect as governments in Africa think and act politically rather than economically so their response is not likely to be in terms of costs and benefits but rather in terms of national prestige. When development partners cut their aid to Kenya a few years ago, the Kenyan Government responded as if they were the “injured party” but did get its act together. Not only did domestic revenue collection grow but so did the sense of responsibility for the use of public funds. Such a scenario cannot be ruled out for Tanzania should a crisis arise in relations with the donor community; however it is not very likely given that both the government and development partners know how to “play the political game” of sustaining direct budget support.

This is not to suggest that such budget support is likely to continue without further scrutiny, not only in terms of how effective aid under such a dispensation really is but also because of the power implications of placing so much aid, untied, at the disposal of government. In the 1990s, individual project and programme aid allowed donors to generously fund efforts by civil society organisations to establish themselves. Although many such projects proved futile, it left the donors with the image in African government circles that they prefer to support the political opposition
rather than the government. Direct budget support is turning this around. Donors are increasingly regarded as abandoning civil society. There are many people in Africa, including in Tanzania, who lament the current trend. They view it as driven by economic and administrative rather than political considerations. The good governance agenda is losing its previously comprehensive character by becoming increasingly responsive to just one side of the political set-up: the government. From the perspective of ordinary citizens, donors are seen as abandoning the participatory and bottom-up approach that they preached so strongly in the 1990s. Ownership is no longer seen in people but in government terms. Local citizens, not least activists, correctly interpret the enormous generosity that they associate with direct budget support as loading power in favour of those controlling the state, leaving civil society actors at its discretion. Some hear an echo of the 1960s when comprehensive planning ruled the minds of donors. This time it is the Ministry of Finance that is allowed to play a hegemonic planning and coordinating role.

The donor inclination to significantly reduce, if not totally abandon, projects and act collectively to boost government budgets limits flexibility but, above all, it carries the risk of leaving out other institutions that are critical for a country’s development. Government bureaucracies in African countries have never proved to be good at enabling local citizens to participate in the policy process. They have preferred the position of commanding people to do things that they have decided are priorities. This has inevitably led to a top-down approach to poverty alleviation. To the extent that participatory approaches have been used, they have come from initiatives by non governmental organisations, some local, others international e.g. Oxfam and care. These initiatives have often had encouraging results, at least in the short run, but they have been scattered and often confined to specific local communities. This reflects the relative weakness of civil society in Tanzania. It is active in many local communities but it lacks a coordinated strategy. Rivalry between organisations is more common than cooperation.

Development partners have belatedly realised that in power terms there is a downside to direct budget support. They have, therefore, initiated a special civil society support programme that gives its members a chance to act based on their own sense of priorities – a sort of equivalent to budget support. This is a step in the right direction given that it offers a “control case” in terms of who makes the most efficient use of aid: government or civil society? Even though it may not shift the power in the direction of Tanzanian citizens in any dramatic manner, it demonstrates a realisation among development partners that poverty reduction is not a
government responsibility only but is one shared by all the organisations in the country (Gould 2005).

2.6 Three different threat levels

As suggested in the Introduction, power analyses can be conducted in many different manners. Because the focus of this volume is on how power relations affect policy outcomes, the work indicates both threats and opportunities in the triangular relations between donors, state and society in Tanzania. As such a power analysis, as used here, is a form of risk analysis that indicates what may be right and what might go wrong. It is of value to development partners as well as Tanzanians interested in the welfare of their country.

Drawing on the previous discussion in this chapter, it may be helpful to think of these challenges facing Tanzania today as constituted at three different threat levels – agenda setting, policy implementation and underlying social forces, as illustrated in the figure below:

![Figure 2: Levels of threat to successful continuation of reform process in Tanzania](image)

This diagram suggests that threats to the ongoing policy reform process are lowest at the agenda setting level while congregating in different degrees of severity at the policy implementation level. The challenges that stem from the underlying social forces are also of different degrees of severity. They are all likely to grow in significance over the next ten-year period.
The message is quite clear: threats to policy reform in Tanzania come from both formal and informal institutions. The former are a problem because laws and procedures tend to be applied in ways that affirm the power of individual government bureaucrats at the expense of citizens. They often have the effect of further marginalising groups that are already weak in society. The latter are problematic because they are applied in discretionary manners that make adherence to official policy objectives and procedures virtually impossible. Those who can use their personal power that is often boosted by occupying public office, steer resource flows toward privileged groups or communities, e.g. to the local areas from which these individuals come. This tendency is particularly pronounced among elected leaders, but it concerns appointed officials as well.

Development partners often overlook the fact that what is being described above is what Tanzanians know and are used to. Few are aware of more ideal governance alternatives that draw on universal principles on the rights of citizens. This is not to underestimate the readiness of Tanzanians to see improvement in their mode of governance. What it does imply, however, is that Tanzanians are likely to make their evaluation based on what they know and have experience of rather than some universal – or foreign – ideal that they may have heard but know little, if anything, about. Tanzanians are pragmatists when it comes to making choices. This is why a power analysis is a necessary complement to the abstract and more generalised type of analysis that goes into deciding policy or country strategy. This is why monitoring how power changes over time provides insights that are at least as valuable as being aware of Tanzanian perceptions of Western ideals of good governance. How monitoring power may be carried out is the subject of the next chapter.
This chapter is an attempt to show how power analysis and monitoring may be carried out in a more systematic fashion. It draws on the lessons learned from the initial study that was presented in Chapter 2. It argues that any attempt to grasp the way power operates needs to rely on both qualitative and quantitative methods of study. It also makes the point that the study of power is of interest not only to development partners but also to Tanzanians.

3.1 Of local interest

Power analysis is not only of importance to development partners. Local stakeholders share an interest in knowing how power operates in their country. This has been the response from Tanzanians who have had the opportunity to read the documents that form part of this volume. The Swedish Embassy has been anxious that the data that are being gathered on how power affects policy and development outcomes are also made available to the public in Tanzania. This aspiration was one reason why the issue of how best to conduct power analyses on a more regular basis was brought up.

The study reported in the previous chapter was an initial effort intended to demonstrate a set of issues that had typically been left out of development policy analysis. It was meant to show the links between policy and politics, between agenda setting, policy analysis and implementation. It generated such interest and support that it was decided to take the power analysis project one step further i.e. to address the question of how such analysis could be carried out in a more systematic fashion. Thus, this chapter reports on two efforts in this direction. The first is a more general
overview of what type of studies could be conducted to gather systematic data targeted on specific relations or nexuses of interest to development partners and Tanzanians alike. The second provides the conceptual framework for a survey instrument of subjective perceptions of power that was produced for use in interviews with a cross section of well-informed individuals, as well as for focus groups. Such a study was conducted in 2006 by Max Mmuya. His findings are presented and analysed in Chapter 4. A slightly edited version of the full survey instrument is included as Annex 1.

3.2 Systematising power analysis: an example

Because power analysis is a new tool aimed at understanding and explaining development performance, it is necessary to outline in more specific detail how it may be operationalised and used in different national settings. Power analysis is not scientific in the sense of being based on objective indicators. It becomes meaningful only if conducted with reference to specific contexts. Power is an expression of political culture. A power analysis, therefore, is an extension of the search for causes of change that are hidden in the grey zone beyond economic statistics. Why is so little official policy implemented? Where does all the money go? This grey zone remains largely unexplored; yet Tanzanians and donors alike increasingly realise that this is where the answers to their questions often lie.

The first question is where to look for relevant, important clues to the use of power. It is possible to look at wide range of issues and arenas where power is exercised. This volume suggests that, from a policy perspective, there are five arenas or nexuses where power makes a difference to a country’s development:

- Donor-government relations
- The formal-informal institutional nexus
- The actual use of power
- The control of power
- State-civil society relations

Each one of these would correspond to a major concern for the international development agenda, as expressed in e.g. the Millennium Development Goals. The links between analysis of power and generally-agreed-upon goals are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2 Power analysis priorities and official development concerns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena or nexus</th>
<th>Development concern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>donor-government relations</td>
<td>keeping country on reform track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formal-informal institutions</td>
<td>more efficient implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>use of power</td>
<td>promoting democratic culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>control of power</td>
<td>accountability and transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state-civil society relations</td>
<td>fostering popular participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This framework is intended to cover the most critical points in the policy process, beginning upstream and continuing toward the downstream end, as illustrated in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3 Points of power analysis in the policy process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda setting</th>
<th>Policy formulation</th>
<th>Policy implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upstream</td>
<td></td>
<td>Downstream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive power</td>
<td></td>
<td>Allocative power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The direction of a country’s development is set upstream; its management takes place downstream. There is more at stake in deciding on the agenda than there is deciding on which individual policies should be given priority, how they should be implemented and by whom. The former implies deciding on which issues become dominant and which are left out. It is directive and conditions the policy process. Agenda-setting power, however, is often challenged by those who exercise power at the points of formulating and implementing policy. As was discussed in Chapter 2, this is evident in Tanzania where informal institutions play havoc with official policy objectives as reflected in, for example, the agenda to which development partners and the government officially agree.

Although agenda setting lends itself to power battles between different social forces, what happens downstream is of special interest in a power analysis given that this is where outcomes are determined. This is where policy and power objectives easily clash and realigning them in a constructive direction becomes a tough challenge. This is where hard power may be turned into soft, where the face of power can become more acceptable to citizens, the use of power can become energising, the effects of power more positive and the control of power stronger. These issues are summarised below:
Table 3 The basic components of a power analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of power</th>
<th>Face of power</th>
<th>Use of power</th>
<th>Effect of power</th>
<th>Control of power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard</td>
<td>Intimidating</td>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>Subservience</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resolute</td>
<td>Tenacious</td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitating</td>
<td>Energising</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft</td>
<td>Reconciling</td>
<td>Pacifying</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is now time to discuss each of the five arenas of power analysis listed above.

### 3.2.1 Studying donor-government relations

The implications of agenda-setting power are usually invisible in democratic societies where consultation and negotiation between different interests and social forces take place on a regular basis. Disaggregating who possesses agenda-setting power and to what degree becomes difficult. In African countries such as Tanzania, however, where the policy process is dominated by donors and government; exactly who calls the tune is easier to discern. The shift to direct budget support does not necessarily mean that donors lose their power. The big difference between aid dependency in the past and today is that it is not only entrenched in financial flows for specific activities but also in the way the country’s future destiny is decided. It could be argued that never before has the donor community carried a greater responsibility for its partners than it does today. That is why the power relations between donor and government must be included in a systematic power analysis.

In order to illustrate a possible way forward to examining these issues more closely, the following table indicates relevant priority questions, potential areas of study and methods of collecting data.
Table 4 Research questions, areas and methods of studying donor-government links

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research question</th>
<th>Area of research</th>
<th>Research method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the effects of more deliberate donor coordination on a government's ability to own and influence the development policy agenda?</td>
<td>Comparing and aggregating experiences from different forums for dialogue between donors and government.</td>
<td>Interviews with well informed actors on both sides; consultation of existing reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the effects of using a softer or harder version of power to ensure compliance with conditions for donor support?</td>
<td>Examining specific sectors where this differentiation makes sense, e.g. governance, policy reform in finance or key development fields.</td>
<td>Consultation of public statements, interviews with ambassadors and government officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which are the issues that tend to create the strongest degree of tension in relations between donors and government?</td>
<td>Identifying and ranking issues in terms of how severely they may affect power relations.</td>
<td>Interviews and consultation of various records, media as well as publicly available reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well do government officials understand global issues that affect their country’s future?</td>
<td>Degree of preparation for international conferences, mode of participation (political or technical), and follow-up?</td>
<td>Interviews with key government officials, official and unofficial records of inter-national meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How can government be more effectively empowered to help set the policy agenda?</td>
<td>Studying the extent to which a “planning mentality” exists and is allowed to influence final decisions by government.</td>
<td>Tracing how policy is prepared and finally decided upon in key ministry or, if possible, Cabinet.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.2 Studying formal and informal institutions
The further down the policy process, the more complex the power analysis becomes. This is true not only in Tanzania. For instance, there is a growing body of literature on the policy process in Western democracies, associated with names such as John Kingdon (2003), James March and Johan Olsen (1976), who have convincingly demonstrated that a policy process is not best understood in “stages” but rather in terms of “streams” that come together, not because of good policy planning but because of coincidence. Problems, policy and politics meet at unexpected junctures. The ability of policy analysts and policy makers to understand when the “time has come” for a particular initiative or a “window of opportunity” is emerging, e.g. after a fresh election, is more important than the technical input of specialists or the coordinating efforts of managers. Shifts in
power matter. They create the opportunities for political traction.

Tanzania and other African countries are, of course, not the United States. They are not pluralist liberal democracies where lobbying and endless bargaining inevitably produces only incremental change. Power in such a system is contained and controlled through competition for influence. Tanzania, though, does offer an interesting parallel that is applicable to many other countries around the world. Wherever power is embedded in interpersonal dependencies created through informal methods of social exchange and thus potentially easy to destabilise and shift, it leads to “back-door” bargaining and “deals” that resemble incrementalist America in that this tends to block major changes or breakthroughs. These become the exception rather than the rule and occur only at unexpected junctures such as the honeymoon period after an election when a new leader and government have emerged. New brooms sweep better than old ones, although one study of policy reform in East African countries has tried to show that old brooms are not completely useless (Kjaer 2004).

This perforation of the social structure that exists in African countries carries definite implications for the exercise of power. The latter tends to focus on people rather than policies. Because power is perceived to lie with individuals, or networks thereof, rather than in offices, it makes the stake for individual actors much higher than in formal contexts where they can “hide” behind rules and a corporate identity. They must continuously think in terms of what their statements and actions mean for their position in the power hierarchy. Remaining silent on a particular issue or providing a false or incomplete explanation often becomes necessary in order not to lose face and thus power and influence among peers. There are quite well understood rules within this informally established hierarchy. The insiders certainly know them (Chabal and Daloz 1999). Consequently, they are more concerned with transgression than with transaction costs. The real challenge in the current good governance context is that the more political actors ignore transgression costs, the greater their risk of falling foul of their peers. This increases political instability and may threaten policy reform. The set of issues that deserve exploration in a power analysis with regard to this institutional nexus are summarised in Table 5.
Table 5 Research questions, areas and methods for studying formal and informal institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research question</th>
<th>Areas of research</th>
<th>Research method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How does the practice of competitive party politics influence the behaviour of key officials in government?</td>
<td>Official decision-making contexts and the extent to which private and public interests are likely to clash.</td>
<td>Consultation of existing reports and interviews with officials in government and political opposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How far do individual cabinet ministers have control over public funds?</td>
<td>Formal powers given to cabinet members and the extent to which these are transcended or ignored.</td>
<td>Consultation of legal and constitutional paragraphs; interviews with well-informed individuals in and outside official decision-making circles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the evidence that indiscipline in public office is consistently punished?</td>
<td>Powers given to and exercised by public service commission and other relevant official agencies.</td>
<td>Reading of official reports, stories in the media, and interviews with well-informed individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How far is there evidence that officers are being hired or promoted on the basis of favouritism?</td>
<td>Public service institutions, individual ministries or executive agencies where records allow comparison of formal and informal practices.</td>
<td>Consultation of staff lists and other official records; interviews with relevant “insiders” and “outsiders”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much “slippage” or “leakage” is there in the implementation of policy?</td>
<td>Comparison of nature of regulations, how they are applied, and with what effects in different sectors.</td>
<td>Expenditure-tracking, evaluation reports, interviews and focus group discussions with officials and potential beneficiary groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.3 Examining the use of power

The personalisation of power relations not only complicates policy and governance reforms, it also tends to make the use of power more arbitrary and “naked”. In countries where the Western notion of justice is not entrenched – and they are still in the majority around the world – there is always a tendency to respond to issues of justice in moral rather than legal terms. What westerners refer to as the “rule of law” dimension is typically weak or largely absent. Reactions to injustice are instant and spontaneous; “due process” is deemed less important. The power climate is intense, the tendency to use repressive power strong. The face of power in these circumstances is intimidating. It perpetuates a legacy of fear of the authorities and those in power. Approaching them becomes difficult; voicing a public opinion potentially risky. They act as “subjects”, not “citizens”, i.e. they are
passive rather than active in the public arena (Almond and Verba 1963). People tend to deal with issues on their own. Reliance on informal rather than formal institutions is preferred because of lower transaction costs. In short, state power often alienates citizens and blocks policy progress. This occurs in many sectors e.g. business, education and health, all key areas for poverty reduction efforts. The challenge here is to be able to turn a zero-sum use of power into a positive-sum use, where both state and society can claim victory rather than leaving one the winner, the other loser. This requires a level of tolerance and readiness to compromise that is not always easy to establish in a climate where the face of power remains intimidating. The specific issues that arise in this context are summarised below.

### Table 6 Research issues, areas and methods in examining the use of power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research question</th>
<th>Area of research</th>
<th>Research method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How discretionary is the use of power in public office?</td>
<td>Violations of legislation and regulations in order to pursue private interests by cabinet ministers and other ranking political figures.</td>
<td>Reports by agencies’ scrutinising officials; media reports and interviews with well-informed individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does the ruling party use its position in relationship to the political opposition?</td>
<td>Evidence from meetings, campaigns and Parliament indicating level of tolerance and respect.</td>
<td>Participant observation, archival material and interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the evidence of political interference in the affairs of institutions that are supposed to enjoy autonomy?</td>
<td>Courts, executive agencies and other institutions that are officially protected from political interference.</td>
<td>Existing studies, reports and interviews with key officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What effects does devolving authority to local levels have on the use of power?</td>
<td>Local government bodies and their interaction with citizens.</td>
<td>Case studies from local government areas, involving study of decisions and their effects on people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How “naked” is the use of power that security forces, including police, use to ensure public safety?</td>
<td>Police and paramilitary institutions and their use in public places to ensure the safety of citizens.</td>
<td>Participant observation, case studies and interviews in addition to media reports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2.4 Studying the control of power
The presence of informal institutions in combination with the way power tends to be used discretionally, and often in an intimidating fashion, means that exercising control of those in power is associated with definite risks.
The introduction of formal democratic institutions does not automatically guarantee greater public accountability or transparency. In places like Tanzania, checks and balances remain weak at many different levels of society. The political opposition is unable to influence and change government behaviour. Ombudsman functions lack the teeth to check officials. Non-state actors may be vocal but their actual influence on public policy and official behaviour in government remains limited. Government leaders like to deal with violation of laws in a political rather than judicial manner. These are all areas where performance in countries receiving assistance often becomes frustrating to development partners. The interest they show in strengthening accountability and transparency is, consequently, understandable.

What has been lacking in this effort to date is an attempt to obtain a better grasp of the informal side of how power is exercised. A power analysis would be one way of ensuring a better understanding and perspective on how far these efforts can be effectively realised. Rein in the unofficial use of office is not going to be easy in countries where informal institutions continue to exercise influence on the minds of people, because they are more “rational” than formal ones. The various issues that are of special interest from a power perspective are summarised in Table 7.

Table 7 Research questions, areas and methods in the study of the control of power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research question</th>
<th>Area of research</th>
<th>Research method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What degree of control of government is the political opposition willing and/or capable of exercising?</td>
<td>Parliamentary regulations, Hansard reports, Public Accounts Committee, political dialogues.</td>
<td>Archival material, interviews and media reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What degree of control do Ombudsman-like types of institutions and courts exercise?</td>
<td>Courts and Ombudsman-like institutions.</td>
<td>Legal statutes, official reports and interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What role do elections play in keeping politicians under scrutiny?</td>
<td>Election campaigns, speeches and outcomes; policy results in the wake of election outcome.</td>
<td>Campaign records in the media; interviews; case studies of key constituencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What role does decentralisation play in enhancing popular means of control of public officials?</td>
<td>Central and local government authorities.</td>
<td>Legal statutes, official appointment procedures, local government records and interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How far are informal means of holding officials accountable important for government performance?</td>
<td>Clientelist practices.</td>
<td>Case studies, focus group discussions, interviews.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.5 Studying state-civil society relations

Power analysis discussed in this volume focuses on the state or the government as these institutions are ultimately responsible for the direction of a country’s development and how it can be realised. In places where development cooperation is a dominant part of the policy scene, government tends to respond to initiatives from the outside rather than being able to determine the country’s direction on its own.

This process, however, often leaves governments more focused on what is going on internationally than locally. Above all, they interact more frequently with donors than with domestic actors such as the private sector or NGOs. The latter are even further removed from agenda setting than governments. This is an issue to some development partners who have expressed concern about the relatively limited consultation with non-state actors occurring in these countries. Because the donors are so influential, they are also part of this problem. The issue arises, however, for other reasons too. There is a legacy in many developing countries, not the least in Africa, which implies that political decisions can only be made by government. Non-state actors may be consulted, but their views do not have to be included in the final event. It requires unusual tenacity and a clever strategy to succeed in exerting any influence at all. In Tanzania there are a few organisations such as Haki Elimu and Tanzania Gender Networking Partnership that fall in this category.

This takes us to the issue of empowerment. Donors have been preoccupied with empowering partner governments, but have usually left the private and voluntary sectors with less rather than more attention. Business councils and other strong interest bodies may have received their due in the ongoing reform process, but the “little guys” – and “girls” – in business or in various other activities have been treated more as targets of state intervention – poverty reduction – than actors with their own interest and priorities. This is where direct budget support and a top-driven reform process run into conflict with the aspiration of promoting participation and building a more democratic culture. The latter involves the creation of institutional mechanisms that offer a sustainable, demand-driven approach to empowering groups and organisations in society and in the informal economy. Donors, as further discussed in Chapter 7, have a key role to play here in developing funding mechanisms that can foster empowerment of the many small-scale actors and activities that currently lack opportunities for growth and scaling up. The issues discussed here are summarised in Table 8.
Table 8 Research questions, areas and methods in study of state-civil society relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research question</th>
<th>Area of research</th>
<th>Research method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Which non-state actors tend to have the greatest influence on policy and why?</td>
<td>Government-private sector and NGO forums and dialogues.</td>
<td>Statutes, records of meetings, policy papers and related documents; interviews; case studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does government try to control non-state actors?</td>
<td>NGO and business councils; individual corporations and NGOs.</td>
<td>Legal statutes, interviews, media reports, case studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does religion or ethnicity influence state-civil society relations?</td>
<td>Composition of public service, distribution of services, relationships in politics.</td>
<td>Official documents, policy evaluations, existing studies, interviews, focus group discussions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do donor policies influence state-civil society relations?</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs and other public institutions responsible for handling relations with civil society.</td>
<td>Policy documents and records of donor coordination meetings; interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do civil society organisations have access to funding that is not controlled solely by government or donors?</td>
<td>Funding policies decided by donor governments, local embassies and government.</td>
<td>Statutes, official documents, reports and interviews.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The framework proposed above is systematic. It treats power in an explicit fashion showing how it relates to policy and thus shapes the extent to which the latter becomes reality. It is not merely prescriptive, indicating what may be desirable from a Western donor perspective. It is also analytical, showing why policy so rarely acquires political traction in many countries receiving foreign aid. Because local conditions are not merely obstacles standing in the way of donor reform, they cannot be ignored. The framework offers a way of bringing valuable qualitative information about what happens in a country which will constitute an inevitable complement to more quantitative and statistical information that typically forms the sole basis for policy analysis in development cooperation circles.

3.2.6 Monitoring changes in perceptions of power

The second approach that was considered and developed as part of the power analysis project sponsored by the Swedish Embassy in Dar es Salaam focused on how to monitor changes in perceptions of power among Tanzanians. Given the importance of power in relations between state and society, as well as between people, monitoring perceptions of how
power is exercised makes as much sense as monitoring subjective perceptions of a set of governance principles. Such studies have been conducted by a number of organisations and reported by, among others, World Bank Institute and Transparency International as well as academics (Hyden, Court and Mease 2004). These studies have indeed varied in method used, but many have accepted that measuring subjective perceptions is more useful than trying to find objective indicators or proxies of governance (Narayan et al 1999).

In proposing the power monitoring project for Tanzania, it was decided that it would be too costly to carry out a regular public opinion poll like the Afro-barometer which in its most recent round collected data on economic and political issues in Tanzania and 20 other African countries (e.g. Bhavnani and Backer 2007). Experience with governance assessments also indicated that a cost-effective and reliable way of collecting data would be to interview a cross-section of well-informed individuals from different sectors in society. Thus, it was decided that a sample of individuals from the state sector and various sectors in society would be used in an initial study. As a result, the study would include (1) government ministers, (2) parliamentarians, (3) senior civil servants, (4) business people, (5) lawyers and judges, (6) academics, (7) media representatives, (8) religious leaders, (9) civil society organisations and (10) international organisations based in Tanzania.

Given that this approach would entail the views of the societal “elite”, focus group discussions with other Tanzanians were included as a complementary mode of collecting information on perceptions of power in Tanzania. These focus group discussions tried as much as possible to use the same questions as those included in the survey of well-informed individuals, but the answers obtained were obviously less precise, yet valuable as comparative information.

3.3 A survey instrument

The rest of this chapter will present the conceptual framework for the survey instrument that was used as the basis for monitoring power in Tanzania, the full instrument being included here as Annex 1. Drawing on the experience of the first power study discussed in the previous chapter, power is defined as “the capacity to exercise control and influence over others through the use of means – soft or hard – which within the way power is constituted and distributed in the first place causes outcomes that are empirically verifiable through the presence of absence of conflict.” The value of this definition is that it recognises that power is not wholly
autonomous but is also shaped by structural determinants. The study of power, therefore, requires attention to its role as both an explanatory and an explained variable. In order to be meaningful and of use, power monitoring must be systemic and transcend the boundaries of formal institutions by probing into the informal relationships and rules that operate in politics; it must focus on the “rules-in-use” whether they are formal or informal.

For the purpose of monitoring power at the macro level of the political system, it is reasonable to assume that it is never absolute. Power, as suggested in the definition above, is determined by structural and institutional constraints and opportunities that shape the way it is exercised and controlled. The exercise and control of power are, therefore, embedded in relations of power that have crystallised into structures or institutions. While exercise and control of power are variables that can be analysed in the short term, the way power is constituted and distributed through structures and institutions operates in the long-term. The former are fast-moving, the latter slow-moving variables. It is this temporal distinction that makes it possible to analyse power as both an independent and a dependent variable.

A power analysis would be incomplete without some indication of its effects on the lives of citizens. The way power performs in the context of making and implementing policy leaves an impact, positive or negative, on the minds of those directly or indirectly affected. The political legitimacy of the regime rests on how individual citizens perceive what the existing structures and uses of power do to them. The effects, therefore, are assessed here in terms of the face the power leaves behind. The basic building blocks of power monitoring, as proposed here, are summarised in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structures and institutions</th>
<th>Constitution of power</th>
<th>Distribution of power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human agency</td>
<td>Exercise of power</td>
<td>Control of power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of these four aspects of power monitoring needs to be further explained and disaggregated in terms of what they are expected to indicate.
A. Constitution of power. This refers to how power is constructed as a result of the underlying socio-economic structures in society. People’s chances of making a difference in a given society vary because their basic circumstances are not the same. Some are rich, others poor; some educated, others not and so on. In addition, societies themselves vary according to the level of formalisation of institutions. For instance, individuals living in industrialised countries are much more influenced by corporate and bureaucratic structures than those living in countries such as those in Africa where customary law prevails and property rights are determined by tradition rather than a written legal regime. Much effort – and thus power – has been devoted to trying to change land tenure and the system of property rights, but changing this slow-moving variable has generally proved much more difficult than policy analysts assumed. The degree to which informal relations and rules prevail, therefore, is a significant indication of constraints on implementation of reform. Conversely, the more structures are corporate and public institutions formalised, the greater the probability that capacity for successful implementation exists. The variations that exist may be captured along the following continuum:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Corporate/bureaucratic</th>
<th>Personal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Distribution of power. This is the other side of the constitution of power coin. Whereas power is formed in response to social change, it is also distributed in response to specific challenges that require “freezing” relationships in order to obtain greater certainty and predictability. While constitution of power, therefore, is a more spontaneous process operating in the long haul, distribution of power is typically the result of intentional interventions made for the same long haul. Not all such interventions succeed, but those that do become part of the framework within which power is subsequently exercised and controlled. The way power is both constituted and distributed is here termed the power structure. Especially significant for this exercise is the extent to which power is concentrated or dispersed. Differences may stem from the presence of multiple ethnicities, religious diversity or disparities in assets or income. They may also result from governance legacies that are difficult to modify. In short, history as well as society provides a structural and institutional legacy that cannot be ignored.
nored in the present because it may be so deeply embedded in social and political consciousness that few, if any, call it into question. Development partners often overlook the fact that African countries are in the process of building a nation-state. It is not yet formed, although some countries have come further than others. African governments are in the process of laying the conditions for greater predictability but cannot take these conditions for granted. Because social and economic power is still constituted in a dispersed fashion and manifest in personal relationships rather than in formal institutions, political power is used in order to concentrate all of it to the state. In the absence of a stable and predictable socio-economic structure, political power becomes a means of shaping society in a more coherent, but also more hierarchical, manner. The political elite of Tanzania and other African countries cannot escape the predicament that before you can build an egalitarian society you need to make it more stratified along class lines.

Consequently, for power monitoring purposes it is important to take into consideration how people perceive what is going on now. A reasonable assumption is that the way power is distributed contradicts an expectation among the public that it should be shared more evenly. How this may be captured is demonstrated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State-centred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentrated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Exercise of power. As suggested in the first chapter, the distinction is often made between “power to” and “power over”, suggesting the latter is constraining, the former enabling. With the definition used here such a distinction is not very helpful. Each act involving power is at the same time implying both “power to” and “power over”. It is precisely because A has power over B that he gets him to do what he otherwise would not have done. A more useful distinction, therefore, is to think of what means are used in the exercise of power. Means may vary from hard to soft, or stated more directly, from coercion to persuasion via the use of incentives. It can be hypothesised that the more ambiguous and unpredictable the existing power structure is, the more probable it is that the exercise of power will be coercive. Conversely, the more formalised and corporate the power structure is, the greater the prospect that power will be exercised through
the use of incentives or persuasion. This suggests that the “good governance” agenda is closely related to how power is exercised in a given country, which in turn is determined by existing power structures. It is vital to understand how these are nested in each other in order to put governance reforms into their proper perspective. The exercise of power, then, can be analysed with the help of the following continuum:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise of power</th>
<th>Coercive</th>
<th>Incentive</th>
<th>Persuasive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

D. Control of power. Power is never absolute in any meaningful sense because individuals subjected to the exercise of it sooner or later find ways of reacting that somehow constrain future usage. Because it is a malleable variable, the extent to which power is checked is difficult to establish firmly because how much of it was used in the first place to achieve a particular objective is itself possible to know only in a relative sense. It is more meaningful for power monitoring purposes, therefore, to examine the various ways by which people constrain the use of power. Do the structural and institutional circumstances facilitate or hinder control of power? Are there methods of holding officials accountable that differ from the more formal means associated with the good governance agenda? Are people ready to organise to use their voice to constrain the use of power or do they prefer a more submissive stance? The hypothesis with reference to Swedish programme countries is that the voice option is potentially positive for national development or poverty reduction, while passivity or loyalty leaves less room for effective control of those in power. This differentiation is captured as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control of power</th>
<th>Voice</th>
<th>Loyalty</th>
<th>Passivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The next step is to identify how this framework can be applied. The first question is where the empirical focus should be. Power can be studied in many contexts, but for the purpose of this exercise it must be significant for understanding poverty reduction and national development issues. Consequently, the most useful locus of power monitoring would be the policy process as it stretches physically from the global to the local level.
and conceptually from agenda setting to policy implementation and policy effects (or, as it is sometimes also referred to: from “upstream” to “downstream”). In order to capture variation, it is suggested here that power monitoring takes places at four points in the process: (a) agenda setting, (b) policy formulation, (c) policy implementation, and (d) policy effects. This is illustrated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agenda-setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Power monitoring, as proposed here, therefore, aims at making assessments at four distinct and different points. It is important that the differences between the four are spelled out to respondents. Agenda setting refers to the general policy framework or strategy that a given country relies upon. The second point refers to the formulation of individual policies at national level. The third point refers to the activities associated with putting policy into practice. The fourth refers to the effects that power has on policy outcomes. This can be measured in terms of effectiveness as well as legitimacy. The former refers to what was achieved; the latter to how it was done. This is the “face” of power that citizens encounter. How it affects the lives and the rights of citizens is an integral part of power analysis because it bears on how citizens relate to government and other public institutions.

The principal actors in the policy process are likely to be drawn from the state, notably government ministries or independent executive agencies. Representatives of both the private and voluntary sectors, however, may also play a part as will international organisations, especially bilateral and multilateral aid agencies in programme countries. With the growing emphasis among the latter on budget support and sector-wide funding, donors are likely to be most prominent at the agenda-setting stage in the process, while government ministries will prevail at the formulation stage. Non-state actors – private and voluntary – are likely to be present primarily at the implementation stage. Foreign organisations may also play a part in the implementation process.

The crafting of this instrument so far can be summarised in the following table:
Prior to presenting the questions that should yield insightful and relevant information, it is important to stress that a survey instrument should never be too long. Whenever a person is asked questions, the length of the interview is a critical factor in deciding the quality of the data collected. Experience suggests that the longer it takes to complete the survey, the more problems arise with regard to the attention span and interest of the respondent. Thus, an exercise aimed at collecting data must be tempered by regard for the limited time span that the average respondent is likely to accept in return for participation.

This questionnaire (see Annex 1) is based on a total of thirty-six questions. Thirty-two deal with substantive issues, while four are meant to identify some personal characteristics of the respondent. The latter would be superfluous if used in a group context but are included here since the assumption is that they will be used in a survey context. There are eight questions each for the three points divided equally into two for each principal aspect: constitution, distribution, exercise and control of power. A brief explanation is provided to illustrate what each question is intended to highlight or indicate.

### 3.4 Conclusions

The ultimate value of an instrument like this depends on who is using it. The specimen version presented in Annex 1 needs to be introduced in ways that make respondents understand and become involved in their answers to the questions. It is also important that whoever is in charge of collecting the information has good country knowledge and can use it independently to interpret answers in relevant and reliable ways.

#### Table 10 Summary of framework components for power monitoring

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure and institutions</th>
<th>Agenda setting</th>
<th>Policy formulation</th>
<th>Policy implementation</th>
<th>Policy effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitution of power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution of power</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human agency</td>
<td>Exercise of power</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control of power</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
If the intention is to use the instrument on a regular basis, e.g. annually to assess how perceptions of power may have changed, it is important that questions and respondents remain the same so that comparability over time is assured. Good record-keeping, therefore, is an integral part of an exercise such as this. This suggests that hiring the same individual or group to do this work over time is necessary. Choosing the right individuals to be responsible is consequently vital. More specifically, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- Monitoring power is not only meaningful but also feasible in the sense that it can be done.
- It brings into focus the social and political realities that are usually not considered when policies are analysed.
- It fosters a better understanding of how political factors function as threats to or drivers of change.
- It sensitises analysts to political factors that have a bearing on why some but not other policies may be implemented.
- It encourages greater patience and humility among all parties involved in promoting development in a country like Tanzania.

The results of the first round of monitoring power in Tanzania are reported in the next chapter.
4.1 A power monitoring study in 2006

This chapter is a revised version of the report on how well-informed individuals, as well as selected local groups of people, perceive power in Tanzania. It is based on the first power monitoring study that was carried out in 2006 and published in early 2007 (Mmuya 2007). Its main objective was to analyse and understand the political and institutional factors that shape development outcomes. The hope was that the results would make analysts and policy makers more aware of the political conditions in which specific policies are implemented. The study was also expected to offer a more informed and balanced perspective on threats and opportunities, strengths and weaknesses associated with policy processes in Tanzania and help make policy analysts and decision makers more sensitive to the social and political realities that, in the end, determine how far specific reforms or policy interventions in a given programme country may go. Respondents were asked in each question to make an assessment of the present situation and compare it with what they believe it was five years ago. This allowed us to make a comparison between perceptions of power as applicable to the years Benjamin Mkapa was president with those that apply to the period of the incumbent head of state, Jakaya Kikwete. Furthermore, it was hoped that the study would identify points of contact between development partners and local stakeholders that could lead to the development of a more successful cooperation strategy. In short, it was carried out with a view to attracting interest both among development partners and Tanzanian stakeholders.

It is important to point out that the study was carried out in 2006; one year after Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete had taken over from Benjamin Mkapa as President of Tanzania. What is reported here as current perceptions,
therefore, are opinions that stem from what may be called the political “honeymoon period” of the new President. A second study using the same instrument – and as much as possible the same respondents – will be conducted in 2009, one year before the next general election in 2010. Significant developments that have taken place in the country since 2006 are discussed in Chapter 5 together with the implications of the survey presented in this chapter as concerns interpreting politics in Tanzania.

4.2 Methodology

The power monitoring study was conducted using the survey instrument discussed in Chapter 3 as well as focus group discussions (FGDS). The former was administered among well-informed individuals while the FGDS targeted other Tanzanians, in urban as well as rural settings.

Of the total of 175 survey respondents, all but four indicated their gender in the questionnaire. Women made up 24% and men 76% of the total. This distribution reflects a gender imbalance in favour of men, an anticipated finding for the type of intended respondents. Well-informed individuals were likely to be senior officials in their institutions, a majority of whom were to be in their middle and senior years. Thus, 48.3% of the respondents were in the age group 36–50, 34.3% were from the age group of older than 51. The rest of the respondents, that is 17.4 percent, came from the below 35 years of age group. Due to efforts aimed at achieving a balance between respondents from different sectors, there was no real predominant sector representation. The largest group was civil servants (19.1%) followed by the business sector (17.3%). These in turn were followed by university dons and civil society leadership (11.6% each), closely followed by elected officials (11%).

Focus group discussions consisted of relatively junior panellists such as students and less highly placed informants. In all, sixteen FGDS were conducted involving 97 panel members, 32 women and 65 men. Groups consisted of students from the University of Dar es Salaam (undergraduate and graduate students), the Mwalimu Nyerere Memorial Academy that conducts courses in the social sciences, and trainees from the Youth Leadership Training Program (YLTP) organised by the German political foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES). Their age distribution ranged from 21–34 years. Although they were all students, there was a good mix of backgrounds. The more senior members of the groups (the 30-year-olds) were already in employment, members of political parties or working in government at lower levels. Other groups were drawn from among city residents of Dar es Salaam and surrounding peri-urban areas. Outside
Dar es Salaam, three FGDs were held in Bagamoyo, Arusha and on Zanzibar. Among the members were young traders and political party activists from both the party in office and the opposition.

The purpose of using both a survey questionnaire and focus group discussions was to ensure that the survey responses could be checked against more qualitative information obtained in the FGDs. Since the survey targeted the elite and the group discussions other Tanzanians, the use of a dual methodology was also aimed at comparing how far the views of the two categories coincide. In the discussion of responses below we have juxtaposed perceptions from the survey with comments obtained in the FGDs.

The questions used in the survey, as well as in the focus group discussions, sought to investigate the extent to which structural and institutional factors as expressed by the constitution and distribution of power, and human agency factors as reflected in the exercise and control of power, shape development outcomes in Tanzania’s policy process i.e. agenda setting, policy formulation, policy implementation and policy effects. The design format is presented in chapter 3, see the summary in Table 9, p. 65.

With this background information in place, we now turn to the analysis of the data.

4.3 Power and agenda setting

4.3.1 The constitution of power

Respondents in the survey and members of the focus groups were asked questions about the way government participates in international development cooperation and the country’s position in the global economy. Both questions were aimed at assessing how far respondents acknowledge the existence of structural variables that confine Tanzania’s options when it comes to making development policy choices. We report here on the answers to the first of these two questions.

There is no doubt that Tanzanians acknowledge the role that donors play in setting the development policy agenda, but they also recognise the role that their government plays. Thus, the majority of our responses indicate that donors and government do it together either “somewhat constrained” or “in constructive cooperation”. There is a slight shift from the Mkapa years when a higher percentage (42.4) saw it as somewhat constrained to a higher percentage (39.3) for constructive cooperation in
A good number of respondents believe that donors set the agenda but that they also listen to the government when doing so – 12% in 2006. The full details are presented in the following diagram:

**Diagram 1 Government and donor involvement in national agenda setting: the Mkapa and Kikwete regimes.**

16 focus groups addressed themselves to the same question about whose values shape the parameters of the national agenda in Tanzania. As in the questionnaire, opinions ranged from outright donor dominance, through what can be termed as collegial cooperation between donors and the government, to the government exercising an autonomous position.
Box 3  Focus Group Discussions on the constitution of power and agenda setting

1. Trainees in the Youth Leadership Training Program (YLTP) in Dar es Salaam
   "Donors sit together with the government but the government has no power or say on any agenda. In the final analysis it is the donors who shape the policy agenda."

2. Trainees from Mwalimu Nyerere Memorial Academy, in Kigamboni, Dar es Salaam
   "Development is highly constrained by the donors. Donors contribute 46% of the national budget while the government contributes the remaining 54%."

3. An FGD from Mikocheni Primary School
   The President of the 3rd phase government (retired President Mkapa) used to demonstrate the success of his policy initiatives on the basis of the degree to which he had won the hearts of the donors. He once said that even the donors had indicated very clearly that the country was doing well. In other words, even the reputation of the country’s performance or otherwise is measured by foreigners.

But again, as in the questionnaire, opinion was skewed more towards the assumed pre-eminence of the donors and somewhat reduced strength of the government in the agenda-setting process. From the myriad of statements and opinions presented by the panellists, as in the questionnaire, Box No 3 highlights examples of the most prevalent opinions.

4.3.2 The distribution of power
Here respondents were asked to consider how the national development agenda is shaped by Tanzania’s position in the international community and the country’s economic institutions. Thus, we were interested not in the structural but the institutional variables that influence the development agenda. There is again a general recognition that Tanzania is constrained by factors over which it has relatively little control, but its reputation and standing among members of the international community allows for what is perceived as more relaxed interaction with development partners. The dialogue tends to be collegial. It seems, therefore, that as long as this good relationship exists, the government has a good chance of influencing development partners and thus helping to set the agenda together with them. There is also ample evidence that respondents recognise the role that the country’s own institutions play in giving Tanzania a good reputation in the international community. Of the respondents, 55% commented on Tanzania’s record of peace and contribution to peace in the region while 35% referred to the important contribution that domestic institutions had made to the social and economic recovery that took
place during the Mkapa years which, in the eyes of the respondents, appeared to continue during the early part of the Kikwete period.

4.3.3 The exercise of power

The questions on the relationship between how power is exercised and agenda setting were intended to find out how government uses its power against other institutions. Two major findings emerged from the survey.

The first is what may be termed the intransigence of the Government of Tanzania to include non-state actors on matters of agenda setting. A staggering 57% of the respondents suggested that on agenda setting, the government consults only selectively and even then typically retains its original position. Government is “going through the motions” of consulting but does not seriously seek opinions from others with a view to improving policies. This appears to be the majority view among the respondents.

Secondly, respondents indicated that the ruling party and the government act completely on their own, ignoring non-state actors. As many as 16% of the respondents claimed that the ruling party and the government act completely on their own and an additional 15% claimed that the government listens to private sector but ignores civil society. Thus, the government is not in the “habit” of taking on board the views of non-state actors when setting the national agenda.

4.3.4 The control of power

The questions under this heading were aimed at identifying how Tanzanians perceive issues of accountability and who is able to exercise it when it comes to agenda setting. That development partners and government work closely together is confirmed in the responses obtained. Most strikingly, it is clear that the accountability relationship to donors is perceived as being much stronger than that to domestic, non-state actors. When it comes to agenda setting, they have no real influence. More specifically, Diagram 2 shows that, in the minds of more than half of all respondents, donors really correct the government if it strays away from the agenda that they regard as necessary for the country’s development, whether they do so with or without consultation.
Government and donors are seen to act in unison and in the same decisive manner when it comes to their relationship with parliament and non-state actors. Diagram 3 shows that as many as 38.6% of respondents claimed that development partners and the government decide matters on the national agenda without consulting other actors. The best that the government and development partners can do, as recognised by 28.7% of respondents, is for them to make decisions and simply wait for parliament to approve. In a state with a dominant party as in Tanzania it only requires the party whip to drum up member discipline to achieve this.

The extent of donor power in Tanzania may, in the eyes of development partners, look exaggerated but this picture is also reiterated in the focus groups, where the views presented in Box 4 indicate a sample of what was said there.
Box 4. Focus Group Discussions on the basis of donor agenda-setting power

a) Donors have more power because they are the ones who fund all the projects under MKUKUTA (NSGPR).

b) What gives the donors more power than the others is that we have a dependent economy which makes us dependent on them. The donors impose conditions on the policies they initiate.

c) The donors are more decisive in setting the country’s agenda. They have more power than the others because:

- They are financially powerful hence they control the country’s economic system.
- We depend on them economically and technologically hence they use this chance or opportunity to set the agenda they want.

There was a time in the 1960s and 1970s when the government was able to set the policy agenda. During the period when Julius Nyerere was President, donors accepted that it was the sovereign right of the recipient government to set the agenda on its own. Sweden and many other donors complied and gave their aid on the terms set by Tanzania. Following the demise of the socialist agenda that Nyerere had supported, things changed radically. From 1986, the donors took over and accepted an agenda that reflected what became known at the time as the Washington Consensus – a neo-liberal agenda. For twenty years now, the donor agenda has pre-
vailed and although there is a growing realisation that development must come from within the recipient countries, donor dependency is still seen as a dominant feature of the political realities in Tanzania.

4.4 Power and policy formulation

4.4.1 The constitution of power
An important theoretical, as well as practical question for consideration when studying the policy-making process is how the social structure shapes power and what the power configurations resulting from it are. Respondents were given alternative descriptions of what Tanzanian society looks like and how it affects policy making: is it well organised into interest groups? Is there a reasonable degree of equality between urban and rural areas, rich and poor etc.? Respondent perceptions are shown in Diagram 4:

![Diagram 4 Social structure and policy making](image)

The most common view, represented by 36.6%, indicates that society is not well organised into groups that can influence the shaping of policy although it is acknowledged that interests such as businesses are better organised (12.2%). Slightly more than 30% of the respondents also observe that there is a considerable gap in influence between the urban and
rural areas with urban-based interests prevailing at the expense of marginalised rural areas.

4.4.2 The distribution of power

The objective under this heading was to get an indication of the extent to which power is perceived as concentrated or dispersed when it comes to formulating and making policy. Diagram 5 provides a summary of how respondents perceive the way power is organised and how it influences policy making in the country. Almost one third of all respondents (32.9%) believe that power is concentrated but shared between the ruling party and government. Almost one quarter (24.3%) take the position that power is almost exclusively concentrated to state institutions.

On the other hand, probably arising from ongoing decentralisation reform efforts, there is recognition by as many as 23.7% that power is shared between central and local government institutions. Finally, as many as 14.5% of the respondents consider that power is dispersed throughout society but not effectively organised.

The views expressed in the focus group discussions tend to confirm that power is concentrated to the centre. “Local authorities have hardly any
“Power” was one opinion expressed more than once. “Power is within the central government and the ruling party when it comes to formulating policies” was another position taken in these groups.

### 4.4.3 The exercise of power

The objective here was to gain insight into how much politicians consult others and listen to economic and other types of advice before making decisions. Diagram 6 presents a summary of all respondents. The dominant position represented by four out of ten (39.5%) is that only some politicians heed technical advice before making decisions. It is also significant that one out of five respondents believe that politicians ignore all technical advice, foreign or local, and that another 13.2% feel that politicians may accept technical advice but ignore economics. This does confirm a common interpretation of African politics as driven by more political than economic or technical considerations (van de Walle 2007).

Diagram 6 Exercise of power during policy formulation

In response to a question about what best describes the way government ministers consult others before making decisions, no less than 42% of all respondents said that if taking advice, ministers prefer that of foreigners to that of their local advisors. On the other hand, as many as 28.8% be-
believe that ministers do indeed regularly organise consultations before taking policy decisions.

**4.4.4 The control of power**

Under this heading, the main objective was to assess how far formal institutions that form part of the constitutional and legal set-up in the country really work at the level of formulating policies. Are ministers being challenged in public, are power-checking institutions working, are ministers really being held accountable and do they adhere to the rule of law? Diagram 7 paints a rather gloomy picture of the extent to which ministers are being challenged, checked and held accountable.

**Diagram 7 How power is controlled in national policy making**

Which of the following statements best describes the way power is controlled when it comes to making national policy:

- Ministers are aware of the formal limits of their power and act accordingly: 9.9%
- Ministers are held accountable in public but only in case of gross misconduct: 9.4%
- Power-checking institutions issue regular reports, but no follow up is undertaken: 28.1%
- Institutional mechanisms for control exist but they avoid challenging ministers: 18.7%
- There are few institutional mechanisms holding decision-makers accountable: 33.9%
Box 5 Focus Group Discussions on the control of power and policy formulation

1) "...Unfortunately there are no clear checks and balances on how power is really controlled. Sometimes ministers make decisions and no questions are raised about these decisions. One wonders whether there are real institutional mechanisms for holding officers accountable..."

2) "...Presently, when the Prime Minister tours a region or district and asks the public about the problems they face, it is only then that the local official responsible can be admonished for wrong actions..."

The group went on to show that there are formal organs created to oversee that the leadership complies with leadership ethics. "...There is the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Ethics Commissions. However, none of their reports have been acted upon sufficiently..." they added.

As many as 33.9% of the respondents suggest that there are few institutional mechanisms for holding decision makers accountable. This position is cemented by 28.1% of the respondents who suggest that power-checking institutions issue regular reports, but no follow up is undertaken.

As is evident also from the FGDs, as reported in Box 5 there is a widespread belief that checks and balances are not really working. There are institutions like the Prevention of Corruption Bureau, however whatever it reports, there is no follow up.

A subsequent question on the same subject asked what perceptions there are concerning the role that non-state actors play in holding government ministers accountable. These views are shown in Diagram 8. Two thirds (66.1%) of all respondents believe that civil society is poorly organised and so weak that it is unable to holding ministers in check. Only well-placed individuals may be able to awaken public concern through the media. Only three out of ten respondents believe that civil society and private sector are growing stronger and thus capable of checking ministers.

Policy formulation is an area where government ministers hold sway. Donors are less prominent here although foreign advisors have the upper hand over local ones. The most disturbing point is, however, how little power non-state actors are seen to possess. This confirms a general observation that civil society in African countries is weak and made up of a large number of dispersed actors that do not share a common strategy in their interaction with government (Callaghy 1994; Kasfir 1998).
4.5 Power and policy implementation

The purpose of this section was to get a sense of how respondents look at the way government implements policy. Is it really a policy government according to which official policy objectives are adhered to, or is it primarily a patronage government engaged in delivering goods and services based on political and personal criteria? The effect of patronage on policy implementation is “slippage”, i.e. poor implementation of policy whereby, for example, funds do not reach intended constituencies or are just delayed because officials allocate resources, not on the strength of strict rules but according to personal services rendered. Slippage occurs because neither state nor market functions in ways that corresponds to expectations pronounced in official policy documents and agreements with the international development community.

Diagram 8 Non-State actors/ public opinion and action

Which of the following statements best describes the way non-state actors may exercise power in order to hold government ministers accountable for their decisions and actions:

- Non-state actors have reliable means of controlling how public office is used
- Civil society and private sector growing stronger and able to check ministers
- Weak civil society but well placed people raise public concerns via media
- Weak civil society; private sector cooperating with but not checking ministers
- Public opinion is poorly organised; objections translate into demonstrations
4.5.1 The constitution of power

Under this heading the respondents were asked two questions: (1) how efficiently and effectively is the government organised to implement policies? and (2) how do social and economic conditions affect policy implementation?

Over two thirds of all respondents (71.5%) believe that government is not efficiently or effectively organised for implementation and even when it has a plan for implementation, little happens at the lower echelons of government. Similar views were expressed also in the FGDs. When placed in the perspective of the second question in this section, it is clear that one reason why plans for implementing policy do not work is that the socio-economic conditions are not very congenial for planned development. 37% of the respondents point to the difficulties of implementing policy in rural areas thereby remaining undeveloped. One out of five (21.5%) point to the lack of developed markets and physical infrastructure that would facilitate policy implementation. At the same time, the equivalent percentage (21.5%) saw no excuse for the conditions for implementing policy and regarded the social and economic circumstances as quite congenial to implementing policy. It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that policy slippage is partly a result of poor organisation of government and partly a consequence of inadequately developed infrastructure, especially in the rural areas.

4.5.2 The distribution of power

Respondents were asked two questions aimed at probing the extent to which power for implementing policy is shared with local authorities and non-state actors. We initially report on the first of these questions in Diagram 9 on the next page.

The problem of slippage again comes out on the question of distribution of power. Central government institutions are accused of being reluctant to delegate authority to other levels (37.2%) and where it does, the authority is too dispersed to be effectual in policy implementation (33.1%).

The focus group discussions confirm this view. Central government is reluctant to delegate authority to other actors.
Box 6 Focus Group Discussions on distribution of power and the policy effects

Power is distributed to the local levels but the central government still holds the reins. In addition, the resources with which to implement policies and get things done have always been lacking.

The non-state actors, on the other hand, are not well enough organised to get things done. What is worse the non-state actors are not only ignored but also harassed.

In response to the second question, answers confirm that policy implementation structures in government are weak. No less than 37.2% have this opinion.

Respondents believe that non-state organisations exist but are not well coordinated for policy implementation (32.0%). To the extent that state and society actors participate in implementation it is mainly in the urban areas.
Box 7 Focus Group Discussions on structural conditions and their effect on policy implementation

The FGDs indicated that during the previous 3rd phase government of retired President Benjamin Mkapa, there was forced implementation of policies and with no actual dialogue and facilitation. The current government (President, PM and some ministers) listens to problems of the people but this is not really formally systematised or organised. It is more on an ad hoc basis.

As the opinions in Box 7 indicate there was, at least in the FGDs, a sense that implementation was with less consultation during the Mkapa presidency than in the first year of President Kikwete’s regime.

4.5.3 The exercise of power

Power is a decisive factor when it comes to implementing policy. How it is applied matters to the outcome. Is it executed command style or is it done with a view to enabling stakeholders to become involved? The respondents in the survey were first given the following options to consider:

- Policies were arbitrarily implemented by officers following their own bias
- Policies were implemented in an arrogant fashion alienating citizens
- Policies were systematically but far too rigidly implemented
- Government servants implement policies on their own, but with flexibility
- Government servants facilitated or hindered participation in implementing policy

Diagram 10 shows the responses. One third of all respondents believe that policies are implemented by government officials in an arbitrary manner following their own biases. Another third think they do it “in an arrogant fashion” or “far too rigidly”.

It could be expected that government is interested in involving other actors in policy implementation in order to accelerate development. Thus, even if it does not consult non-state actors, there is a good reason for having them involved in delivery of goods and services. Respondents were asked to choose between the following options:

- The Government listens to objections or suggestions by others
- The Government listens to demands made by donors but not locals
- Some, but by no means all, ministries are respectful of other actors
- The Government sees the benefit of involving others, but does so only occasionally
- The Government realises the benefit of involving others and does so regularly

Diagram 10 The exercise of power and policy implementation

The distribution of answers reveals that government is indeed seen by many as involving other actors. One out of five respondents confirms that government realises the benefit of doing so. Another 36% also agree although they qualify their statement by suggesting that it does so only occasionally. A little over 40% are more critical indicating that government either does not listen to suggestions by others at all or may listen to demands from donors but not locals.

4.5.4 The control of power

Under this section, respondents were asked to consider the quality of government’s own internal mechanisms for checking on policy implementation as well as the role played by non-state actors in checking how far policies are efficiently implemented. Only 12% of respondents believe that government really has a good audit system in place. The majority sees some fault. Four out of ten respondents believe that government does
indeed allow for regular audits but it never reacts to them. The Auditor-
General’s Annual Report tends to be shelved and nothing happens to 
those who have been at fault or committed criminal acts. Expenditure 
tracking by the Ministry of Finance is also seen as being inefficient be-
because it is unable to really correct problematical line ministries. As many 
as 17% believe that government officials rarely show interest in monitor-
ing what happens to policy. This same view was also repeated in the fGdS 
as illustrated in Box 8.

Box 8 Focus Groups Discussions on government role in policy implementation 
monitoring

There is no culture of accountability in respect to implementation of policies. Most government 
leaders do not monitor policy implementation and that is why audit reports in most of the ministries 
and district councils are not up to date.

With regard to the inclusion of non-state actors in controlling policy im-
plementation, two complementing dominant views emerge. First, some, 
but not all ministries, are regarded as responsive to public review (30.3\%) 
and second, a slightly higher percentage (31.4\%) views transparency and 
accountability as improving but not yet institutionalised (31.4\%), as shown 
in Diagram 11 below.

4.6 Power and policy effects

4.6.1 The constitution of power

Power is never constituted in an even manner. Even though policies are 
expected to deliver goods to all citizens, they typically reach people in a 
differential manner. Some get more than others. Some receive better serv-
ces than others. Close to two thirds of respondents (65.1\%) see some bias 
in the effects of government policy. More than 25\% feel that those with 
the right connections in government benefit more than others, 26.4\% 
believe the rich benefit more than the poor, and another 14.4\% see some 
regions benefit more than others. The fGdS also see the constitution of 
power causing policies to have differential effects. One statement reads: 
“…policies have benefited those who are up there, the rich, the policy 
makers and friends…The majority of poor people have been sidelined.”

A second question asked respondents to consider how structures and 
institutions affect policies with regard to their rights as individual citizens. 
Although a respectable 26.3\% believe that policies do indeed help create
new opportunities for respect of rights and liberties, two thirds are sceptical as to whether policies really have positive effects with regard to raising consciousness about rights. 17.7% think that policies do little, if anything, to enhance the rights and liberties of citizens while 26.9% see policies helping the already well-off to enhance their rights, but not others and 21.7% believe policies help the urban but not the rural people to become aware of their rights. The details are shown in Diagram 12 next page.

### 4.6.2 The distribution of power

A similar distribution of answers was obtained in response to a question about how policies are carried out within the existing government system. One out of five respondents believes that government assures citizens of law and order but does not help in reducing poverty. Another two out of five respondents think that state power helps to get things done, but remains insensitive to citizens’ rights. The other question that respondents were asked to consider focused on the effects of policies on the lives of individual citizens. The results are shown in Diagram 13 next page.
Diagram 12 Structures and institutions and their influence on policy effects

- Policies have the effect of really strengthening right and liberties of people: 7.4%
- Policies help create new opportunities for respect of rights and liberties: 26.3%
- Policies help the urban but not rural people to become aware of their rights: 21.7%
- Policies, directly or indirectly, help the already well-off to enhance their rights: 26.9%
- Policies do little, if anything, to enhance the rights and liberties of citizens: 17.7%

Diagram 13 Policies and their effects on the lives of individuals

- Central and local governments function well with across-board positive effects: 9.9%
- Government system facilitates positive effects in some sectors but not in others: 22.8%
- Local governments have some powers but their efforts leave few effects behind: 17.5%
- Policy is too centralised to really affect people other than in selective instances: 26.9%
- Most citizens are little affected and pursue their livelihoods independent of the state: 22.8%
The answers indicate that government really does not reach out very well. Many citizens live without being influenced by government policy because policy is too centralised and local governments are not effective. Even those who have a more positive view recognise that the positive effects are confined to selected sectors. It is not happening across the board.

4.6.3 The exercise of power
Given that the structural conditions and the institutional set-up in government are seen as skewing policy effects in favour of the rich, the well-connected as well as urban rather than rural areas, it comes as no surprise that the way power is exercised leaves few positive effects when it comes to involving the public. Policies tend to have the effect of leaving people in a passive rather than participatory mood, a point of view that was confirmed more than once in the FGDs. Box 9 contains one illustration of this from these group discussions. Survey respondents by and large shared this rather negative view, although it should be noted that as many as 26.2% saw state policies as participatory and encouraging involvement by others, a somewhat higher figure than one would have expected given their answers to other questions. On the other hand, one out of four respondents saw harsh policies leaving people with little choice but to comply.

Box 9 Focus Group Discussions on the exercise of power and policy effects

State policies have not given leverage and courage to citizens to participate in improving their own lives and despite the fact that the government subscribes to human rights, it has not given them due respect.

11% felt that benevolent state policies leave people without incentive to act on their own and another 14.5% thought that state policies have limited reach and other actors do not provide enough compensation to fill that void. The details are contained in Diagram 14 next page.

There is also a widespread view that when it comes to exercising power, officials either show disregard for international treaties their government has signed, or they are simply not aware of them. In short, there is a marked discrepancy between word and action. More than two thirds of all respondents, when asked about the effects of the exercise of power on the rights of citizens, believe that government either lacks interest in practicing rights charters it has signed, or government is aware of human rights but individual officials disregard them.
4.6.4 The control of power

The lack of constructive interaction between government and citizens is also confirmed in responses obtained to questions about how people’s livelihoods are affected by efforts to control state power. People are more likely to show submissiveness or loyalty to those in power than to raise their voice in public to question policies. The same views emerged from the FGDs with a sample of opinions presented in Box 10.

Box 10: Focus Group Discussions on the control of power and policy effects

In the absence of efficient control mechanisms most people have become submissive.

However a section of the population has become reactive either through demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins as happened with workers in both state and private agencies e.g. Tanesco, TRC, and Tanzania Elimu Suppliers and students who have clashed with the police.

The answers from the survey are shown in Diagram 15. As many as 30.2% of respondents suggest that, in the absence of efficient control mechanisms, citizens are largely submissive. Another large group of respond-
ents, representing 22.7%, suggest that because formal control of power was weak, citizens resort to demonstrations.

**Diagram 15 Effects on people’s livelihoods of efforts to control the state**

In response to a second question in this section asking about the effects on individual rights of efforts to control the state, no less than 43.6% believe that in the absence of efficient control mechanisms, rights are often trampled upon. Another 27.9% saw citizens lacking education and a tradition of speaking out in public on rights issues. The overall impression, therefore, is that efforts to control the state have not yet produced a citizenry that is ready to voice their opinions on critical policy issues but rather prefer to stay silent and loyal to those in power.

### 4.7 Conclusions from the study

So what are the conclusions that can be drawn from this monitoring study? Power affects policy outcome in many different ways, but judging from the 2006 survey and the accompanying focus group discussions the following conclusions seem appropriate: (1) power is centralised when it comes to agenda setting and policy formulation, (2) power is dispersed but ineffective when it comes to policy implementation, (3) non-state actors have...
very little, if any, effect on government policy, and (4) power tends to make citizens afraid of using their voice and they prefer to stay loyal or submissive to those in power.

Tanzania occupies a marginal position in the global economy and the government has come to be dependent on both foreign investors and donors. Foreigners tend to make investments in countries where the international donor agenda is operating. It serves as an assurance of sorts. The donors, on their side, are anxious to see their aid used effectively. For this to happen, they insist that recipient governments adhere to a set of principles of “good” governance that are typically derived from international agreements but reflect their perception of what partner governments such as that of Tanzania, must comply with. Although development partners may dispute the extent to which they have power in Tanzania, it is clear that they have left a legacy in the minds of well-informed, as well as other individuals that they do in fact set the agenda and thus hold the government in check. It is the donors rather than the locals that correct government if it deviates from this agenda. It is the interaction between donors and government that is seen as the most crucial power nexus in the country. The Paris Declaration is meant to make this relationship more equal but how far this will happen remains to be seen. This issue is further discussed in Chapter 6.

Viewed from within Tanzania, it is also clear that people regard power as being concentrated to central government and the ruling party. The two are seen as working in tandem, thus reinforcing the view that power lies in the hands of a few. Because the social structure is such that it does not encourage a spread of influence to the majority of citizens, economic and social power also tends to be concentrated and further reinforces the hierarchical relationships that exist both in the private sphere between elders and the younger generations as well as between males and females, and in the public sphere between officials and citizens. In fact, the notion that Tanzanians are citizens in the sense of being aware of rights and responsibilities toward the state may be a misnomer. The vast majority continue to act as subjects preferring to stay quiet rather than expressing their views in an organised fashion in public.

While power is concentrated when it comes to deciding on the country’s destiny, it is dispersed when it comes to policy implementation. Dispersed here does not mean decentralised as, despite reforms aimed at giving more power to local authorities, central government retains power, not the least over the purse strings but also over appointments of key administrative personnel at local levels. Dispersed power in Tanzania refers mainly to the fact that it is not coordinated; that the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing. This is not only evident at local govern-
ment level but also within central government itself. There is no sense of a common implementation strategy and little, if any, coordination. The result is that government often pursues and implements policies that are contradictory. For the same reason, policies suffer from severe slippage when implemented. Estimated costs are overrun, timetables are ignored and effects are often unintended. These are the conclusions that can be drawn from both the survey and the focus group discussions.

Tanzania may be undergoing democratisation but it still has a long way to go to the development of a civic culture. Government still prefers to ignore civil society and private sector actors. Even if they are consulted occasionally, their influence on policy formulation is limited. The weakness of civil society that has been recorded in earlier studies (e.g. USAID 2003) is still evident in the responses that were obtained in the survey. There are some individual organisations in civil society that are doing well, but they do not yet form enough of a critical mass to make a difference to how the national agenda is set and policies formulated. Their participation tends to be confined to the role of implementation partners where their influence is limited.

Finally, it may be helpful to provide a graphic illustration of the power relationships between development partners, the Tanzanian state and non-state actors. This triangular relationship of power is summarised below:

**Diagram 16 A graphic sketch of the triangle of power in Tanzania**

As the findings of the study showed there is a thick, firm and steep directional link of communication between the donors and the state. This represents the dominant role development partners enjoy over the local state, especially at the upstream points of the policy process. The interaction from the State is more “uphill”, “feeble” and “green” and represents the limited room to manoeuvre that the local state has in the interactive proc-
The firmness of the line seeks to indicate the findings that there is more of a mutual bondage between the two than is the case between either of them and society at large. The relationship between donors and society and that between the local state and society is sporadic and illustrated by the broken line. From the findings, there is some degree of reciprocity and a relatively firm bond between development partners and the non-state actors presented in the text above as resulting from the latter’s dependency on the donors. In the case of Tanzania, this somewhat “easy” relationship between development partners and the non-state actors has been regarded with suspicion by the state, always wondering whether or not these non-state actors are authentically local and national. Finally, the link between the state and the non-state actors, as the line shows, is thin and unidirectional. This is to emphasise the finding that the local state considers consultation with local constituencies as unnecessary. All in all, it is this power configuration that prevents efficient and effective development cooperation and needs to be reformulated and reconstituted.
It is now time to discuss the implications of the power monitoring study for Tanzanian stakeholders. The 2006 survey and the focus group discussions confirm that well-informed members of the elite and other Tanzanians alike have an overwhelmingly critical view of the way power operates in the country. At the level of formal institutions, there is only limited constructive interaction between government and citizens. If they want something done, they have to spend enormous amount of time to get the service they ask for. Without connections in the right places, it is very difficult to achieve anything. Thus, informal institutions develop to compensate for the void that exists at the formal level. The prevalence of informal institutions also means that a lot of things that happen in government ministries are secretive. Informal institutions tend to generate a climate in which transparency is a liability rather than an asset. These informal institutions develop both between ruling party and government as well as between officials and citizens. Politics, therefore, tends to occur in a “bubble” removed from close scrutiny. Prying this open in order to achieve greater transparency and public accountability has been the subject of a number of donor-funded reform programmes. The rather sad observation is that despite all these efforts, little has changed. Even where reforms have been introduced, they have not taken root. Work habits that were in place before the reform are easily resuscitated. The door to the power chambers closes again. Citizens are left outside to beg for favours.

The point is that power relations are not realigned merely through expert interventions. Governance reforms are highly political and require an understanding of how power operates in settings where Western assumptions do not prevail. This does not mean that political change is impossible; just that it does not necessarily happen in a planned or programmatic fashion. It happens through contestation involving first and fore-
most the local state and civil society, but also development partners. As we discuss further in Chapter 6, this is a challenge that must be seriously considered in order to make aid more efficient and effective.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe implications for Tanzanian stakeholders. The issue here, therefore, of how development partners fit into the local scene will be discussed in that light. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first reiterates some of the principal features of the Tanzanian political scene with additional details to those discussed in the conclusion of the previous chapter. The second discusses political events that have taken place in 2007 and 2008 with a view to examining how far the findings in the 2006 study help to understand them. The third and final section deals with what might be done in order to create more successful cooperation among the key actors responsible for the country's development.

5.1 Principal features of the political scene

Tanzania is one of few countries in Africa where the ruling party today is the same as the nationalist movement that came to power at independence. To be sure, the original movement was called Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) but after its merger with the Afro-Shirazi Party in Zanzibar in 1977 and it became CCM, it remained the same mass organisation. It has managed its relations with both local citizens and foreigners in ways that has allowed it to remain in control. Despite the failure of its socialist policies and sometimes arbitrary interventions in government and society, it has never overstepped its mandate to the point where it has become a pariah in the eyes of locals or foreigners alike. Rather than being dogmatically tied to a set of narrow ideological principles, it has pragmatically adjusted to new circumstances. This kind of adjustment has not always been appreciated and the party has found itself divided into various factions. Nonetheless, it has usually been able to emerge from these tense moments with greater strength. This happened in the mid-1980s during the transition from Nyerere to Mwinyi as Party Chair and President. It occurred again over the so-called “third government” issue in the mid 1990s. It happened yet again in the transition to multi-party politics. As will be discussed further in the next section of this chapter, it is also recurring in 2008 over misappropriation of public funds by prominent party and government leaders.

\[7\] A group of 55 MPs, all belonging to CCM, independently pushed for a special government for the mainland, the equivalent to what Zanzibar has. Former president Nyerere had to intervene to block this initiative and it was eventually defeated costing the then Prime Minister, John Malecela, his position as leader of government.
The other side of the ruling party stems from its position as a private organisation registered under the Political Parties Act. This allows CCM, because of its dominance, to bring contentious issues under its own roof and make policy decisions without further debate in the legislature or in public. Consequently many important issues are decided without consultation with other stakeholders, be they government ministries, civil society organisations or private sector operators. This has been a source of frustration for the political opposition for many years because the ruling party has not shown much interest in, or respect for, the views of these other parties. This does not mean that CCM lacks internal democracy. It has quite an impressive range of procedural rules that are common in democratic party organisations. It allows people to compete for nomination, candidates have to face a panel of party members before they are accepted and there is a good deal of turnover in the leadership. Yet, its internal party politics are also Byzantine. Decisions are often announced without any advance information or warning. How the inner circle operates is largely covered in cloud.

While these are the features of the ruling party that Tanzanians have become used to, it is also increasingly clear that sustaining them is becoming more difficult due to changes in the economy. Tanzania today is an integral part of the global economy and affected by economic and political factors over which it has little control. Tanzanian society is also undergoing rapid change. More and more people migrate from rural to urban areas. As part of this process, the gap between rich and poor keeps growing rather than declining. Poverty reduction policies tend to make only a small dent in this process. The result is that the leadership style and pattern that is the product of the country’s dependence since the days of independence is becoming increasingly obsolete. It is not sufficient to manage the country economically or politically. Stirrings indicating this are becoming clear and will be further discussed below.

These changes pose a challenge not only to the ruling party but also to the government. Its bureaucracy, despite extensive reform efforts, remains as suggested above very inefficient and prone to corruption. Transaction costs are very high and often an embarrassment to those Tanzanians who wish to see the country develop faster. Large-scale foreign investors are often treated well, but others, for example local investors, find themselves in a quagmire from which they find it hard to extract themselves without paying bribes. Central government ministries, by and large, are not administered to facilitate accelerated national development in which private investors play a greater role. The problem is exacerbated by limited capacity at local government level and consequently the tendency to con-
centrate decision making to central ministries. Some of these, notably, the President’s Office, the Prime Minister’s Office as well as the Ministry of Finance are dominant. Not surprisingly, many government departments are serious bottlenecks to development. This encourages extensive reliance on informal institutions to solve problems and overcome red tape.

Civil society in Tanzania is weak. Strong organisations representing the views of particular interest groups are few and far between. Only some of these are ready to take on a political role in the sense of voicing independent opinions in public. The situation has improved somewhat since the mid-1990s when one local observer described civil society in Tanzania as lacking a “common identity and self-awareness as a civil society to manage its affairs and become independent of the state” (Hartmann 1994). Still, civil society in Tanzania continues to struggle to become an actor in its own right in the policy process. This should not overshadow the fact that the number of entities registered as civil society organisations has grown exponentially in recent years. The non-profit category of organisations that are coded as such for tax purposes and make up the core of civil society had risen to 58,577 in 2007 (Ndumbaro and Othman 2007). The majority of these are primarily involved in delivery of services in social development contexts. Many would be what are called community-based organisations. These types of organisation generally do not take a political position but regard themselves as non-political and involved in development. They do not add much to the political clout of civil society. The power that civil society has as an entity, therefore, is very limited and confined to individual organisations based in Dar es Salaam that are able to participate in policy dialogue with government.

In this set-up, where state and civil society do not really engage each other very much, relationships to development partners easily become politicised. Members of civil society dislike the close relationship between donors and government. They see it as taking place at the expense of building local accountability and benefiting local stakeholders. Government, on its part, views any donor involvement with civil society in a suspicious light. They believe that such support amounts to strengthening the political opposition. Consequently, ccm and the government, when challenged by civil society, try to draw “a line in the sand” to show that civil society involvement in the public realm has its definite limits. This occurred in the mid-1990s when bawata, the independent women’s organisation, was considered by the ruling party to be mobilising women to vote for any party that they preferred. It occurred again in 2005, when Haki Elimu, the non-governmental organisation, was threatened with suspension – and temporarily silenced – because of its criticism of the...
country’s educational policies. Development partners get easily dragged into this kind of controversy because they are involved in supporting both government and civil society. They are part of a power game in which their own position often makes a difference.

In attempting to summarise the political profile of Tanzania, it may be best described as a process of “top-down” democratisation. The ruling party and government want to control the reform process and allow it to proceed on their own terms. Any opening in the political process tends to be incremental, often tentative. The brakes are applied when things appear to be moving too fast. The question that has arisen since the 2006 survey, however, is how effectively CCM and the government can inhibit the process toward greater social and political diversity. There are cracks in the structure. The public is beginning to peep into the bubble only to realise that many political leaders are enriching themselves at their expense. What is really happening and what it means is the subject of the next section.

5.2 A tipping point?

Reforms typically become reality when the political opportunity structure changes (Tarrow 1998). They do not happen at just any time and are rarely the result of planned efforts. They are typically spontaneous in response not only to repression or other authoritarian measures, but also to changing circumstances. The election of President Kikwete raised the hopes of most Tanzanians that life would become better. He had promised a job creation programme and had made a series of populist statements that, because of his own popularity, registered in people’s mind. However, due to economic circumstances beyond his and Tanzania’s control, the first three years of his first term in office have not been easy. People have not experienced the level of improvement that they had hoped would come. In addition, when some leaders have taken advantage of their position to enrich themselves, people’s disappointment has turned to a mixture of anger and cynicism. Because of the attention that these issues have received in the print media and in parliament, they have reached a point where the CCM has been seriously shaken. As the party’s Publicity Secretary put it: “They (scandals) were turbulent and have rocked our ship but they did not stop us from sailing” (The Citizen, 25 June, 2008). To explain this further it is necessary to provide some details about these scandals.
5.2.1 Corruption brought out into the open

Corruption is not new to Tanzanians. It has occurred on an almost regular basis for the past twenty-five years. Some of it has been “grand” corruption involving large amounts of money. Others have been “petty”, typically involving small amounts extracted by police and other public servants in the name of chai (tea). There has also been widespread political corruption manifesting itself, for example, in the distribution of material favours to potential supporters. This use of takrima, or bribes, was officially banned but it has been difficult to stop in practice. Tanzanians have got so used to corruption that many have accepted it as part of the social scene in the country.

What has changed since 2007 is that for the first time corruption has been brought out in the open. It has become not only a subject of political gossip but part of the official discourse. Corruption has shifted from being something people take for granted to being the subject of scandal. This must be attributed to a bolder attitude among media personnel but most importantly an increasingly vocal criticism in parliament not only among opposition party but also ccm members. They in turn have been helped by independent audits and “behind-the-scene” investigations supported by development partners. Two incidents, in particular, have attracted public attention.

One is the “Richmond Scandal”. It happened when a company called Richmond Power Generation was awarded a contract worth a usd100 million to provide electricity at a time when the country was suffering power shortages and cuts. It turned out that the us-based company had no real experience and competence to take on this assignment but was still given the contract instead of other, more experienced, competitors. On closer examination, it became clear that Richmond was a fake entity made up of unscrupulous business people in cahoots with people in government. Following these revelations, parliament began to take an active interest in the matter. Outspoken members both in the opposition and within ccm demanded a special investigation. Eventually, a special Parliamentary Select Committee was established to look into the matter. It was chaired by Dr Harrison Mwakyembe, a law professor at the University of Dar es Salaam and elected Member of Parliament. The Committee Report when submitted early 2008 became the subject of heated debate in the legislature and led to something that had never happened in Tanzania before: the Head of State publicly dismissing his Prime Minister and dissolving the Cabinet. In appointing his new cabinet a few days later, the President did not include any of the ministers whose name had been implicated in the scandal.
The second scandal centres on the use (or rather abuse) of the External Payment Arrears (EPA) function at the Bank of Tanzania. This facility is meant to enable companies to borrow money from the Bank in order to carry out transactions involving the use of foreign currency. The expectation is of course that this money will be paid back once the transaction is completed and money recovered. According to several newspaper accounts, presumably drawing on information leaked from the Ernst & Young audit report (see below), a number of business people in ccm and government created fake companies in order to gain access to these funds and use them for purposes other than those they are meant for. Details of what happened in individual cases are still to be fully disclosed at this date, but at least two entities appear to have been used to finance ccm political campaigns during the 2005 elections. An independent audit by Ernst & Young has detailed the abuse of the EPA account, however unlike the Richmond scandal it has not been the subject of a similar parliamentary investigation. The facts, therefore, have not come out in public to the same extent. The Minister of Finance has made statements aimed at damage limitation. For instance, he has suggested that the money is not public money but belongs to a number of individual businesspeople (Mtanzania, 23 June, 2008). The media and critical MPs, again including some within the ccm ranks, have kept up the pressure during the debates on the 2008–09 Budget, arguing that those implicated must pay back the money they borrowed.

These scandals raise a series of interesting questions, not least whether Tanzania is entering a new phase in which the top-down and rather secretive approach to managing the political process is giving way to more transparency and formal accountability. Many Tanzanians would like to believe this is the case, as do the development partners who have been arguing for it for a long time. For the latter, such a shift would be a vindication that their new approach to foreign aid which gives greater ownership to recipient governments really works, at least in Tanzania. For the former, it is a wake-up call that things political do not have to be taken for granted as they have been in the past. The ccm monopoly of power is not absolute or total.

5.2.2 A new phase?
The full implication of what is happening in Tanzania in 2008 may not be known until much later but it is clear that going back to a more authoritative approach to managing the political process will be associated with greater costs for the ruling party and government. The ruling party has attempted to handle the scandals in a political manner and has been
unwilling, so far, to prosecute any of those suspected of wrong-doing in court. Pressure has, however, been increasing on the President and on October 31st, through the President’s monthly address to the Nation, the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) was instructed to prosecute those suspected of abusing the use of funds from the EPA. A total of seventeen suspects have since been brought before the Kisutu Magistrate. (The Daily News, November 2008). CCM is not likely to split into two over this issue, but its hold on the minds of its own members and representatives in the legislature is becoming more tenuous. This means not only more sincere and open debates but also a greater recognition of the views held by opposition party leaders. They cannot be as easily ignored as they have in the past. One well-placed observer and university don, Professor Mwesiga Baregu, suggested in his analysis of the new situation that CCM seems to be divided into three groups. One is reform minded and expresses its criticism of the status quo in terms of corrupt leaders stealing what belongs to the public or to ordinary people. This is not a big group, but it is the most vocal and consists mainly of new, young MPs. It receives most media attention because of the freshness of its message. A second group is made up of older members, many of whom occupy positions of power within CCM. They may or may not be implicated in questionable activities but their main stand is that the party cannot afford to appear divided in public. They want to reduce dissent, if not to silence those who take an independent position. This is also a relatively small group but one that wields influence within the party. The third and largest group, according to this analysis, is made up of MPs who do not want to take a position one way or the other. They are happy to just be MPs and do not want to “rock the boat” because of the privileges they enjoy as elected representatives (Mtanzania, 23 June, 2008). They are not likely to change their position unless, or until, the wind begins to blow more definitely in one direction or the other.

Whether it will continue to blow in a reformist direction or begin to blow against it again will ultimately depend on how well the CCM leadership can manage this more turbulent phase of the political process. With the middle class growing, although it remains rather weak, rapid urbanisation, and extensive exposure to the whims of the global economy, the task of holding the country together using a power monopoly is becoming increasingly difficult. There seems to be more to gain from retaining the level of openness that characterised the country’s politics in 2008. Much of the old guard within CCM has left positions of influence and although the generation shift is far from complete, there is “young blood” in the party leadership as well as in government that may be ready to accept governing under conditions of greater public accountability and transparency.
Another relevant question is whether what happened in 2008 could have been predicted by the results of our 2006 study. Our answer is both “yes” and “no”.

When reading through the survey and the detailed notes from the focus group discussions it is clear that not only was there a widespread criticism of how government operates but also a sense, especially in the focus groups, of “enough is enough”. The public mood, as reflected in our notes from these discussions, is more categorical than the responses obtained by interviewing well-informed individuals who are members of the elite. To be sure, several respondents in this category were also critical to the point of being impatient with the status quo; however the averages that were shown in Chapter 4 do remove some of the nuances that the survey also generated. Overall, therefore, it could possibly have been concluded from that study that Tanzania may be on the brink of a major change.

Such a position on our part, however, would be slightly gratuitous given what we know now. The point we would prefer to make is that more dramatic changes in power relationships are not easily predicted in a scientific fashion. They grow out of circumstances over which even the more powerful have little control. A number of factors come together to create a force that produces change. The accumulation of these factors into a single force becomes so powerful that the status quo gives way to something new; hence the idea of a “tipping-point”.

Tipping-points cannot be predicted but careful studies of events may provide enough insights that when they do occur they are not total surprises. It looks as if Tanzanians are more attuned to the idea that things happen in unpredictable ways. Tanzanians are not surprised over recent events in the same way that development partners are. They think politically; consequently the notion that reform comes through power confrontations is an integral part of their register. Development partners, on the other hand, are only now beginning to accept such thinking. They are still caught in the notion that improved governance comes through capacity-building or realignment of incentive structures that are designed in particular programmes. This managerial approach to reform precludes what Tanzanians react to, namely the constraints and opportunities that shifting power constellations produce. That is why, as we argue further in Chapter 6, thinking “power” and not just “policy” is so important if development partners are really interested in making sense of the spirit of the Paris Declaration.

The answer to the question as to whether politics in Tanzania have reached a tipping-point may be less important than the fact that, by rais-
ing the question, analysts are stimulated to think in terms other than “business-as-usual”. Tanzanians are more excited – even enthusiastic – about what happens politically in their country. Some of the submissiveness and unquestioned loyalty to authority that they have shown in the past may be giving way to more political participation and civic awareness. Development partners are equally excited. The question is what lessons they will learn from this, not only in terms of their level of support in Tanzania but also their modes of operation.

5.3 Toward greater inclusiveness – what can be done?

5.3.1 The Confluence Site – a public platform

The last section addresses the question of what can and should be done to make headway under the new political circumstances that exist in 2008. This is a proposal on how the weaknesses of the past can be overcome in order to bring a better balance between state and civil society as well as with the donors. The greater inclusiveness that we have in mind, therefore, starts from the twin assumptions that Tanzanians must lead this process but development partners must adjust their own strategy to suit a more political approach to development cooperation.

Our presentation and analysis here centres on the idea of creating a “Confluence Site”, a public platform where stakeholders can meet and debate issues of common concern. This Site is a symbolic representation of what may also be described as the “civic public realm” (Ekeh 1975) where actors come together respecting each other’s right to participate and express themselves freely. The idea is to ensure inclusiveness and equality among all actors. It is presented graphically in the figure next page.

The Confluence Site is a symbolic arrangement whose basic principle is to facilitate the meeting of minds on shared values, practices and goals in respect of any undertaking. It is a forum for consultations and negotiations. It is a field where a variety of players “must” meet in advance of a decision to share details of an undertaking, thrash out strategies for action, outline enforceable means and draw a portrait of rewards and sanctions for success or failure.

The basic assumption of the Site is that the currently existing three angles of power have mutual and shared interests in development cooperation and are committed to realising them. These interests are enshrined, or can be enshrined, in shared development values and good governance practices. Practically, this can be taken to mean the realisation of human material wellbeing across society and attainment of human dignity. Human values and respect are at the centre of this venture.
The Confluence Site is also an advance warning system of the misfortunes that might befall development cooperation. Rather than wait for explosions, convulsions and protests because of hanging on to power, exclusion and abuse, the Site alerts to possible failure. Its pay-off is not only in physical outcome of development but also attitudinal and behavioural change and a dynamic view of development.

As the figure above shows, the three institutional angular actors lead into and out of the Confluence Site in the middle of the triangle. The three angular power actors are linked to it as shown by the dark inner arrows. The arrows around the Site simply suggest that there may also be an independent interactive relationship between the three angles of power. However, while such interaction may be intermittent (broken lines) between the donor and the local state and the non-state actors and the donor, that between the local state and the non-state actors must be firm, mandatory and reciprocal.

The Confluence Site is not another local state. Each of the angles of power is supposed to work on the basis of its own rules, procedures and organs. Still, its decisions should be enforceable and binding on the workings of the different angles of power. As a matter of principle, what is called for here is that development cooperation should be negotiated in an interactive manner by all the three angles of power. Such a process will provide the donor with a more efficient docking platform. The structure of power within the local state will also be altered so as to allow for ac-
countability and responsiveness to its citizenry. The people will be able to exercise their will.

The Confluence Site may be compared to a national conference in which principal constituencies are represented and heard. This model is not an automatic equalizer but it provides a platform for voices to be heard regardless of the constituency they represent. It is the kind of forum that is a necessary derivative of a context where dominance and/or lack of clout enables actors who want to share values to dialogue in order to attain that shared value. The Site, therefore, is an important complementary platform to other avenues of interaction between the angular actors.

Issues can be raised with regard to the efficacy of the Confluence Site in altering power configurations. The idea of inclusiveness is new to all the actors involved. The local state has disregarded it in the past. Non-state actors have wanted it but seen little chance of it happening. Development partners have shied away from taking part. We believe that the time for the Confluence Site idea has come. It is built on the ongoing changes in Tanzanian politics that are moving towards greater openness and accountability. It takes into consideration the spirit of the Paris Declaration, especially the principle of mutual accountability between development partners and their partner country institutions.

What is important in this model is that the angular actors engage each other in constructive dialogue. Such dialogue is not merely about administrative and technical matters but also about how their political interaction can be strengthened. The Confluence Site is an ideal field to work in without being seen as sidelining other angular actors. As all angular actors are present on the site, this provides a restraining mechanism so it becomes more difficult for one party to act unilaterally. It is here that the power of the development partners can legitimately be swayed in a way that is cognizant of local conditions. It is also here that the angular actors, notably the development partners, can identify pro-change groups and individuals that may make the necessary difference. Moreover, it is here that the local state and non-state actors can “present their case”. The model is based on the assumption that, in order to be effective, relations between the three angular actors must be based on the premise of “consultation with commitment”.

The proposal above is fairly straightforward, however putting it into practice is of course associated with both hesitation and fear. Development partners would be afraid of taking a regular seat side by side with state and non-state actors because it would compromise current diplomatic praxis and protocols. Governments would have a similar hesitation because it challenges conventional relations with non-state actors and de-
development partners. Non-state actors may fear being drawn into relations that compromise their autonomy.

Implementing the Confluence Site model must address these fears or hesitations. In the case of the development partners, they must cease being mere referees of the political game in Tanzania and find ways of engaging the local stakeholders on an equal basis. Even if there may be legal constraints on becoming actors in their own right, there are ways around such obstacles. One way would be to be represented by proxies, i.e. people whom the development partners appoint to be their representatives in the various forums that would be created as part of the Confluence Site. The important thing is that there is a degree of genuine commitment by the development partners in ways that allow them to learn how power operates and how they may be able to become constructive agents of change.

Chapter 4 shows that a common perception among Tanzanians is that development partners and state actors confide in each other to the point where others become suspicious. This applies not only to civil society representatives but at least as much to parliamentarians. The legislators do not move in the same orbit as development partners and partner governments. As was recommended in a previous study, sponsored by DFID, donors have an important role to play in disseminating information to other actors, particularly parliament and to political parties whilst also developing improved channels for dialogue with these other actors (Lawson et al 2005). Such measures ought not to be too difficult for the development partners to take, especially if they adopt the line of thinking that reflects the principles of inclusiveness and equality contained in the Confluence Site model.

Many Tanzanians are painfully aware of the weakness of their state to get public policy objectives realised. Power is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals and institutions. There is little separation of power and a lack of respect for professionalism and managerial autonomy. The rule of law falls short of expectations among many groups, especially in the urban centres. Elected bodies, especially at the local government level, are not taken seriously. Public offices suffer from red-tape and other forms of inefficiency. The list could be longer. The good news is that in spite of failed reform efforts, civic awareness is growing. There is a chance, therefore, that in the light of a more constructive political climate, measures that have not been very successful in the past may finally be addressed seriously by local stakeholders, including the government itself.

As has been suggested in previous pages, the power of the state in Tanzania is closely linked to that of the ruling party. In fact, it may be said that the state is in its pocket. Even that, however, is now being challenged.
Reform-minded leaders inside the CCM may be able to introduce measures that reduce the discretionary influence that individual leaders or ministers have owned in the past, often to the detriment of not only positive policy effects but also the legitimacy and credibility of the party itself. The relatively “high ceiling” that the party leadership has allowed for political debate in 2008 is a sign that CCM can continue to be a powerful actor without having to resort to a blanket form of party discipline that silences the many voices that could be part of the Confluence Site.

Non-state actors suffer from exclusion, lack of resources and lack of independence. They would, directly or indirectly, benefit from some of the measures that we recommend the development partners and the state to take in order to realise the values associated with the Confluence Site. The biggest challenge that they face, however, stems from their lack of resources and independence. In the current arrangement between development partners and partner governments, non-state actors are at best “secondary citizens”. Given their own lack of resources, they cannot readdress this situation on their own. Development partners have a responsibility to ensure that the playing field becomes more level. In Chapter 7, we propose the establishment of development funds that cater for local government and civil society organisations in a competitive fashion. As long as civil society, like local government, is treated as a sector and not integrated into a confluence site-like context, these entities will remain marginal to the country’s development. This constitutes a serious waste of resources and is likely to have a demoralising effect on a large section of the population.

The Confluence Site is a long-term venture. In the short term there is a need to better understand the current political dynamics within Tanzania with the explicit intention of identifying agents that can promote the changes proposed above. There are too few “drivers of change” in Tanzania today and they tend to be far apart. Furthermore, they are little understood. Tanzanians may have a hunch about it, but their knowledge is sporadic and unsystematic. Development partners know even less and should focus their attention not only on policy and project design but also on how power affects the implementation of whatever ventures they support. This macro-political knowledge becomes especially crucial in the light of what the Paris Declaration prescribes. We shall return to this subject at greater length in Chapter 6.
The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005) is broadly conceived as a significant juncture in the history of development assistance and cooperation. It has paved the way for a new approach that emphasises (a) a deeper ownership of the assistance mechanisms by the recipient partner countries, (b) a greater degree of integration of foreign aid into the national budget of these countries, (c) enhanced harmonisation among donors and creditors, (d) a stronger emphasis on management of results and (e) and the development of a sense of mutual accountability among donors and partner countries.

Tanzania is one country in Africa where this new approach has been pushed quite extensively. Under the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) the donors have committed themselves to (a) aligning their support to Tanzanian Government poverty reduction policies, (b) making increased use of the government system for such key tasks as financing, accounting, procurement, monitoring and evaluation, (c) engaging in dialogue with government and other domestic stakeholders, and (d) making their aid less tied to the original financing source. As a mark of commitment to this strategy no less than fourteen donors provided direct budget support to Tanzania in 2008.

Even though this signifies a major change in donor-recipient relations, it does not mean that all donors have adopted the principles of the Paris Declaration. The United States, for instance, is an important exception especially since its aid to Tanzania has markedly increased since 2006. Neither USAID nor the Millennium Challenge Corporation or PEPFAR, the special programme aimed at combating HIV/AIDS, has aligned their support with the government budget. Other countries take a very cautious approach and, for example, have adopted direct budget support – the principal mechanism in building this new relationship – on a trial basis.
Japan is a case in point. Yet other donors, which are not part of the OECD group of countries, e.g. China, and international organisations such as the Global Fund for Combating HIV/AIDS and philanthropic foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Clinton Foundation which are active in the public health sector, operate outside the framework of the Paris Declaration. The dispersed policy preferences and operational procedures of all these donors mean that implementing the Declaration among these actors is very difficult and sometimes contested.

This is evident in the reports that OECD issues on an annual basis to monitor progress towards the targets set in the Paris Declaration in order to make aid more effective. Although Tanzania fares relatively well from an African perspective, challenges remain notably in terms of integrating aid into the national budget and making it more predictable (OECD 2008). Other areas of concern are a weak system of public financial management and coordination of the national budget process. These are especially significant issues because increased use of budget support and basket funding for specific sector programmes is likely to hinge on the reliability and performance of these processes.

There is a general agreement among development partners that Tanzania has taken the right initiatives to help make aid more effective and efficient in the country. It has adopted an overall development framework and long-term social and economic development goals. It has a medium-term strategy for national economic growth and poverty reduction. It has introduced ambitious reforms in the public service, local government and the legal sectors. It has established a results-based monitoring and evaluation system. The list of commendable policy initiatives could be made longer. The problem in Tanzania lies in the implementation of its ambitious strategies and policies. There continues to be a noticeable difference between promise and practice. This is particularly evident to the development cooperation officers who work on the ground in Tanzania. Even though they typically never see as much as they should – or would like to – they do encounter the apparent weaknesses in the “system” on a regular basis.

The explanations that are usually offered for inadequacies in the implementation processes are twofold: a lack of capacity and insufficient incentives to change the behaviour of those in charge of getting things done. These explanations reflect the economic and managerial thinking that continues to dominate the international development community. There is no doubt that such ideas are part of the explanation, but they are rarely more than a part. Much of what explains the outcome of a policy process is externalized because it does not lend itself to quantification and
tangible “interventions”. The most obvious void in development policy analysis is its neglect of power. Yet, as discussed in this volume, power is at the core of getting things done. Such neglect is a critical shortcoming in any effort to make foreign aid more effective. The Paris Declaration, both directly and indirectly, serves as an invitation to development partners and partner countries alike to deepen their country analyses to include the political factors that determine policy outcome. Policy and politics can no longer be treated as two separate tracks.

The rest of this chapter will discuss some of the major implications for the development partners of bringing power into policy analysis. It will address the following themes: (a) the shift from downstream to upstream in the policy process, (b) the effects of being agenda setters, (c) the differences in perceptions and use of power between donors and partner governments, and (d) the treatment of civil society. The chapter ends with a discussion of what could and should be done in order to make aid more effective.

6.1 Donors have moved upstream

As suggested in Chapter 3, a useful way of understanding how power enters into a policy process is to think of it as consisting of four separate points or “stations”: (1) agenda setting, which involves determining the overall strategic framework of policy action, (2) policy formulation, which entails making policies for specific sectors, (3) policy implementation, which means turning policies into practical action, and (4) policy effects, which is concerned with how policies are perceived and received by the public. These four points can be placed along a continuum with agenda setting and policy formulation forming the upstream part of the policy process, policy implementation and policy effects the downstream. As confirmed in the survey data presented in Chapter 4 and discussed further in Chapter 5 with reference to Tanzania, the donors are perceived by people as being more powerful than either government or civil society. This applies especially to the upstream parts of the policy process. Donors are responsible for setting the agenda and are also influential when it comes to formulating policy.

These perceptions are, in part, a general reflection of the level of aid dependency that exists in Tanzania. Even though development partners themselves may have a different perception of their power and influence, it is significant that the perceptions of donor power and influence are so deeply and widely engrained. The Government of Tanzania is aware of these perceptions and is, at least rhetorically, committed to trying to bring
the level of aid dependency down, most recently confirmed in the Budget Speech by the Minister of Finance in June 2008 (The Citizen, June 13, 2008).

The point here is to show that whatever power development partners possess has shifted, especially after the Paris Declaration, from downstream to upstream in the policy process. As long as foreign aid was primarily carried out through individual programme and project support, donor influence was spread throughout the system and exercised largely at the downstream points of the process. Project personnel are, by definition, involved in implementation of particular policies and programmes and help shape the outcome and effects that members of the public – favourably or unfavourably – respond to.

Because power in the context of individual programme and project aid tends to be exercised at the micro level, it is dispersed and less noticeable than at the macro level. Hence, it is understandable that the role of power is overshadowed by other concerns, notably how to build capacity or create better incentives. Technical assistance personnel, funded by the donors in specific project contexts, can usually testify to how much power to make a difference they have, but because they operate in a micro environment, they do not think of their role in power terms but rather more practically in terms of getting things done. Especially those who have the opportunity to work in one organisation or location for a longer period of time become aware of how to make things happen, but also conscious of the many constraints that exist in dealing with the government bureaucracy. The accumulation of these impressions, collected through personal interviews and reports as well as project evaluations, has served as a valuable guide for donor agencies to understanding how things work – or do not work – in Tanzania.

Because the donor presence at the downstream points of the policy process was never interpreted in power terms, anything political was treated as lying outside what donors were involved in. Hence, the separation between aid agencies and government ministries at headquarters level, an equivalent separation in recipient countries, and a gap in reporting between those responsible for political matters (diplomats) and those in charge of development cooperation (administrators).

6.1.1 The challenges to donors
The reduction, if not termination, of project aid and the adoption of direct budget support has changed this set-up and moved the position of the donors from downstream to upstream. Although this had already begun to happen in some individual donor countries before 2005, the Paris Dec-
laration has accelerated this process especially among European donors and the international development banks, not the least the World Bank itself. The donor role is increasingly confined to interaction with high-level government officials. Performance monitoring, which was previously carried out at project level, is now operated through mechanisms set in place for the government administration as a whole. It is macro rather than micro considerations that matter. The priority is building “systems” that make government operations – and by implication foreign aid – more predictable. Compared to the presence at the downstream level, it represents a “hands-off” approach, but it does not mean that control mechanisms are gone. They are there in the form of performance indicators that donors and partner governments jointly agree upon and the latter has the responsibility of fulfilling. While the donors are taking a position on the sideline, they still have control of the game. While in the past they tried to act as players on the field, they have now adopted the role of referee responsible for ensuring that the rules of the game are adhered to by local players.

Everybody familiar with this sports metaphor knows that referees are enormously powerful. They may not score the goals that make the fans happy, but they can use their whistle to intervene at any time, including issuing red cards to those who violate the rules too blatantly. When the players adhere to the rules and it is a game without incident, the power of the referee tends to be latent in the sense that players and fans do not notice it. If, on the other hand, games are full of incidents that require referee intervention, their power is manifest. Donor power in Tanzania is largely latent, but circumstances sometimes force it into the open as happens when key actors and agencies do not follow the rules that the international community has agreed upon through various treaties and protocols and which the development partners regard themselves as prime guardians of.

The challenge to the donors is when to use their whistles and what action to take. They are not yet used to their new role and waver between letting play continue and interrupting it with penalties. After all, an ideal game should have as few interruptions as possible and the spectators, as well as the players, expect that. Yet, if things go wrong or some actors delay the game so that agreed-upon targets are not met, referees have to decide when and where to put their foot down. When to use their power and how to apply it, given the often problematic nature of the game, is the real challenge for the development partners in the new aid dispensation where they wish to run their aid through existing government channels.
6.2 The ambivalent power of the agenda setters

The problem with the foreign aid to Africa that originates in OECD countries is that it is dispensed in accordance with a set of rules that remain if not foreign, at least remote, to most African actors. The latter would like to play the game their own way, but the donor community ties its support to performance standards that come out of the practice of developed societies rather than being attuned to the circumstances and capacities of developing countries such as Tanzania. Development partners give Tanzania a chance to develop, but they only let it happen within a framework that is unmistakably theirs. Their sensitivity to how the government operates and what indigenous norms and practices may produce results without being in tune with OECD standards is becoming more difficult to uphold when their primary task is to use their diplomatic missions to assess progress towards targets contained in the Paris Declaration, rather than assembling information about how the country’s government and public agencies really work. The latter was a well-known fact in previous years when technical assistance personnel provided insights into local performance on a regular basis. The flow of such information is now much more restricted and provided only indirectly through consultants.

The irony (if that is not too strong a word) today is that while their expectation is that Tanzania will do better if it controls its own budget and aid is provided and aligned in a more effective manner, the commitment of development partners in the country seems to be on decline. Those in the diplomatic missions and development cooperation offices in Dar es Salaam do not want it that way but have little choice as harmonisation of aid, one of the key targets in the Declaration, tends to take up a lot of time.

The harmonisation goal, therefore, is not always in line with other objectives in the Declaration because it forces staff at embassies to spend a lot of time talking among each other. Such conversations and discussions do, of course, have a value but they tend to become dominant at the expense of obtaining a better understanding of how Tanzania works. As the report on how the Paris Declaration is implemented in Tanzania indicated, this is acknowledged by several officers in the donor embassies in Dar es Salaam (Hyden 2007).

While giving partner governments greater control of how foreign aid can be fitted into their budget process is a noble policy objective, the methods used to measure progress towards the Paris Declaration targets are controversial. As suggested above, OECD issues an annual report for each country where donor and partner government compliance with these targets is assessed and discussed. These reports reflect the views of
both donors and partner governments and tend to be “watered” down from drafts that had been initially prepared by the donor representatives alone. Reading these reports, it is quite obvious that implementing the Declaration is a high priority among development partners while African partner governments, even those like Tanzania that are reported to be doing quite well, identify with it much less. This is not to imply that the Government of Tanzania is “dragging its feet” on these issues, only to suggest that it has other competing priorities that matters more. Put in other words, while the main preoccupation of the OECD missions in Tanzania is to assess progress toward the targets of the Paris Declaration, the government simultaneously juggles a whole host of political challenges.

6.2.1 Understanding the role of power

This divergence in approach to the Declaration almost inevitably leads to frustration among development partners. Through their singular lens, the government is criticised for not doing enough and for failing to live up to its commitments. So far, the Government of Tanzania has shown enough action to enjoy at least the “benefit of doubt” among the donors. However, there is little evidence that the “system” that the donors are helping to institutionalise in Tanzania is developing fast enough to cope with the enormous challenges of public finance management and budget coordination that is required under the new system of general budget support and sector-wide basket funding (Idd and Associates 2006).

The power that development partners possess as agenda setters is ambivalent. It is necessary, on the one hand, to ensure that Tanzania is moving in a direction that is desirable from their own perception of what development is all about and how it should be achieved. It is exercised, on the other hand, in ways that in the long run may be counter-productive. First of all, by “rushing” Tanzania to move toward targets that are truly beyond its short to medium-term capacity, it is setting the country up for yet another disappointment. Secondly, by moving to direct budget support, the donors are left with few levers that can be applied in a situation where things go wrong thus leaving the approach easily vulnerable to criticism and attack.

Implementing the Paris Declaration in African countries is a volatile venture that is likely to succeed only if greater attention is paid to how things work there. This involves a deeper understanding of the cultural and political realities, and these are typically left out of development policy

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8 This is evident in the draft that had been prepared for the 2008 Report by the Development Partners Group, which is more critical than the version that was entered into the official OECD report once the government had vetted and revised the draft.
analysis. At the heart of all this is the role that power plays: how it is exercised by Tanzanians and how this stems from a very different concept of the world than the one that underpins the thinking of the donor community.

6.3 Differences in perceptions of power

Development partners have learned to play the political game according to conditions that are different to those in Africa. Tanzanians, therefore, approach the game from a different angle to the donors, making their task as referees more contested. Tanzanians, like other Africans, are first and foremost interested in scoring; how it is done, including violating the rules, is of less consequence. Development partners, however, wish to see that any goal is scored following the rules that they have laid out for the game based on their own experience of it. Translating this into a development policy context means that Tanzanians are mainly concerned with achieving a particular goal, regardless of means and costs, while the donors pay equal attention to how the goal is achieved and at what cost. They approach development goals in the light of the principles of good governance and feasibility, as well as the cost and benefits of achieving it. Underlying this difference in outlook is a divergent concept of power.

This issue was highlighted in Chapter 1 and it is now time to revisit the subject with a discussion of what its practical consequences are. Before doing so, however, some philosophical reflection is necessary. What Europeans and North Americans usually forget is that their values merely constitute one culture of many. One reason is that theirs is claimed to be universal, although it is far from ubiquitous. Another is that they typically do not talk about their own values as “culture” because they have so extensively been turned into rational institutions that serve specific public goals that the discourse is pursued in economic and technocratic terms (Zijderveld 1970). This gradual secularisation over the past centuries has largely separated economics from politics and culture. For instance, the latter in Europe and North America is a sector of artists, writers, etc. Politics has been reduced to serving as an extension of economics. Certainly, it is economic and managerial values that dominate politics. In the language of philosophy, positivism reigns in Western societies. To be sure, there has been a reaction to this and there is a post-positivist or post-modernist movement in scholarly circles (e.g. Foucault 1977, Bourdieu 1990), but this has not managed to replace the hegemony of positivist ideas.

These ideals are reflected in development cooperation circles where policy reigns and therefore also the economic and technocratic language that accompanies such a focus. Because economics permeates politics and
culture in the West, power is viewed as capacity to achieve public goals. It is embedded in the policy process and is “tamed” to function in instrumental terms. Individuals who use power to advance personal or private goals are typically frowned upon and criticised in these societies. Individuals serving in public office, including those elected, are cogs in a complex machine or “system” that appears to move independently of personal agency. At its best, it delivers at low transaction costs. No extra measures are needed to get things done. The system works.

It is fair to add that this is an ideal, even in the West, but the way governments work in these countries is used as the benchmark for setting standards of operation and how to measure it as reflected, for example, in the New Public Management approach. Targets are carefully considered in feasibility and cost-benefit terms before they are approved. Indicators, therefore, are chosen within a framework that is expected to deliver as planned. Although this does not always happen, it is generally true in Western organisations, whether private or public, that the various components of the policy cycle – formulation, implementation and evaluation – are coordinated from the very beginning in such a way that in the end there is no room for surprises – positive or negative. It is business as usual.

This same positivist orientation exists in Tanzania but is far from dominant. It can be found among economists and other professionals who have been trained in tertiary educational institutions, but they still do not form enough of a critical mass to make a difference at the political level. There, distinctly non-positivist ideas prevail. Power is seen in personalistic terms, a legacy that reflects the influence of pre-colonial norms in the present. African societies were previously constructed on the basis of “rule over people”. Land was plentiful and owned communally. Chiefs or elders allocated land to individual families based on their loyalty. People dissatisfied with their leaders would “vote with their feet” and leave to take up residence under some other chief or in the “wilderness” where they would establish a new clan and community (Kopytoff 1979).

This behaviour repeats itself in many ways today. People leave the countryside for the urban centres because few development benefits reach the villages. People leave their country because of misrule and poverty.

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9 African attachment to land is quite different because it is not owned privately. People do retain an attachment to their family farm, not so much because of the economic value of the land but because of the cultural significance it has as the place family ancestors are buried (Gluckman 1969). With increasing population density land does take on a growing commercial value and where that happens the attitude to land is changing. As experience shows from Kenya, however, privatising ownership of land through registration and the issuance of title deeds has proved quite difficult because families have kept sub-dividing plots causing a loss in productivity and an increase in family litigation (Kanyinga 2000).
They continue to prefer the “exit” rather than the “voice” option (Hirschman 1970). Those who do not leave typically stay put or, as subjects, adopt the “loyalty” option. The introduction of multi-party politics has provided people in African countries with an opportunity to express their voice in public, but it continues to remain largely confined to elections, hence the conclusion that they are “voters but not yet citizens” (Bratton and Logan 2006). Their sense of civic rights and responsibilities is still poorly developed. The majority continue to think and act as “subjects” subordinate to powerful individuals serving as their patrons.

This “rule over people” legacy tends to confine power relations to the private sphere. It is not viewed as a public matter, hence the weakness of what Westerners refer to as the public realm where civic rights and responsibilities are both acknowledged and contested. Nor is it viewed in economic or managerial terms. The notion that governments are there to produce public goods and services is poorly understood. These governments do indeed engage in building schools and clinics, even providing equipment, etc. but the systems for delivery that are designed and built with donor funds are less important to local actors than the personal delivery of any good or service that a political leader can make. Political power stems from, and is sustained by, such personal interventions. Beneficiaries or clients want to put a face to the act in order to appreciate it (Schatzberg 2002).

Because power is personalised and largely exercised as a private rather than a public matter, political leaders and government officials do not strategise in policy terms but do pay a lot of attention to how specific policies may affect the networks of power that sustain them (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). For example, governments do not operate – as they do in the OECD parliamentary democracies – as a team with collective responsibility. Ministers in Africa typically do not behave as if they are members of a team. They first and foremost make a point of their position as leaders who as “Big Men” have a personal responsibility for the destiny of their subjects. It is always these “Big Men” that make headlines in the morning or evening news. There is often a sense of mutual accountability in these relationships although they are not civic in the sense that the good governance agenda prescribes.

Other evidence of how power operates in a “rule over people” setting comes from government ministries and other public agencies. Management, including coordination and control, is not carried out in relation to particular policy goals but more in terms of supervising subordinates. In the absence of a positivist outlook, civil servants do not see themselves merely as “cogs” in a machine but equally much as individuals deserving
dignified treatment. Instead of functioning as a system, therefore, government ministries are loose assemblies of individuals working in the same building but with little, if any, sense of a common mission. These were found to be dominant features in public institutions in nine southern African countries some twenty years ago (Montgomery 1987). Anecdotal evidence provided by development cooperation officers and others suggests that at least in Tanzania, this remains the case – despite public sector reform programmes in recent years. For Tanzanians seeking a government service, it is still virtually impossible to get something done without personally spending time “pushing” the matter. That such a situation invites bribes should be no surprise.

Because those employed in government view power in personal terms, they have a limited sense of their role as servants of the public. This includes their role as users and supervisors of public funds. Financial management and accounting remain the “Achilles Heel” of governments across Africa. Reports issued by the Auditor General confirm this in Tanzania (e.g. United Republic of Tanzania 2008). These shortcomings are not necessarily the result of deliberate misuse of funds. They are as often caused by the fact that money comes from so many different sources that keeping track of it becomes difficult. Donor alignment in recent years may alleviate this particular problem but it does not necessarily eliminate the weaknesses of public financial management since direct budget support pushes more money into government ministries with personnel who have a very limited understanding of their role as guardians or managers of public funds.

Transparency and public accountability are not regarded as priorities as long as power is seen in these personalistic terms. Because power is often exercised outside and in conflict with official policy objectives, it causes deviations that undermine agreements with development partners. Sometimes such deviations can be corrected with the supply of additional funds, but it is unlikely that government ministers or officials in the ministries will admit that they have done anything wrong. They are certainly not going to make a confession in public. They are more likely to try to cover it up. Action is rarely taken against those who have misused public funds. If it involves prominent political leaders or senior government officers, as in the case of the removal of the Prime Minister and two other cabinet ministers in Tanzania in February 2008, any action taken is political not legal. Only those at lower levels who can be sacrificed are typically taken to court. Thus, even though things may be changing in the direction of greater transparency and public accountability as suggested in Chapter 5, any such change will continue to be contested. Development partners cannot
get too excited about recent events in Tanzania, but they can become smarter by bringing power into their strategising and focus on key points, e.g. parliament, which could be asked to take greater responsibility of its own rather than being merely reactive to government ministers.

Finally, where power relations are perceived in personalistic terms, it is difficult to challenge and change them without causing a major conflict. Power in African countries is not calibrated to facilitate negotiated settlements, as the deadlock between CCM and the opposition party, CUF, over how to govern Zanzibar confirms. Soft power is viewed as ineffective; compromise always a loss, not even a half-victory. Elections provide opportunities for circulation among the political elite, but it is limited by the fact that many leaders jump from one party to another in order to maximise their chances of being a beneficiary of government “goodies”. Elections in Africa are also limited by the fact that they do not lead to empowerment of new groups in society. Political leaders tend to interpret any challenge to their position in personal terms and respond accordingly. They often identify a “straw-man” whom they accuse of sabotage or unpatriotic behaviour. The language used is expressed not in terms of policy but personal disagreement.

In sum, there is indeed a great distance between predominant donor perceptions of power and those embraced by the Tanzanian officials with whom they interact. To the latter, policy is a tool to exercise power; to the former power is a tool to realise policy. It should be no surprise that the expectations that development partners have of how to get things done are rarely fulfilled. A better understanding of this gap and how power operates in Tanzania is necessary, not only to make expectations more realistic but also to identify where and how particular policies may acquire political traction. A better contextualisation of particular policy interventions, especially understanding how power determines policy outcome, is an important first step that some donors are taking increasingly seriously. In the upstream position that they now occupy this, and other related measures, are crucial.

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10 Negotiations between CCM and CUF have been ongoing for more than ten years under the umbrella of Mwafaka (Consensus). There have been several times when an agreement has been announced. But in all those cases, full implementation of the agreements has stalled, thereby triggering demand for subsequent negotiations. This political stalemate has held back development, especially on the island of Pemba in Zanzibar, a CUF stronghold.

11 We do not suggest that such an approach to politics is exclusively African. It occurs in many other countries, for example, in the United States where, especially in the past eight years, calling a candidate’s behaviour into question based on moral or patriotic values has often overshadowed factual policy issues. Yet it is rarely in the end sustainable in complex societies like the U.S. and there is a self-correctible process at work. This is what tends to be missing in African countries and it is a challenge how it could be brought about.
6.4 The treatment of civil society

The survey of power perceptions in Tanzania (Chapter 4) demonstrates that it is a widespread view that civil society, in comparison with the state and the donors, is a very weak actor. This is no surprise. Civil society throughout Africa remains poorly developed (Tripp 1997). In societies where power is viewed in personal terms, there is little sense of responsibility beyond the boundaries of kin and neighbours. In countries with mass poverty families have little, if any, money to spend on the pursuit of public goals. In short, voluntarism is limited, membership in associations typically confined to members of the elite.

Yet, civil society is potentially an important partner in any development effort. It is fertile ground for the generation of new ideas. It is closer to people than government bureaucracies. It can often get things done at less cost and with better results than government. For these reasons, civil society in African countries tends to be viewed by governments with envy. They accept its existence but do not want it to challenge government power or question its policies and actions. Individual civil society organisations that are successful in mobilising societal support and funding often become victims of government harassment. As noted in Chapter 5 this is what happened to Bawata – an independent women’s organisation – in 1996 when it successfully mobilised women to participate in the political process. Hakì Elimu, arguably one of the best non-governmental organisations in Tanzania, is another case in point although its fate has not been quite as dramatic. When, in 2005, it began to question the government’s policy on building schools with little attention to substantive issues such as the quality of education and the rights of school children, the Minister at the time threatened it with suspension and temporarily silenced it (The Citizen, 16 October 2005). Although the suspension was never implemented, its activities were restricted. Thus, for example, it was no longer allowed to send its material directly to schools in Tanzania but had to accept communicating with schools via the Ministry of Education.

The donor attitude to civil society has shifted since the 1990s. In the early years of democratisation in Tanzania and other African countries civil society, as in Latin America, was regarded as a key actor in bringing about democracy. A good deal of money was invested in NGOs, both old and new, in fields such as human rights, civic education and gender empowerment. Experience from this funding showed, however, that among the few good ones were also a large number of bad ones. These included so-called “briefcase NGOs” that were typically one-person fake creations with no sincere intention to provide a service to clients. Others were trying
to achieve programmatic ends but failed to manage their funds in an honest fashion. Following this experience, donors significantly reduced their interest in, and support of, civil society organisations in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

6.4.1 “Sectorising” civil society

Although the Paris Declaration speaks of the importance of national ownership of development activities it does so with reference largely to government. Direct budget support is the mechanism that confirms this on the ground. Other institutions are referred to as partners in dialogues with government but not as owners in the same way as government. There is no real consideration of the power implications of legitimising government ownership of development funds, including foreign aid. Whatever alignment development partners are expected to do is in relationship to the government budget. Such an approach would make sense in societies where there are organised economic interests and vibrant voluntary associations representing its citizens, however it is controversial in countries where people still see themselves as subjects rather than citizens and organisations outside the state are few and far between. In these latter cases, Tanzania being one of them, this approach tends to reinforce a top-down and supply-driven version of development. It strengthens rather than reduces a “handout” mentality among Tanzanians. It stands the risk of increasing rather than decreasing aid dependency especially if the Government continues to show its official commitment to the targets of the Paris Declaration. Tanzania is at risk of becoming a prisoner of its own success.

Thus, when development partners decided in 2007 to provide additional funding for civil society in Tanzania, it looked rather like an afterthought. They acknowledged the important role that non-governmental organisations play in raising social consciousness, as well as in the delivery of services to the public. They also realised the lack of parity in relations between state and civil society. Yet, when it came to supporting civil society, the partners failed to find institutional mechanisms for making civil society organisations direct beneficiaries of funds channelled through the Treasury as general budget support. Instead, civil society support was provided in project form, albeit as a “basket fund” supporting a special Civil Society Foundation responsible for allocating money to NGOs. The result is that civil society continues to be treated as a “sector” receiving its own funding rather than as an integral part of the national development effort that donors so generously finance through direct budget support, despite obvious limitations in getting things done through the government bu-
6.5 What could and should be done

As the “Paris Agenda” advances, the issue of power is likely to become even more salient in relationships between development partners and Tanzanian institutions. The agenda, to which everyone is expected to subscribe, calls for a realignment of power relations in Tanzania that implies greater social justice and more equitable and sustainable development. It calls for a change in the way power is exercised and a move towards greater respect for human rights, tolerance of the views of others, and a professionalisation of the government, as well as other institutions. In addition, it calls for greater scope for holding those in power accountable by encouraging collective action aimed at demanding more respect for the processes and procedures by which policies are implemented.

For a country like Tanzania with a political dynamic that is quite different from this governance formula, this agenda is a tall order. The challenge for the partners is to find agreement on a level of progress toward the formula that is satisfactory and how to ensure that their own interaction with Tanzanian institutions fosters this process. The dilemma that they face is that realigning power relations and changing attitudes toward power not only take time but are also difficult to objectively assess, yet they need to demonstrate to sceptics and friends alike back home that the new aid modality, especially direct budget support, is not a waste but yields meaningful results. Donor harmonisation is not easy and it carries its own costs as well as benefits that must be assessed in relationship to the ultimate objective of assisting Tanzania achieve more rapid economic growth, reduce levels of poverty and improve its form of governance.

As suggested throughout this volume, power is a factor “out there” that shapes the outcome of what development partners and local actors attempt to do in Tanzania. Structures and institutions determine the extent to which power can make a difference. Because the structural set-up and the political dynamic it generates is so different from what is familiar to the donor community and what its own models tend to presume, it is important that this contextual understanding is made part of country strategies and other lead documents in use. In this respect, power needs to be “domesticated” for analytical and operational purposes within the donor agencies and diplomatic missions. It is not possible to operate on
the assumption that it is only a matter of answering such questions as how “political will” and “capacity” can be strengthened. Equally important is the question why things happen the way they do. The challenge, therefore, among the development partners is how to bring the “how” and “why” questions together in such a way that country strategies become more relevant and realistic. By bringing power closer to policy, the partners will also become more effective in their own internal interaction and, especially, in their dialogue with government and other institutions in Tanzania. The challenge, therefore, among the development partners is how to bring the “how” and “why” questions together in such a way that country strategies become more relevant and realistic. By bringing power closer to policy, the partners will also become more effective in their own internal interaction and, especially, in their dialogue with government and other institutions in Tanzania. The strategy should address the question of how Tanzanian institutions can be changed from within rather than without. This means that methodologically they should go about the task inductively rather than merely deductively. Being able to read and respond to what happens on the ground and how this creates opportunities and constraints – a political task – is as important, if not more so, than designing policies that look professional on paper but lack little, if any, grounding in reality. Departments within Sida are already making headway in terms of contextualising their operational strategies. Power considerations are part of the analysis that goes into deciding what to do and how to do it.

This step, which is also pursued in various ways in some Swedish embassies, is generally met with a positive response. Instead of dealing merely with administrative issues, officers get a chance to grapple with real-world issues and thus become involved in the country in which they work, or for which they serve as desk officers. In short, bringing power into the analysis has motivational consequences among development cooperation staff.

These are issues internal to the agencies and missions representing the donors. They can be handled relatively easily and yield operational results quite quickly. More complicated and requiring both more time and dialogue are measures that have consequences for existing power relations in Tanzania. For a long time now, the donors have pursued the good governance agenda without much, if any, attention paid to its power implications. This shortcoming has caused the good governance agenda to become stale with little to show for itself.

One prerequisite for making aid more effective and efficient, therefore, is the acknowledgement that donors are part of a tripartite power nexus that involves the Tanzanian state as well as civil society. Perceptions of the donors, as reported in Chapter 4, are that they are more powerful than either state or civil society in Tanzania. This reflects the high level of aid provided by the donors.

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12 This was evident, for example, in a seminar organised at Sida headquarters on December 14, 2007 by Sida’s former Department for Democracy and Social Development.
dependency that their presence in Tanzania for more than four decades has generated. The playing field is far from level. Chapter 5 discusses the importance of creating a Confluence Site where donors, state, and civil society can interact in a more equal fashion and new partnerships can be built. This would entail a change in the relationships and roles that these three sets of actors play. The current interpretation of the Paris Declaration among most development partners is that they must respect whatever “system” or institutions that are officially prescribed by government. Thus, funds should be channelled directly via institutional channels that have been put in place by partner governments. The latter need to learn how to correct their own mistakes. This is a noble principle but it means, of course, that should things go wrong development partners have little leverage of their own except for termination of support. In short, the current approach is not particularly well calibrated to deal with the “growth” problems that come with strengthening formal institutions in a context where they tend to be dominated by informal ones.

Perhaps the greatest challenge faced by development partners today is to make their support more related to demands and capacity. From the perspective of the development partners this means tackling a twofold challenge: how to reduce aid dependency while at the same time enhancing their involvement with partner countries in ways that are constructive and developmental. Pumping money into government treasuries based on political agreements with partner country governments, but with only little attention paid to demand and capacity for using it is likely to perpetuate aid dependency. Recipient governments will find it hard to say no. Phenomena such as rent-seeking and corruption will also be more difficult to tackle. Development partners must also take an interest in the politics of recipient countries, relate this interest to what they do, and thus re-engage with their partners in new ways that seem to have become lost in the wake of the Paris Declaration as it is approached largely from a managerial perspective. The references in the Declaration to mutual responsibility and accountability should not be viewed only in these or in diplomatic terms, but also in terms of how development partners can become more involved in the governance and development of these countries without being intrusive. As suggested in Chapter 1, power dynamics in Africa are different to those development partners are used to. Not all of this is un-productive or malign. Some can be applied for development purposes. It is up to the development partners to reach a better understanding of this local dynamic and relate their own input to selected aspects of it. Such a formula is not necessarily easy to find, let alone put into practice, but the time has come to be bold and creative. Without the ability to “think out-
side the box” development assistance, as we have known it, is in for a rough landing.

If aid is going to become more effective and the high level of aid dependency in many African countries reduced, development partners need to leave the sidelines, abandon their role as referee and become regular players, and thus acknowledge the political role that they already play in recipient countries. By being open about their role rather than portraying themselves as neutral or pretending not to involve themselves in another country’s affairs, they should try to identify formulas that allow them to be constructively engaged in the recipient country’s development efforts. This does not mean going back to providing technical assistance or setting conditionalities for their involvement. Such a move must be a step forward, not backward. It must address the unequal power relations that exist between donors, state and civil society. It must transcend the current use of development assistance which excludes civil society and treats it as a separate sector or project rather than a beneficiary on equal footing with government institutions. It must also make donors take responsibility and be accountable on an equal basis with government and civil society in recipient countries. Drawing on the power studies that have been conducted in Tanzania, the general literature on politics and development in African countries that were reviewed in Chapter 1, and an expert consultation held in Kampala in 1995 (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 1995), in Chapter 7 we propose a formula for consideration by the development partners, governments and civil society representatives in these countries.

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13 This meeting was organised by the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation to explore ways of making development assistance more responsive to local demands and encourage a participatory process in the application for and use of public funds. It was attended by donor representatives (World Bank, USAID, DFID and Sida), African government ministers and parliamentarians, civil society representatives, and a sprinkling of academics.
The development fund model

This is an institutional mechanism for realising the objectives of the Confluence Site that was introduced and discussed in Chapter 5. Development funds are not new to Africa. Tanzania has its own Social Action Fund, one of many that have been set up with the help of the World Bank and other donors. Sweden has been instrumental in helping to establish a special Rural Energy Agency with the objective of providing capital subsidies for better use of energy among small-scale users. The problem with these funds is that insufficient attention has been paid to how they are governed. They are typically managed by boards made up of representatives of particular ministries. They all come in their ex-officio capacity. The result is that those who bear ultimate responsibility to ensure the agency’s welfare pay little, if any, attention to this issue. Consequently the objectives of the funds have rarely been realised. Many have been plagued by inefficiency and corruption. The role of these funds must be seen in the light of the particular challenges that exist in African societies where power is personalised, patronage reigns over policy, and aid dependency continues to be high. Levelling the playing-field involves designing institutional mechanisms that address these weaknesses. The development fund model that we propose here is meant to do exactly that.

The presentation below is organised under a set of themes that provides a comprehensive understanding of its main features: (a) legal status, (b) ownership, (c) management, (d) responsibility, (e) accountability, and (f) rules of access.

7.1 Legal status

The important thing is to enable the creation of funds that are not directly subsumed under the authority of a particular ministry or minister,
but are one step removed from such direct control. This model is in line with the policy of introducing independent executive agencies that operate as public institutions, yet are not part of the regular civil service and thus not subject to the same bureaucratic restrictions. One possibility, therefore, is to have these funds established under separate Acts of Parliament such as those guiding e.g. the tax revenue authorities that have been created in many African states under the auspices of New Public Management. Such separation of policy management and public administration has been an integral part of governance in the Scandinavian countries and served the transition to democratic and decentralised governance in the late 19th century well. Given current trends of thinking about public sector management in weak states, the fund model is a valuable complement that, legally speaking, fits into current reforms and can be introduced without appearing to be a major alternative. These must not be viewed as a parallel mechanism but as a complementary means of enhancing good governance, and thus improved use of public funds.

7.2 Ownership

These funds should be open for anyone to place money into. They can be treated as public investment funds in which the main beneficiaries are not shareholders but citizens. As social development funds, it is important that they are not owned and managed solely by the investors but also by representatives of prospective beneficiaries. One possible set-up would be where the board is equally divided into three sets of representatives from (a) government, (b) civil society, and (c) resource providers. Government is there because it is the official representative of the public. Civil society is there because it articulates the opinions of crucial interests in society. Resource providers are there because they provide the funding and are interested in its efficient use for development.

It is important that those who are appointed to the boards are individuals who do not have a conflict of interest. They should be trusted public figures who are not currently employed in government, civil society organizations, hold a diplomatic position or are employed by a donor agency. If the position on a fund board is held ex-officio it will not only cause a potential conflict of interest but is also likely to reduce the individual’s commitment to its success. The trusted individuals who are appointed to these boards are there in their personal capacity, i.e. not speaking for a particular organisation, but are at the same time expected to generally represent the interests of the sector by which they have been appointed. They hold a public trust but do so without being tied to specific organisational interests.
This model is common in many other countries around the world but has not yet attracted sufficient interest among donors for consideration in Africa. It also takes care of the legal issue that some donors face which is that they cannot serve on boards of institutions that they directly fund.

7.3 Management

With board members representing government, civil society and resource providers in equal number (say, three from each making up a board of nine), the management of these funds creates a fresh game-theoretical situation. Bilateral agreements often lead to cat-and-mouse games in which one party tries to hide from the other what it is up to, or to bitter confrontations over different interpretations of specific contractual issues. Donors are excessively interested in the cost-benefit aspects of their assistance and do not consider the issue of how they can create preconditions for negotiations that are not only diplomatically or administratively convenient, but also constructive to the use of their funds.

A management game involving three parties rather than two creates a new dynamic that has the potential of making decision making more efficient. For instance, in the (not so unlikely) case of money not being accounted for as agreed upon, there is greater probability of someone blowing the whistle. Such an act may be politically sensitive but it is much more likely to lead to a constructive resolution in a three-party game situation than where there are only two actors involved. With individuals acting in their personal capacity, their positions will be less rigid and opportunities for compromises that work in the interest of the organisation are more plausible. Individual board members may, of course, pursue their own agendas including the possibility of using their position for political career ambitions, but on a nine-member board where positions are not tied to specific organisational interests, there will be enough veto players to reduce such tendencies as this type of behaviour will be viewed as a breach of both protocol and etiquette.

This is how a “good governance” culture can be fostered in partnership and tie competing actors into acceptance of a rule of law notion that serves the public interest. Such respect for civic rules is largely missing in African states. Such respect does not come about from rhetorical persuasion or the application of conditionalities but from practical experience in which the rules are applied on a regular basis by different sets of actors. Management of these funds becomes a tutelary exercise in governance with potential benefit for overcoming the weaknesses of the state and creating a stronger voice for civil society.
7.4 Responsibility

Two issues arise with regard to the scope of responsibility of these funds: (a) should they be national or regional (i.e. district-based)? and (b) should they be thematic or sector-based? Experts at the gathering in Kampala (mentioned at the end of Chapter 6) favoured the idea that these funds be national rather than regional, the argument being that in many of these multi-ethnic countries, organising it on a district or regional basis has three potentially detrimental effects. One is that it generates a sense that some areas are favoured over others if funds are not established in every district or some districts get more than others. The second is that if all districts were to be treated equally and get one fund each, resources would be spread too thinly. The third potentially negative effect would be that instead of being driven by demand from the public, funds would be set up from above and be instead driven by supply. The latter has proven to be the way that central government and donors have funded local government in African states to date only to find that it does not generate sustainable local institutions.

National funds are easier to establish because they are less likely to be captured by particular individuals or interests. The smaller the scale of its operations the more probable the threat of hijacking by certain individuals for patronage purposes. Such has been the experience with the many educational trust funds that individual Members of Parliament set up in the 1990s in Tanzania. This level also makes sense in a situation where donors are essentially bringing their own support of individual programmes or projects to an end. By increasing the potential number of applicants, there is also a greater likelihood of an adequate turnover – even in countries where local authorities and civil society are weak.

Funds may be established to cater for needs within a particular sector, but there is the same potential risk here that such a focus increases rivalry among representatives of particular interests. Because most developmental problems facing countries in Africa cut across particular political or administrative jurisdictions there is merit in considering these funds as thematically oriented. Thus, even if they cater for such needs as public education or public health, their mandate should be spelled out in thematic rather than sector terms. It is important that the fund mandate is not too broad and that its more specific funding purposes are adequately stated to the public. It is better to establish more than one such public development fund than to cast the net too wide in any given country.
7.5 Accountability

Because these are public funds, they need to be accountable to a branch of government. The choice is between the executive and the legislature. The preference for donors interacting with governments in African countries has been to place assistance at the disposal of the executive. Development funds have been channelled through the national Treasury or – in the case of individual programme and project aid – directly via line ministries. Funds for public sector reforms have been aimed at the civil service. Parliament remains secondary to the executive in the minds of African leaders and donors alike. As highlighted by others, e.g. Moore (1997), Kjaer (2004), this has detrimental consequences not only for decentralised governance but also for the emergence of other important qualities associated with democracy.

There are good reasons, therefore, to recommend that these funds have a responsibility to report directly to parliament. Such an arrangement would be especially appropriate if each fund is established by an Act of Parliament. Not only would such a reporting responsibility invite parliament to take a more active interest in scrutinising the use of public funds, but it would also enhance the interest of individual members of parliament in national as opposed to constituency issues. It is one of the shortcomings of most African legislatures that they focus more on “pork-barrel” issues than on becoming involved in broader national policy debates (Barkan et al 2000). This is where donors can make a significant contribution to the emergence of good governance in African countries by being creative and courageous enough to engage in a political dialogue aimed at providing the conditions under which parliament may be strengthened. Taking MPs on a study tour to Europe or North America or providing them with computers does not change the already asymmetric power relationships between the executive and the legislature in these countries in the way that allocating responsibility for overseeing development funds does.

7.6 Rules of access

This refers to who has the right to apply for money from these funds. The original model discussed in Kampala referred to the possibility of funds operating through three separate windows: (a) grants, (b) soft loans, and (c) commercial loans. Depending on the overall goal of any particular fund, the relevant constellation may vary. For instance, having a commercial loan window makes sense if the goal is to support business development,
but is not appropriate if the purpose is to improve public health. Soft
loans, i.e. subsidised credits, although controversial in some policy circles,
may be relevant in certain situations, e.g. in facilitating the transition for
informal sector entrepreneurs into formal sector operations. Rules of ac-
cess, therefore, would vary and should be set with each fund objective in
mind. The idea of matching contributions by beneficiaries should apply
wherever appropriate.

A second issue concerns the extent to which government institutions
should have access to these funds. In the Kampala deliberations there
were voices both for and against allowing central government institutions
access to the funds. Some argue that, as public institutions, the funds
should be open to every type of organisation, public, private or voluntary.
Others pointed to the risk of conflict of interest and, above all, the exer-
cise of power that a ministry or government department could exercise in
terms of obtaining access to fund resources. Circumstances may vary suf-
ciently from one country in Africa to another so that who should have
access to a particular fund is best decided on an individual case basis.

For the purpose of enhancing governance, however, it may be prefer-
able to restrict access to local government authorities and civil society or-
ganisations only. Due to the fact that the amounts made available through
these funds would be small or medium-sized, rather than large, the scale
of funding also suits such a limit better. The typical clients of these funds,
therefore, would be local government bodies, non-governmental organi-
sations and community-based organisations. They can bolster their own
resources by applying for development project financing from the funds.
Financing of such projects would be advertised publicly on an annual or
semi-annual basis. Resources would be allocated on a competitive basis
giving priority to the proposals that demonstrate the most persuasive indi-
cators of desirability, feasibility and efficiency. Those that fail to meet the
standards set by the fund will be informed by staff of their shortcomings
and invited to reapply once these have been adequately addressed.

From a governance perspective, the most important aspect is the com-
petition that the funds generate, not only among local government bodies,
but also between them and non-governmental organisations. Donors have
tended to treat local governments and non-governmental organisations as
merely separate sectors. The funds will involve them in competition not
only for extra funds but also to enhance their management capacity. The
funds will help generate an institution-building programme with poten-
tially positive consequences for decentralised governance.
7.7 Funds and the Paris Declaration

Much of what is being proposed here is in accordance with the principles of the Paris Declaration, most notably the emphasis on national ownership and mutual accountability. It also calls into question, however, other aspects of the Declaration, for example the idea that greater predictability in disbursement of money is such an important priority. The fund serves as a depository of money for development. It does not go straight from the Treasury to local government or civil society institutions. By storing the money in these funds, local governments and civil society organisations must apply for them and thus generate specific project proposals that meet certain feasibility and cost-benefit standards. These actors need to demonstrate what needs are being met by the proposed project, how it will be implemented and at what cost, and what capacity they have to implement it. This means that they will be assessed in terms of what managerial capacity they have rather than being given money merely because local governments or civil society organisations are viewed as important for delivering public goods and services. The competition among the applicants will reward those that take their role most seriously, thus helping to raise the quality across the board as others realise that they need to improve their capacity in order to obtain financing for development.

Another challenge to the Declaration is that the donors are no longer merely referees but are invited to engage in the development efforts of recipient countries through the appointment of representatives on the boards of these funds. They become more like foreign investors although their contribution lies not in business but in the delivery of social and economic development benefits. Furthermore, they do not control the boards by themselves but share responsibility and accountability with local actors representing both government and civil society.

These modifications of Paris Declaration principles are in line with practical experience to date as discussed in Chapter 6, and an acknowledgement that development partners are involved not only in administering foreign aid but also in a relationship of mutual accountability in which power matters as much as policy. As agenda setters, donors do not escape the perception that they are in control. They can significantly reduce this perception by being operationally involved at the board level of development funds such as those proposed here. This is a constructive involvement that is low profile yet capable of making a difference to the efficiency of public services and thus, indirectly, the use of foreign aid. The development fund is also a way of realigning power relations in favour of the weaker parties including parliament, local government and civil society.
7.8 Conclusions

Chapters 6 and 7 have argued that there is no shortcut to improved governance. Nor is there a “one-size-fits-all” or a “business-as-usual” approach to achieving it in weak states such as Tanzania. There is a need for a historical perspective and a contextual understanding of the political realities of these countries. The limits of conventional policy analysis centred on cost-benefit ratios or cost effectiveness must be transcended. Donors must do what African governments have done for nearly fifty years: think politically about their relationships not only in prescriptive but also in analytical terms. Promoting a prescriptive good governance agenda makes little sense without an accompanying political analysis.

It makes sense to encourage a bottom-up or demand-driven approach to development that is based on creating policy and decision space for local actors, not only government bureaucrats. The more these local actors have an opportunity to take responsibility for raising their own funds, the sooner steps will be taken in the direction of also strengthening state institutions that make decentralised governance a reality.

With the prospect that Africa will continue to receive large amounts of funding from the international development community, the fund model is a practical approach to reducing both the sense of dependency and influence that they are perceived to have over agenda-setting and policy formulation. There is no way that weak states will be able to absorb additional funds without doing themselves more harm than good. Governments in many of these countries already find it difficult to spend funds allocated by donors, one reason being that these governments are reluctant to share donor money with other actors. It is regarded as the prerogative of central government.
Power analysis and monitoring bring a range of factors to actors’ attention that are typically overlooked as long as development cooperation is viewed in merely economic and managerial terms. The Paris Declaration affirms the trend among development partners in recent years to acknowledge the political dimension of their aid. This volume has discussed what this means on the ground in Tanzania, the value of both power analysis and power monitoring to local stakeholders and development partners, how such studies can be conducted, and what the implications are of taking power seriously in the context of developing country strategies for all parties. This last chapter will address the question of how to use or apply power analysis. It brings together some of the points already reported in the text and adds others that have not been explicitly discussed earlier.

Power analysis is, at least in the development cooperation context, not an end in itself. It needs to carry some practical value. Those concerned must have a sense of how such analysis helps them in their day-to-day work. At the same time power analysis, as suggested in this volume, is not just another tool to enhance planning or management. It does call into question the desirability as well as the possibility of domesticating power in specific guidelines aimed at routinisation. Power analysis captures the contextual variables that determine policy outcomes. It calls for an inductive rather than a deductive mode of analysis. The important message it sends to its users is that sensitivity and adaptation to changing social and political realities is a more suitable method of approaching development cooperation than programme plans are. Partner institutions in countries like Tanzania already operate with such an approach in mind but development partners find it hard to abandon their technocratic, economistic or managerial approach that presupposes the possibility of planning action in a linear and predictable manner. The Paris Declaration may help
them transcend these limitations, but they have a long way to go. It is imperative, therefore, that some “practical” conclusions are drawn from the series of studies that this volume includes.

Power analysis is relevant and helpful on three different levels: (1) global, (2) national, and (3) agency. It lends itself to rethinking approaches and routines with regard to the following functions: (a) collaboration, (b) reporting, and (c) capacity-building. Table 11 below illustrates examples of what can be done at different levels with regard to the three functions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels/Functions</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Reporting</th>
<th>Capacity-building</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global</strong></td>
<td>1. Movement from grants to investments</td>
<td>1. Movement from technical to political evaluation</td>
<td>1. Establishment of training in power analysis at centres of excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Movement from referee to player</td>
<td>2. Strengthening risk analysis by relying on locally collected data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National</strong></td>
<td>1. Rethinking the role of conventional aid agencies</td>
<td>1. Making political reporting from diplomatic missions to headquarters more solid</td>
<td>1. Building civic capacity among non-state actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Working out modes for levelling the political playing field</td>
<td>2. Strengthening the role of Parliament</td>
<td>2. Creating greater awareness of how local actors can succeed on their own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agency</strong></td>
<td>1. Inter-departmental collaboration with a focus on the role of power</td>
<td>1. Including power analysis in evaluation and country strategy reports</td>
<td>1. Organising workshops for staff to internalise ways of thinking about power in their day-to-day work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Including achievements with regard to empowerment and holding officials in check</td>
<td></td>
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### 8.1 The global level

When referring to the global level in this chapter, we have in mind the activities that involve both development partners and partner institutions in the developing world. The burden of change may lie most heavily on the shoulders of the former but it does also affect state and non-state ac-
tors in the partner countries. As suggested in the previous two chapters, the conventional aid formula has run its course. The introduction of direct budget support, now spurred by the Paris Declaration, may be the first step on the path of finding new ways of allocating resources from the richer to the poorer parts of the world. The use of power analysis certainly highlights issues that call for a re-think.

8.1.1 Collaboration at the global level

Under this heading we have chosen to highlight two issues that, based on a power analysis like ours, call for special attention. The first is the need to take the next step in changing the current aid modality, the second is examining the implications of such a move.

Tanzanians and development partners alike are aware that the level of aid dependency in the country is far too high, however efforts to reduce it have so far been at best incremental. The irony is that the better Tanzania performs with regard to benchmarks identified by the donors the more money it is likely to receive. As the agreement between development partners and the Tanzanian government stands, it is very difficult to reduce aid dependency unless the latter decides to breach the accord and “behave badly”. This may be a blessing in disguise as the case of Kenya in recent years seems to suggest, but it is not necessarily the formula that the development partners regard as desirable. This is why we have argued for the need to place money into funds rather than channelling all the direct budget support through the Treasury for immediate disbursement to specific ministries or local government institutions. This approach only reinforces the already heavily entrenched “top-down” approach that characterises governments in Africa like that of Tanzania. It gives power to the state at the expense of the non-state actors. Public development funds that report to Parliament offer the opportunity to slow down the disbursement urge among development partners while at the same time providing an opportunity for domestic actors to compete for additional resources in ways that strengthen internal capacity and national governance. This is the formula that can help to bring about a more effective and efficient use of development aid. In the light of the many failures of previous aid modalities, this proposal is neither far-fetched nor impractical. It has the best chance of helping to make aid more effective and efficient.

Such a move, however, requires a rethink on the part of development partners away from being merely grant-makers towards becoming “investors” in social and economic development aimed at reducing poverty. By regarding themselves as investors rather than donors in the conventional manner, they can justify a greater commitment to partner countries with-
out becoming first and foremost purveyors of political conditionalities. They will be able to show that they really care about the partner country’s welfare and development.

This takes us to the second issue that we have already alluded to in Chapter 6: the need for development partners to become true partners rather than adopting the role of political referee. Being a true partner means becoming a team player committed to the overall welfare of the partner country. Tanzanians note that the commitment and interest that donors used to have in their country’s welfare and development has abated. Sitting on the fence – whether or not this involves issuing conditionalities for their aid – is less appreciated than being engaged in what we term “consultation with commitment”. This is “smart aid” and should be contrasted with the often bullying approach in the form of conditionalities and dictates that some donors have used – and still use – toward many African countries (although it should be pointed out that Tanzania has been spared the worst). The promotion of democracy and human rights to which the donors are broadly committed requires a combination of positive and negative incentives that are tailored to specific circumstances and selectively applied (Santiso 2002).

8.1.2 Reporting at global level

Power analysis calls for reporting by multi and bilateral agencies that includes paying more attention to political factors. The tendency to evaluate specific policy interventions merely on the basis of how well they have attained their objectives or “targets” has such obvious limitations that the approach ought to have been modified long ago. Politics must be “brought back in” to the reporting that takes place whether it is in the multilateral or bilateral context. Without such inclusion, the international agencies continue to live in a dream world, out of touch with reality. It is no longer enough to merely write about what politics ought to be and place countries on a global scale indicating how much they fall short of others. Power analysis invites reporting to start from the other end: allowing for an assessment of progress that builds on factors identified on the ground in each country rather than being subjected to measurement against some subjectively invented global benchmarks.

Power analysis is also the basis of political risk assessments that are of interest to a great number of international – and some – domestic actors in partner countries. To date most such risk assessments have been conducted by international experts, often using secondary source material. Such a basis is clearly inadequate. The type of power analysis we have developed in Tanzania has the strength of being based on local opinion
and events. It is more embedded in the social and political realities and thus likely to be more reliable than the “desk products” that are written from a distance. The various methods and tools that we introduced in Chapter 3 are directly useful for political risk assessments.

### 8.1.3 Capacity-building at global level

Good power analysis relies on competent scholarship attuned to both context and various research methods. Much of it would – and should – be carried out by local scholars in partner countries. While there are many well-trained political scientists around Africa, they have had difficulty maintaining their professional standards because of low salaries, poor library facilities and preoccupation with short-term consultancies rather than research. Development partners have a responsibility to help reverse this trend.

They may want to take a lead from the field of economics where competence in policy analysis and the related fields of micro and macroeconomics has been strengthened through masters and doctoral programs that involve economics institutions across Africa with limited, but targeted, assistance by scholars from other countries. This consortium that is known as the African Economics Research Consortium (aerc) has been one of the great successes in capacity-building.

Exploration has begun to see how far funding can be obtained for a similar initiative focused on the field of political science. Tentative discussions indicate that it would be geared toward developing political science scholarship that would be focused on application to, among other things, power analysis and how it relates to policy analysis. The consortium – potentially called the African Consortium for Political Research (acpr) – would be led by a board of senior scholars from Africa and elsewhere, similar to the arrangements within the economics consortium.

### 8.2 National level

The changes that may be required to make aid more effective and efficient at the national level would be as far-reaching as those at the global level. They include rethinking the relationships between aid agencies and government ministries responsible for policy decisions on development assistance, levelling the playing field in partner countries and strengthening the capacity of local non-state actors to make decisions of their own.

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14 Given the leading role that dfid has played in promoting support for power studies, it is no surprise that this exploration is led by a senior advisor in that Department.
8.2.1 Collaboration at the national level

There are two issues that merit special attention here. The first is what role the aid agencies will play in a future post-Paris Declaration scenario. The second is how the political playing field in partner countries may be strengthened.

Although, as we have indicated in previous chapters, not all donor countries have signed off on the Paris Declaration, there is sufficient support among many of these countries to abandon the individual project and programme aid that used to dominate development assistance. By moving from being involved in implementing particular development activities to participating in setting the agenda and influencing policy formulation – or moving from downstream to upstream in the policy process, as we call it – the role of the aid agency and its relations to government ministries in the home country are significantly influenced.

This shift has at least two important implications. One is that development assistance is becoming increasingly political. As our power analysis confirms, the view among Tanzanians is that with their upstream move the development partners are perceived as becoming, if anything, even more powerful than they have been in the past. Some donor governments have already gone as far as incorporating their development assistance agencies into their ministries in charge of foreign affairs. Denmark is a case in point. Other countries have decided to retain the agency as an autonomous unit. However, even in these countries (such as Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom) the role of the development agencies is beginning to change in the direction of relying more on generalist than technical expertise. Because the aid agency is no longer – at least as much – involved in project implementation but dealing with macro or systemic issues e.g. helping to build public management systems and promoting good governance in other respects, the competence that is most needed requires as much generalist as specialist knowledge. Donors cannot ignore a deeper understanding of the context in partner countries. Doing so amounts to building castles in the sand.

Thus, there is good reason in all OECD countries to think of what relevance the conventional aid agency that we have seen in operation for the past forty years has if the emphasis is to be laid more on how politics affects policy and how to reduce policy slippage in the future.

The other issue concerns the playing field in partner countries. Our analysis has clearly demonstrated the imbalance that exists in the relationships between development partners on the one hand and local state and non-state actors on the other. The interpretation of the Paris Declaration that the most important thing for the former is to stay on the sideline as
referees and be primarily preoccupied with matters of harmonisation among themselves, omits the issue of mutual accountability that is also part of the same document. Power analysis shows the importance of adjusting the current interpretation to make room for a constructive role as partners with both state and non-state actors in recipient countries. The idea of a Confluence Site and the proposal to consider placing financing into public development funds, discussed in the previous three chapters, are meant to illustrate what can – and should – be done in order to demonstrate that the notion of good governance is not merely a set of abstract principles that development partners use to retain their role as referees, but a shared practical and political commitment to the development of partner countries.

8.2.2 Reporting at national level

Taking power analysis seriously has many important consequences for how information about development is reported and disseminated. Based on our own analysis we are concerned about two issues, one that relates to how diplomatic missions report back to headquarters, the other to how reporting requirements in partner countries can be used to shift power relations between state and non-state actors.

Carrying out regular power analysis and monitoring at national or sector levels in development partner missions in recipient countries significantly enhances the substance and quality of reporting back to headquarters. For a considerable period of time, political reporting has been separated from technical or economic reporting because the two activities have been perceived as separate. With growing acknowledgement in OECD circles that development cooperation is first and foremost political, the boundary between the two has become irrelevant. Without suggesting that previous political reporting has relied on talks with senior partner government officials only or the “gossip” in the diplomatic circuit, it is clear that with more consistent attention paid to power analysis and monitoring, the basis for political reporting will be significantly enhanced. There will be broader range of information to draw from and it will be information that is representative not only of official views but also the views of other people.

Possessing information that others have no access to is a source of power. Partner governments in Africa often shamelessly use this to hit other actors over the head with. Changing the information flows and who has access to what information, consequently, is a critical but also political act that development partners cannot ignore. As our analysis has confirmed, Parliament and civil society actors are largely left outside the po-
political orbit that leads to the adoption of specific policies. One way that development partners can use their clout to change this scenario is to push for mechanisms that respond to the concerns associated with the Confluence Site model. For example, as elaborated in Chapter 7, helping to set up public development funds that are professionally and independently managed by a board and report to the legislature rather than the executive would be an important step in that direction. If parliamentarians are allowed to assess the reports from such funds rather than them being controlled by special interest or specific ministers, they will realise that they have power to make a difference.

8.2.3 Capacity-building at national level

Capacity-building is not merely a matter of sending people to seminars or specific courses aimed at training them in a technical sense. Capacity-building in a post-Paris Declaration scenario also means enhancing the civic or political competence of actors in partner countries. The development partners cannot and should not engage in this on their own but should facilitate for local organisations to embark on such a course. Whether in the media sector or among civil society organisations there is a need to become more independent. Such independence will only come if they are ready to engage in, often brave, acts of disclosing information about corruption and other ill-deeds committed by the political elite. Thus, for instance, investigative journalism is important. So is activism among civil society actors. The important thing that development partners need to bear in mind is to avoid “sectorising” media and civil society. By doing so, they reduce these institutions to conventional program management categories rather than viewing their contributions in the context of changing power relations in society at large. It is the competition between state and non-state actors that must be encouraged, however sensitive such an act still may be in many partner countries.

The other concern under this heading is how to wean people in recipient countries away from their “dependency mentality”. This may be more pronounced in some countries than in others, but it definitely shows up as a problem in Tanzania with its legacy of government monopoly of development. As our study indicates, there is still a notion that people cannot solve their own problems; it is the responsibility of government. To be sure, the liberalisation of the economy has changed conditions but it has not erased the old attitude that development is something that government does, not people. Many non-governmental organisations in Tanzania are involved in reversing this, but making it a sustainable approach is not easy. People expect that initiatives for development should come from
The outside. They do not mind being “mobilised” but they are less likely to internalise the lessons and next time around engage in self-mobilisation. The main reason is that with the way that development partners have approached—and continue to approach—development, government has remained a monopolistic actor in partner countries. Development has remained a supply-driven, top-down exercise. Our power analysis shows the full consequences of this approach and the need to turn it around toward a more demand-driven mode. The public development fund model institutionalises self-mobilisation in a way that single NGOs cannot do so easily, however hard and professionally they try. Civic capacity comes primarily through participation in the development process in which goods and services are not offered free on a silver spoon but are the rewards of hard work, both political and managerial, to obtain funding for specific projects. This is how whining is turned into building self-esteem and confidence with appropriate civic implications.

8.3 The agency level

At this lower level for the application of the results of power studies, what is needed of individual officers who work in development agencies or diplomatic missions where development cooperation is an important, if not dominant, part of their mission is addressed. The real challenge is how a concern with power can be adopted without officers—really civil servants—not becoming politicised in ways that undermine the real mission of the agency or embassy. In other words, how far can these civil servants go without overstepping their mandate and how can they do it?

8.3.1 Collaboration at the agency level

Agencies such as Sida have, for an extended period of time, been organised in line with a matrix that mixes regional or country knowledge with technical and specialist competence relevant to particular sectors e.g. agriculture, education, public health, environment and governance. Other bilateral agencies have displayed similar organisational features. The current, growing interest in power originates in the department responsible for governance and democracy issues. They realise that it is not only a natural development of their own work with governance but it is an issue that has real implications for all personnel, regardless of department. It is important, therefore, that even those who are primarily hired because of their specialist competence, whether in economics, ecology or any other field, are given a chance to acquire a more generalist knowledge about politics and culture in the countries they work. To be sure, some introduc-
tory information is shared before personnel are sent out to specific partner countries, but it is often more abstract and based less on exposure to the reality of these countries than to books and lectures.

The adoption of power as a concern in development cooperation, therefore, suggests that it should not be the concern solely of those who work on governance, democracy and human rights issues. Much the same applies to the diplomatic missions, where its political affairs and development cooperation sides can be brought closer together, using e.g. the governance advisor, as a catalyst.

8.3.2 Reporting at agency level
Reporting on development assistance during the days when individual projects and programmes were predominant included largely an assessment of how well specific objectives were met, how well budgets were followed and what the output and possibly impact was of each particular intervention. In short, it was an exercise in micro-economics. To be sure, specific aspects have often been added to these evaluations e.g. how far they have met gender or environmental impact considerations, but the political side of these projects was typically left out. With power in focus, such an omission is no longer feasible. The challenge that those in charge of reporting face is to avoid falling into the trap of the measuring of performance merely against universal or global standards that has previously characterised so much of the work on governance. Power analysis should bring the reporting to the local level where the benchmark is not a set of abstract principles invented by the international community but the information that more inductive studies of power provide through specific reports or monitoring surveys, as proposed in Chapter 3. Building such information into evaluation reports and other documentation of what happens in partner countries is important in order to provide a baseline more realistic for political evaluations than those that have prevailed in the governance assessments made by international organisations over the past decade.

The next issue under this heading is ensuring that civic or political acts are rewarded. None of these is likely to be of the significance that it merits the Nobel Peace Prize but that is no excuse for ignoring the possibility of reward. Whether it is a revelation uncovered by investigative reporters under very challenging and difficult circumstances or a major gain in respect of human rights or other civic values, development partners should not hesitate to support and reward such acts. These acts are integral parts of realigning power relations in society. A more constant attention to power issues in development should help emphasising their significance.
8.3.3 Capacity-building at agency level

Even if the personnel who are most directly concerned with political issues, e.g. those that arise from work on governance and democracy, take the lead and develop the necessary tools for how to integrate power into development analysis – as is already underway e.g. in Sida – it is important that all units in the agency have a chance to understand what it brings to their work and how it may alter their tasks. There must be a regular set of workshops that involve all agency personnel. These exercises should be as interactive as possible, encouraging individuals to think about how power analysis affects their own work. By approaching capacity-building this way, there is a much greater chance that power considerations will “come alive” in the workplace and gradually become an integral part of how personnel regard their jobs. Experience from such exercises in Sida suggests that not only are they enlightening for the participants but they also tend to have a motivating effect. Participants begin to see their responsibilities in a new light. They are able to transcend the limitations that bureaucracy places on their mind. To this extent, bringing power to the table often has an emancipating effect on the average administrator.

Although dealing with power requires social and political sensitivity, there is no reason to really hold back in bringing new and more controversial aspects to the administration of development cooperation. The dice are already loaded in favour of administrative and managerial considerations. What needs to be enhanced is the political aspect of what development cooperation administrators do. This does not mean that they should be encouraged to operate as “unguided missiles” undermining development cooperation efforts. The risk of this happening, however, is reduced if the entire team considers the importance and value of power analysis and there is a team leader, i.e. the ambassador or the director-general, who shares this vision and can deal with the others in the way that a successful coach does on the playing field.

8.4 Conclusions

There are many other issues that could have been brought up as a result of considering what to do with power analysis. For instance, is there a rationale for keeping the aid agencies as separate units? Should these agencies, if they continue, shift to recruitment of personnel who are more attuned to power analysis and monitoring? We have been anxious not to cast our net too widely. Yet, it is clear to us that taking power seriously has consequences at different levels and with regard to several functions. Bringing power into focus should have consequences for future develop-
ment cooperation, some of which have been possible to identify thanks to our work in Tanzania.
ANNEX 1

Annex 1

The questionnaire in the survey instrument (see chapter 3)

Agenda setting

A. Constitution of power:
1. Which of the following statements best describes the way the government participates in international development cooperation?
   a. It sets the national development agenda on its own
   b. It sets this agenda somewhat constrained by donors
   c. It sets the agenda in constructive cooperation with donors
   d. Donors set the agenda but they listen to the government
   e. Donors do it themselves with government obliging

This question will throw light on how the power structure is perceived when it comes to controlling the overall direction of the country’s development.

2. Which of the following statements best describes the country’s position in the global economy?
   a. It lacks important natural resources and is heavily in debt
   b. It has important natural resources not yet exploited but is heavily in debt
   c. It has few natural resources and enjoys debt relief
   d. It has important natural resources and enjoys debt relief
   e. It has important natural resources and has no debt burden

This question will throw light on how the global economy shapes the power structure and the presumed ability a government has to act on its own. It helps to place the answer to the first question in perspective, the assumption being that the stronger its economic position the greater its chances of setting its development agenda independently.
B. Distribution of power:

3. Which of the following statements best describes how the national development agenda is shaped by the country’s position in the international community?
   
   a. The country enjoys respect because of its long contribution to peace and development
   b. It has enough good friends to rely on for funding development
   c. It has improved its standing recently by improving governance
   d. Its reputation is mixed due to political instability
   e. It is considered a problem case requiring international interventions

This question is intended to throw light on how the national political agenda is shaped by the reputation or standing that a country enjoys among other members of the international community.

4. Which of the following statements best describes the economic conditions that shape agenda setting in the country?
   
   a. The country has a long record of economic growth and development
   b. It has improved its development record thanks to successful economic reforms
   c. Its economic development performance has been mixed in recent years
   d. Its economy has suffered some decline but chances for recovery clearly do exist
   e. Its economy has suffered persistent decline and recovery is not on horizon

This question provides an indication of how economic performance affects the power a country may be able to exercise in its interaction with members of the international development community. It complements the previous question.

C. Exercise of power:

5. Which of the following statements best describes the way power is exercised with a view to determining the country’s overall development direction?
   
   a. The donors deliberately decide themselves and impose conditionalities

   b. It has enough good friends to rely on for funding development
   c. It has improved its standing recently by improving governance
   d. Its reputation is mixed due to political instability
   e. It is considered a problem case requiring international interventions

   This question is intended to throw light on how the national political agenda is shaped by the reputation or standing that a country enjoys among other members of the international community.
b. The donors provide incentives to coerce government into adopting their agenda

c. The donors try to persuade government to adopt their agenda

d. The government and donors enter into dialogue and decide together

e. The government acts in ways that alienates others, including donors

This question is meant to illustrate how decisions are made given the power structure identified above and the extent to which decision making is arbitrary or characterised by dialogue.

6. Which of the following statements best describes the way power is exercised by government in relationship to non-state actors with an interest in setting the national development agenda?
   a. Ruling party and government act completely on their own
   b. Government consults selectively but retains full control of agenda
   c. Government listens to private sector but ignores civil society
   d. Government deliberately encourages other actors to shape agenda
   e. Government has no choice but to take views of others into account

This question complements the previous one by offering insights into how far national actors outside government are able to exercise power at the agenda-setting level.

D. Control of power:

7. Which of the following statements best describes the way power is controlled when it comes to setting the national development agenda?
   a. Donors force government to correct strategy if deviating from agenda
   b. Donors encourage government to correct strategy if it deviates
   c. Donors engage in dialogue with government if it deviates
   d. Donors cannot do very much if government decides to change direction
   e. Donors have no way of changing government direction if it deviates
This question is meant to capture the extent to which donors are seen as exercising control of government decisions about overall development direction.

8. Which of the following statements best describes the extent to which parliament and local non-state actors can exercise control over the national development agenda?
   a. Donors and government decide without consultation with others  
   b. Donors and government decide but wait for parliamentary approval  
   c. Government lets non-state actors exercise control through participation  
   d. Government allows independent reviews of its strategies by local actors  
   e. There are well-established platforms for local control of strategies  

This question will offer insights into what kind of leverage non-state actors have at the level of setting the national development agenda. It complements the previous question.

**Policy formulation**

**A. Constitution of power:**

9. Which of the following statements best describes the context in which policies are formulated and established at national level?
   a. There are well-functioning formal government institutions in place to do it  
   b. It is shared between government departments and other public agencies  
   c. The organs of the ruling party really decide national policies  
   d. There is an inner circle of politicians that really decides the policies  
   e. Individual ministers with influence can decide policies at their own discretion  

This question is meant to provide insights into how much government capacity is viewed as vested in formalised as opposed to informal institutional power.
10. Which of the following statements best describes the social structure in which national policy making takes place?
   a. Society consists of well-organised groups representing competing interests
   b. Some interests such as business are better organised and have more influence
   c. There is a considerable gap in influence between urban and rural areas
   d. Urban-based interests prevail at the expense of marginalised rural people
   e. Society is not well organised into groups capable of shaping public opinion

This question complements the previous one by offering insights into how the social structure shapes the way power is structured.

**B. Distribution of power:**

11. Which of the following statements best describes how national policy making is shaped by the way power is organised?
   a. Power is almost exclusively concentrated to state institutions
   b. Power is centralised but shared between ruling party and government
   c. Power is shared between central and local government institutions
   d. Power is effectively divided into different branches of government
   e. Power is dispersed throughout society but not effectively organised

This question is meant to indicate the extent to which power is perceived as concentrated or dispersed when it comes to formulating and establishing policy.

12. Which of the following statements best describes the structural conditions in which national policy making takes place?
   a. A few people are rich but most are small-scale farmers or entrepreneurs
   b. A group of rich people is amassing wealth at the expense of other people
   c. A class of rich people is emerging capable of developing the national economy
d. The economy is producing organised interests among rich and poor alike.
e. Society is differentiated and citizens peacefully balance competing loyalties.

This question provides a sense of how the underlying social structures that have been shaped over time influence the way policy is made at national level. It complements the previous question.

C. Exercise of power:
13. Which of the following statements best describes the way power is exercised in the context of formulating and establishing policy at national level?
   a. Politicians make decisions ignoring technical advice, local or foreign.
   b. Politicians made decisions accepting technical advice but ignoring economics.
   c. Some, but not all, politicians heed technical advice before making decisions.
   d. Politicians make decisions in close consultation with their top civil servants.
   e. Politicians decide but closely follow feasibility and cost-benefit considerations.

This question is meant to provide an insight into how much politicians consult others and listen to economic and other types of advice before making decisions.

14. Which of the following decisions best describes the way government ministers treat other actors when it comes to making national policy?
   a. Ministers ignore actors outside their own organisation, local and foreign alike.
   b. Ministers may take advice from trusted friends but seek no formal advice.
   c. Ministers may take advice but prefer that of foreigners to local actors.
   d. Ministers may organise consultations with others but only on critical issues.
   e. Ministers regularly organise consultations before taking policy to cabinet.
This question is meant to highlight the extent to which there is consulta-
tion on individual policies before they are finalised and taken to Cabinet
level for approval.

**D. Control of power:**

15. Which of the following statements best describes the way power is
controlled when it comes to making national policy?

- a. There are few institutional mechanisms holding decision-makers
  accountable □
- b. Institutional mechanisms for control exist but they avoid challeng-
ing ministers □
- c. Power-checking institutions issue regular reports, but no follow-up
  is undertaken □
- d. Ministers are held accountable in public but only in cases of gross
  misconduct □
- e. Ministers are aware of the formal limits of their power and act
  accordingly □

This question should provide an indication of how far power is perceived
as controlled by the formal institutions that form part of the constitu-
tional and legal set-up of the country.

16. Which of the following statements best describes the way non-state
actors may exercise power in order to hold government ministers account-
able for their decisions and actions?

- a. Public opinion is poorly organised and unable to effectively check
  ministers □
- b. Weak civil society; private sector cooperating with, but not
  checking, ministers □
- c. Weak civil society but well-placed people raise public concerns via
  media □
- d. Civil society and private sector growing stronger and able to check
  ministers □
- e. Non-state actors have reliable means of controlling how public
  office is exercised □

This question is meant to indicate how far non-state actors are organised
in order to check the way public office is exercised.
Annex 1158

Policy implementation

A. Constitution of power:

17. Which of the following statements best describes the context in which national policies are implemented in the country?
   a. Government is not effectively organised to implement policies
   b. Government has a good plan for implementing policy but little happens
   c. Government is well organised to implement at the centre but not at lower levels
   d. Government has delegated authority to lower levels, but capacity is lacking there
   e. Government has delegated authority to lower levels with positive policy results

This question would throw light on how effectively state power is organised in order to achieve policy results.

18. Which of the following statements best describes the social and economic conditions in which policy is implemented?
   a. Markets and physical infrastructure are poorly developed and integrated
   b. Urban areas function reasonably well, but the countryside remains undeveloped
   c. Regions differ in terms of their capacity for policy implementation
   d. Important improvements are occurring in market and infrastructure
   e. Social and economic circumstances are quite congenial to implementing policy

This question is meant to indicate the extent to which power in society is really well-organised and developed to ensure a level of policy implementation that does not merely rely on personal whims and preferences.

B. Distribution of power:

19. Which of the following statements best describes the way the distribution of power in government affects policy implementation?
   a. Central government institutions are reluctant to devolve authority to other levels
b. The President’s Office dominates at the expense of other ministries and agencies

c. The Ministry of Finance puts effective budgetary limits on what can be implemented

d. Authority is delegated to lower levels, but too dispersed for good results

e. Power is shared between government levels with positive results

This question is meant to provide insights into how government structures affect the outcome of policies.

20. Which of the following statements best describes the structural conditions in which national policy is implemented?

a. Organisational structures for policy implementation outside the state are very weak

b. Non-state organisations exist but are not well coordinated for implementation

c. State and society actors participate in implementation but mainly in urban areas

d. Government is investing in the improvement of conditions for implementation in rural areas

e. Conditions for effective implementation exist in both urban and rural areas

This question should provide an indication of how far structural conditions affect the use of power to get things done.

C. Exercise of power:

21. Which of the following statements best describes the way the exercise of power influences the implementation of national policies?

a. Policies are arbitrarily implemented by officers following their own biases

b. Policies are implemented in an arrogant fashion, alienating citizens

c. Policies are systematically, but far too rigidly, implemented

d. Government servants implement policies on their own but with flexibility

e. Government servants facilitate participation in implementing policy
This question should indicate the extent to which policy is implemented in a repressive or facilitating manner.

22. Which of the following statements best describes the way power is exercised vis-à-vis non-state actors when it comes to implementing national policy?
   a. Government does not listen to objections or suggestions by others
   b. Government may listen to demands made by donors but not locals
   c. Some, but by no means all, ministries are respectful of other actors
   d. Government sees the benefit of involving others, but does so only occasionally
   e. Government realises benefit of involving others and does so regularly

This question should provide insights into how government interacts with non-state actors when it comes to implementing policy.

**D. Control of power:**

23. Which of the following statements best describes how far government has a system in place for checking the use of power when it comes to implementing national policy?
   a. Government officials show little interest in monitoring what happens to policy
   b. Government allows for audits of its operations but never reacts to them
   c. The Ministry of Finance tracks expenditures but cannot correct defaulting ministries
   d. Government exercises control of expenditures but allows no public insight
   e. Government has good audit system in place and allows public oversight

This question should provide insights into how effectively government organises itself with a view to keeping track of its own policy implementation activities.

24. Which of the following statements best describes how far government allows other actors to control the implementation of national policy?
a. Government ignores other actors when they express views on implementation
b. Government only listens to donors when it comes to implementation
c. Some, but not all ministries, are responsive to public review and criticism
d. Transparency and accountability are improving but are not yet institutionalised
e. Public expenditure reviews and other controls are open and publicly discussed

This question will indicate the extent to which other actors have access to, and are able to check, the way government policy is implemented.

Policy effects

A. Constitution of power:
25. Which of the following statements best describes how the structures and institutions in the country influence the effects of national policies on the lives of individual citizens?
   a. People in some regions benefit more than those in others
   b. The rich benefit more than the poor
   c. Those with the right connections in government benefit more than others
   d. Some policies really improve life but others have little effect
   e. Whatever policy government implements tends to have positive effects

This question is meant to indicate the extent to which structural and institutional constraints inherent in society are overcome and consequently government policy makes a difference for the better.

26. Which of the following statements best describes how structures and institutions influence the effects policies have on the rights of individual citizens?
   a. Policies do little, if anything, to enhance the rights and liberties of citizens
   b. Policies, directly or indirectly, help the already well-off to enhance their rights
   c. Policies help the urban but not rural people to become aware of their rights
d. Policies help create new opportunities for respect of rights and liberties

e. Policies have the effect of really strengthening right and liberties of people

This question is meant to provide insights into how far government policy is hindered by structural and institutional factors when it comes to policy effects on human rights.

**B. Distribution of power:**

27. Which of the following statements best describes the effects on the lives of individual citizens due to the way policies are carried out within the existing government system?

a. Most citizens are little affected and pursue their livelihoods independent of state

b. Policy is too centralised to really affect people other than in selective instances

c. Local governments have some powers but their efforts leave few effects behind

d. The government system facilitates positive effects in some sectors, but not in others

e. Central and local government functions well with across-board positive effects

This question is meant to throw light on how far the government system itself, and the way power is distributed, affects the outcome of policies.

28. Which of the following statements best describes the effects on the rights of citizens due to the way policies are carried out within the existing government system?

a. State power is virtually non-existent when it comes to protecting human rights

b. State power is both repressive and arbitrary with little or no regard for rights

c. State power helps to get things done but remains insensitive to rights

d. State power assures citizens of law-and-order but not poverty reduction

e. State power is distributed in a manner that respects both political and other types of rights
This question is meant to provide insights into how the way government operates helps to shape the effects of policies on the rights of individual citizens.

**C. Exercise of power**

29. Which of the following statements best describes the effects of the way power is exercised over the lives of citizens?
   a. Harsh state policies leave citizens with little choice but to do things on their own
   b. Benevolent state policies leave people without incentive to act on their own
   c. State policies have limited reach; other actors not strong enough to compensate for this shortcoming
   d. State policies encourage citizen involvement in some, but not all, sectors
   e. State policies are viewed as participatory and encourage involvement by others

This question will provide an indication of how far the exercise of power really encourages citizens to participate in efforts to improve their own livelihoods.

30. Which of the following statements best describes the effects of the exercise of power on the rights of citizens?
   a. Government shows no respect for human rights as it implements policies
   b. Government has signed rights charters, but lacks interest in practising them
   c. Government is aware of human rights, but individual officials disregard them
   d. Government respects political rights but lacks capacity to promote other rights
   e. Government respects political rights and tries its best to promote other rights too

This question will indicate the extent to which citizens’ rights are violated or protected by government policies.
D. Control of power

31. Which of the following statements best describes the effects on people's livelihoods by efforts to control state power?
   a. In the absence of effective control mechanisms, citizens are largely lethargic □
   b. Because control of power is weak, citizens raise their voice only sporadically □
   c. Citizens show loyalty to those in power and are reluctant to voice their opinions □
   d. Citizens are loyal to the government, but publicly question specific policies □
   e. Government and citizens engage in constructive dialogue on policy issues □

This question is meant to highlight how far the presence or absence of mechanisms for control of state power affects the lives of citizens.

32. Which of the following statements best describes the effects of efforts to control state power on the rights of individual citizens?
   a. In the absence of effective control mechanisms, rights are often trampled on □
   b. Because control is weak, citizens take to the streets to demonstrate for rights □
   c. Citizens lack education and a tradition of speaking out in public on rights issues □
   d. Control mechanisms are in place and work adequately to protect human rights □
   e. Government is responsive to checks and balances and social inequalities □

This question is expected to indicate the extent to which existing control mechanisms on government power leave behind a legacy that encourages respect for citizens’ rights, political as well as social and economic.
Personal information:

33. What is your gender? Male □ Female □

34. What is your occupation or main line of work?
Civil servant □ Religious official □
Judge □ Diplomat □
Private lawyer □ Elected politician □
University don □ Civil society employee □
Teacher □ Blue collar worker □
Businessperson □ Farmer □
Media person □
Other □ Please specify ____________________________

35. What is your nationality?
Citizen of the country □ Non-citizen □

36. What is your age?
Below 35 years of age □ 36–50 □ above 51 □
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAPAM</td>
<td>African Association of Public Administration and Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPR</td>
<td>African Consortium for Political Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AERC</td>
<td>African Economic Research Consortium</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAWATA</td>
<td>Baraza la Wanawake wa Tanzania (Tanzania Women’s Council)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>Civic United Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>DESO</td>
<td>Department for Democracy and Social Development (Sida)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (U.K. Government)</td>
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<td>DPs</td>
<td>Development partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Director of Public Prosecution</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>External Payment Arrears (Bank of Tanzania)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FES</td>
<td>Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussions</td>
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<td>FILMUP</td>
<td>Financial and Legal Management Upgrading Project (Government of Tanzania)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>JAST</td>
<td>Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MKUKUTA</td>
<td>Mkakati wa kukuza uchumi na kupunguza umaskini Tanzania (National Strategy for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction)</td>
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<td>MPs</td>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
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<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Election Commission</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NOU</td>
<td>Norges offentlige utredninger (Public Reviews of Norway)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSPGR</td>
<td>National Strategy for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEPFAR</td>
<td>President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (U.S. Government)</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>SOU</td>
<td>Sveriges offentliga utredningar (Public Reviews of Sweden)</td>
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<td>TANESCO</td>
<td>Tanzania Electrical Supply Company</td>
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<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
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<td>TRC</td>
<td>Tanzania Railway Corporation</td>
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<td>TWPG</td>
<td>Tanzania Women’s Parliamentary Group</td>
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<td>URT</td>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>YLTP</td>
<td>Youth Leadership Training Program</td>
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Göran Hydén, born in 1938, is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Florida, Gainesville. He was educated at Lund University in Sweden where he won his Ph.D. in 1968 based on a dissertation that focused on political developments in rural Tanzania in the years immediately after independence.

He taught at Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda (1965–66), University of Nairobi, Kenya (1968–71) and University of Dar es Salaam (1971–77) before becoming Regional Social Science Research Advisor to the Ford Foundation based in Nairobi (1978–80). He was eventually promoted to Regional Representative of the Foundation for Eastern and Southern Africa and served in that capacity 1980–85. He was offered a position as Professor at the University of Florida in 1986 and was promoted to Distinguished Professor in 1999. He retired in 2008.

He has written a dozen books and edited another half dozen. He has contributed 19 articles to peer-reviewed journals and no less than 48 chapters to edited volumes. His more notable publications include Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (1980), No Shortcuts to Progress (1983), Governance and Politics in Africa, co-edited with Michael Bratton (1992), Agencies in Foreign Aid: China, Sweden and the United States in Tanzania 1965–95, co-edited with Rwekaza Mukandala, and African Politics in Comparative Perspective (2006).

Göran has held public lectures and seminars at universities and research institutes in all parts of the world and has been regularly invited to conferences on issues dealing with governance and development issues. He has served as consultant to a range of multilateral and bilateral agencies as well as to government agencies in Africa.

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Göran Hydén   Max Mmuya
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No 19 The Least Developed Countries and World Trade – Second Edition. Stefan de Vylder with contributions from Gunnel Axelsson Nycander and Marianne Laanatza. Art. no. SIDA34047en
No 20 Energy sector reform: strategies for growth, equity and sustainability. Per Ljung. Art. no. SIDA38233en
This study of mainland Tanzania shows that power is centralised and significantly influenced by development partners. Power is also dispersed among patronage-oriented individuals who fail to coordinate or act in a strategic manner in order to realise the common objectives stated in strategic development documents and declarations.

The study proposes how analysis and monitoring of power could be conducted in more systematic ways. It offers a set of proposals for local actors and development partners that would help bring a more equal character to their relationships. There are ways in which civil society and state institutions could enter into a competitive and constructive relationship under the auspices of national ownership of the development process. The conclusion discusses how power analyses can be used by development partners and partner institutions alike.